Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it isn’t. (...) In fact, 2FA is not conservative over n-th order logic, for all $n \geq 2$. It follows that in the usual one-sorted setting, HP is not deductively Field-conservative over second- or higher-order logic. (shrink)

In a recent article, Fabian Freyenhagen argues that we should understand first-generation Frankfurt School critical theory (in particular, the work of Adorno and Horkheimer) as being defined by a kind of ‘linguistic turn’ analogous to one present in the later Wittgenstein. Here, I elaborate on this hypothesis – initially by calling it into question, by detailing Herbert Marcuse’s extensive criticisms of Wittgenstein (and other analytic philosophers of language) in One-Dimensional Man. While Marcuse is harshly critical of analytic ordinary language philosophy, (...) he is much more sympathetic to a different sort of ordinary language philosophy, which he unpacks with reference to Karl Kraus. I show how, by getting Marcuse’s criticisms of Wittgenstein and other analytic philosophers, and lauding of Kraus, into view, we can better understand the first generation of the Frankfurt School as having practised a sort of ‘non-quietistic’ philosophical therapy (that may or may not have been the sort of thing that Wittgenstein himself had in mind). (shrink)

The type III secretion system (T3SS) is a specialized nanomachine that enables bacteria to secrete proteins in a specific order and directly deliver a specific set of them, collectively known as effectors, into eukaryotic organisms. The core structure of the T3SS is a syringe‐like apparatus composed of multiple building blocks, including both membrane‐associated and soluble proteins. The cytosolic components organize together in a chamber‐like structure known as the sorting platform (SP), responsible for recruiting, sorting, and initiating the substrates destined to (...) engage this secretion pathway. In this article, we provide an overview of recent findings on the SP's structure and function, with a particular focus on its assembly pathway. Furthermore, we discuss the molecular mechanisms behind the recruitment and hierarchical sorting of substrates by this cytosolic complex. Overall, the T3SS is a highly specialized and complex system that requires precise coordination to function properly. A deeper understanding of how the SP orchestrates T3S could enhance our comprehension of this complex nanomachine, which is central to the host‐pathogen interface, and could aid in the development of novel strategies to fight bacterial infections. (shrink)

This brief article examines the notion of that there are sorts (or kinds) of people are varying qualities relevant to their eugenic policies, such as sterilization or immigration restriction.

Conhecimento e sorte parecem dois conceitos excludentes, isto é, em ordem de atribuirmos conhecimento a alguém, tal sucesso cognitivo deve excluir elementos de sorte da aquisição intelectual. Entretanto, desde o artigo de Edmund Gettier “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (1963), tem se reconhecido cada vez mais a envergadura que elementos de sorte assume no conhecimento, a ponto de chegarmos a uma conclusão cética no campo epistemológico. A questão que fica, então, é como solucionar a atribuição de conhecimento, (...) com fatores de sorte praticamente onipresentes. Dito isso, o objetivo do trabalho será dois: (i) primeiro, irei expor os desdobramentos do debate da sorte epistêmica, ou seja, mostrar sua amplitude, classificações, conceituação e algumas respostas ao problema. Após (ii) pretendo argumentar sobre as vantagens de se abordar a sorte epistêmica fora do campo proposicional a partir de uma abordagem da epistemologia das virtudes que foque em outros bens epistêmicos além da crença verdadeira. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Syntax and Semantics of Complex Sortal Terms On the Identity of Sorts.

Each many-sorted theory can be converted to an unsorted theory. But this conversion procedure is not uniquely determined, leading to a dilemma: which unsorted theory captures the content of the corresponding many-sorted theory?

We achieve several results. First, we develop a variant of the theory of absolute Galois groups in the context of many sorted structures. Second, we provide a method for coding absolute Galois groups of structures, so they can be interpreted in some monster model with an additional predicate. Third, we prove the “Weak Independence Theorem” for pseudo-algebraically closed (PAC) substructures of an ambient structure with no finite cover property (nfcp) and the property [Formula: see text]. Fourth, we describe Kim-dividing in (...) these PAC substructures and show several results related to the SOPnhierarchy. Fifth, we characterize the algebraic closure in PAC structures. (shrink)

The article, a contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Fuzzy Studies: On the Consequence of Blur,” analyzes the metaphysical assumptions behind the valorization of “clear and distinct ideas,” apodictic knowledge, and definitiveness, and it suggests alternatives derived from Daoist sources, where a different model of knowing prevails. That model undermines the idea of purposive willing in the service of goals known in advance, and undermines as well the bases for any human or divine activity designed to achieve definite ends. If (...) purpose is not privileged either metaphysically or ethically, the concomitant notion of unambiguous fact is also shaken. In the absence, even in principle, of any form of knowing, human or divine, that is unambiguous and apodictic, there is no reason to grant ontological privilege to the paradigm of “unambiguous potential objects of knowledge.” This article concludes by asking and in part answering what the world looks like, what sort of human cognition and activity is most appropriate, in the absence of clear purposes, definite knowledge, and unambiguous facts. (shrink)

. Current debates concerning the concept of mental disorder involve many different philosophical issues. However, it is not always clear from these discussions how, or whether, these issues relate to one another, or in exactly what way they are important for the definition of disorder. This article aims to sort through some of the philosophical issues that arise in the current literature and provide a clarification of how these issues are related to one another and whether they are necessary for (...) defining disorder. I argue that the main concern in defining disorder, namely demarcation, is obscured by a number of these other philosophical issues and that a focus on demarcation gives us a means of placing these other issues in a clarifying context. (shrink)

In "Two sorts of Naturalism" John McDowell is sketching his own sort of naturalism in ethics as an alternative to "bald naturalism". In this paper I distinguish materialist, idealist and absolute conceptions of nature and of naturalism in order to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of what McDowell’s own naturalism amounts to. I argue that nothing short of an absolute naturalism will do for a number of McDowell's own purposes, but that it is far from obvious that this (...) is his position. If he directly denies that it is, he seems to be left with some rather awkward choices. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Sorting without Gaps Sharp Semantic Cutoffs and Higher‐Order Vagueness Judgment Situations References.

In this article I investigate several "sorts of naturalism" that have been advanced in recent years as possible foundations for virtue ethics: those of Michael Thompson, Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, John McDowell, and Larry Arnhart. Each of these impressive attempts fails in illuminatingly different ways, and in the opening sections I analyze what has gone variously wrong. I next use this analysis to articulate four criteria that any successful Aristotelian naturalism must meet (my goal is to show what naturalism must (...) deliver, not yet to show that it can deliver it). I then look at Alasdair MacIntyre's approach, which begins with our natural trajectory from complete dependency toward becoming independent practical reasoners; I argue that this sort of naturalism meets the aforementioned criteria and thus provides a good example of what Aristotelian naturalists must do. I close with a consideration of two important objections to any broadly MacIntyrean sort of naturalism. (shrink)

Cet article vise à dégager les implications ontologiques du projet Ricoeurien d’une herméneutique du soi tel que formulé dans Soi-même comme un autre. L’auteur retrace d’abord la double approche de Ricoeur proposant de penser l’attestation du soi suivant la notion aristotélicienne de l’être-vrai et l’homme capable selon les catégories de l’acte et de la puissance. Soulignant le caractère fragmentaire et insuffisant des analyses de Ricoeur, il explore ensuite une troisième façon de nommer l’être du soi selon la catégorie de la (...) relation, développant ainsi l’idée d’une “ontologie de la relation” sous-jacente à cette herméneutique du soi. This article aims to make explicit the ontological implications of the Ricœurian project of a hermeneutics of self as formulated in Oneself as Another . The author first redraws Ricœur’s double approach proposing to think the attestation of the self following the Aristotelian notion of being-true and the capable man following the categories of actuality and potentiality. Underlining the fragmentary nature and the incompleteness of Ricœur’s analysis, he then explores a third way to speak about the being of the self following the category of relation, thus developing the idea of an underlying “ontology of the relation” implied by this hermeneutics of the self.  . (shrink)

Online debates typically possess a large number of argumentative comments. Most readers who would like to see which comments are winning arguments often only read a part of the debate. Many platforms that host such debates allow for the comments to be sorted, say from the earliest to latest. How can argumentation theory be used to evaluate the effectiveness of such policies of sorting comments, in terms of the actually winning arguments displayed to a reader who may not have read (...) the whole debate? We devise a pipeline that captures an online debate tree as a bipolar argumentation framework, which is sorted depending on the policy, giving a sequence of induced sub-BAFs representing how and how much of the debate has been read. Each sub-BAF has its own set of winning arguments, which can be quantitatively compared to the set of winning arguments of the whole BAF. We apply this pipeline to evaluate policies on Kialo debates, where it is shown that reading comments from most to least liked, on average, displays more winners than reading comments earliest first. Therefore, in Kialo, reading comments from most to least liked is on average more effective than reading from the earliest to the most recent. (shrink)

This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend (...) a factive view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary. (shrink)

As a result of a spate of studies geared to investigating Brazilian racial categories, it is now believed by many that Brazilians reason about race in a manner quite different to that of Americans. This paper will argue that this conclusion is premature, as the studies in question have not, in fact, investigated Brazilian categories. What they have done is elicit sorting tasks on the basis of appearances, but the cognitive models of respondents have not been investigated in order to (...) determine what are the boundaries of their concepts. Sorting based on appearances is not sufficient to infer the boundaries of concepts whenever appearance is not a defining criterion for the concepts in question, as the case appears to be for racial and ethnic categories. Following a critique of the methods used, I review a terminological and theoretical confusion concerning the use of the terms 'emic' and 'etic' in anthropology that appears directly responsible for the failure so far to choose methods appropriate to parsing the conceptual domain of 'race' in Brazil. (shrink)

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. (...) Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us —but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife. (shrink)

We formalize the construction of Paterson’s variant of the Ajtai–Komlós–Szemerédi sorting network of logarithmic depth in the bounded arithmetical theory , under the assumption of the existence of suitable expander graphs. We derive a conditional p-simulation of the propositional sequent calculus in the monotone sequent calculus.

The basic hypothesis of this book is that linguistic reference to kinds should be seen as reference to sortal concepts, i.e. cognitive categories for identifying and classifying objects. Viewed that way, kinds serve as the interface between the conceptual system and the grammatical system. Kind-level predicates differ as to whether they presuppose (e.g. to be extinct) or entail (e.g. to invent) the existence of objects, with crucial consequences for the interpretation of indefinite argument noun phrases. Moreover, object reference always involves (...) underlying kind reference, but kind reference does not always involve object reference. This asymmetry, once recognized, proves useful in solving otherwise puzzling problems in semantic composition. (shrink)

An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substantive proposals concerning knowledge and justification.

Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain and develop what I call nature-first constitutivism, which says that what something is determines what it should be. Nature is the basis of normativity. I explain this view in terms of a unique type of property which particulars of a genus can lack even though those properties partially determines the nature of the genus. Such properties partially describe the nature of a genus and are thereby (...) normative for the particulars of that genus. Particulars of genera with such essential properties are by nature subject to standards with respect to those properties. Particulars of genera without such properties are not by nature subject to standards. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: 1. 2. 3. 4. Notes References.

Three experiments investigated young children’s ability to use a causal property, making a machine light up and play music, to sort objects together (sorting task), and then to predict how to make the machine work (action task). The results show that the performance of 30-month-old children is guided in both tasks by the causal properties of the objects. This suggests that causal information is used to categorize objects even in a task that does not involve naming. The causal interpretation of (...) the results is supported by data showing that non-causal temporal association and perceptual prominence cannot account for the results. Finally, 36-month-olds, but not 30-month-olds, sorted objects together on the basis of a “negative” feature, namely, the fact that they lacked a particular causal property. © 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The bulk of this volume consists of a somewhat revised version of the Axel Hägerström Lectures given in Uppsala, Sweden in 1991. It also contains previously published papers on the relevance of philosophy of language to ethics and the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. The latter, in particular, deserves comment, but space considerations force me to devote my attention to the Hägerström Lectures, entitled “A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories.”.

This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. (...) The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism. (shrink)

claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.

Intercellular communication is an essential process in all multicellular organisms. During this process, molecules secreted by one cell will bind to a receptor on the cognate cell leading to the subsequent uptake of the receptor‐ligand complex. Once inside, the cell then determines the fate of the receptor‐ligand complex and any other proteins that were endocytosed together. Approximately 80% of endocytosed material is recycled back to the plasma membrane either directly or indirectly via the Golgi apparatus and the remaining 20% is (...) delivered to the lysosome for degradation. Although most pathways have been identified, we still lack understanding on how specificity in sorting of recycling cargos into different pathways is achieved, and how the cell reaches high accuracy of these processes in the absence of clear sorting signals in the bulk of the client proteins. In this review, we will summarize our current understanding of the mechanism behind recycling cargo sorting and propose a model of differential affinities between cargo and cargo receptors/adaptors with regards to iterative sorting in endosomes. (shrink)

We give an example of a polynomial time algorithm for a particular algorithmic problem involving vagueness and visual indiscriminability, namely sock sorting.

This paper describes axiomatic theories SA and SAR, which are versions of second order arithmetic with countably many sorts for sets of natural numbers. The theories are intended to be applied in reverse mathematics because their multi-sorted language allows to express some mathematical statements in more natural form than in the standard second order arithmetic. We study metamathematical properties of the theories SA, SAR and their fragments. We show that SA is mutually interpretable with the theory of arithmetical truth PATr (...) obtained from the Peano arithmetic by adding infinitely many truth predicates. Corresponding fragments of SA and PATr are also mutually interpretable. We compare the proof-theoretical strengths of the fragments; in particular, we show that each fragment SAs with sorts <=s is weaker than next fragment SAs+1. (shrink)

Supervaluational theories of vagueness have achieved considerable popularity in the past decades, as seen in eg [5], [12]. This popularity is only natural; supervaluations let us retain much of the power and simplicity of classical logic, while avoiding the commitment to strict bivalence that strikes many as implausible. Like many nonclassical logics, the supervaluationist system SP has a natural dual, the subvaluationist system SB, explored in eg [6], [28].1 As is usual for such dual systems, the classical features of SP (...) (typically viewed as benefits) appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form, and the nonclassical features of SP (typically viewed as costs) also appear in SB in ‘mirror-image’ form. Given this circumstance, it can be difficult to decide which of two dual systems is better suited for an approach to vagueness.2 The present paper starts from a consideration of these two approaches— the supervaluational and the subvaluational—and argues that neither of them is well-positioned to give a sensible logic for vague language. §2 presents the systems SP and SB and argues against their usefulness. Even if we suppose that the general picture of vague language they are often taken to embody is accurate, we ought not arrive at systems like SP and SB. Instead, such a picture should lead us to truth-functional systems like strong Kleene logic (K3) or its dual LP. §3 presents these systems, and argues that supervaluationist and subvaluationist understandings of language are better captured there; in particular, that a dialetheic approach to vagueness based on the logic LP is a more sensible approach. §4 goes on to consider the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness within an LP-based approach, and §5 closes with a consideration of the sorites argument itself. (shrink)

I first got on the network in 1995, and belonged to a fairly early group of people in China who were doing that. Those on the network tend to treat it as a special field, but in fact, it is extremely valuable to have outsiders poke their noses into such specialized areas and express their unsophisticated, yet estimable, points of view. Indeed, the outsiders will often see right through things and pick up things that the experts have overlooked. I hope (...) that Beijing University students can retain the clear head of the nonspecialist. I also hope to take this opportunity to share my knowledge with my fellow students, setting up an exchange as we look at just what it is that computers and the network have to offer us—is it good or is it bad? (shrink)

This book explores why Africa has not managed to achieve sustainable, self-regenerating development. The work situates problems in the practices employed by national political elites, donors and lenders to African development, and book offers a studied alternative that can positively change Africa's development direction - The Participatory Social Learning Approach.

This paper examines how three central aspects of personhood — the capacities of individuals, their normative status, and the social aspect of being recognized — are related, and how personhood depends on them. The paper defends first of all a ‘basic view’that while actual recognition is among the constitutive elements of full personhood, it is the individual capacities (and not full personhood) which ground the basic moral and normative demands concerning treatment of persons. Actual recognition depends analyti- cally on such (...) pre-existing normative requirements: it is a matter of responsiveness to them. The paper then discusses four challenges. The challenges claim that pace the basic view, the relevant capacities depend on recognition, that recognition seems to have normative rele- vance, and that the basic view cannot as such explain the equality either of persons, or of humans. Responding to these challenges amounts to refining the basic view accordingly. (shrink)

Psychologists believe grade schoolers' free play in the United States is universally biased toward single-gender groups. In a study of grade schoolers in a children's museum, already-acquainted kindergartners to sixth graders were observed at three exhibits. While boys chose more automobile play and girls more supermarketing, one-quarter of each group played in settings dominated by the other gender. Boys had no group-size preference; girls had a strong preference for small groups. That preference accounts for most of the gender differences found (...) in children's gender sorting in a novel environment. However, the ubiquity of gender segregation in large groups of grade schoolers was disconfirmed for this setting. (shrink)

Prominent experts present papers which discuss problems regarding this subject. Coverage includes case studies in the translation of logics for second-order and propositional dynamic logic; many-sorted algebras and equational logic; logical foundations of artificial intelligence along with a variety of methods that exist to encode information; program verification techniques such as Floyd-Hoare, intermittent assertion and temporal logic of programs.

The secretory system of plant cells sorts a large number of soluble proteins that either are secreted or accumulate in vacuoles. Secretion is a bulk‐flow process that requires no information beyond the presence of a signal peptide necessary to enter the endoplasmic reticulum. Many vacuolar proteins are glycoproteins and the glycans are often modified as the proteins pass through the Golgi complex. Vacuolar targeting information is not contained in glycans as it is in animal cells; rather, targeting information is in (...) polypeptide domains as it is in yeast cells. Several such domains have now been identified, but these show little or no amino acid sequence homology. We discuss the possibilities that targeting of protein to plant vacuoles may involve receptors as well as aggregation of protein at low pH. (shrink)