Sorting out the anti-doomsday arguments: A reply to Sowers

Mind 116 (462):269-273 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The doomsday argument without knowledge of birth rank.Bradley Monton - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):79–82.
Is global scepticism self-refuting?André Gallois - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):36 – 46.
Semioethics and the Average Life.Ionut Untea - 2021 - American Journal of Semiotics 37 (1-2):47-69.
The Quantum Doomsday Argument.Alastair Wilson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):275-296.


Added to PP

63 (#262,459)

6 months
5 (#710,646)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tom Adams
University of North Carolina (System)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations