Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):1-20 (2021)

Authors
Jeremy David Fix
Oxford University
Abstract
Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain and develop what I call nature-first constitutivism, which says that what something is determines what it should be. Nature is the basis of normativity. I explain this view in terms of a unique type of property which particulars of a genus can lack even though those properties partially determines the nature of the genus. Such properties partially describe the nature of a genus and are thereby normative for the particulars of that genus. Particulars of genera with such essential properties are by nature subject to standards with respect to those properties. Particulars of genera without such properties are not by nature subject to standards.
Keywords Constitutivism  Normativity  Essence
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Reprint years 2019, 2021
DOI 10.1111/phib.12166
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References found in this work BETA

Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
Metaphysical Rationalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):379-418.
Real Definition.Gideon Rosen - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189-209.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Error Condition.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):34-48.
The Simple Constitutivist Move.Luca Ferrero - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):146-162.
The Instrumental Rule.Jeremy David Fix - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (4):444-462.
Mental Disorder as a Puzzle for Constitutivism.Diana B. Heney - 2018 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 24 (5):1107-1113.
Constitutivism and Generics.Samuel Gavin - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1015-1036.

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