This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related

Contents
416 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 416
  1. Conscious Unity.Paul Raymont - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Introduction to the Non-dualism Approach in Hinduism and its Connection to Other Religions and Philosophies.Sriram Ganapathi Subramanian & Benyamin Ghojogh - manuscript
    In this paper, we introduce the Hinduism religion and philosophy. We start with introducing the holy books in Hinduism including Vedas and Upanishads. Then, we explain the simplistic Hinduism, Brahman, gods and their incarnations, stories of apocalypse, karma, reincarnation, heavens and hells, vegetarianism, and sanctity of cows. Then, we switch to the profound Hinduism which is the main core of Hinduism and is monotheistic. In profound Hinduism, we focus on the non-dualism or Advaita Vedanta approach in Hinduism. We discuss consciousness, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Solutions to some philosophical problems of consciousness.J. H. Van Hateren - manuscript
    A recently developed computational and neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness is applied to a series of persistent philosophical problems of consciousness (in recent formulations by Tye, Searle, and Chalmers). Each problem has a clear solution according to this theory, as is briefly explained here. A slightly modified version of this paper can be found as Chapter 16 ('Philosophical problems of consciousness') in my book 'The estimator theory of life and mind: how agency and consciousness can emerge', see VANTET-8 at philpapers (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The functioning hypothesis of consciousness.Bret Alan Hughes - manuscript
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Unity in Dawani.Hussein Khani - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 54.
    Undoubtedly, Dawani is one of the most prominent figures that came to the world of being after the Mongols' attack on Iran and in the time interval between the development of the illuminative School of Philosophy and the formation of the Transcendent Philosophy. Dawani's significance lies not only in his numerous writings but also in his benefiting from a kind of independence in his thoughts, which led to the development of a number of innovative ideas. In addition to being famous (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Signaling systems and the transcendental deduction.A. Ahmed - forthcoming - In T. Goldschmidt K. Pearce (ed.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.David Bennett & Chris Hill (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  8. A Unified Theory of Consciousness.Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  9. The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Precis of Belief, Inference, and The Self-Conscious Mind.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  11. Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  12. Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness.Jennifer Matey - forthcoming
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities.Ralph Schumacher (ed.) - forthcoming - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. The Octopus and the Unity of Consciousness.Walter Veit - forthcoming - Psychology Today.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism.David Builes - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12959.
    According to First-Person Realism, one's own first-person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged in some way. After clarifying First-Person Realism by reference to parallel debates in the metaphysics of modality and time, I survey eight different arguments in favor of First-Person Realism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  17. A Map of Selves: Beyond Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]T. Parent - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):887-889.
    In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar ove.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The unity of consciousness in Sartre’s early thought: reading The Transcendence of the Ego_ with _The Imaginary.Henry Somers-Hall - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (6):1212-1233.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation for Sartre’s account of the unity of consciousness in The Transcendence of the Ego. I will argue that it is only once The Transcendence of the Ego is read alongside other texts written around the same time, such as The Imaginary, that we can understand how Sartre believes it is possible for consciousness to be unified without an I. I begin by setting out the Kantian context that Sartre develops for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Consciousness, content, and cognitive attenuation: A neurophenomenological perspective.Christian Coseru - 2022 - In Rick Repetti (ed.), Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Meditation. New York, NY, USA: pp. 354–367.
    This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Naïve Realism and Minimal Self.Daniel S. H. Kim - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):150-159.
    This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. I argue that naïve realism is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):556-572.
    Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. A problem for extensional theories of time-consciousness.Jan Almäng - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14865-14880.
    Extensionalist theories of the specious present suggest that every perceptual experience is extended in time for a short while, such that they are co-extensive in time with the time experienced in them. Thus, there can be no experience of time, unless the experience itself is extended in time. Accordingly, there must be something that unites the temporal parts of a perceptual experience into temporally extended wholes. I call this the “glue-problem for extensionalism”. In this paper I suggest three desiderata that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. Emotion’s role in the unity of consciousness.Maria Doulatova - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):529-549.
    In this work I argue that emotion plays a key role in ensuring a unified perspective on the world. In particular, while many thoughts and feelings surface onto consciousness, it is not clear how they get combined into a unified point of view or what’s it’s like to be you at any given time. While many philosophers argue that reason or higher-order cognition plays a key role in delineating our point of view, I argue that higher-order cognition plays a subsidiary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind.Eric Marcus - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  25. Phenomenology and the unity of consciousness.Graham Peebles - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5455-5477.
    The phenomenology of the unity of consciousness can be analyzed in terms of perceptual spatial and object unity. Subject unity—what we commonly understand by “the unity of consciousness”—has no attendant phenomenology. The further, non-phenomenological, effects of unity can be analyzed in terms of the functional notion of access unity. The unity of consciousness in general can therefore be analyzed in terms of access unity. As a consequence, we can avoid the theoretical introduction of problematic notions such as subsumptive or phenomenal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. The Identity of 'One:' Tokenization of a Circle.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
    The tokenization of a circle produces, what humans label, ‘the identity of one.’.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The Importance of 'Unitization'.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - In https://medium.com/the-circular-theory/.
    Conservation of a circle is the basis for unification (and, also, then, 'unitization'). Explaining and unifying physics, philosophy, and psychology. All disciplines.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius.Robert Elliott Allinson - 2020 - Dialogue and Universalism 30 (1):57-66.
    The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. A case of shared consciousness.Tom Cochrane - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1019-1037.
    If we were to connect two individuals’ brains together, how would this affect the individuals’ conscious experiences? In particular, it is possible for two people to share any of their conscious experiences; to simultaneously enjoy some token experiences while remaining distinct subjects? The case of the Hogan twins—craniopagus conjoined twins whose brains are connected at the thalamus—seems to show that this can happen. I argue that while practical empirical methods cannot tell us directly whether or not the twins share conscious (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  30. The Reality of Free Will.Claus Janew - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 11 (1):1-16.
    The uniqueness of each standpoint, each point of effect, can only be "overcome" by the standpoint changing to other standpoints and returning. In such alternation, which can also appear as constant change, lies the unity of the world. The wholeness of an alternation, however, is a structure of consciousness due to the special relationship between the circumscribing periphery and the infinitesimal center. This process structure unites determinacy and indeterminacy also totally in every place. Therefore, everywhere we are dealing with forms (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Does sentience come in degrees?Andrew Y. Lee - 2020 - Animal Sentience 29 (20).
    I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness.Farid Masrour - 2020 - In The Oxford Handbook of The Philosophy of Consciousness. pp. 208-229.
    opinionated review of some of the recent work on the phenomenal unity of consciousness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Representation, Consciousness, and Time.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):137-155.
    I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in "split second." Meanwhile, Bourget's empirical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Problems with Unity of Consciousness Arguments for Substance Dualism.Tim Bayne - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 208–225.
    In the early modern period one can find unity of consciousness arguments in the writings of Rene Descartes and G. W. Leibniz, and in the recent literature they have been defended by David Barnett, William Hasker, and Richard Swinburne (among others). Descartes's unity of consciousness argument for dualism is to be found in the sixth of his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes claims that his unity of consciousness argument was itself sufficient to establish substance dualism. Swinburne's central line of argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem in Indian Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 92-104.
    This chapter considers the literature associated with explorations of consciousness in Indian philosophy. It focuses on a range of methodological and conceptual issues, drawing on three main sources: the naturalist theories of mind of Nyaya and Vaisesika, the mainly phenomenological accounts of mental activity and consciousness of Abhidharma and Yogacara Buddhism, and the subjective transcendental theory of consciousness of Advaita Vedanta. The contributions of Indian philosophers to the study of consciousness are examined not simply as a contribution to intellectual history, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.J. P. Moreland - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley. pp. 183–207.
    The appearance of consciousness in the world is an amazing and puzzling fact in its own right. Indeed, consciousness is one of the most mystifying features of the cosmos. The unity of consciousness is something that cries out for analysis and explanation as well. This chapter provides a way of relating the three types of unity: objectual phenomenal unity; subject phenomenal unity; and subsumptive phenomenal unity. According to Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, this sort of unity is irrelevant for investigating (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2018 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 9 (1-2):132-160.
    This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness.Dainton Barry - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 61-74.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Coming Together.Barry Dainton - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 500–518.
    The notion of “phenomenal field” often occurs when philosophers attempt to characterize the unity of consciousness. The phenomenal unity relationship is distinct from the coinstantiation relation. There are grounds for supposing that experiences can be phenomenally unified in the absence of any higher‐order conscious state, and in the absence of any spatial relations of a phenomenal kind. There is a way in which phenomenal unity can be construed as a primitive feature of experience. Rather than starting off from the perspective (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Brentano's Mind: Unity Without Simplicity.Arnaud Dewalque - 2017 - Rivista di Filosofia 108 (3):349-64.
    This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental parts’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. Conscious Unity from the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach.Anna Giustina - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):16-37.
    The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes rather the problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. Mounting Evidence that Minds Are Neural EM Fields Interacting with Brains.Mostyn W. Jones - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (1-2):159-183.
    Evidence that minds are neural electromagnetic fields comes from research into how separate brain activities bind to form unified percepts and unified minds. Explanations of binding using synchrony, attention, and convergence are all problematic. But the unity of EM fields explains binding without these problems. These unified fields neatly explain correlations and divergences between synchrony, attention, convergence, and unified minds. The simplest explanation for the unity of both minds and fields is that minds are fields. Treating minds as the fields' (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4637-4666.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Gap? What Gap?—On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 89-113.
  47. Phenomenal unity of consciousness in synchronic and diachronic aspects.Maria A. Sekatskaya - 2017 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 54 (4):123-135.
    Synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness and their in­terrelation pose interdisciplinary problems that can only be addressed by the combined means of philosophical and scien­tific theories. In the first part of the article the author briefly reviews psychological and materialistic accounts of personal identity. Historically these accounts were introduced to solve the problem of diachronic identity of persons, i.e., the problem of their persistence through time. She argues that they don’t explain how synchronic unity of consciousness, subjectively experienced as the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Review of The Minds I by Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennet (1981).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Variable quality essays dominated by reductionist nonsense. This is a followup to Hofstadter´s famous Godel, Escher, Bach (1980). Like its predecessor, it is concerned largely with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the contributions by one or the other of them. For my views on the attempts of D and H to understand (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (5):811-836.
    The problem of phenomenal unity consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge. I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress. This perspective facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. Sensory integration and the unity of consciousness. [REVIEW]Tony Cheng - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):632-635.
    Based on but not limited to material from a conference at Brown University in 2011, Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness is an ambitious collection that brings together two distinct but inter- twined topics.1 In what follows, I briefly explain what sensory integration and the unity of conscious- ness amount to, highlight the contents of the papers, and finally end with general observations and suggestions. I will spend more time on sensory integration, since it is relatively unfamiliar terrain in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 416