In this research, we examine the relationship between employee psychological entitlement and employee willingness to engage in unethical pro-organizational behavior. We hypothesize that a high level of PE—the belief that one should receive desirable treatment irrespective of whether it is deserved—will increase the prevalence of this particular type of unethical behavior. We argue that, driven by self-interest and the desire to look good in the eyes of others, highly entitled employees may be more willing to engage in UPB (...) when their personal goals are aligned with those of their organizations. Support for this proposition was found in Study 1, which demonstrates that organizational identification accentuates the link between PE and the willingness to engage in UPB. Study 2 builds on these findings by examining a number of mediating variables that shed light on why PE leads to a greater willingness among employees to engage in UPB. Furthermore, we explored the differential effects of PE on UPB compared to counterproductive work behavior. We found support for our moderated mediation model, which shows that status striving and moral disengagement fully mediate the link between PE and UPB. PE was also linked to CWB and was fully mediated by perceptions of organizational justice and moral disengagement. (shrink)

Job candidates who possess characteristics likely to result in organizationally desired outcomes are valuable, yet not always easily identified. Offering validation support for selection tools that organizations can use to identify such candidates is therefore important. The present study examines the construct of psychological entitlement to determine if it can be used to identify individuals who are more likely to make sound ethical judgments in organizations. Specifically, we examine the relationship between psychological entitlement and ethical decision (...) making, positing that individuals with high levels of psychological entitlement are more likely to make less ethical decisions and to use less ethical upward influence tactics than those with opposing characteristics. We administered a survey to 174 participants using the Multidimensional Ethics Scale, the Subordinate Influence Ethics Scale, and the Psychological Entitlement Scale. To test our hypotheses, we used hierarchical multiple regression. Results suggest that individuals with high levels of psychological entitlement are more likely to consider unethical actions as ethical, given several scenarios. In addition, individuals with high levels of psychological entitlement are more likely to consider self‐serving and maliciously‐intended upward influence tactics as acceptable when used to advance in an organization. They are also less likely to consider pro‐organizational upward influence tactics to be acceptable when used to advance in organizations. (shrink)

Given the importance of work engagement for organizations and the almost unified and steadfast understanding of its benefits, it is imperative to investigate the potential downside of work engagement to prevent unexpected damage. However, there has been relatively little research on its negative impacts. Drawing on the moral licensing theory, this study identifies the potential negative effects of work engagement by exploring the mediating role of psychological entitlement. An online experiment and a survey are conducted to test the (...) theoretical model. The results reveal that work engagement leads to deviant workplace behavior through psychological entitlement only in cases where there is a higher level of relationship conflict with supervisors. The conclusions of this study shed light on how work engagement negatively affects organizations. The current study also contributes to practice by suggesting that supervisors should be aware of employees with a higher level of work engagement and communicate with them in a reasonable manner. (shrink)

Building on the emerging research on antecedents of abusive supervision, the current research offers an empirical investigation concerning how and when supervisor psychological entitlement instigates abusive supervision in the workplace. Specifically, drawing on social cognitive theory, we develop and test a moderated-mediation model delineating the process that prompts psychologically entitled supervisors to become abusive towards subordinates. We argue that supervisor psychological entitlement facilitates supervisor moral disengagement, which subsequently incites supervisory abusive behaviors. We also argue that supervisor (...) moral identity and core self-evaluation are likely to play an essential role in predicting the relationship between supervisor psychological entitlement and abusive supervision. We argue that supervisor psychological entitlement is more likely to instigate abusive supervision through moral disengagement when the magnitudes of supervisor MI and CSE are weaker. We test our theoretical model utilizing time-lagged, multisource data from a variety of organizations in the United States. We find general support for our hypotheses. We discuss implications for theory and practice as well as future research avenues. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) in the workplace has been widely researched, studies have focused on its antecedents rather than its outcomes. To fill this gap in the literature, we integrated moral licensing theory and the literature on leader gratitude expression to explore the ethical consequences of UPB. Using a sample of multi-source time-lagged surveys of 206 leader–employee dyads, we found that the pro-organizational nature of UPB fostered employees’ psychological entitlement and thereby increased their likelihood of engaging (...) in subsequent unethical behavior. Leaders’ expressions of gratitude for employee UPB strengthened the relationship between UPB and psychological entitlement, ultimately reinforcing employees’ unethical behavior. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted that P) through the exercise of a (...) reliable competence to comprehend and filter assertive speech acts, then the hearer's belief is prima facie warranted. The paper discusses the psychology of comprehension, the function of assertion, and the evolution of filtering mechanisms, especially coherence checking. (shrink)

Hesperides Press are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

Although previous research has examined the effectiveness of various levels of punitive reactions to misconduct, researchers have given leader leniency relatively inadequate attention. Prior studies consistently suggest the beneficial effects of reacting less punitively toward misconduct. The current research challenges this notion by delineating a mixed effect of leader leniency on subordinate psychological and behavioral reactions. Building on social exchange theory (i.e., reciprocity norm and rank equilibration norm) and motive attribution literature, the authors argue that when subordinates hold high (...) levels of instrumental motive attribution, leader leniency relates positively to subordinate psychological entitlement, which in turn leads to workplace deviance. In contrast, when subordinates develop high levels of value-expressive motive attribution, leader leniency is positively associated with their felt obligation toward leaders, which positively influences their subsequent organizational citizenship behavior. The results of a field study, a scenario experiment, and a recall experiment conducted to test these hypotheses confirm the double-edged effects of leader leniency. These findings have important implications for theory and practice. (shrink)

Drawing on theoretical arguments from the psychology discipline, we investigate the implications of employee entitlement in organizational settings. Specifically, we utilize workplace engagement theory to suggest that due to their skewed sense of deservingness, employees high in entitlement are less likely to experience workplace engagement. Furthermore, the negative relationship between employee entitlement and workplace engagement is strengthened when ethical leadership is low, yet mitigated when ethical leadership is high. Finally, we predict that under conditions of low ethical (...) leadership, reductions in engagement explain why employee entitlement results in hindered job performance. This mediated effect does not hold when ethical leadership is high. We tested our theoretical model utilizing field data from employees and their direct supervisors in the financial services industry. Our results support our theoretical model. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

The term ‘Gestalt’ was introduced into psychology by the Austrian philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels in an essay entitled “On ‘Gestalt-Qualities’” published in 1890. ‘Gestalt,’ in colloquial German, means roughly: ‘shape’ or ‘structure’ or ‘configuration’, and Ehrenfels demonstrates in his essay that there are certain inherently structural features of experience which need to be acknowledged in addition to simple tones, colours and other mental ‘atoms’ or ‘elements’. His essay thus initiated a reaction against the then still dominant atomism in psychology, a (...) reaction which culminated in the work on ‘cerebral intregation’ of the so-called Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. Max Wertheimer, one of the leading members of this school, was a student of Ehrenfels in Prague. Ehrenfels himself belonged to an impressive list of original thinkers – a list which includes also Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong and Carl Stumpf, the founder of the Berlin school – who were students of Franz Brentano. Each of these thinkers attempted to elaborate, both ontologically and psychologically, the doctrine of intentionality put forward by Brentano. The work of Ehrenfels and of the later Gestaltists, too, may be seen as a contribution to the understanding of this mental directedness, and in particular to the understanding of the directedness of perceptual experience. (shrink)

Given the paradoxical nature of unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB), that it simultaneously involves sincere extraordinary efforts to help the organization but violates ethical norms, we examined its paradoxical psychological and behavioral outcomes in the workplace. We hypothesized that UPB generates simultaneous but conflicting feelings: On one hand, guilt (for having behaved unethically) and on the other, psychological entitlement (for having done something positive for the organization). In turn, these conflicting psychological states differentially affect two conflicting behaviors. (...) Feelings of guilt motivate customer service behavior but reduce self-serving cheating, whereas psychological entitlement does the opposite. We further hypothesized that moral identity centrality moderates the paradoxical effects of UPB. Data from three studies using experimental and field methodologies demonstrated support for all hypotheses. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings. (shrink)

THE TEXT In the summer semester of 1925 in Freiburg, Edmund Husserl delivered a lecture course on phenomenological psychology, in 1926127 a course on the possibility of an intentional psychology, and in 1928 a course entitled "Intentional Psychology. " In preparing the critical edition of Phiinomeno logische Psychologie (Husserliana IX), I Walter Biemel presented the entire 1925 course as the main text and included as supplements significant excerpts from the two subsequent courses along with pertinent selections from various research manuscripts (...) of Husserl. He also included as larger supplementary texts the final version and two of the three earlier drafts of Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article, "Phenomenology"2 (with critical comments and a proposed formulation of the Introduction and Part I of the second draft by Martin Heidegger3), and the text of Husserl's Amsterdam lecture, "Phenomenological Psychology," which was a further revision of the Britannica article. Only the main text of the 1925 lecture course (Husserliana IX, 1-234) is translated here. In preparing the German text for publication, Walter Biemel took as his basis Husserl's original lecture notes (handwritten in shorthand and I Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 1968. The second impression, 1968, corrects a number of printing mistakes which occur in the 1962 impression. 2 English translation by Richard E. Palmer in Journal o{ the British Society {or Phenomenology, II (1971), 77-90. 3 Heidegger's part of the second draft is available in English as Martin Heidegger, "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. John N. Deely and Joseph A. (shrink)

Our sense of entitlement influences our interactions and attitudes in a range of specific relational contexts, one of them being aging parents’ relationships with their adult children. This study aimed to examine the factor structure of the Sense of Relational Entitlement—aging parents toward their offspring, an 11-item questionnaire that assesses aging people’s sense of relational entitlement toward their children, and examine the associations of its subscales with related personality and mental health constructs. One thousand and six participants, (...) aged 65–99, with at least one child, completed the SRE-ao, Brief Symptom Inventory, Loneliness Scale, and General Belongingness scale. The SRE-ao demonstrated good construct structure using confirmatory factor analysis. Both SRE-ao subscales were significantly and positively associated with anxiety, depression, somatization and sense of loneliness and negatively with sense of belonging. When all variables were entered into a regression model, age, anxiety, and low sense of belonging, but not sense of loneliness, positively predicted both restricted and inflated sense of entitlement. Somatization negatively predicted inflated sense of entitlement. The SRE-ao is a reliable and valid scale that can be used in clinical practice and research to enhance our understanding of parent–child relationships throughout the lifespan. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Studies on bottom-line mentality suggest that an exclusive focus on bottom-line outcomes has detrimental consequences; however, it is not clear when this leads to negative outcomes. This study examines the role of supervisors’ BLM in fostering workaholism in subordinates. These supervisors, by creating a bottom-line driven environment, may intensify workaholism, leading to workplace cheating behavior. However, not all subordinates react in the same manner. We theorize that the positive relationship between supervisor BLM and workplace cheating behavior through workaholism is (...) strengthened when the psychological entitlement is high. The moderation-mediation model was tested with data from 193 employees working in various industries. Our findings demonstrate that under conditions of high psychological entitlement, workaholism resulting from supervisor BLM leads to workplace cheating behavior. Implications of these findings have been discussed. (shrink)

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy (...) and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address. (shrink)

Human social life is structured by social norms creating both obligations and entitlements. Recent research has found that young children enforce simple obligations against norm violators by protesting. It is not known, however, whether they understand entitlements in the sense that they will actively object to a second party attempting to interfere in something that a third party is entitled to do — what we call counter-protest. In two studies, we found that 3-year-old children understand when a person is entitled (...) to do something, and so they actively defend this person’s entitlement against unjustified interference from second parties. In some cases, they even enforce second-order entitlements, for example, in the case of ownership where an owner is entitled to entitle others to use the owner’s property. (shrink)

Recent research has investigated how the sense of relational entitlement diminishes couple satisfaction, but little is known about how SRE affects the daily quality of close, romantic relationships. Moreover, the evidence on how SRE interacts with other features of a satisfying relationship is scarce. Using an electronic daily diary, we examined 99 couples for 7 days, with two daily measurements for each partner. We used a dyadic double intercept multilevel model, which simultaneously computes effects for men and women. We (...) tested a model where one partner's daily couple satisfaction was predicted by their overall levels of SRE and by their daily and overall levels of self-disclosure, perceived partner self-disclosure, and perceived partner responsiveness. The model also included person-level interactions and cross-level interactions between the SRE types and variables of the interpersonal process model of relationships for each gender. The analysis indicated that person-level excessive SRE lowers couple satisfaction. Also, day and person-level perceived partner responsiveness and person-level self-disclosure are related to couple satisfaction, but the latter association is significant only for men. Finally, we found some significant person-level interactions that account for changes in couple satisfaction. For men, the links between couple satisfaction, excessive and restricted SRE were moderated by self-disclosure and perceived partner responsiveness, respectively, perceived partner self-disclosure and perceived partner responsiveness. For women, the associations between couple satisfaction, restricted and assertive SRE were moderated by self-disclosure, respectively, perceived partner self-disclosure. This study advances our understanding of the general implications of SRE in the dynamics of couple relationships. More specifically, it shows how SRE interacts with other couple-specific variables in shaping day-to-day couple satisfaction. The theoretical and clinical implications for couple therapy are discussed. (shrink)

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already (...) constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism. (shrink)

I will present what I think is the best argument for the version of psychological egoism under consideration here, and explain why I think even that argument fails to go much distance toward establishing it. It turns out, though, I will caution, that defeating that argument means only that we are right to reject psychological egoism as extremely implausible; it does not entitle us to claim to have shown the thesis itself to be either confused and senseless or (...) false. However, my main goal in this paper is neither to refute nor to defend psychological egoism, but rather to show how it, even in a very strong form, manages to survive a number of common objections both to itself and to arguments meant to support it. (shrink)

in a recent article entitled “Hume on the Passions,” Stephen Buckle opens with the claim that Hume’s theory of the passions has largely been neglected. “Apart from a couple of famous sections in the Treatise concerning the sources of action,” he writes, “the subject matter has rarely excited interest.”1 His analysis of why the subject of the passions in Hume has been uninspiring points to the fact that readers have largely misunderstood the point of Hume’s theory. They usually regard the (...) account as yet another mechanistic analysis of the passions in the vein of seventeenth-century science, alongside the offerings of Malebranche, Hobbes, and Spinoza. Buckle is right to point out that there is a.. (shrink)

W.E.B. Du Bois’s reading of whiteness as a “public and psychological wage” is enormously influential. This essay examines another, lesser known facet of Du Bois’s account of racialized identity: his conceptualization of whiteness as dominion. In his 1920–1940 writings, “modern” whiteness appears as a proprietary orientation toward the planet in general and toward “darker peoples” in particular. This “title to the universe” is part of chattel slavery’s uneven afterlife, in which the historical fact of “propertized human life” endures as (...) a racialized ethos of ownership. The essay examines how this “title” is expressed and reinforced in the twentieth century by the Jim Crow system of racial signs in the United States and by violent “colonial aggrandizement” worldwide. The analytic of white dominion, I argue, allows Du Bois to productively link phenomena often regarded as discrete, namely, domestic and global forms of white supremacy and practices of exploitation and dispossession. Ultimately, the entitlement Du Bois associates with whiteness is best understood as a pervasive, taken-for-granted horizon of perception, which facilitates the transaction of the “wage” but is not reducible to it. (shrink)

In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, (...) that is, to put it even more briefly, how a brain can have semantic content. In these two articles, one in this issue of the journal and one in the next, I engage in a critical examination of the two most thoroughly canvassed approaches to the theory and problem of intentionality in philosophical psychology over the last hundred years. In the first article, entitled 'The modern reduction of intentionality, ' I examine the approach pioneered by Carnap and reaching its apotheosis in the work of Daniel Dennett. In the second article, entitled 'The return to representation, 'I examine the approach which can be traced back to the work of Noam Chomsky but which has been given its canonical treatment in the work of Jerry Fodor. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology is a science in the making, working toward the goal of showing how psychological adaptation underlies much human behavior. The knee-jerk reaction that sociobiology is unscientific because it tells just-so stories has become a common charge against evolutionary psychology as well. My main positive thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a proper method for evolutionary analyses, and it supplies a new perspective on the issues raised in Schlinger's (1996) just-so story critique. My main negative (...) thesis is that, like many nonevolutionist critics, Schlinger's objections arise from misunderstandings of the evolutionary approach.Evolutionary psychology has progressed beyond telling just-so stories. It has found a host of ingenious special techniques to test hypotheses about the adaptive significance and proximate mechanisms of behavior. Naturalistic data using the comparative method combined with controlled tests using statistical analyses of data provide good evidence for a variety of hypotheses about behavioral control mechanisms — whether in nonhumans or in humans. For instance, the work of Gangestad and Thornhill on evolved mate preferences and fluctuating asymmetry of body type (FA) is a model of success. As the quantity and quality of evidence increase, we are entitled not just to regard such evolutionary hypotheses as preferable, but also as true. Such studies combine to show that the best explanation of the psychic unity of humankind — common patterns across societies, history, and cultures exposed by evolutionists — is the gendered, adapted, evolved species-typical design of the mind. (shrink)

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION The present volume of "Poznari Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities", entitled "Consciousness: methodological ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NEWMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: THE ILLATIVE SENSE (Continued) VI THE FACULTIES OF COGNITION AND APPETITION Since the Grammar of Assent gives us a phenorhenological analysis of the art of thinking and often refers to the influence of other faculties in our reasoning processes, it will be very instructive to examine what the author holds about our faculties of cognition and appetition. This will make us better acquainted with the (...) nature of the illative sense. I. THE SENSES 1. The External Senses and their Objects. We had already arrived at the conclusion that Newman rejects the mere subjectivity of our knowledge. When he writes about this matter he explicitly deals with sensation or sensuous cognition. Although he takes exception to the word "immediate perception," 1 we may nevertheless call him an adherent of direct or immediate realism according to Scholastic terminology, because he emphatically excludes the intervention of a reasoning process from sense perception and uses the term "mediate perception" only to express the instrumentality of experience. In this meaning our perception of external objects is mediate or indirect indeed.2 The fact is that as early as 1839 he wrote in his University Sermons: "Of the material we have direct knowledge through the senses"3 and in 1843: "The senses are direct, immediate, and ordinary informants, and act spontaneously without any will or effort on our part."4 On the importance of sense perception for our mental activities he writes in a series of hitherto unpublished notes, entitled Elements of Thought:6 "I grant or I assume that the soul would not think without some external stimulus; that if it were cut off from all communication from the external world, it would pass this life in a sort of torpor... But then, as soon as it is roused, it reflects upon itself, and thereby gains a number of ideas..." 1. See supra V, 14.2. Supra V, 14.3. P. 205. 4.P. 303 ; cf. Gramm., p. 260. 5.See the unpublished Philosophical Papers, note Fcbr. 24, 1859. 40 DR. ZENO, OJM. CAP.41 Apart from the passages already referred to, Newman nowhere enlarges on the doctrine about the senses. He does not speak about the distinctions between sensible objects; he does not explain the difference between sensation and perception, and uses those terms promiscuously.6 There are no statements on the subject which contradict current Scholastic notions, although sometimes his vague terminology may be an occasion for misunderstandings. For instance, some passages in connection with "images" and "impressions," when read apart from the context, would appear to imply that he identifies them with the Scholastic species a sensibili accepta. However, we shall show further on that. Newman means something quite different. He deals with these species and the so-called sensibilia per acci· dens by the way when describing our knowledge of God7 and teaching that we have evidence of the presence of individuals or substances in the phenomena which occur to our senses. We picture those things to ourselves in those phenomena. They are like pictures, he says, but at the same time "they give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them." "Therefore when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it goes, but not adequate." 2. The Internal Senses and their Objects. Newman nowhere gives a distinction between external and internal senses, but nevertheless he speaks about those faculties of the mind which by the Scholastics are called the internal senses. These philosophers distinguish a common sense or rather a central sense (sensus communis), which unites the impressions of the external senses into one whole, makes us conscious of the conditions of our body and notifies to us the sensations of our external as well as internal senses; — the imagination or the faculty which preserves and reproduces things perceived; — the sensuous memory, i. e., the power to retain and to reproduce sense images; — and the vis aestimativa or the instinctive faculty, which discovers without any intellectual means, what is good and what is bad for our welfare. 6.It would seem that he generally... (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology is a science in the making, working toward the goal of showing how psychological adaptation underlies much human behavior. The knee-jerk reaction that sociobiology is unscientific because it tells “just-so stories” has become a common charge against evolutionary psychology as well. My main positive thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a proper method for evolutionary analyses, and it supplies a new perspective on the issues raised in Schlinger's (1996) just-so story critique. My main negative (...) thesis is that, like many nonevolutionist critics, Schlinger's objections arise from misunderstandings of the evolutionary approach.Evolutionary psychology has progressed beyond telling just-so stories. It has found a host of ingenious special techniques to test hypotheses about the adaptive significance and proximate mechanisms of behavior. Naturalistic data using the comparative method combined with controlled tests using statistical analyses of data provide good evidence for a variety of hypotheses about behavioral control mechanisms — whether in nonhumans or in humans. For instance, the work of Gangestad and Thornhill on evolved mate preferences and fluctuating asymmetry of body type (FA) is a model of success. As the quantity and quality of evidence increase, we are entitled not just to regard such evolutionary hypotheses as preferable, but also as true. Such studies combine to show that the best explanation of “the psychic unity of humankind” — common patterns across societies, history, and cultures exposed by evolutionists — is the gendered, adapted, evolved species-typical design of the mind. (shrink)

This volume draws together important selections from the rich history of theories and debates about emotion. Utilizing sources from a variety of subject areas including philosophy, psychology, and biology, the editors provide an illuminating look at the "affective" side of psychology and philosophy from the perspective of the world's great thinkers. Part One features classic readings from Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. Part Two, entitled "The Meeting of Philosophy and Psychology," samples the theories of thinkers such as Darwin, James, and (...) Freud. The third section presents some of the extensive work on emotion that has been done by European philosophers over the past century, and the final section comprises essays from modern British and American philosophers. (shrink)

This paper is based on the archives of Michel Foucault collected (since 2013) at the Manuscripts Department of the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. Our investigation focuses in particular on a complete manuscript, until now totally unknown and entitled ‘ Phénoménologie et psychologie’ (‘Phenomenology and Psychology’). This manuscript could be the first project for a thesis devoted to ‘The Notion of the “World” in Phenomenology’, written around 1953–4, at the same time as a manuscript on Binswanger and existential psychiatry (...) and as a manuscript on philosophical anthropology. We aim to show the importance that phenomenology seems to have held for Foucault at the beginning of the 1950s and in particular the role that it could have played in Foucault’s distancing himself from a naturalist psychology and a philosophy of consciousness to which he opposes a philosophy of the world, of being and of language. Foucault thus discovers a truth of the phenomenology which rests on the radicality of the transcendental gesture and on the access to an ontology gathering the being, the meaning and the language. (shrink)

Three remarks, which are sometimes made about Freud's distiction between Ego and Id are discussed: 1. This distinction would have no analogy in other psychological concepts. 2. The essence of the "I" would be misjudged here. 3. It would be the rest of an atomising psychology, not yet arriving at the modern views of totality. Although the common parlance concerning psychic "parts" has indeed analogies in the old atomistic-psychological conceptions, these instances, as well as the conflicting drives are (...) and have been always considered in psychoanalysis as expressions of which the person himself is the subject. Especially the concept "Id" must be looked at as equivalent to the biological total, to the concept: Person-Stern. The concept I or Ego, as a special structure of "figure" within this whole, means no split-off part, but is equivalent to what is called elsewhere "durchstrukturiertes Unterganze". Freud entitles a certain intern organisation with the word "Ich". He that thinks the essence of "the" I herewith misjudged, confuses word and concept -- the word I contains a lot of equivocations. That there are conflicts within the person is a basic matter of fact, which is not to be pushed aside in favour of totalitarian dogmatics, this conflict must be expressed in our terminology in some way or other. Terms, by way of comparison borrowed from material situations cannot always be avoided, and need not give any inconvenience, provided reflecting over the import of the terms is practised sufficiently. (shrink)

Scholars of ideology in social-scientific disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and political science, stand to benefit from taking seriously the philosophical contributions of Professor Peter Railton. This is because Railton provides much-needed conceptual precision—and a rare sense of epistemological and moral clarity—to a topic that is notoriously slippery and prone to relativistic musing and the drawing of false equivalences. In an essay entitled “Morality, Ideology, and Reflection: Or, the Duck Sits Yet,” Railton (2000/2003) aptly identified the purpose of ideological analysis as (...) the unmasking of “nonepistemic” interests—that is, interests other than truth-seeking, accuracy, or warrant —that contribute to the development, adoption, and dissemination of political and religious belief systems. (shrink)

The author divides this work into three parts entitled: analytical therapy; yoga; and a comparison.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook. Vol. I, Psychology (with Ethics and Religion)James WilberdingRichard Sorabji. The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD: A Sourcebook. Vol. I, Psychology (with Ethics and Religion). Pp. xv + 430. Vol. II, Physics. Pp. xix + 401. Vol. III, Logic and Metaphysics Pp. xvii + 394. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. Paper, $39.50, each volume.Interest in the Greek (...) commentators continues to grow, thanks in large part to Richard Sorabji, who has done more than anyone else to reestablish them as at once faithful and original philosophers who remain relevant even to modern students of philosophy. The Sourcebook makes the commentators still more accessible by providing an introductory tool for the systematic exploration of their thought.Each volume contains a 30-page introduction consisting of roughly six sections: an explanation of the aims of the Sourcebook (1–5), a brief introduction to the commentators (5–12), a survey of issues relating to Neoplatonism (12–14) and the compatibility of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (14–19), a section entitled "The commentators and Christianity" (19–25), which is largely devoted to offering renewed support for Sorabji's suggestion from Aristotle Transformed (Cornell 1990) regarding the content of Ammonius's concession to the Christian patriarch in the 490s, and, finally, a short, volume-specific section designed to survey some of the innovations and disagreements in the respective subjects (25–28/29/30). Each volume is divided into between 18 and 28 topics, which are subdivided into as many as 26 subtopics (on average 5–6), and these subtopics are often further divided into as many as 8 subsections (on average roughly 4 subsections for every 10 subtopics). Nearly all subtopics and subsections contain introductions (typically one or two paragraphs, occasionally longer) as well as some interspersed annotations that together serve two functions: they review some of the relevant background passages—mostly from Plato and Aristotle, but also from the Presocratic and Hellenistic schools—and they introduce and summarize the passages contained in the Sourcebook by surveying some of the issues raised by the passages that follow. Both the introductions and the annotations are kept brief, since Sorabji's aim is to explain the relevant concepts "only so far as necessary for a first understanding" (4). The passages themselves are mostly drawn from surviving Greek as well as Latin texts of the commentators—a group that features Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus (see 4)—but also includes a handful of passages preserved only in Hebrew and Arabic. For example, included in the subtopic devoted to the status of nature (Physics 1[b]) is an English translation of a passage from Themistius preserved only in Averroes' Metaphysics. Over one hundred scholars contributed translations, though Sorabji emphasizes that in the interests of greater harmony he reworked them so that "the final versions are rather based on the work of the translators" (xvii). Often, Sorabji also refers to additional passages containing like-minded or opposing views not included in the Sourcebook, as well as cross-references to other passages in the Sourcebook. In most cases he provides a helpful selection of secondary literature on the subject. [End Page 470]There are some striking differences between the Sourcebook and two comparable introductory collections, Long and Sedley (LS), and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (KRS), which might offer the clearest picture of the nature and objectives of the Sourcebook. The foremost of these is the very task of introducing periods in which the amount of surviving material is so different. Whereas of Hellenistic and especially of Pre-Socratic philosophy we have in large part only fragments, of the commentators we possess thousands of pages of Greek text. This means that the Sourcebook is the result of a long process of selection and systematization that ultimately captures only a fraction of the available material. Far from being a shortcoming, this belongs to the very nature of framing an introduction to such an extensive body of literature and would become problematic only if Sorabji wished to establish a canon of the philosophically significant texts of the period. He explicitly rejects such an aim, however (5). The Sourcebook also... (shrink)

ABSTRACT In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be (...) essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against the view. Second, it is shown that the committive dimension is rich and flexible enough to accommodate all the apparently problematic cases. (shrink)

This work is intended as an introduction to the study of Soviet psy chology. In it we have tried to present the main lines of Soviet psycho logical theory, in particular, the philosophical principles on which that theory is founded. There are surprisingly few books in English on Soviet psychology, or, indeed, in any Western European language. The works that exist usually take the form of symposia or are collections of articles translated from Soviet periodicals. The most important of these (...) are Psychology in the Soviet Union (ed. by Brian Simon), Recent Soviet Psychology (ed. by Neil O'Connor) and Soviet Psychology, A Symposium (ed. by Ralf Winn). Raymond Bauer has also edited an interesting symposium entitled Some Views on Soviet Psychology. Only two systematic studies of Soviet psychology have been published to date: Joseph Wortis' Soviet Psychiatry and Raymond Bauer's The New Man in Soviet Psychology. Both are valuable introductions to Soviet psychology; Bauer's book, in particular, gives a good account of the debates on psychological theory in the Soviet Union in the nineteen twenties and -thirties. Both, however, are somewhat out of date. There are also a number of interesting articles written by Ivan D. London and Gregory Razran, which give general surveys of particular periods or aspects of Soviet psychology. These have been listed in the bibliography. (shrink)

Psychological contracts represent perceived reciprocal obligations between an employer and an employee. Most research has focused on employee or employer rights (the entitlement side of the obligation equation). We examine the responsibilities inherent in psychological contracts. After reviewing the moral aspect of psychological contracts, we use the issue of tenure as a discussion point for this topic.

In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well exp...

Immunologists use psychological and cognitive terms to describe and explain the behavior of our immune system. Do they use them metaphorically or literally? In this paper I show that on the grounds of some psychophysical assumptions, the uniqueness of each person as an individual organism necessarily corresponds to the singularity of each person as a psychological subject. On the basis of these assumptions, immunologists, irrespective of their various conceptual frames, are entitled to ascribe psychological and cognitive traits (...) to our immune system and its behavior. Immunologists are allowed to do so because each immune system of any higher, unique individual organism corresponds to psychological traits, which are ascribable only to persons, each of whom is a singular being. This correspondence is necessarily compatible with the psychophysical unity or inseparability. Furthermore, the psychological or cognitive traits pertain to the immune system require no consciousness. In the case of artificial immune systems, in contrast, the application of psychological or cognitive terms is only metaphorical, for each such system is not unique but it is duplicable or replicable. Only the immune system of unique individual organisms that as psychological subjects are singular beings—i.e. persons—can be subject, literally or non-metaphorically, to psychological and cognitive terms. (shrink)

while kant's transcendental philosophy as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena has been extraordinarily influential over the past two centuries, its transcendental methodology has continued to puzzle commentators. Recently, Colin Marshall, in an article entitled "Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?," has brought one of the central problems for any interpretation of Kant's methodology to the fore again.1 In his paper, Marshall discusses what he calls "the Regress Puzzle": Several commentators have noted (...) that there is a puzzle about how the positive part of Kant's project could work. The puzzle, which I will call the "Regress Puzzle," arises when we ask: If Kant... (shrink)

The recently published story by D. Granin entitled Aurochs [Zubr] presents the recollections of N. V. Timofeev-Resovskii on Moscow University in the first years after the revolution. In his account, an interesting philosophical circle was active there at the time: "The logical and philosophical circle was headed by Gustav Gustavovich Shpet, who unsettled minds with unprecedented paradoxes and shook the most unshakeable foundations of this world, and Nikolai Nikolaevich Luzin, a great mathematician who was able to find a philosophical meaning (...) in mathematics." V. Kaverin also tells about the tremendous impression made on him by a lecture Shpet gave in 1919 at the Faculty of History and Philology of Moscow University. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of returnee executives on top management teams' (TMTs') unethical management behavior (e.g., excess perquisite consumption). Synthesizing insights from upper echelons theory and the psychological entitlement literature, this study proposes that returnee executives cause TMTs to generate a high degree of psychological entitlement, which subsequently leads to a high degree of excess perquisite consumption in their firms. In addition, this study proposes that returnee chief executive officers, product diversification, and regional institutional development (...) moderate the aforementioned relationships by influencing managerial discretion. This study provides empirical evidence for the above view using a dataset that was constructed based on 1960 listed Chinese manufacturing companies from 2010 to 2019. From a psychological entitlement perspective, this study confirms, for the first time, that the introduction of returnee executives may have unintended negative consequences, for example, in promoting the excess perquisite consumption activities of TMTs. (shrink)

This study examines the impact of returnee executives on top management teams' (TMTs') unethical management behavior (e.g., excess perquisite consumption). Synthesizing insights from upper echelons theory and the psychological entitlement literature, this study proposes that returnee executives cause TMTs to generate a high degree of psychological entitlement, which subsequently leads to a high degree of excess perquisite consumption in their firms. In addition, this study proposes that returnee chief executive officers, product diversification, and regional institutional development (...) moderate the aforementioned relationships by influencing managerial discretion. This study provides empirical evidence for the above view using a dataset that was constructed based on 1960 listed Chinese manufacturing companies from 2010 to 2019. From a psychological entitlement perspective, this study confirms, for the first time, that the introduction of returnee executives may have unintended negative consequences, for example, in promoting the excess perquisite consumption activities of TMTs. (shrink)

This study examines whether and how the qualities of newcomers’ interpersonal relationships [i.e., leader-member exchange (LMX) and coworker exchange (CWX)] relate to their initial performance and how changes in the qualities of these relationships relate to the changes in performance. To test a latent growth model, we collected data from 230 newcomers at six time points over a 6-week period. The results showed that LMX quality is positively related to initial newcomer performance; however, changes in LMX quality are not statistically (...) significantly related to changes in newcomer performance. In contrast, an increase in CWX quality is positively related to newcomer performance improvement, but the initial quality of CWX does not predict newcomer performance. Furthermore, newcomers’ psychological entitlement moderates the relationship between LMX quality and newcomer performance; newcomers’ conscientiousness moderates the relationship between increases in CWX quality and improvements in newcomer performance. The findings increase our understanding of the newcomer exchange relationship-performance link over time and suggest that future newcomer socialization research explore the initial level of and the changes in these relationships simultaneously. (shrink)