Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74 (2021)
AbstractABSTRACT In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against the view. Second, it is shown that the committive dimension is rich and flexible enough to accommodate all the apparently problematic cases.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):123-125.
Mind-Making Practices: The Social Infrastructure of Self-Knowing Agency and Responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
Citations of this work
The Fanciest Sort of Intentionality: Active Inference, Mindshaping and Linguistic Content.Remi Tison - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-41.
Similar books and articles
"Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.
Autonomy of Folk Psychology Reconsidered.Taavi Laanpere - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):55-78.
Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation.Martin Davies & Tony Stone - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-82.
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Thomas Metzinger & Wanja Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers.Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.) - 2006 - Kluwer/Springer Press.
The Origins of Folk Psychology.George Graham - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):357-79.
Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--148.
Attribution, Content, and Method: A Scientific Defense of Commonsense Psychology.John Dewain Trout - 1988 - Dissertation, Cornell University