The tendency to attribute foundationalist ambitions to the Vienna Circle has long obscured our view of its attempted revolution in philosophy. The present paper makes the case for a consistently epistemologically anti-foundationalist interpretation of all three of the Circle's main protagonists: Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. Corresponding to the intellectual fault lines within the Circle, two ways of going about the radical reorientation of the pursuit of philosophy will then be distinguished and the contemporary potential of Carnap's and Neurath's (...) project explored. (shrink)

The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker’s narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting (...) that the same argumentative schemas can be adapted to undermine a related non-description theory, according to which the reference of a name as used on a given occasion would semantically depend on broad mental states of the speaker. Once this is realised, it becomes evident that the falsity of the description theory is not the deepest lesson of the canonical arguments, but only a consequence of the deepest lesson. The most fundamental moral is that the speaker’s mental states, whether narrow or broad, do not always determine linguistic reference. (shrink)

The ideas and political commitments of the revolutionary abolitionist and Spencean Robert Wedderburn (1762–1835) represent a compelling example of a form of universality, articulated in the midst of the Age of Revolution, which defied European colonialism and plantation slavery. An engagement with Wedderburn’s writings on the Haitian Revolution, maroon warfare and his proposal of a Spencean communist programme will clarify ongoing debates about Enlightenment, empire, slavery and universality, and might inform a re-engagement with the idea of universal emancipation (...) in the political present. (shrink)

In this lively and provocative book, the author provides the first systematic and detailed analysis of the anti-democratic tradition in Western thought. His approach is both thematic and historical. The author highlights the fatalism and pessimism of anti-democratic thinkers and argues that they fail to understand the adaptability of democracy and its ability to co-exist with traditional and elitist values. At the same time, the author also acknowledges that some of the predictions and observations of anti-Democratic thinkers (...) have been confirmed by history. (shrink)

Intellectual history still quite commonly distinguishes between the episode we know as the Scientific Revolution, and its successor era, the Enlightenment, in terms of the calculatory and quantifying zeal of the former—the age of mechanics—and the rather scientifically lackadaisical mood of the latter, more concerned with freedom, public space and aesthetics. It is possible to challenge this distinction in a variety of ways, but the approach I examine here, in which the focus on an emerging scientific field or cluster (...) of disciplines—the ‘life sciences’, particularly natural history, medicine, and physiology —is, not Romantically anti-scientific, but resolutely anti-mathematical. Diderot bluntly states, in his Thoughts on the interpretation of nature, that “We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will have left it.... We will not go beyond.” Similarly, Buffon in the first discourse of his Histoire naturelle speaks of the “over-reliance on mathematical sciences,” given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional” and “demonstrative,” and thereby “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.” Earlier in the Thoughts, Diderot judges “the thing of the mathematician” to have “as little existence in nature as that of the gambler.” Significantly, this attitude—taken by great scientists who also translated Newton or wrote careful papers on probability theory, as well as by others such as Mandeville—participates in the effort to conceptualize what we might call a new ontology for the emerging life sciences, very different from both the ‘iatromechanism’ and the ‘animism’ of earlier generations, which either failed to account for specifically living, goal-directed features of organisms, or accounted for them in supernaturalistic terms by appealing to an ‘anima’ as explanatory principle. Anti-mathematicism here is then a key component of a naturalistic, open-ended project to give a successful reductionist model of explanation in ‘natural history’, a model which is no more vitalist than it is materialist—but which is fairly far removed from early modern mechanism. (shrink)

Molecular Revolution in BrazilFélix Guattari and Suely Rolniktranslated by KarelClapshow and Brian HolmesYes, I believe that there is a multiple people, a people of mutants, apeople of potentialities that appears and disappears, that is embodied in social, literary, andmusical events.... I think that we're in a period of productivity, proliferation, creation, utterlyfabulous revolutions from the viewpoint of this emergence of a people. That's molecular revolution:it isn't a slogan or a program, it's something that I feel, that I live....--from (...) MolecularRevolution in BrazilFollowing Brazil's first democratic election after two decades of militarydictatorship, French philosopher Félix Guattari traveled through Brazil in 1982 with Brazilianpsychoanalyst Suely Rolnik and discovered an exciting, new political vitality. In the infancy of itsnew republic, Brazil was moving against traditional hierarchies of control and totalitarian regimesand founding a revolution of ideas and politics. Molecular Revolution in Brazil documents theconversations, discussions, and debates that arose during the trip, including a dialogue betweenGuattari and Brazil's future President Luis Ignacia Lula da Silva, then a young gubernatorialcandidate. Through these exchanges, Guattari cuts through to the shadowy practices of globalizationgone awry and boldly charts a revolution in practice.Assembled and edited by Rolnik, MolecularRevolution in Brazil is organized thematically; aphoristic at times, it presents a lesser-known,more overtly political aspect of Guattari's work. Originally published in Brazil in 1986 asMicropolitica: Cartografias do desejo, the book became a crucial reference for political movementsin Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s. It now provides English-speaking readers with an invaluablepicture of the radical thought and optimism that lies at the root of Lula's Brazil. Félix Guattari, post-'68 French psychoanalyst and philosopher, is the author of Anti-Oedipus, The Anti-Oedipus Papers, 2006), and other books. Semiotext haspublished the first two volumes of his complete essays, Chaosophy and Soft Subversions, and will publish the final volume, Chaos and Complexity, in 2008. Suely Rolnik is apsychoanalyst, cultural critic, and curator who lives and works in São Paulo, Brazil. She was aclose collaborator of Guattari during her exile in Paris from the military dictatorship inBrazil. (shrink)

Molecular Revolution in BrazilFélix Guattari and Suely Rolniktranslated by Karel Clapshow and Brian HolmesYes, I believe that there is a multiple people, a people of mutants, a people of potentialities that appears and disappears, that is embodied in social, literary, and musical events.... I think that we're in a period of productivity, proliferation, creation, utterly fabulous revolutions from the viewpoint of this emergence of a people. That's molecular revolution: it isn't a slogan or a program, it's something that (...) I feel, that I live....--from Molecular Revolution in BrazilFollowing Brazil's first democratic election after two decades of military dictatorship, French philosopher Félix Guattari traveled through Brazil in 1982 with Brazilian psychoanalyst Suely Rolnik and discovered an exciting, new political vitality. In the infancy of its new republic, Brazil was moving against traditional hierarchies of control and totalitarian regimes and founding a revolution of ideas and politics. Molecular Revolution in Brazil documents the conversations, discussions, and debates that arose during the trip, including a dialogue between Guattari and Brazil's future President Luis Ignacia Lula da Silva, then a young gubernatorial candidate. Through these exchanges, Guattari cuts through to the shadowy practices of globalization gone awry and boldly charts a revolution in practice.Assembled and edited by Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil is organized thematically; aphoristic at times, it presents a lesser-known, more overtly political aspect of Guattari's work. Originally published in Brazil in 1986 as Micropolitica: Cartografias do desejo, the book became a crucial reference for political movements in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s. It now provides English-speaking readers with an invaluable picture of the radical thought and optimism that lies at the root of Lula's Brazil. Félix Guattari, post-'68 French psychoanalyst and philosopher, is the author of Anti-Oedipus, The Anti-Oedipus Papers, 2006), and other books. Semiotext has published the first two volumes of his complete essays, Chaosophy and Soft Subversions, and will publish the final volume, Chaos and Complexity, in 2008. Suely Rolnik is a psychoanalyst, cultural critic, and curator who lives and works in São Paulo, Brazil. She was a close collaborator of Guattari during her exile in Paris from the military dictatorship in Brazil. (shrink)

Intellectual history still quite commonly distinguishes between the episode we know as the Scientific Revolution, and its successor era, the Enlightenment, in terms of the calculatory and quantifying zeal of the former—the age of mechanics—and the rather scientifically lackadaisical mood of the latter, more concerned with freedom, public space and aesthetics. It is possible to challenge this distinction in a variety of ways, but the approach I examine here, in which the focus on an emerging scientific field or cluster (...) of disciplines—the ‘life sciences’, particularly natural history, medicine, and physiology —is, not Romantically anti-scientific, but resolutely anti-mathematical. Diderot bluntly states, in his Thoughts on the interpretation of nature, that “We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairauts, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will have left it.... We will not go beyond.” Similarly, Buffon in the first discourse of his Histoire naturelle speaks of the “over-reliance on mathematical sciences,” given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional” and “demonstrative,” and thereby “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.” Earlier in the Thoughts, Diderot judges “the thing of the mathematician” to have “as little existence in nature as that of the gambler.” Significantly, this attitude—taken by great scientists who also translated Newton or wrote careful papers on probability theory, as well as by others such as Mandeville—participates in the effort to conceptualize what we might call a new ontology for the emerging life sciences, very different from both the ‘iatromechanism’ and the ‘animism’ of earlier generations, which either failed to account for specifically living, goal-directed features of organisms, or accounted for them in supernaturalistic terms by appealing to an ‘anima’ as explanatory principle. Anti-mathematicism here is then a key component of a naturalistic, open-ended project to give a successful reductionist model of explanation in ‘natural history’, a model which is no more vitalist than it is materialist—but which is fairly far removed from early modern mechanism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Origins of the Ateneo de la Juventud The Lectures at the Ateneo de la Juventud The Ateneo de la Juventud and the Mexican Revolution References Further Reading.

Marxism is the tradition of thought and practice founded by Marx. To be identifiable as Marxism any phase of this tradition must have important resemblances to Marx's own work, and those resemblances must be conscious and acknowledged. Anti-Marxists tend to interpret this relation according to a derogatory religious model. Marxists, they suppose, treat Marx as an authority and follow their leader wherever he leads, instead of following the argument wherever it leads. On this view Marxism has an essentially scholarly (...) relation to Marx and a polemical relation to everything else: it seeks to identify exactly what Marx said and thought, to preserve the master's teaching in all its original purity, and to appeal to it for correct answers to the substantive questions that we face. In other words, Marxism is that tradition which treats the works of Marx as a bible and imagines that it can clinch substantive arguments with the words ‘Marx has said it’. (shrink)

The article shows that three antirealistic theories of classical analysis and synthesis are logically possible: presentationistic, solipsistic and Kantian, but only the latter is actually being developed. Revealed its specific features and features shared with other, logically possible antirealistic theories. The correlation of the Kantian theory of analysis and synthesis of knowledge with his theory of analysis and synthesis of subjects of knowledge is analyzed. Gnoseological problems that forced Kant to assert that new knowledge is provided only by the synthesis (...) of knowledge, and analysis only clarifies the results of synthesis, are characterized. The Kantian solution to these problems is correlated with their realistic solution. The role that the Kantian "Copernican revolution in philosophy" plays in his interpretation of the analysis and synthesis of subjects of knowledge is investigated. The Kantian theory of analytical and synthetic judgments is considered. It is shown that the Kantian question "how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" is essentially a question about the nature of theoretical knowledge, which was historically formed in ancient geometry precisely as the unity of analysis and synthesis. A qualitative difference is shown between classical and geometric (by origin) analysis and synthesis. Three historical stages of their formation are described. The assertion of I. Newton that the natural science experiment arose as a result of the extension of the method of geometric analysis and synthesis to the natural sciences is investigated. (shrink)

György Lukács’s Marxist phase is usually associated with his passage from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism. Nonetheless, Nietzschean influences have been covertly present in Lukács’s philosophical development, particularly in his uncompromising distaste for the bourgeois society and the mediocrity of its quotidian values. A closer glance at Lukács’s corpus discloses that the influence of Nietzsche has been eclipsed by the Hegelian turn in his thought. Lukács hardly ever mentions the weight of Nietzsche on his early thinking, an influence that makes cameo appearances (...) throughout his lifetime writings. During the period of his adherence to a Stalinist approach to communism, his new subjectivity seems to be re-constituted through a disavowal of his earlier romantic anti-capitalism. Implicit in Lukács’s attack on Nietzsche in the Destruction of Reason (1952) is an acerbic reaction to the mute presence of the latter in his earlier thought. Apart from his ignorance of the unreliability of the collection of the Will to Power edited by Peter Gast and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, his battle against the anti-proletariat Nietzsche in the Destruction is waged on a metaphysical, non-historical plain. Lukács’s pre-Marxist works (Soul and Form, On Poverty of Spirit, and The Theory of the Novel) in a sense betray the instance of a writer who writes most of someone where he omits his name. Thus perceived, Lukács’s early corpus lends itself to a symptomatic reading. -/- This essay seeks to extract the Nietzschean undercurrents of Lukács’s work through a reflection on the romantic anti-capitalist tendencies that the young Lukács shared with Nietzsche. For although it may appear that Nietzsche lacked a clear politics, his criticism of the bourgeois ethos as a structure based on debt/guilt [Schuld], and his critique of modern value-system and nihilism paved the way for the emergence of Lukács’s theory of reification. Nietzsche’s category of 'transvaluation of values’ suggests a total transfiguration of reality, a radical rupture with the ordinary state of things, and as such carries within itself a revolutionary promise. Drawing a distinction between political romanticism and romantic politics, I argue that romantic anti-capitalism contains a potential for the latter. The essay further traces the link between Lukács’s ‘romantic politics’ and the persistence of a thought of the tragic (a ‘tragic vision’) in his texts that, despite its temporary decline during his realist period, is undismissable in different constellations of his thought. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger and Slavoj Žižek represent the two major anti-liberal European revolutions of the twentieth century, the Nazi and the October revolutions. Both revolutions ended badly, but neither Heidegger nor Žižek retreats from the revolutionary position, simply because it is an indelible part of their philosophy, where the finitude of the world and human being necessitate a partisan truth. By reintroducing the concept of the subject, Žižek wants to present a correction that cures Heidegger’s politics. Unfortunately, the resurrection relies (...) on a sleight of hand: the subject to be reintroduced tries to be at the same time ahistorical and leftist. Žižek finds in Heidegger’s reading of Anaximander signs of ahistorical subjectivity, but this interpretation is based on a misconstrual of Heidegger’s notion of alêtheia. On the other hand, by analysing Heidegger’s two famous passages mentioning the extermination camps, we find the factual blind-spots in Heidegger’s ontological gaze. (shrink)

This review essay analyses the proposed synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism, which often presents itself as a critique of the kind of utopianism associated with 'Freudo-Marxism'. In Yannis Stavrakakis's The Lacanian Left this anti-utopianism slides towards a left reformism, in which the emphasis on constitutive lack prevents any thinking of transformation. Ian Parker's Revolution in Psychology presents a bracing but reductive polemic, in which psychology and psychoanalysis seem to function as mere reflections of capitalist ideology. What goes (...) missing in both accounts is the possibility of a re-thinking of subjectivity, both individual and collective, posed between Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marxism. (shrink)

Landmarks of Scientfic Socialism: Anti-Dühring (German: Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft, "Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science") is a book by Friedrich Engels, which was first published in German in 1878. It had previously been serialised in a periodical called Vorwärts. There were two other German editions during Engels' life. Anti-Dühring was first published in English translation in 1907.The work was perhaps Engels' most important contribution and development within Marxist theory.Eugen Dühring had previously created his own (...) version of socialism, which was supposed to be a replacement for Marxism. This work was supposed to be a defence of Marxism against produced his own version of socialism, intended as a replacement for Marxism from Dühring's attack. (shrink)

Descartes est la figure emblématique de la naissance des temps modernes. Le « je pense, je suis » par lequel il aurait traduit l'autonomie de la raison marquerait l'affranchissement à l'égard de toute autorité transcendante. En réalité, c'est pourtant Dieu que Descartes invoque comme garantie de la vérité de sa découverte. Dieu occupe d'ailleurs la place centrale dans les systèmes philosophiques du « Grand Siècle ». La vraie révolution de la modernité, celle de la science, celle de l'observation de la (...) nature, celle de l'induction, les grands philosophes du XVIe siècle, tels Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz et Descartes ne l'auront pas connue. La place qu'ils occupent comme fondateurs de la modernité est une place usurpée, reconduite par une tradition philosophique qui persiste à se réfugier derrière des abstractions plutôt que de s'inspirer de la démarche scientifique. L'invocation du patronage cartésien comme modèle de rigueur intellectuelle et comme fondateur du rationalisme moderne, cette « révolution cartésienne », origine mythique de la modernité en philosophie, n'a jamais eu lieu. Le XVIIe siècle est le siècle de l'induction et de la science expérimentale. Le siècle de Bacon, de Galilée et de Newton... Une erreur ou une distorsion de la réalité répétée mille fois devient vérité. Nous vivons sous un régime d'écriture cartésien. Cet ouvrage place l'histoire future de la philosophie sous l'emprise de la résistance au cartésianisme. (shrink)

Darwin proclaimed his own work revolutionary. His revolution, however, is still in progress, and the changes that are going on are reflected in the contemporary historical and philosophical literature, including that written by scientists. The changes have taken place at different levels, and have tended to occur at the more superficial ones. The new ontology that arose as a consequence of the realization that species are individuals at once provides an analytical tool for explaining what has been happening and (...) an example of the kind of changes that seem in order. It provides a clear distinction between the roles of history and of laws of nature. Pre-Darwinian "evolution" was superficial in the sense that it treated change as either as something pre-ordained or else due to timeless laws of nature, rather than historical contingency. Darwinism puts the ontological emphasis upon concrete, particular things (individuals) and therefore delegitimizes both essentialistic and teleological ways of thinking. However, traditional ways of thinking have persisted, if not explicitly, then often as assumptions and procedures that are merely implicit or even unconscious. As a result, anti-evolutionary attitudes continue to influence the practice of evolutionary biology as well as the study of its history and philosophy. (shrink)

That the Enlightenment shaped modernity is uncontested. Yet remarkably few historians or philosophers have attempted to trace the process of ideas from the political and social turmoil of the late eighteenth century to the present day. This is precisely what Jonathan Israel now does. In Democratic Enlightenment , Israel demonstrates that the Enlightenment was an essentially revolutionary process, driven by philosophical debate. The American Revolution and its concerns certainly acted as a major factor in the intellectual ferment that shaped (...) the wider upheaval that followed, but the radical philosophes were no less critical than enthusiastic about the American model. From 1789, the General Revolution's impetus came from a small group of philosophe-revolutionnaires , men such as Mirabeau, Sieyes, Condorcet, Volney, Roederer, and Brissot. Not aligned to any of the social groups represented in the French National assembly, they nonetheless forged " la philosophie moderne "--in effect Radical Enlightenment ideas--into a world-transforming ideology that had a lasting impact in Latin America, Canada and eastern Europe as well as France, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. In addition, Israel argues that while all French revolutionary journals powerfully affirmed that la philosophie moderne was the main cause of the French Revolution, the main stream of historical thought has failed to grasp what this implies. Israel sets the record straight, demonstrating the true nature of the engine that drove the Revolution, and the intimate links between the radical wing of the Enlightenment and the anti-Robespierriste "Revolution of reason." Acclaim for earlier volumes in the trilogy: "His vast--and vastly impressive--book sets out to redefine the intellectual landscape of early modern Europe. Magnificent and magisterialwill undoubtedly be one of the truly great historical works of the decade." -- Sunday Telegraph "The scholarship is breathtaking. Israel has read everything, absorbed every nuance, followed up every byway." -- New Statesman "An enormously impressive piece of scholarship. The breadth and depth of the author's reading are breathtaking and Enlightenment Contested is set to become the definitive work for philosophers as well as historians on this extraordinary period." -- Tribune. (shrink)

This article revisits an historic exchange between two black ex-communists, Harold Cruse and Harry Haywood, a debate that prefigured many of the central contradictions of the black-power era. Their exchange followed Cruse’s influential 1962 essay forStudies on the Left, ‘Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American’, which declared that the American Negro was a ‘subject of domestic colonialism’. Written against the prevailing liberal integrationist commitments of the civil-rights movement, his essay called for black economic and political independence, and inspired many of the (...) younger activists who would give birth to the black-power movement. In a series of essays for the Bay Area black radical journalSoulbook, Haywood criticised Cruse’s mishandling of class politics among blacks, and his retreat from anti-capitalism. This forgotten episode is important on its own terms, for what it says about the character and limitations of left-political thinking during the sixties, and equally for understanding and contesting those commonsensical notions of African-American public life in our times which too often remain rooted in the vanished social context and political realities of the twentieth-century racial ghetto. (shrink)

Resumen: La contingencia de los fenómenos sociales y políticos ha sido abordada por diversas teorías contemporáneas. El tema circula en la sociología histórica, la teoría de sistemas de Luhmann, el institucionalismo histórico, la historia contrafáctica o el posmarxismo, asociado, entre otras, al carácter disruptivo y abrupto de ciertos procesos históricos, al cruce de series causales inicialmente independientes, a la inconsistencia de todo orden, a la coexistencia de mundos posibles o a la electividad asociada a la agencia. Como parte de esa (...) constelación, y de la mano de un estudio de caso, el sociólogo Charles Kurzman habla de “anti-explicación”. Su propósito no es solo cuestionar, sobre esa base, cualquier afán predictivo de las ciencias sociales, sino la posibilidad misma de analizar causalmente fenómenos contingentes como las revoluciones y los movimientos sociales. El texto busca desarrollar un contraargumento a esta tesis, moviéndose en el doble plano en el que opera Kurzman y mostrando, a la vez, su filiación y resonancia con posturas posmarxistas. Pretendiendo integrar la contingencia en la explicación del tipo de fenómenos mencionados, se recurre para ello a conceptos como causación descendente, catalizadores, bucles complejos y mecanismos causales.: The contingency of social and political phenomena has been addressed by various contemporary theories. The topic circulates in historical sociology, Luhmann's system theory, historical institutionalism, counterfactual history, or post-Marxism, associated, among others, to the disruptive and abrupt character of certain historical processes, the cross points of initially independent causal series, the inconsistency of all order, the coexistence of possible worlds or the electivity associated with the agency. As part of that constellation, and along with a case study, the sociologist Charles Kurzman speaks of the “anti-explanation”. The purpose of such is not just to question, on that basis, any predictive haste of the social sciences, but the very possibility of causally analyzing contingent phenomena such as revolutions and social movements. The text seeks to develop a counterargument to this thesis, moving along the epistemological and historical-social double plane in which Kurzman operates and showing, at the same time, its filiation and resonance with post-Marxist positions. With the purpose of integrating the contingency with the explanation of the type of phenomena mentioned, concepts such as downward causation, catalysts, complex loops, and causal mechanisms are used. (shrink)

This article discusses an anti-sovranist variant of political theology. Recent work on the sociology of modern constitutionalism has identified its source in the so-called Papal legal revolution that proclaimed the autonomy of the Church in relation to the Empire. The claim is that this legal revo-lution contributed to the “secularization” or de-sacralization of political power and established legali-ty as the principle of legitimacy. This paper critically discusses this genealogy of constitutionalism. It proposes an alternative route to modern secularism (...) and constitutionalism that passes through the reception of Averroistic doctrines in the philosophy of Dante. (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) has commonly been seen as Europe’s leading philosopher since Kant. His influence extended across the globe down to the Second World War – not least through his dissident disciple, Karl Marx. Since then, despite intermittent revivals, his importance has tended to be eclipsed by a rising tide of anti-modernist polemic, extending from Heidegger to postmodernism. Central to Hegel’s political thought was his view of the French Revolution. But notwithstanding its pivotal role in the (...) development of his ideas, his reaction to that event has been systematically misconstrued. In presenting a more faithful account of Hegel’s interpretation of his own era, the argument presented here places his response to contemporary developments in the context of a series of World Revolutions which framed the meaning of his age. This approach serves to illustrate the unique combination of historical and philosophical reasoning on which Hegel’s thought depended. In the process, reconstructing his arguments raises challenging questions about the applicability of bygone political ideas to later historical periods. (shrink)

Marxism is the tradition of thought and practice founded by Marx. To be identifiable as Marxism any phase of this tradition must have important resemblances to Marx's own work, and those resemblances must be conscious and acknowledged. Anti-Marxists tend to interpret this relation according to a derogatory religious model. Marxists, they suppose, treat Marx as an authority and follow their leader wherever he leads, instead of following the argument wherever it leads. On this view Marxism has an essentially scholarly (...) relation to Marx and a polemical relation to everything else: it seeks to identify exactly what Marx said and thought, to preserve the master's teaching in all its original purity, and to appeal to it for correct answers to the substantive questions that we face. In other words, Marxism is that tradition which treats the works of Marx as a bible and imagines that it can clinch substantive arguments with the words ‘Marx has said it’. (shrink)

In Eros and Revolution, Javier Sethness Castro presents a comprehensive intellectual and political biography of the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), investigating the Hegelian-Marxist, Romantic, existentialist, social-psychological, and anti-authoritarian dimensions of his thought, as well as his contemporary relevance.

Despite our common self-conceptions, we philosophers have our myths, heroes, and guiding narratives. Our work may emphasize conceptual clarity and deductive arguments, but these more sober and discursive elements of our work always occurs within the context of a broader, often implicit, and frequently illusive orientation, within the scope of some particular vision of our vocation, our history, and our place within the contemporary world. These visions are meta-philosophical: they precede and frame philosophical work, and they engender the most intractable (...) philosophical disputes. Thus, for the sake of self-knowledge and rational discussion, we should constantly struggle to articulate and scrutinize these myths and narratives. Which predecessors do we continue to read? Why? What repeated stories and anecdotes generate our common and competing identities? What do past episodes in the history of philosophy mean, and how do they direct our current endeavors? Like every community, we philosophers sustain our collective work through stories, through the celebration of our heroes, and through repeated reference to paradigmatic arguments and texts. We should reflect upon these sustaining elements of our community, even if this requires modes of thought that lie beyond conceptual analysis, deductive argument, and the careful interpretation of canonical texts. -/- In this paper, I excavate and criticize the contours of one narrative that still guides us, the common celebration of Kant’s critical philosophy as a radical, farsighted, disruptive, irresistible, and irrevocable break with the religious and metaphysical dogmatism of its age. In Section 2, I briefly sketch two complementary versions of this narrative, the accounts provided by the Hegelian philosopher Eduard Gans and by the poet Heinrich Heine. Drawing various parallels with the French Revolution, these thinkers significantly overemphasize the skeptical, destructive, anti-metaphysical, anti-religious and historically discontinuous aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy, which they portray as the inauguration of a new and robust philosophical movement, one that rapidly vanquished its intellectually beleaguered and reactionary opponents. In Sections 2–4, I then turn to consider three of the more active and vociferous opponents of the Kantian movement: Basilius von Ramdohr, Friedrich Nicolai, and Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob. Contrary to the standard version of events, these men had little sympathy for metaphysics, religion, rationalism, and dogmatic certitude. In fact, they principally opposed the Kantian movement as the unwelcome resurgence of an outdated form of quasi-religious enthusiasm, as a form of philosophical Schwärmerei that threatened to appropriate the banner of reason and hinder the progress of enlightenment. -/- Drawing upon a wide range of late eighteenth-century German texts on the dangers and varied manifestations of Schwärmerei, I reconstruct Ramdohr’s, Nicolai’s, and Jakob’s vision of the Kantian movement. I argue that the charges of philosophical Schwärmerei highlight three meta-philosophical disputes that pitted these anti-Kantians against many proponents of the Kantian movement. These disputes involved: (a) the social role of the philosopher and her relation to the general public; (b) the place of internal and/or private experience within the open and polyphonic domain of public discourse; and (c) the merits of philosophical systematicity, technical neologisms, and more hermetic versions of semantic holism. -/- A consideration of these meta-philosophical disputes allows us to position Kant’s critical philosophy more accurately within its historical context, to highlight its significant continuities with the intellectual assumptions of the Berlin Enlightenment, those assumptions that largely inform Ramdohr’s, Nicolai’s, and Jakob’s attacks on the so-called Kantian movement. These continuities then reveal the meta-philosophical distance between Kant and “the Kantian movement”, between the texts of the critical philosophy and the projects of Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This challenges the traditional account. We often celebrate Kant’s critical philosophy as a radical break with the past, as the inauguration of new and fundamentally modern assumptions, which were then developed and elaborated by the post-Kantian Idealists. By contrast, I argue for a series of complex, ambivalent, and often unintended breaks: while occasionally celebrating his intellectual achievements as an epochal “Copernican Revolution”, Kant largely remains true to the guiding assumptions and philosophical values of his age, only occasionally deflecting them in minor but portentous ways. By contrast, while Reinhold and Fichte at least initially proclaimed their fidelity to the “spirit” – if not the letter – of Kant’s philosophy, they nonetheless managed to release a new and strange philosophical spirit, a potent, quasi-secularized, and post-Enlightenment form of Schwärmerei. (shrink)

Giovanni Maddalena’s The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists’ Incomplete Revolution is an ambitious, original, and creative contribution to the re-evaluation of the history of pragmatism and its contemporary legacy in various areas of philosophy, ranging from logic and the theory of reasoning to the philosophy of science and art, as well as ethics and the philosophy of education. A reader can only admire the author’s broad and deep knowledge and learning, which extends from the hist...

?Packaging the Conservative Revolution? assesses the role of conservative think?tanks, particularly the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, in engineering conservative prominence in national affairs. While AEI and Heritage have been particularly effective in promoting conservatism to legislators and the public, serious problems emerge from their analyses. The anti?welfare state bias of AEI projects reflects the dominance of Fortune 500 executives on its Board of Directors. Theoretical manipulation by AEI project directors raises questions about the purpose (...) of their work. Heritage, for its part, has proposed analogues to governmental programs. Notably, Heritage has provided important intellectual support to the traditionalist movement. As conservative think?tanks grow and influence national affairs, the impartiality and quality of their work become important factors in understanding national politics. (shrink)

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has been interpreted in a wide variety of ways, including a theory of consent, of political unity, of ‘anti-politics’, and of geopolitical competition. These interpretations are united in regarding hegemony as a general theory of political power and domination, and as deriving from a particular interpretation of the concept of passive revolution. Building upon the recent intense season of philological research on the Prison Notebooks, this article argues that the concept of hegemony is better (...) understood as a ‘dialectical chain’ composed of four integrally related ‘moments’: hegemony as social and political leadership, as a political project, as a hegemonic apparatus, and as the social and political hegemony of the workers’ movement. This alternative typology of hegemony provides both a sophisticated analysis of the emergence of modern state power and a theory of political organization of the subaltern social groups. This project is encapsulated in Gramsci’s notion of the formation of a ‘modern Prince’, conceived as both political party and civilizational process, which represents an emancipatory alternative to the dominant forms of political modernity. (shrink)

Cogitation described as calculation, the living being described as a machine, cognitive functions considered as algorithmic sequences and the ‘mechanization’ of the subjective were the theoretical elements that late heideggerian anti–humanism, especially in France was able to utilize[1], even more so, after the second cybernetics or post-cybernetics movement of the late ‘60s introduced the concepts of the autopoietic and the allopoietic automata[2]. Recently, neurologists pose claims on the traditional epistemological field of philosophy, proceeding from this ontological decision, the equation (...) of human cognition to cybernetic systems. -/- The emergence of the world-wide-web in the 1990s and the global expansion of the internet during the first decades of the 21st century indicate the fallacies of the cybernetics programme to mechanize the mind. We stand witnesses to a semantic colonization of the cybernetic system, a social imaginary creation and expansion within the digital ensemblistic – identitarian organization that cannot be described by mechanical or cybernetic terms. Paradoxically, cyberspace, as a new being, a form of alterity, seems to both exacerbate and capsize the polarization between the operational and the symbolic. The creation of the internet might be more than an epistemological revolution, to use the terminology of Thomas Kuhn. It might be an ontological revolution. -/- I will try to demonstrate that the emergence of the Internet refutes any such claims, since its context and utility can only be described by means of a social epistemology based on the understanding of social significances as continuous creations of an anonymous social imaginary proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997). I will try to explore some social-semantic aspects of the cyberspace as a nexus of social representations of the individual identity that forms a new sphere of being, where the subjective and the objective merge in a virtual subjective objectivity with unique epistemological attributes and possibilities. (shrink)

This paper analyses the impact of the Law and Economics movement on legal decision making. Focussing on the position of the leading intellectual figure of this movement, Richard Posner, the author shows how his theories imply a silent revolution in American jurisprudence. Starting from the criteria of economic efficiency and wealth maximization, seen in the light of American pragmatism, Posner upholds anti‐formalist interpretation of statutor law by judges based on the principles of free market economics. His theory starts (...) from the assumption that statutor law has become more and more ambiguous and open‐ended and thus, as in the case of antitrust law, judges can freely interpret legal provisions on the basis of free market postulates. This position has broader implications in the debate about the meaning of the rule of law: Posner's position implies abandoning the emancipatory core of the liberal tradition. (shrink)

In 1814, Baron de Vastey wrote in The Colonial System Unveiled: “When Europeans came to the new world, their first steps were accompanied by crimes on a grand scale, massacres, the destruction of empires, the obliteration of entire nations from the ranks of the living”. Jean Louis Vastey was a Black Haytien man born in 1781, who assumed the role of an administrator in Hayti after Jean-Jacques Dessalines freed the island from European rule. The Haytien Revolution, which was fought (...) from 1791 to 1804, is the origin of Black theories of liberation from the nineteenth century. The possibility of freedom was not found in the rhetoric of American democratic proclamations, as many authors have asserted, but... (shrink)

The theory practiced as resistance must come to grips with the state and with revolution. To evade, explain away, or assume the state is fatal. And to think of revolution only as anti-state is as dangerous. After all, the revolution's aftermath is revealed by history to be just another state. I argue that the danger posed by both state and revolution can be countered by the multiple in society that becomes contentious - or a contentious (...) multiplicity. The multiple and the contentious are practices that pervade society. The state's objective is to control multiplicity and sublimate contentiousness. The revolutionary strategy is to sublimate multiplicity and direct contentiousness. But multiplicity is dangerous when it is independently contentious. And contentiousness indicates a dialectical process of challenging state power wherein the process itself is privileged over any synthesis. Contentious multiplicity is a practice of freedom. (shrink)

From the National Revolution to the Victory of Evo Morales. A Review of a Half Century of Struggles in Popular Bolivia (1952-2007) The « Bolivian democratic and cultural revolution », often presented as a symbol of the leftward turn of Latin America, and which is led by Evo Morales, is without doubt part of the country’s nationalist and anti-oligarchic tradition, fruit of the revolution of 1952. The current revolutionary phase cannot however be entirely reduced to this (...) tradition, insofar as it illustrates the profound upheavals which the popular movement has undergone since the 1980s, during a period marked by the brutality of neo-liberal reforms and by the emergence of the “native American peasant” as the exemplary agent of “Insurgent Bolivia”. Bolstered by the support of a rural and plebeian base, the Morales “revolution” differs from previous revolutionary experiences by way of the resolutely anti-imperialist nature of its politics. The current nationalist cycle thus takes on an innovative, unprecedented perspective of social emancipation. (shrink)

Everybody knows that the Revolution of 1911 was an anti-imperialist and antifeudal democratic revolution led by the revolutionary and democratic group of the bourgeoisie in the period of the old democratic revolution in China. The leader of that revolution was Sun Yat-sen, and the guiding ideology was his old Three People's Principles. It is well known that Chairman Mao has made a series of scientific appraisals of these facts, but the newspapers and magazines controlled by (...) the anti-Party clique of Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan openly oppose Chairman Mao's scientific appraisals, betraying the fundamental principles of Marxism, distorting the Revolution of 1911 as a struggle between Confucians and Legalists, and replacing Sun Yat-sen as the standard-bearer of the revolution with Chang T'ai-yen, who played first an active and then a devastating role in the revolution. All this is part of the clique's attack on the Party in order to usurp the Party, seize power, restore capitalism and fabricate the "history" of the struggle between the Confucians and the Legalists. (shrink)

Weinert defends a distinctively anti-Kuhnian position on scientific revolutions, predicating his argument on a nuanced and clear case analysis. He also builds on his previous work on eliminative induction that he sees as the central scientific method in the rise of revolutionary theories. The treatment of social sciences as revolutionary offers the key elements of a promising ambitious project. His botched attempt to portray the Darwinian view of mind as a brand of emergentism is the only weak point if (...) this insightful book. (shrink)

For over a century, the Oxford English Dictionary has defined Enlightenment as “shallow and pretentious intellectualism, unreasonable contempt for tradition and authority.” But this definition misreads two passages from Stirling's Secret of Hegel (1865) and misrepresents how “enlightenment,” “illumination,” and “Aufklärung” were employed in the wake of the French Revolution. An examination of British critiques of the Revolution and early translations of texts by Kant, Mendelssohn, and Hegel shows that, prior to the close of the nineteenth century, “enlightenment” (...) designated a process, not a period, and had few negative connotations. (shrink)

A rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, "A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art".