Pojem filosofie nabyl v průběhu historie řadu podob a významů. Kromě tradičního teoretického zaměření se lze setkat s přístupem, který vyzdvihuje praktický dopad filosofování na život člověka. Příspěvek představuje koncept filosofické praxe a reflektuje její současný stav na území České republiky. Autoři vymezují filosofickou praxi jako disciplínu filosofie, a načrtávají její možné dělení na dílčí oblasti. Nastíněny jsou její historické kořeny, které autoři identifikují v antickém Řecku. Dále se věnují systematickému představení doposud sepsaných materiálů k filosofické praxi a přehledu její (...) realizace na území České republiky. Detailní pozornost věnují autoři popisu tří jejích oblastí, mezi které patří filosofie pro děti, filosofický workshop a filosofická konzultace. Kromě teoretického vymezení reflektují rovněž své vlastní postupy v uvedených oblastech. Článek čerpá především ze zahraniční odborné literatury, konkrétně z textů a dalších materiálů filosofických praktikantů. Jeho cílem je představit českému čtenáři doposud podrobněji neřešený koncept filosofické praxe a připravit tak pole pro možnou debatu na akademické rovině. -------- The concept of philosophy has had several forms and meanings throughout the history. Besides the traditional theoretical focus, we may also encounter the approach that highlights a practical impact of philosophizing on one’s life. This text introduces the concept of philosophical practice and reflects its current situation in the Czech Republic. Authors characterize philosophical practice as a discipline of philosophy and present its possible division into subsections. They also present its historical roots, which can be found in ancient Greece. Moreover, authors introduce available sources dealing with the philosophical practice and describe how this discipline is actually practiced in the Czech Republic. Detailed attention is given to three of its sections, namely philosophy for children (P4C), philosophical workshop, and philosophical consultation. Authors present theoretical background and also reflect their own methods in these sections. The text draws primarily from scholarly literature from abroad, particularly from the manuscripts and other sources produced by philosophical practitioners. The aim of this text is to introduce the concept of philosophical practice to the Czech reader and prepare the field for further academic discussion. (shrink)

Deviendrai-je le héros de ma propre vie ou ce rôle sera-t-il tenu par un autre? Cette question, inspirée de la littérature, nous interpelle : tout être humain doit trouver sa propre voie, sa manière personnelle de participer à l’aventure humaine. Or, aucun de nous n’est vraiment préparé à se lancer dans un tel périple. Nous n’avons pas choisi notre milieu familial et culturel. Notre corps est fragile, notre pensée faillible. Puis, la route sera parsemée d’embûches de toutes sortes : précipitation, (...) erreur de calcul, malentendu, abandon, chagrin d’amour, injustice, ressentiment, maladie, conflit. Pourtant, nous espérons tous et toutes vivre en paix et avec un minimum de liberté. Pour y parvenir, nous suivrons les chemins qui nous semblent les meilleurs. Comment les choisir? Quelle sera notre boussole? Cet ouvrage porte sur notre quête philosophique d’unité ou d’harmonie. L’auteur y ouvre dix fenêtres sur diverses expériences de vie, de notre premier à notre dernier souffle. (shrink)

An analysis of theological and philosophical understandings of debt and its role in contemporary capitalism. Max Weber’s account of the rise of capitalism focused on his concept of a Protestant ethic, valuing diligence in earning and saving money but restraint in spending it. However, such individual restraint is foreign to contemporary understandings of finance, which treat ever-increasing consumption and debt as natural, almost essential, for maintaining the economic cycle of buying and selling. In The Debt of the Living, Elettra Stimilli (...) returns to this idea of restraint as ascesis, by analyzing theological and philosophical understandings of debt drawn from a range of figures, including Saint Paul, Schmitt and Agamben, Benjamin and Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, and Foucault. Central to this analysis is the logic of “profit for profit’s sake”—an aspect of Weber’s work that Stimilli believes has been given insufficient attention. Following Foucault, she identifies this as the original mechanism of a capitalist dispositif that feeds not on a goal-directed rationality, but on the self-determining character of human agency. Ascesis is fundamental not because it is characterized by renunciation, but because the self-discipline it imposes converts the properly human quality of action without a predetermined goal into a lack, a fault, or a state of guilt: a debt that cannot be settled. Stimilli argues that this lack, which is impossible to fill, should be seen as the basis of the economy of hedonism and consumption that has governed global economies in recent years and as the premise of the current economy of debt. Elettra Stimilli is research fellow of theoretical philosophy at Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, Italy. Arianna Bove is the translator of many books, including Factory of Strategy: Thirty-Three Lessons on Lenin, by Antonio Negri. (shrink)

This book presents a new account of Thales based on the idea that Acheloios, a deity equated with water in the ancient Greek world and found in Miletos during Thales’ life, was the most important cultic deity influencing the thinker, profoundly shaping his philosophical worldview. In doing so, it also weighs in on the metaphysical and epistemological dichotomy that seemingly underlies all academia—the antithesis of the methodological postulate of Marxian dialectical materialism vis-à-vis the Platonic idea of fundamentally real transcendental forms. (...) Unbeknownst to many scholars, there are various Neo-Marxian thinkers that position the origin of coinage as the pivotal technological development giving rise to impersonal “metaphysical cosmology,” suggesting that the value of money was more-or-less projected back onto the cosmos in the form of “ideal substances.” While the arguments are incredibly sophisticated and persuasive, their conclusions (either stated or implied) are rather difficult to swallow: the self is merely an illusion, abstract ideas of an ultimate source of value, like God or the Good, are totally delusional (as is the soul, and presumably any notion of inherent human dignity), and essentially everything is reducible to mankind’s enslavement to commodities and the notion of our own objectified labor, which is the true source of all value according to Marx. Not only is this an alarming belief that many scholars (consciously or unconsciously) have adopted, since essentially any action could be “justified,” it is also demonstrably false, since it rests on a misunderstanding of Thales and misconception of philosophy as such. -/- My work rectifies that misunderstanding. In an important sense, it is an attempt at redefining philosophy as a “love of wisdom,” which I argue was accurate even in the Presocratic setting, and it uses the influence of Acheloios on Thales to do so. Throughout its pages I explore the etymology and historical uses of the word ὔδωρ, examine the archaeological context of 7th to 6th century Miletos, consider various aquatic myths Thales encountered, and highlight a hitherto overlooked tradition stemming from Thales and influencing such thinkers as Pythagoras, Empedokles, and Hippo, which culminates in a completely new reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, a dialogue in which Plato responds to the exact type of thinking employed by the Neo-Marxians. It is there that we find Socrates and Phaedrus surrounded by the iconography of Acheloios and the nymphs, all while they lie reclined like river gods (the sinews of Acheloios) on the banks of the Ilisos. And it is in that dialogue that Plato defines philosophy as a love of wisdom—the beholding of a multiplicity of hermeneutical frameworks—and alludes to the fact that it began with the sacrifice of Acheloios, the initial philosophical maneuver which he attributes to Thales. The book ends with a threefold rejoinder to the Neo-Marxian school, corresponding to the λόγος, μῦθος, and ἔργον of Acheloios. It turns out that, (1) the λόγος of Acheloios contained the ideal preconditions conducive to an abstraction to a more refined philosophical worldview in which divine water operated as the One among the Many; (2) the μῦθος of Acheloios actually encouraged the application of the notion of sacrifice to Acheloios himself (thus revealing his essence as divine water); and, (3), the ἔργον of Acheloios, in which he kneels in assent to sacrifice, is found on a coin that was probably designed by Thales. In the final analysis, I suggest that the tradition of Acheloios is reflective of a greater philosophical truth, and that by following Thales’ lead, we transcend the Marxian hermeneutic of doubt and reorient ourselves toward the οὐσια ὄντως οὖσα. (shrink)

This book promotes the research of present-day women working in ancient and medieval philosophy, with more than 60 women having contributed in some way to the volume in a fruitful collaboration. It contains 22 papers organized into ten distinct parts spanning the sixth century BCE to the fifteenth century CE. Each part has the same structure: it features, first, a paper which sets up the discussion, and then, one or two responses that open new perspectives and engage in further reflections. (...) Our authors’ contributions address pivotal moments and players in the history of philosophy: women philosophers in antiquity, Cleobulina of Rhodes, Plato, Lucretius, Bardaisan of Edessa, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, Porphyry, Peter Abelard, Robert Kilwardby, William Ockham, John Buridan, and Isotta Nogarola. The result is a thought-provoking collection of papers that will be of interest to historians of philosophy from all horizons. Far from being an isolated effort, this book is a contribution to the ever-growing number of initiatives which endeavour to showcase the work of women in philosophy. (shrink)

This is the first study dedicated to Montaigne's philosophy of the passions. It presents the wisdom of the Essays in a new light. Theoretically original, Montaigne’s anthropology of the passions has a great impact on modern philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes.

Nowadays there is a renewed interest in philosophy as art-of-living. Several prominent authors have pointed out the return of the notion of the good life in philosophy, particularly understood as a form of normative ethics. Questions such as: how should I live have been taken up as a resistance against the dominances of a neo-liberal discourse in all areas of life. This paper is concerned with this renewed interest in philosophy as art-of-living and the form of education that supports this. (...) The main idea is that the commitment from which we live is a subject of change. This way, art-of-living comprises the possibility and the effort to lead on’s life in a reflective way, and not to let it simply go by. Historically this has been connected to the process of becoming educated. In this paper I will take a closer look at this renewed interest in philosophy as the art-of-living by contrasting two different readings of philosophy as the art-of-living. One that is inspired by Oscar Brenifier and one that is inspired by the late Foucault. (shrink)

In light of the recent revival of interest for philosophy as a way of life, Cynicism has received relatively little attention. Classical cynicism, however, is a particularly rich and valuable school in this respect, offering a philosophy that is before anything else a way of life, combining philosophical reflection, a value system, and a practice of living. The present article articulates classical Cynicism as a philosophy as a way of life along these lines. Additionally, classical Cynicism offers a valuable contribution (...) both to current philosophical investigation and to philosophy’s contribution to the question of the good life. In particular, classical Cynicism gives a number of guidelines for a new cynicism, distinct from and regularly in opposition to common modern cynicism. (shrink)

The paradoxical affinities that research has managed to identify between the Epicurean philosophical ‘sect’ and the Christian sect in the early centuries of our era are recalled, then examined in detail in relation to the first document that attests to a specific encounter between the two sects, the narrative of the Acts of the Apostles, which shows Paul discussing with the Athens Epicureans and Stoics, then recovers for us Paul’s speech before the Areopagus in Athens. It seems that Paul sets (...) himself up as a philosopher to expound his doctrine in terms that are to a certain extent compatible with a materialist or even polytheistic doctrine. (shrink)

In ancient as well as in early modern theories of emotion, philosophy is often described as some kind of therapy. However, the assumption that philosophical reflection can influence our emotional life is only plausible, if the following requirements are met. First, one has to defend a realist account of self-knowledge. Second, one must allow for some kind of constructivism in regard to the description of one′s own experience. Finally, one has to maintain a strictly cognitivist conception of emotion. The article (...) discusses these three conditions and shows that, while the idea of a therapeutic influence of philosophical reflection is valid in principle, it is only of a restricted use. (shrink)

En la famosa “Lettre à un critique sévère”, Gilles Deleuze sugiere que existen dos maneras de leer un libro: una que supone un proceso de interpretación y comentario y otra que supone un proceso de experimentación y devenir. En este artículo nos proponemos mostrar que la primera modalidad de lectura es característica de la filosofía entendida como especialización, mientras que la segunda es característica de la filosofía entendida como experimentación. Asimismo, mostraremos que la primera modalidad obedece a un impulso retrospectivo (...) mientras que la segunda a un impulso prospectivo. (shrink)

In this paper the question of note-taking is addressed in reference to a specific educational approach, that of the community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) in the tradition of Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp’s Philosophy for Children (P4C). After emphasizing the pivotal role that this activity plays within a typical session of P4C, its specific status (in comparison with what happens in a classic lecture) is explored, insofar as it could be interpreted as a gesture distributed among and between the teacher (...) and the students. The argumentation is animated and sustained by three intimately interwoven questions: first, how can we construe note-taking in reference to the two philosophical-educational matrices (the Socratic-Platonic and the pragmatist) presiding over CPI? Secondly, who actually takes notes in a P4C session? Could we venture to say that it is CPI as an “intersubject”? And, thirdly, what is the status of the notes taken and written on the flip-chart as a text? Through the analyses developed, note-taking is interpreted as the ‘inscription’ of the co-philosophizing and a kind of self-writing and its significance for the emergence of CPI as such is shown. (shrink)

Kevin Mulligan | : La philosophie des valeurs cognitives, et des vertus et des vices intellectuels, prête peu d’attention au phénomène de la liberté intérieure et de son rapport à la sottise. On doit au poète et penseur polonais, Czesław Miłosz, une étude classique de ce rapport, La pensée captive (1953), examinée ici. Il est aussi question ici de l’apport d’une autre analyse de Miłosz au sujet du coeur de Julien Sorel et du ressentiment à la philosophie de la sottise. (...) | : The philosophy of cognitive values and of intellectual vices and virtues pays little attention to the phenomenon of inner freedom and its relation to foolishness. We owe to the Polish poet and philosopher, Czesław Miłosz, a classic study of this relation, The Captive Mind (1953). I examine the contribution of this study and of an earlier and little known analysis by Miłosz of the heart of Julien Sorel and resentment to the philosophy of foolishness. (shrink)

The Timaeus is a muthos that attempts to imagine a logos of the cosmos. Like the demiurge, readers are to be mimetic artists, poets, who move constantly between the intelligible essences and their likenesses in the world of appearance, experience, and becoming, occupying a third register that is neither and both. The cosmology of the Timaeus is both a likely story and an allegory of its own failure. It takes place within the nonspace of the khōra, a realm accessible only (...) through bastard reasoning that we can perceive only as if in a dream. The Timaeus is an unfinalizable logos in which each moment of positing is also a moment of irony and interrogation, of simultaneous acceptance and active separation, of choric space. (shrink)

This article explores the work of Pedro de Valencia (1555-1620) with the purpose of establishing his philosophical allegiances. On the basis of his only published work, the Academica of 1596, widely circulated and translated into French twice in the eighteenth century, some authors have assumed that he was an Academic skeptic. On the basis of his translations of Dio Chrysostome and Epictetus and other manuscripts in imitation of the literature of retirement of Greek cynicism, others have taken him for a (...) cynic. Placing this work in the context of his other manuscripts on social and economic issues from the price of bread to the burning of witches ; his serious Biblical scholarship and polemics ; and his work as Royal Chronicler in the years 1606-1620, his writings on ancient skepticism and cynicism begin to look like little more than the scholarly exercises of a late humanist. Skepticism and cynicism were rendered harmless as only a part —-and a relatively small part—- of the arsenal of scholarly skills and philosophical sympathies of this knowledgeable and influential early modern scholar. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 40 - 64 This paper focuses on the four preserved commentaries to a Pythagorean poem known as the _Golden Verses_. It deals with two Greek texts—Iamblichus’ _Protrepticus_ and Hierocles’ _Commentary to the Golden Verses_—as well as two commentaries preserved in Arabic, attributed to Iamblichus and Proclus. The article analyses how each of these commentators understood the relationship between man and god in the context of the eschatological vision presented in the poem. It also (...) demonstrates how differences in the interpretation of particular verses and ideas within the poem were dependent on an author’s philosophical views and cultural background. (shrink)

Reseña de Gutiérrez, D. Sócrates y la práctica de la espiritualidad.

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

The complexity of the epistemological framework developed in the philosophy of Iamblichus does not allow to be captured from the polarity that underlies the categories of rational and irrational. After the projection of such categories, the core of this philosophy remains itself misunderstood. In this paper we intend to point to the need for a hermeneutic that respects the Neoplatonism that, from their own internal assumptions, display models that allow open understanding about the meaning and coherence of this thought. A (...) serious approach to the texts foregrounds the importance of the method. This must accompany the complexity of its meaning without projecting beyond categories that hide their cores basic sense, attempting an inside their outlines. The deployment of this path indicates the result of the demonstration of the precariousness of certain exegetical lines that tend to hide behind the projection of conceptual parameters strangers, basic access key to this thought. (shrink)

This article shows how the public inscriptions of Hellenistic poleis, especially decrees in honor of leading citizens, illuminate Greek ethical thinking, including wider debates about questions of central importance for Greek ethical philosophers. It does so by comparing decrees' rhetoric with the ethical language and doctrines of different ancient philosophical schools. Whereas some scholars identify ethical views comparable to Stoic ideas in Hellenistic decrees, this article argues that there are more significant overlaps, especially in decrees from Asia Minor dating to (...) after 150 BC, with fourth-century BC ethical philosophy, especially Aristotle's, and its Hellenistic continuators. The overlaps between decrees and philosophers' approaches had complex, diverse causes, probably sometimes including philosophical education and influence. Comparison of philosophy and epigraphy shows that, in the same way as the polis continued to flourish after Chaironeia, critical reflection about the ethical foundations of civic life also remained vibrant, among both philosophers and citizens. (shrink)

I argue in this essay that Stoic philosophers in the late Greco-Roman period utilized philosophical exercises and spiritual technologies similar in form to a meditative exercise currently practiced in Buddhism. I begin with an in-depth discussion of moral development in the late Stoa, focusing particularly on their theories of cosmopolitanism and oikeiōsis. These theoretical commitments, I argue, necessitated the adoption of exercises and practices designed to guide practitioners toward the goal of universal moral concern. Using insights gained from Buddhist practice, (...) I identify passages in Stoic texts that call for and prescribe moral exercise. While much work in comparative philosophy compares the content of diverse philosophical theories, the form that these theories take can also be compared. Stoic philosophy was viewed as a “way of life” by many ancient philosophers, and thus their philosophical views share several formal characteristics with Buddhist religious practices. The primary good realized by this comparison, I conclude, is to outline the ways in which Greco-Roman philosophies can be enriched by reading these theories in light of the lived, practical traditions that characterize Buddhist thought. (shrink)

Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

Toma-se a crítica de Nietzsche a Sócrates como um caso exemplar que mostra os dois sentidos fundamentais da crítica nietzscheana: (i) a crítica nietzscheana consiste em censura e em elogio de modo dual, ou seja, censura e elogio são aspectos da crítica; e (ii) ao criticar alguém, Nietzsche está, igualmente, se autocriticando.

El presente artículo se centra en el estudio de la exégesis que lleva a cabo Plotino en torno a la significación de la inefabilidad del uno, planteada en el Parménides platónico al hilo de la primera hipótesis. Este ubica a este primer uno inefable en el centro mismo de su sistema, lo que tendrá fuertes implicaciones tanto a nivel ontológico como por lo que respecta a la comprensión del lenguaje. la concepción de la realidad que se deriva de esta inefabilidad (...) del primer principio, de un lado, y las implicaciones en la naturaleza del lenguaje filosófico que abre este postulado, de otro, ocuparán la centralidad de nuestras reflexiones. Atenderemos a los textos originales en los que se plantea la cuestión, apoyándonos en la labor de la crítica, discutiendo los puntos fundamentales a fin de esclarecer la posición que encontramos en las Enéadas. Tomaremos, asimismo, en consideración la actualidad que tiene esta posición y su capacidad de ir más allá de la crítica heideggeriana a la metafísica. (shrink)

À partir d’une typologie des formes de connaissance, je soutiens qu’il y a trois formes principales de connaissance littéraire : cognitive propositionnelle, affective et pratique. La conception propositionnelle est erronée : la littérature ne fournit pas directement une forme de savoir que. La conception affective ou expressiviste peut au mieux dire qu’il y a des effets cognitifs des oeuvres littéraires. La conception pratique a le plus de chances d’être correcte, mais seulement si l’on accepte l’idée que le savoir pratique est (...) en partie basé sur le savoir propositionnel. Starting from a typology of kinds of knowledge, I argue that there are three basic conceptions of literary knowledge : cognitive propositional, affective, and practical. The cognitive conception is misguided : literary knowledge cannot be directly a form of knowledge that. The affective or expressivist conception is too weak : it can at best amount to the idea that there are cognitive effects of literary works. The practical conception is the most promising, but only if one accepts that knowing how is partly based on knowing that and propositional knowledge. (shrink)

The paper addresses the integration of ethics into professional education related to the disciplines responsible for the conception and creation of the artificial (artefactual or technology). The ontological-epistemological paradigm of those disciplines is understood within the frame of the sciences of the artificial as established by Herbert Simon (1969). According to that paradigm, those sciences include disciplines not only related to the production of artefacts (technology), such as engineering, architecture, industrial design, etc, but also disciplines related to devised courses of (...) action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones, like medicine, law, education, etc. They are centered on intentional action and at their core is the activity of design, which is their common foundation and attitude, or their common culture. The science of design becomes the broader foundational discipline for any professions engaged in the intentional transformation of the world. The main distinction between design disciplines and scientific ones rests on the object-project dichotomy. Indeed, contrary to Science that sees the world as an object to be observed, Design sees the world as a project and acts upon the world through projects, which are grounded in intentions, ends, and values. Design disciplines are meant to transform the world, or part of it, and are teleological. Being so, they are embodied in an act that is ethical and their ontology-epistemology must be addressed also through practical reason to resituate all professional disciplines according to their involved nature. (shrink)

For centuries, philosophy has been considered as an intellectual activity requiring complex cognitive skills and predispositions related to complex (or critical) thinking. The Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach aims at the development of critical thinking in pupils through philosophical dialogue. Some contest the introduction of P4C in the classroom, suggesting that the discussions it fosters are not philosophical in essence. In this text, we argue that P4C is philosophy.

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)

The Abrahamic traditions regard God as the world’s author. But what kind of author? A novelist? A playwright? Perhaps a composer of classical music? I will argue that it is best to regard God as like an improvisational play director or the leader of a jazz ensemble. Each determines the broad melodic contours or coarse-grained plot beforehand, while allowing their musicians or actors, and chance, to fill in the more fine-grained details. This analogy allows us to regard God as the (...) ultimate author of this world, while allowing us to be, while less than co-authors, more than mere enactors of a pre-written piece. These metaphors are particularly well-suited to illustrate and flesh out an Open Theistic view of things. (shrink)

Étudier la philosophie antique exige une réflexion sur la conception même de la philosophie. Les travaux de Pierre Hadot montrent avec une lumière nouvelle la distance qui sépare la conception moderne de la philosophie de ses origines antiques. Sans prétendre saisir tous ses aspects et toutes ses implications philosophiques, ce qui est ici proposé est une initiation à la conception de la philosophie entendue comme manière de vivre, telle que développée par Hadot. Il s’agit d’explorer quelques principes et notions fondamentales (...) de cette conception philosophique et de montrer que, tout comme la mystique et la spiritualité, la philosophie définie comme exercice spirituel relève essentiellement de l’expérience vécue. Parallèlement, cet article cherche à comprendre les dimensions herméneutiques de cette conception de la philosophie et à voir comment elle peut servir de clé interprétative pour la lecture des Anciens en vue de nos recherches futures. (shrink)

At a time when bioethical issues are at the top of public and political agendas, there is a renewed interest in representations of the embryo in various religious traditions. One of the major traditions that have contributed to Western representations of the embryo is the Jewish tradition. This tradition poses some difficulties that may deter scholars, but also presents some invaluable advantages. These derive from two components, the search for limits and narrativity, both of which are directly connected with the (...) manner in which Jewish tradition was constructed in Antiquity. The article accomplishes three goals: • To introduce some central elements in ancient Rabbinic literature on the subject of the embryo and its representation; • To present this body of literature as clearly as possible, noting some of the difficulties encountered by scholars who engage in its study; • To explain how the literature’s textuality came about, examining the particular sociopolitical circumstances of Judaism at that time, including the reasons for the delay in the production of scientific texts, transmitted as such, as compared to other philosophical or religious traditions. The claim is that these circumstances engendered a tradition peculiarly relevant for the study and teaching of medical ethics today. (shrink)

In a recent work entitled You must change your life, Peter Sloterdijk explores the practising nature of philosophy and predicts the return of the “immunological”. There is currently a growing demand for anthropotechnics able to strengthen our immune-symbolic system (i.e. mental and physical methods that protect us against uncertainty, anguish, and death). The anthropotechnics that are being practiced worldwide, such as Yoga or Mindfulness, come originally from Indian philosophies and not from ancient Greek or Roman philosophy. Despite the work of (...) historians of philosophy such as Pierre Hadot, the spiritual exercises of ancient Greco-Roman philosophy continue to be studied as fossilized specimens inside university classrooms. This could be due to the pact of indifference, the tacit agreement that lies behind the functioning of contemporary Institutional Philosophy. Thanks to this pact there is no longer any possible contradiction between life and work, because there is, to begin with, no vital commitment to the genuine exercise of philosophy. We assume that philosophy is an exclusively rhetorical exercise and that the task of the professional philosopher is to publish as many papers as possible in prestigious journals that tend to privatize knowledge. Following a different daimon, this essay was conceived as an exercise in thinking outside the academic standards of professional philosophy. The resulting literary experiment has been intentionally kept as natural as possible, without disguising the crossroads of ideas, thinkers, doubts and new problems that arose spontaneously during the exercise. (shrink)

La Práctica Filosófica tiene lugar en el asesoramiento que realiza un filósofo con un cliente que le plantea un problema vital suyo. Este encuentro se realiza siempre mediante el diálogo. Sin embargo, este diálogo siempre está condicionado por unos presupuestos metafísicos del filósofo asesor porque, de hecho, estos condicionan toda acción del filósofo. En este dialogar conjunto, el cliente clarifica su relación con el entorno y le permite comprenderlo mejor. Esta comprensión genera en él un bienestar. El bienestar que gana (...) nuestro cliente no parece responder al resultado de una terapia si se toma la palabra en su significado actual, que tiene su origen en un cambio semántico al ser tomada del griego por el latín: la curación de un mal físico. El proceder de las terapias, alternativas o no, tampoco responde a la forma de comprender los problemas que es característica de la filosofía. En definitiva, las terapias no consideran al ser humano en su totalidad, como sí pretende hacerlo la filosofía. (shrink)