The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop a specific perspective on the history of human thought. This goal can be achieved by critically reflecting on the dominant concept of modernity, linked with the idea of teleological and linear development, which underlies the common vision of history. The proposed approach is grounded in an in-depth analysis of the life and work of Michel de Montaigne, drawing on numerous achievements in intellectual history, conceptual history, and the history of philosophy, simultaneously (...) outlining a novel approach to the history of human thought. The first part of the dissertation revises the concept of modernity, surveys various philosophical interpretations of history (in dialogue with contemporary historiography), and finally outlines reworked notions of modernity and postmodernity. These considerations are based on discussions of history and historicity undertaken by various authors, especially Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. It is especially the latter’s contribution in this area that has been so far underestimated, especially in Poland. What emerges is an image of history as a nexus of changes, neither absolutely progressive nor regressive, occurring in three dimensions: material, linguistic, and mental. Consequently, it appears necessary to take their intertwining into account in all historical research. Contrary to what the dominant notion of modernity suggests, these intersections are in fact argued to facilitate non-dogmatic thinking in any period or moment in history. The second part of the dissertation turns to Montaigne’s Essais – a work whose publication was an exceptional event in intellectual history, which is argued to confirm the previously formulated theses. First, a theoretical construct is introduced, describing the structure of human reality, termed “the structure of authority.” It defines the system of relations that shape the existence of every human being: relations of power, knowledge, and faith. This system of relations is demonstrated using the example of the early modern era. Against this background, Montaigne appears as an author who questioned or at least attenuated the structure of authority in his time because he now appears as a modern or even postmodern writer who was ahead of his time. The first part of the thesis consists of five chapters, two directly addressing the concept of modernity (chapters 1 and 5), one discussing the concept of history (chapter 2), and two other dealing with specific concepts of history developed by Foucault and Derrida (chapters 3 and 4). The second part elaborates on the concept of the structure of authority (chapter 6), and applies it in practice to discuss the early modern period (chapter 7) when Montaigne lived and wrote. His thought is analysed in two subsequent chapters (8 and 9). The author of Essais is argued to be a coherent thinker despite the numerous contradictions found in his work, as well as the originator of the “essay” method. Discussion covers many of his concepts and ideas, as well as his political and religious views. The conclusion gathers all reflections and summarizes the results. (shrink)
Man avoids solitude through _divertissement_ because he is afraid of what staying alone entails: thinking about himself (Pascal). Furthermore, man seeks isolation in order to gain ambition and reputation (Montaigne). However, solitude is really different from isolation and it is a fundamental emotional condition. Heidegger’s analysis of the forms of boredom adapts to and relates to the specific dynamic of solitude, showing that it is a part of human being’s structure despite his experience appearing controversial. Even if man lives in (...) modern apartments and one-room apartments, he is in a condition of co-isolation (Sloterdijk) that differs from solitude. There is a space solitude (Foucault) that involves – or can involve – human isolation, but we only experience essential solitude in sleep (Merleau-Ponty, Blanchot, Perec) where man detached himself from himself and he is really alone, from himself and the others. The forms of solitude lead the analysis towards impersonal activity. (shrink)
Montaigne’s “Apology” is a lengthy work the overarching theme of which is the relationship between epistemology, virtue, and vice. It is a commentary on the thesis that science or knowledge “is the mother of all virtue and that all vice is produced by ignorance.” Montaigne’s response is radical and unequivocal: there is no idea more harmful; its consequences are no less than the destruction of inward contentment and the undermining of societal peace and stability. Indeed, Montaigne sees the Protestant Reformation (...) as the instantiation of this terrible thesis, with all of the attendant trouble it had and continued to cause in France. So Montaigne inverts the thesis: ignorance begets virtue and (presumption of) knowledge vice. Out of this inversion he draws many conservative social and political consequences, and this is one of the most interesting and yet underexplored aspects of the text. Montaigne exhibits the conservatism of the Counterreformation in the “Apology,” and I intend to draw more attention to this theme. I show that Montaigne’s main target in the “Apology” was not dogmatism as such, but Protestantism as a species of dogmatism. I then show that, by using a few elementary epistemic concepts, Montaigne launches a withering skeptical attack on the Reformation. Out of this criticism I draw some important conservative themes that have important implications for our understanding of Montaigne’s social and political thought, as well as for conservative political theory and its intellectual history. (shrink)
Brian C. Ribeiro’s _Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers_ invites us to view the Pyrrhonist tradition as involving all those who share a commitment to the activity of Pyrrhonizing and develops fresh, provocative readings of Sextus, Montaigne, and Hume as radical Pyrrhonizing skeptics.
The article reconsiders a historical example of thinking about otherness. The example is the Essays by Michel de Montaigne, a piece of work from the early modern times which undermines the interpretation of the contemporary times as a modern age, i.e. supposedly more open, less dogmatic, and less hostile towards strangers. Four figures of otherness are taken into account: an infidel, a “savage,” a woman, and an animal, proving Montaigne’s particular openness. It turns out that the Essays induce a contemporary (...) man to revise his sense of historical superiority in regard to men from the previous centuries; they also let him develop a more just relationship with others of the present times. (shrink)
This essay argues that Montaigne and Emerson share not only a literary style and a form of skepticism, but also a moral project, namely—to borrow a concept from Charles Taylor—the affirmation of ordinary life. Moreover, Montaigne and Emerson approach this project in fundamentally the same way: rather than offering readers discursive arguments, they attempt to reform readers’ imaginations. Finally, recognizing the poetic nature of their respective affirmations of ordinary life allows us to appreciate how their seemingly dogmatic claims regarding human (...) equality and the human good are compatible with their shared form of skepticism. (shrink)
Montaigne is a model of philosophy as anti-politics. As incapable as any man of reconciling warring religious parties in 16th-century France, he retires to his estate to write his Essays, revolutionary in its time for collecting its author’s thoughts on a miscellany of subjects – with no didactic intent whatsoever.
Michel de Montaigne famously argued in “Man is No Better Than the Animals” that humans and non-human animals cannot be dichotomized based on language or reasoning abilities, among other characteristics. This article examines a selection of writing features at play in the text and discusses how successfully they convey Montaigne’s claims. Throughout, I argue that Montaigne presents a superficially convincing case for doubting a categorical distinction between humans and animals on linguistic and rational grounds through the use of rhetorical questions, (...) listing, appeals to authority, point of view, imagery, and narrative anecdotes. However, Montaigne’s rejection of a human/animal distinction appears self-refuting since the form and content of his text both suggest that humans typically possess some degree of unique language and reasoning capacities. (shrink)
This study aims to highlight some major aspects of Emersonian skepticism while at the same time showing their deep links with the philosophy of Montaigne. In doing so, it does not rely solely on the well-known essay “Montaigne; or, the Skeptic” (1850), but it tries to articulate its content and other works of Emerson, in order to enrich and refine the moral and anthropological meanings of his skeptical attitude.
Robert Pippin has recently raised what he calls ‘the Montaigne problem’ for Nietzsche's philosophy: although Nietzsche advocates a ‘cheerful’ mode of philosophizing for which Montaigne is an exemplar, he signally fails to write with the obvious cheerfulness attained by Montaigne. We explore the moral psychological structure of the cheerfulness Nietzsche values, revealing unexpected complexity in his conception of the attitude. For him, the right kind of cheerfulness is radically non-naïve; it expresses the overcoming of justified revulsion at calamitous aspects of (...) life through a reflective, higher-order affirmative attitude. This complex notion of cheerfulness turns out to have roots in Montaigne himself, and it must be thought of as a kind of second nature cultivated through practice, as a kind of second nature. Understanding the meaning of cheerfulness thereby sheds light on the conception of philosophy as a way of life in both Nietzsche and Montaigne. (shrink)
Montaigne's thought and writings have been a subject of enduring interest across disciplines. This "Handbook brings together essays by prominent scholars that examine Montaigne's literary, philosophical, and political contributions, and assess his legacy and relevance today in a global perspective.
From Martha Nussbaum to Terence Cave, contemporary literary criticism and philosophy question the moral and cognitive value of literature. Founding their anthropological and moral investigation on a cognitive and pragmatic usage of fictional and non-fictional literature, Montaigne’s Essais offers a striking example of the productive and close relations between literature, philosophy and life.
Literary theory and criticism over the last three decades have shown an increasing interest in studying the cognitive and critical relevance of the “essay” for modern history and culture . This paper aims to supply supporting evidence for this perspective, examining the function of essay writing for both Montaigne and Francis Bacon's conception of human thought and knowledge. In particular, I will focus on the epistemological implications of the essay and fragmentary prose, both considered forms of writing that express a (...) particular way of thinking. (shrink)
Les études qui composent ce volume offrent au lecteur trois perspectives générales sur le scepticisme de Montaigne, dans son rapport respectif : 1) à la raison et à la foi ; 2) aux héritages philosophiques et rhétoriques humanistes ; 3) à la pensée moderne (anthropologie, morale, politique).
Against a background of civil, political and religious conflict, Montaigne and Hobbes redeveloped a form of anthropological and political thinking that ushered in modernity. This collective work is as much concerned with the points where the two authors converge as with the difference in the paths they follow.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)
이 논문은 몽테뉴의 철학을 즐거움의 창조와 삶에 대해 긍정이라는 주제를 통해 조명하려는 시도이다. 본고는 다음과 같은 순서로 전개된다. 나는 우선 몽테뉴가 회의주의의 전개를 통해 인간을 자연의 일부로서 주제화했다는 점을 보여줄 것이다. 두 번째로 나는 몽테뉴가 특이성으로 가득 차 있으며 부단한 변화 중에 있는 자연적 조건 안에서의 인간에게 실체로서의 자기 인식은 가능하지 않으며, 오직 부단한 변화 속에 있는 자기 자신에 대한 묘사만이 가능하다고 생각했다는 점을 보여줄 것이다. 그리고 나는 몽테뉴가 각 인간이 자기 자신과 맺는 관계를 자기 자신에 대한 확실한 인식이 아니라 (...) 신체와 정신을 능동적으로 사용하며 다양한 삶의 형식들을 창조하는 “삶의 기술”로 이해했다는 점 역시 설명할 것이다. 마지막으로 나는 아리스토텔레스와 토마스 아퀴나스로 대표되는 행복에 대한 전통적인 관점과 비교하면서 몽테뉴가 좋은 삶을 말하는 방식의 새로움을 부각시킬 것이다. 그에 따르면 좋은 삶이란 감각적인 것들과 우연적인 것들로 가득 차 있는 자연적 조건 안에서 삶을 긍정하고 즐거움을 창조하는 삶이다. 이 논의들을 통해 본고는 몽테뉴를 목적론과 실체론적 형이상학에 환원되지 않는 철학적 사유의 선구자 중 하나로 제시하려 한다. (shrink)
Montaigne is widely appreciated as an important figure in the history of skepticism, but the precise nature of his skepticism remains unclear. While most treatments of Montaigne’s skepticism focus on the “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” there is reason to believe that the “Apology” does not contain his last word on the subject, and that—as many scholars have pointed out—whatever endorsement he gives there to ancient Pyrrhonism must be qualified in light of the fact that he does maintain beliefs, not only (...) about appearances, but also about reality itself. This essay argues that by the end of the Essais, Montaigne has developed a skepticism that is, as he would say, “all his own,” one that is best understood as a therapeutic practice meant to treat what Montaigne calls our “natural and original malady.”. (shrink)
In the essay “Of repentance,” Montaigne proclaims his moral autonomy, explaining to readers that he lives his life according to his own laws and that he judges himself in his own court. This essay attempts to give an account of the nature of Montaigne’s conception of autonomy, and ultimately argues that it deserves the attention of philosophers interested in alternatives to the conceptions of autonomy offered by figures from the history of philosophy such as Plato, Kant, and Rorty.
This is the first study dedicated to Montaigne's philosophy of the passions. It presents the wisdom of the Essays in a new light. Theoretically original, Montaigne’s anthropology of the passions has a great impact on modern philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes.
Shakespeare, Nietzsche wrote, was Montaigne’s best reader—a typically brilliant Nietzschean insight, capturing the intimate relationship between Montaigne’s ever-changing record of the self and Shakespeare’s kaleidoscopic register of human character. And there is no doubt that Shakespeare read Montaigne—though how extensively remains a matter of debate—and that the translation he read him in was that of John Florio, a fascinating polymath, man-about-town, and dazzlingly inventive writer himself. -/- Florio’s Montaigne is in fact one of the masterpieces of English prose, with a (...) stylistic range and felicity and passages of deep lingering music that make it comparable to Sir Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy and the works of Sir Thomas Browne. This new edition of this seminal work, edited by Stephen Greenblatt and Peter G. Platt, features an adroitly modernized text, an essay in which Greenblatt discusses both the resemblances and real tensions between Montaigne’s and Shakespeare’s visions of the world, and Platt’s introduction to the life and times of the extraordinary Florio. Altogether, this book provides a remarkable new experience of not just two but three great writers who ushered in the modern world. (shrink)
Montaigne's Essais (1580-1592) are one of the most remarkable works of the European Renaissance. The Essais' innovative open-mindedness is at odds with the dogmatism and intolerance of their times, the decades of civil and religious wars in Unsettling Montaigne reassesses Montaigne's scepticism. Informed by psychoanalytic and related theory, its close attention to Montaigne's complex uses of metaphor illuminates the psychic economy of his scepticism and tolerance and their poetics.
It is a recent tendency to read certain pre- and early-modern thinkers as “anticipatory critics” of modernity; the name of Michel de Montaigne often comes up in this context. Most of the critical approaches treat Montaigne like a pre-Rousseau proto-romantic which is indeed is an important part of Montaigne’s thinking. However, as I show in this paper, his Essays also allow for a different interpretation. Namely, I demonstrate that 1) Montaigne’s appraisal of Nature is far from a romantic-idyllic one; 2) (...) his understanding of the interspecies division is more subtle than it is often thought; 3) his thought thus interpreted includes an ethics of becoming-animal that is based on a radically anti-Platonic body-mind economy. (shrink)
Montaigne’s _Essays_ are rightfully studied as giving birth to the literary form of that name. Ann Hartle’s _Montaigne and the Origins of Modern Philosophy_ argues that the essay is actually the perfect expression of Montaigne as what he called "a new figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher." Unpremeditated philosophy is philosophy made sociable—brought down from the heavens to the street, where it might be engaged in by a wider audience. In the same philosophical act, Montaigne both transforms philosophy and invents (...) "society," a distinctly modern form of association. Through this transformation, a new, modern character emerges: the individual, who is neither master nor slave and who possesses the new virtues of integrity and generosity. In Montaigne’s radically new philosophical project, Hartle finds intimations of both modern epistemology and modern political philosophy. (shrink)
Cet article tente de montrer que la première partie du Discours de la méthode est le lieu d'expériences proprement montaniennes ordonnées sous deux types de pratique: la pratique des livres d'une part, la pratique des voyages d'autre part, autrement dit dans la lecture des auteurs et la fréquentation du monde. Rejouant ainsi un cliché de la littérature médiévale — la dichotomie entre le liber scripturae et le liber naturae, monde du livre et livre du monde —, Montaigne se trouve dépassé (...) par Descartes, pour qui la quête de la vérité ne peut finalement se passer de l'étude en soi-même. L'excès cartésien, qui consiste à récuser le liber naturae autant que le liber scripturae, non sans les avoir préalablement pratiqués, va alors de pair avec la promotion d'une subjectivité de type transcendantal opposée à la subjectivité montanienne. Our article attemps to show the First Part of the Discours on Method is the place of Montanian experiences ordered under two types of practice: practice of books on one hand, practice of travels on the other hand, in other words in reading of the authors and company of the world. So replaying a cliché of medieval literature — the dichotomy between liber scripturae and liber naturae, world of the book and book of the world —, Montaigne is exceeded by Descartes, for whom the quest of the truth cannot finally do without the study in the self. The Cartesian excess, which consists in rejecting the liber naturae as much as the liber scripturae, not without having practised them beforehand, then keeps pace with the promotion of a transcendental subjectivity opposed to Montanian subjectivity. (shrink)
In this paper I interpret Montaigne’s essay, “On Educating Children”, as a pedagogical text through its performance of a distinct epistolary function, one that addresses the letter-recipient for the purpose of shaping the ideas, actions, and beliefs of that individual. At the same time, I also read “On Educating Children” within the context of the wider project of Montaigne’s Essays, which, as I suggest, is an ethical-aesthetic project of self-fashioning and self-cultivation. The net result is an interpretation of teaching as (...) an ethical-aesthetic practice of the self, one that is in concert with the interpretation of Montaigne’s writing of the Essays as a similar practice of the self. In order to build this case, I employ Michel Foucault’s fourfold schema of ethical subjectivity, mapping that schema onto “On Educating Children”, so as to reveal a unique pedagogy of self-formation—a pedagogy that works as much upon the self of the teacher as it does the self of the student. (shrink)
De concert avec ses fonctions politiques - et cela sur vingt ans -, Montaigne rédigea ses Essais que l'on considère trop souvent comme séparés de ses responsabilités publiques aujourd'hui reléguées à l'arrière plan de sa carrière d'écrivain. Nous voudrions arguer que ses Essais sont indissociables de sa vie publique. Certes, les préoccupations littéraires et politiques de Montaigne changent avec son temps, mais ce qui fonde la forme de l'essai - à savoir un discours profondément inscrit dans le présent - ne (...) permet pas d'établir une différence théorique entre le privé et le public puisque les deux sont pratiquement inséparables quand ils sont réduits à leur unité la plus stricte qui se rapporte essentiellement au quotidien, car dans l'immédiat du vécu, le privé et le public sont pratiquement indissociables. Si une philosophie se dégage indubitablement des Essais, elle a peut-être plus à voir avec la manipulation constante effectuée par Montaigne entre le particulier (vie privée) et l'universel (vie publique) que sur le contenu de tel précepte moral ou dogme des écoles antiques. La temporalité de l'écriture et celle des événements ne sont pas en synchronie dans les Essais et Montaigne joue constamment sur cette image d'un livre privé (hors de toute temporalité historique) alors que les Essais sont conçus comme un objet lui permettant précisément l'accès à la vie publique. Cette philosophie du quotidien et du temps présent qui ressort des Essais ne saurait mettre à l'écart les considérations publiques et historiques qui rythment toujours l'écriture d'une vie bien particulière. Paralelamente a suas funções políticas - e isso em 20 anos - Montaigne escreveu seus Ensaios frequentemente considerados como separados de suas responsabilidades públicas, atualmente relegadas a um segundo plano em relação à sua carreira de escritor. Gostaríamos de argumentar que seus ensaios são inseparáveis de sua vida pública. Certamente, as preocupações literárias e políticas de Montaigne mudam com o seu tempo, mas o que funda a forma do ensaio - a saber, um discurso profundamente inscrito no presente - não permite estabelecer uma diferença teórica entre público e privado, uma vez que os dois são praticamente inseparáveis quando reduzidos à sua unidade mais estrita, a qual se relaciona principalmente com a vida cotidiana, porque no imediato do vivido, o privado e o público são praticamente indissociáveis. Se uma filosofia emerge, sem dúvida, dos Ensaios, ela talvez tenha mais a ver com a manipulação constante realizada por Montaigne entre o particular (vida privada) e o universal (vida pública) do que com o conteúdo de algum preceito moral ou dogma das escolas antigas. A temporalidade da escrita e a dos eventos não estão em sincronia nos Ensaios e Montaigne opera constantemente sobre a imagem de um livro privado (fora de toda temporalidade histórica), enquanto os Ensaios são concebidos como um objeto, permitindo-lhe precisamente o acesso à vida pública. Essa filosofia do cotidiano e do tempo presente que promana dos Ensaios não afasta as considerações públicas e históricas que sempre dão ritmo à escrita de uma vida muito particular. (shrink)
More than any other early modern text, Montaigne's Essais have come to be associated with the emergence of a distinctively modern subjectivity, defined in opposition to the artifices of language and social performance. Felicity Green challenges this interpretation with a compelling revisionist reading of Montaigne's text, centred on one of his deepest but hitherto most neglected preoccupations: the need to secure for himself a sphere of liberty and independence that he can properly call his own, or himself. Montaigne and the (...) Life of Freedom restores the Essais to its historical context by examining the sources, character and significance of Montaigne's project of self-study. That project, as Green shows, reactivates and reshapes ancient practices of self-awareness and self-regulation, in order to establish the self as a space of inner refuge, tranquillity and dominion, free from the inward compulsion of the passions and from subjection to external objects, forces and persons. (shrink)
"Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in" (1.31.152, VS205).1 Remarks such as this from the essay "Of cannibals" have led commentators to argue that Montaigne subscribes to the theory of moral relativism, and that he takes "reason" to be a subjective, rather than an objective, standard for judgment.2 Yet (...) later in that same essay, Montaigne condemns the cannibals' brutal treatment of their enemies (1.31.155, VS209) and concludes that "we may call these people barbarians, in respect to the rules of reason, but not in respect to ourselves, who surpass them .. (shrink)
This essay argues that Montaigne draws on elements of both the Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptical traditions, but that the fundamental desire for self-knowledge that initially led him to appreciate the insights of the ancient skeptics ultimately leads him beyond them. What lies at the heart of Montaigne’s skepticism is neither an epistemological position nor the experience of doubt, but rather the determination to philosophize self-consciously.
Skepticism is a central aspect of our intellectual heritage, even if many of us do not recognize it. Only in recent decades has the intellectual archeology been done that enables to see this part of our heritage and its role in how we came to think the way we do. Gianni Paganini's Skepsis . Le debat des modernes sur le scepticisme (2008) is the most important recent work in this archeology, bringing out the role of early modern thinkers from Montaigne (...) to Bayle in the development of the contemporary world view. Some of these thinkers helped us accept and learn to live with skepticism, such as Montaigne and Bayle. Others, such as Campanella and Descartes, thought they could refute skepticism, but their encounters with it accomplished two things: one, bringing skeptical arguments to the attention of the philosophical world, and two, giving skepticism renewed life by their failures to refute it. All of this is great background to understanding what Barack Obama means when he calls himself a skeptic. (shrink)
According to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom. (shrink)
While contemporary readers may find what appear to be appealing streaks of liberalism in Montaigne's 'Essays', I argue that a more careful analysis suggests that Montaigne's overall stance is quietistic and conservative. To help support this claim I offer a close reading of 'Essays' III.11 ("Of Cripples"), where Montaigne offers his famous critique of the witch trials of early modern Europe. Once Montaigne's objections to the witch trials are properly understood, we see that Montaigne did not seriously or consistently dispute (...) the church's authority in political matters, though certain undeveloped seeds of liberalism do leave an unresolved tension in his writings. (shrink)
The relation between scepticism and health is not considered in the same light by the sceptics and by their enemies. According to its enemies, scepticism is a disease of the soul that has no access to truth ; whereas for the sceptics, it is the only means to mental health. But in fact, things are more complex. Modern sceptics like Montaigne or Hume, see doubt as something that has to be overcome. They view scepticism as a critical moment leading to (...) health.RésuméEn ce qui concerne la santé et la maladie, le scepticisme est diversement apprécié par ses détracteurs ou ses adeptes. Pour les premiers, il est la figure même de la maladie de l’âme privée de vérité, pour les seconds il est le seul moyen d’atteindre la santé mentale. Mais les choses sont plus compliquées, car certains sceptiques modernes, comme Hume ou Montaigne, voient dans le doute un moment critique qu’il faut traverser. (shrink)
Tradução para o português de "L'Entretien de Pascal avec M. de Saci" - Colóquio com o Senhor de Saci Sobre Epicteto e Montaigne". Tradução realizada com base na edição das Œuvres completes de Pascal, estabelecida e anotada por Jacques Chevalier, da Bibliothèque de la Plêiade, Paris, 1954, p. 560-574.