Freedom and Liberty

El artículo realiza un diálogo crítico con las 18 tesis alemanas sobre marxismo y liberación animal publicadas en la Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Críticos Animales (Año VI, Vol. II, 2020). Se conjetura que una actualización programática de la teoría de la revolución permanente de León Trotsky, el materialismo histórico en la contemporaneidad de crisis civilizatoria, la agencia estratégica del movimiento obrero, el trabajo asalariado y sus partidos políticos, precisan incorporar la liberación de las especies animales del Sur y Norte, explotadas (...) por el capital universal, deslindándose de la ideología especista occidental y el imperialismo. El orden que se sigue es dialogar en torno a siete puntos controversiales entre los defensores de los animales, el medio ambiente y el proyecto socialista, a la luz de las dieciocho tesis alemanas y las ciencias de especies. (shrink)

For those who are not familiar with the terms used and issues discussed by political philosophers, or are familiar but want to go down the philosophical rabbit hole a little further, you can do so by having a look at my recent book—Analytical Fascism: What Stares Back When One Stares into the De-Enlightenment. The book came out at the end of last year, before Trump’s January 20, 2025 inauguration, but I think it fair to say that the underlying moral views (...) that are motivating every move the Trump administration has made so far are described and explained in that book. Of course, I can only mention a few of the many arguments I presented in that book here, but I will begin with one that might be the most philosophically significant: how Trumpism and liberalism as ideologies have such radically different starting positions that committed members of either group have no common moral language with which to talk to one other. (shrink)

This book analyzes the interaction between Internet culture and the bureaucratic culture of secrecy. It explores how the collection of data enables the acquisition of a solid body of evidence leads to mapping initiatives across case studies and developing a common set of metrics to consistently assess impact and value creation within and across countries.

Humans use narratives to make sense of historical developments as well as to guide their future actions, and these narratives can in turn have great impact on their lives, societies and the world overall. Here I would like to put forward such a narrative to rationalize the increasingly forceful changes of our current decade. Arguing for the existence of three ongoing waves of emancipation of the individual in society, it is proposed that we are currently approaching the high-point of conflict (...) of the second, economic emancipation process. After the outgoing first wave made (at least some) people fully aware of the importance of political equality and lead to the formation of (at least some) democratic states on the basis of national constitutions, we now have to fully accept the importance of economic fairness to enable us to continue our venture into the third wave of cultural fairness as diversity, which in my opinion puts the philosophy of economics under the pressure to tackle an increasingly important task, namely to develop ideas for better working constitutional principles for economic communities. A failure to do so would mean to not only fail to implement fair and sustainable markets, but as a result to fall back behind even political equality, with strongmen – banally driven by childhood wounds and riding on waves of public discontent – capturing democratic states with badly informed narratives about western civilization, for instance in the form of ‘Christian Nationalism’. Intentionally obscuring the facts that liberal democracies and free markets do in fact not underperform in comparison to the existing alternatives, and that extreme inequality is instead most often to a large part driven by the greed and ruthlessness of individuals who misuse their power to distort economic and political frameworks, these strongmen could then roll-back important civilizational advances while trying to satisfy their insatiable ego: What ‘great’ men want is still so boring. (shrink)

what really needs to remain from the text at the end of the day is that which contains all there is to know about how to live the end (The Final Text). The most effective technique of acceleration to the summit of history is to forget all that needs to be forgotten. Perhaps languages must compete and merge for unification. One thing that for sure has to go is that who wrote what and when. Once the author is physically dead, (...) absolutely nothing benefits him posthumously. What matters is Total semiosis and internalization of terms of hegemonic anarchism constrained by zero violence and singular acutely politically concentrated free market. (shrink)

Extended Abstract After the onslaught of some Enlightenment thinkers on religion, Tocqueville was one of the most impressive philosophers who tried to reconcile modern democracy with religion. He believes liberty cannot be established without morality, and morality cannot be established without faith. For Tocqueville, religious belief is an essential bulwark of freedom. He wanted to persuade French liberals that the Catholic Church was not necessarily the enemy of freedom and French Catholics that democracy was not necessarily the enemy of the (...) Catholic Church. In his last years, Tocqueville’s pessimism about the future of liberty in France directly resulted from the stormy relationship between religion and democratic society in France. Tocqueville’s vision of religion’s enduring significance in democratic societies aligns him with those associated with “post-secular society” theories today. This article analyzes Tocqueville’s personal beliefs, the causes of his attention to religion, the relationship between religion and the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood,” the relationship between religion and materialism, the relationship between religion and freedom, and the relationship between religion and state in Tocqueville’s philosophy. As Kahan says, moral issues (concerns about human character and its development) in a democratic society were at the heart of Tocqueville’s project. In putting the question of moral character at the center of his work, Tocqueville was placing himself within a long and distinguished French tradition that reached back to writers including La Bruyère, Pascal and Corneille and continued through figures such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Chateaubriand. If Tocqueville invented a “new political science,” it was in the service of his new moral science, a science intended to encourage democratic grandeur and preserve democratic souls from degradation. For Tocqueville, democratic societies faced a choice between despotism and freedom. His new political science was intended to help them choose freedom. His new moral science was designed to help them face a parallel and related choice between moral degradation and moral greatness. As a moralist, Tocqueville aspired to be not merely democracy’s political guru but its spiritual director. Tocqueville is going to discover a road between two paths. The first path is materialism. It is concerned only with satisfying the needs of the body. The second path is spiritualism, i.e. to inflict suffering and privations on ourselves to live the life of the soul. He notices at the one end of this tendency, Heliogabalus, and at the other, St. Jerome, and he believes that the middle road (a path between Heliogabalus and St. Jerome) is the only one that can be suitable for humanity. Tocqueville believes that man can never simultaneously bear complete religious independence and full political liberty. So, he thinks that man must have faith for freedom; if he does not, he must serve, and if he is free, he must believe. As Zuckert says, in democratic times, religion can be preserved and exercise a salutary effect on morals - individual and social - only by combining it with economic calculation in public opinion, as in America. Democratic circumstances are not antagonistic to all tenets of faith. On the contrary, similar and equal people can easily understand the notion of a single God, imposing on each one of them the same rules and granting them future happiness at the same cost. However, as Zuckert says, if religious beliefs were to be propagated and preserved by such a public consensus, the doctrinaire and formal aspects antagonistic to democratic tastes would have to be minimized. It would not suffice merely to separate church and state. The content and form of religious services had to be adapted to democratic conditions. Religious leaders would also have to work to synthesize secular and sacred beliefs. Rather than stressing how concern for their eternal salvation stands in opposition to the material interests of their congregations, preachers need to recognize the dominance of public opinion and explicitly align themselves with it in an emphatically nonpartisan way. Tocqueville says Americans combat individualism with the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood.” Zuckert says this doctrine serves precisely the two functions for which Tocqueville had praised religion. Although it does not destroy the materialist desires of democratic people, it does make them pursue those interests honestly. It also works to overcome the “individualism” or isolation that economic pursuits tended to foster. The philosophers who teach this doctrine say to men that, to be happy in life, you must watch over your passions and carefully repress their excesses; that you cannot gain lasting happiness except by denying yourself a thousand passing enjoyments, and that finally, you must triumph over yourself constantly to serve yourself better. Tocqueville is not afraid to say that, of all philosophical theories, the doctrine of “self-interest properly understood” seems the most appropriate to the needs of his contemporaries. He sees it as the most powerful tool they have left to protect them from themselves. It should, therefore, be the primary focus of today’s moralists. He does not believe that the doctrine of self-interest as preached in America is self-evidently true in all respects, but it does contain many truths so evident that enlightened men cannot fail to see them. Enlighten them, therefore, regardless of the cost, for the century of blind self-sacrifice and instinctive virtue is fast receding into the past, and what he sees approaching is an age in which liberty, public peace, and social order itself will be unable to do without enlightenment. Zuckert says that if religion survived in modern egalitarian societies, Tocqueville concluded that it would result from self-interested calculations that were generally effective through the force of public opinion. The specifically religious content of “self-interest properly understood” was minimal, but irreplaceable. To convince individuals to risk their lives for the common good, beliefs in God and judgment in the afterlife are beneficial, if not indispensable. The necessary beliefs are few, simple, and, we should note, not distinctively Christian. Indeed, when Tocqueville turned to discuss the basis of individual morality, he suggested that even belief in divine retribution or punishment was not essential. Tocqueville thus minimizes the necessary content of a “civil religion” even more than Jean Jacques Rousseau did in Social Contract. He believes that most religions are only general, simple and practical means to teach men the immortality of the soul. In this respect, Tocqueville follows Montesquieu, who characterized Stoicism as a religion. Last but not least, like Montesquieu, Tocqueville also had serious doubts about the compatibility of some religions with human liberty, if for no other reason than that they do not allow for the necessary separation of religion and politics. -/- . (shrink)

Relational egalitarianism holds that people should live together as equals. We argue against the received wisdom amongst both friends and foes of relational egalitarianism that it fails to provide a theory of intergenerational justice. Instead, we argue that relational egalitarianism is concerned with social equality amongst future contemporaries, and that this commitment gives rise to duties of justice for current generations that can be grounded in the idea of generational overlap. In doing so, we argue that that the scope of (...) relational egalitarian concerns extends beyond generations amongst whom social relations exist. (shrink)

In these transformative times of interrupted lives, humanity has had to take a step back and subject its frantic, rushed existence to a profound analytical glance. The COVID pandemic has caused millions to suffer and the elderly are more vulnerable than ever; moreover, many families are left to mourn alone, not always able to gather around their departed loved ones at the time of grief. This has led many to believe that humanity has lost control of its environment and its (...) destiny. Yet, if recent predictions by sociologists come true, the current, seemingly never-ending pandemic might have some positive results. The anguish it causes may be, in fact, teaching us to appreciate the value of the natural world that we are depleting, to understand “the other”, and to recognise the planet-saving significance of the phrase “less is more”. And while the world’s populations slowly realise that their social environment has changed permanently, the pandemic’s beneficial upshot might be that people will be mindful of things beyond their immediate concerns and will begin to see the “bigger picture”. In view of the speculative disarray inherent to our present condition, this paper proposes existentialism as a system of thought with the intrinsic power to guide individual and social awareness; it thus analyses our present in an interpretive and pragmatic light while it draws on the existentialist theories of Søren Kierkegaard and Simone de Beauvoir. Both philosophers are querying and inquisitive and both timelessly relevant, sensible and direct about what they see is at the core of human existence. (shrink)

Com uma história que ultrapassa cem anos, a ciência da mensuração da pobreza foi impulsionada pela necessidade de critérios mais sistemáticos para determinar tanto a extensão do fenômeno quanto aquelas pessoas com direito à assistência social. Discuto dois dos principais produtos dessa história: as linhas de pobreza e as abordagens para sua mensuração. As linhas separam as pessoas em pobreza ― aquelas cujo nível de carência está abaixo da linha ― daquelas fora dela ― aquelas cujo nível está acima. E (...) se pobreza é uma carência, nem todas as carências caracterizam pobreza. Não por acaso, cada abordagem se distingue por definir que tipo de carência faz da pobreza o que ela é. Aqui, apresento seis abordagens: monetária, subsistência, privação relativa, necessidades básicas, capacidades e direitos humanos. Mas entre pesquisadores, persiste a falta de consenso, seja sobre como traçar a linha de pobreza ou sobre qual abordagem é mais adequada. Relacionado a isso, concluo que diagnósticos sobre a pobreza de uma sociedade exigem o emprego não de uma, mas de diferentes medidas. (shrink)

Este libro reúne una serie de contribuciones que abordan, desde distintas disciplinas y enfoques, el diseño, la implementación y la evaluación de las políticas de protección social en América Latina. Los capítulos son reformulaciones de los problemas y respuestas presentados en el Workshop Internacional “Protección social y pobreza: abordando la multidimensionalidad del problema”, llevado a cabo en mayo de 2024. Durante el evento, se presentaron estudios sobre el impacto de los programas de transferencia de ingresos en países del Cono Sur, (...) como Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y México. La obra refleja la multidimensionalidad del problema, integrando análisis normativos, económicos y políticos, así como perspectivas etnográficas y jurídicas. A través del estudio de casos como el Programa Prospera (México), el Programa Bolsa Família (Brasil) y el programa Acompañamientos de Familia (Argentina), el libro ofrece una mirada crítica sobre los alcances y desafíos de estos programas en el contexto de la pobreza y la exclusión social en la región. A partir de estas experiencias, no solo se busca evaluar las políticas actuales, sino también reflexionar sobre estrategias futuras para enfrentar estos desafíos. (shrink)

The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender-unjust world. Rather than justifying (...) pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old-age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old-age redistribution. (shrink)

Freedom and security are often portrayed as things that have to be traded off against one another, but this view does not capture the full complexity of the freedom-security relationship. Rather, there seem to be four different ways in which freedom and security connect to each other: freedom can come at the cost of security, security can come at the cost of freedom, freedom can work to the benefit of security, and security can work to the benefit of freedom. This (...) paper analyses each of these connections in turn. It shows that particular understandings of freedom can help us to see particular connections between freedom and security. The practical examples used to illustrate these connections are drawn from the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be suggested that, in the face of challenges such as this one, taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can ultimately help decision-makers in upholding both. (shrink)

Ein kurzer Aufsatz über den Zusammenhang von negativer Freiheit und Privateigentum.

Transparency has become a global concept of responsible government. This book argues that the transnational discourse of transparency promotes potentially contradictory policy ideas that can lead to unintended consequences. It critically examines whether or not increased transparency really leads to increased democratic accountability.

The article argues that liberty-based arguments alone are not enough to justify a universal basic income, whether as a replacement of current welfare programs, or as an addition to them. Appeals to negative liberty, real freedom, republican liberty, and autonomy cannot show that a universal basic income is superior to (all kinds of) conditional benefits. To do so, proponents of a universal basic income will have to invoke values beyond liberty.

---- I ---- Once upon a time, there was a most elegant lady who had a most majestic dog on leash standing but distracted by something other than the dog. The dog struggled impossibly but forcefully to loose free and chase a most ordinary rabbit. ------ II ------ Another time the elegant lady dines at a fancy restaurant. Then she was walking on the sidewalk when she encountered an ordinary homeless in the state of minimal energy giving all in to (...) gravity. She gave him her left-over. He nodded or something. Then she cheerfully and vigorously and most innocently and heartwarmingly and charmingly wished the homeless guy a GREAT night. ----- III ----- IF the rabbit and the homeless guy are the same ordinary entity, and the elegant entity is to represent acutely concentrated political power and the Majestic entity is to represent the free market THEN a fair contract would be: ask for food and security and shelter in exchange for mindless work and give up money or capital and the privilege of procreation. Excursus: cryptocurrency features the rabid dog. (shrink)

Medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems are value-laden technologies that can simultaneously encourage and discourage conflicting values that may all be relevant for the pursuit of justice. I argue that the predominant theory of healthcare justice, the Rawls-inspired approach of Norman Daniels, neither adequately acknowledges such conflicts nor explains if and how they can resolved. By juxtaposing Daniels’s theory of healthcare justice with Axel Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s respective theories of justice, I draw attention to one such conflict. Medical AI may (...) improve the distribution of opportunity qua health while simultaneously mis-recognizing patients and thereby reducing their self-respect. I argue that justly resolving this conflict will at times require greater inclusion of those mis-recognized in deliberation about medical AI, and consider what such inclusion may entail. (shrink)

La "servitude volontaire" est une formule mobilisée tant dans le champ universitaire que dans le champ intellectuel ou journalistique. Ses usages, parfois référés au Discours de la servitude volontaire de La Boétie et, plus rarement, appuyés sur une lecture précise de ce texte, prétendent situer la source de la domination dans le libre consentement de ceux qui la subissent. Mais cette formule au caractère oxymorique, presque provocateur, occulte le plus souvent les véritables causes de cette apparente volonté de servir. Les (...) explications de ce phénomène, telles que le désir, la coutume, la soumission consentie, la domination symbolique, l'obsequium ou la jouissance dans la servitude, doivent permettre de comprendre ce qui apparaît sinon comme une monstruosité et une énigme. L'étude du monde du travail montre notamment que les analyses en termes de servitude volontaire ne sont pas les plus adéquates. Enfin, si une telle formule peut susciter une prise de conscience, elle ne fournit pas pour autant la clé de l'émancipation. (shrink)

Parents appear to dominate their children in ways they cannot with other adults. While it might seem unavoidable, this issue raises important questions about whether children are unfree under parental authority. Republican theories of freedom, such as Philip Pettit’s influential account, look especially vulnerable. He claims that we are free only if non-dominated and so not under the arbitrary interference by others. Domination is a threat to freedom that republican freedom opposes for all. However, non-domination seems impossible to avoid for (...) everyone, most notably children, which is broadly accepted. If so, it is unclear why domination is permissible for some and not others if it is an evil for all to avoid. In this article, I argue that parental authority need not entail domination where it is subject to legitimacy constraints drawing on Pettit’s work on freedom and criminal justice that might also be endorsed by non-republicans. Republican children can enjoy non-domination from the cradle to the grave and this reveals how parental authority need not render children unfree for non-republicans as well. (shrink)

Freedom of expression in a conflict of rights. Freedom of expression is one of the issues that society considers important for various reasons. Its application, however, gives rise to many conflicts. This article discusses the conflicts that come from both plurality of opinions and misunderstanding of freedom of expression. It focuses on the conflicts between the individual and the totalitarian regime. Then there is a discussion of the conflict of rights which can be the result of the practicing of freedom (...) of expression. This conflict can often only be resolved by authoritarian intervention, restricting the application of certain rights. The attempt to resolve the conflict and define the necessary restrictions leads to the need to rely on a concrete justification and derivation of human rights. The paper relies on a justification of rights based on an analysis of human nature, specifically the understanding of human beings as rational and free beings, capable of acting responsibly and naturally forming human society with others. From such an analysis, a response to the conflicts of opinion will emerge in the synergy of tolerance and paresis. (shrink)

The classical liberal paradigm has always argued for strong economic freedom combined with limits on government power. But it has also been always openminded about using government programs to improve the society. These principles, if applied to today’s society, are simultaneously a criticism of “really existing” welfare state ideology – with its lack of economic freedom and its reliance on the expansive bureaucracy – but also an opportunity for reforming welfare states toward more freedom-based alternatives. There is a utopian potential (...) in classical liberalism. This book articulates how several strands of liberalism, including Austrian school liberalism and Chicago school liberalism, may support something like universal basic income (UBI). (shrink)

If there is no God everything is permitted. The phenomenology of decision tells us that permissibility and utility are intimately coordinated (Reason Internalism is effectively a thesis that erases the line between the two). Because of the difference in utility one does not find every choice equally permitted. That the instant of decision is madness means one finds facing every real decision frightening. it is not the case that there is no God. One's God is that which matters most crucially (...) for one's decision. (shrink)

The courage to use one's own reason is an invitation to take more actions---implicating excessive use of agency, even under rampant false consciousness manufactured by mass media and technological priorities. If one does nothing and gains nothing by doing nothing, one is not subject to any evaluation or interpretation. Modernity is an ongoing incessant festival of cruel hermeneutic sacrificial.

Not only is freedom a shared concern of Sartre and Schelling, which would not be anything particularly unique, but for both philosophers, freedom must be articulated out of an ontological ground, or within the confines of an ontological system. A contradiction nevertheless appears to arise regarding the “orientation” of Sartre and Schelling’s respective “ontologies of freedom”: the freedom of Sartre, reflecting a contemporary stoic-inspired doctrine, is directed toward the future, while for Schelling, with affinities to the temporal logic of psychoanalysis, (...) freedom is oriented toward the past. This article presents both Sartre and Schelling’s ontological reasoning out of which either a progressively oriented freedom (the freedom to negate the present in the name of future “possibles”) or a retrogressively oriented freedom (the freedom to determine the ground of the present out of an indefinite, a-temporal becoming), before attempting to resolve this contradiction in the temporality of freedom by examining the position and role of the negative (of negation, contradiction, or nothingness), as either secondary or primary, within the ontology of each respective philosopher. (shrink)

I provide a defence of the classical liberal tradition (from Locke and Smith to Hayek and Tomasi) as a blueprint for a 'bleeding-heart libertarian' framework of society. Such a society defends three principles: 1) Freedom from private coercion (Private Property), 2) Freedom from public coercion (Limited Government); and 3) Within these limits, the provision of a limited range of public goods and public welfare (Limited Welfare State). I show that principles can be abstracted from a reading of the classical liberal (...) tradition. Then, through an extensive analysis of Locke, I show the importance, and consequentialist justifications, of the Three Principles for any liberal welfare state. Through a critique of Nozick, I show the inadequacy of the hardcore libertarian interpretation. Then, I show that John Tomasi, Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek have all defended versions of limited welfare states. On this basis, I propose that the Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is a good example, supported by Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman, of a welfare principle that is compatible with bleeding-heart libertarianism. I believe we can justify, on the basis of a consequentialist theory, that the limited welfare state, which combines welfare with liberty, and the free market with a social safety net, has highly beneficial effects on the society. It thus suggests itself as a viable competitor to rights-based libertarianism and more expansive social liberalism. (shrink)

I will show that there are mainly two different, mutually contradictory approaches taken by philosophers in trying to answer the question: “Who or what is to blame for the Holocaust?” The first answer, offered by radical critics of Enlightenment (Adorno/Horkheimer, Saul, Heidegger), blames one of the following: Reason, Modernity, the State, Industrial Society, Bureaucratic Management and/or Technocratic Efficiency. On the other side, we have the answer given by liberal-democratic defenders of Enlightenment (Arendt, Habermas, Rawls): It claims the Holocaust was caused (...) the upsurge of anti-rational, irrational or pre-rational forces and a deep rejection of the humanistic principles and ethical values that underpin modernity. In this study, I want to analyze these two perspectives, comparing and contrasting their respective merits. (shrink)

How is it possible to perform more than is required? And yet, isn’t that precisely what is required, in order for an interlocking society of human beings to function, develop and evolve? If human beings only did what we were told to do, we would live in complete monotony and enslavement. If human beings did only what we were permitted to do, nothing interesting would ever happen. Although performance has often been limited to the study of isolated artistic forms of (...) expressions (music, visual arts, etc.), it is equally possible to analyze culture, on the whole, as a behaviour-encoding system of rules and regulations, wherein the individual actor’s performative appropriation and reinterpretation of these said (cultural, political, artistic) rules makes possible the culture’s very survival, against all odds and obstacles, over long periods of time, as a “tradition” upheld by a community of rule-followers / rule-breakers. Rules, in a very real sense, are meant to be broken. Rule-breaking, by the same token, is, as it were, legislated within the very law code itself, as its own guarantee of immortality. After all, what law could function for any period of time without undergoing reinterpretation? This is good news both for culture and for the avant garde (the creative individual or collective), because even the strictest of rules creates its own conditions of transgression, and vice versa. The performance of culture through the creative freedom of the transgressive individual – i.e. any individual qua his or her individuality – is the sine qua non for a democratic society of peers. Creativity depends upon structure, and structure depends upon that which breaks its shackles of normativity, by rebirthing structure transgressively. The whole point of interpreters is to make things alright for the reappearance of the “father” (the law code) again. Ironically, then, anarchy is the only guarantee of the rule of law. (shrink)

Traditional institutions are often considered inadequate to govern for the long term as their politicians promote short-term thinking which can harm the future. This book proposes a novel theory of social time perception to address the short-term thinking of traditional institutions which threaten to stifle liberal democracies. The semi-future reconfigures liberal democracies’ franchises, representative instruments, deliberative practices, accountability mechanisms, and policymaking to include in the demos all citizens, regardless of age, and holders of representable objective interests in the future. The (...) result is not only a way to legitimise long-term governance but also to improve the quality of current democracies. (shrink)

This working paper combines Lukas Schmid’s article “Responding to unauthorized residence: on a dilemma between ‘firewalls’ and ‘regularisations’” with three critical responses as well as a rejoinder by the author. Schmid argues that a set of liberal-democratic commitments gives conscientious policymakers strong reason to implement both so-called ‘firewall’ and ‘regularisation’ policies, thereby protecting unauthorised immigrants’ basic needs and interests and officially incorporating many of them in society. He then explains that the background imperative of immigration control creates a dilemmatic tension (...) between these policies, as regularisation is envisaged alongside the removal of the ineligible, which is in turn hindered by the implementation of firewalls. This creates a dilemma between the pursuit of two policy goals that are both underwritten by the same value commitments. Schmid concludes that the best way to mitigate this dilemma is to design regularisation policy in a way that leaves only a small number of unauthorised immigrants subject to removal. Antje Ellermann’s response reflects critically on Schmid’s understanding of firewalls, arguing that there is good reason to think that the presence of firewalls does not hinder the implementation of removals of unauthorised immigrants who are ineligible for regularisation. She concludes that, contrary to Schmid’s argument, there is no true ethical dilemma between firewall and regularisation policy. Adam Omar Hosein’s contribution argues that the tensions Schmid discusses arise only because of his adoption of widely shared assumptions about the proper basis for regularisation policies. He suggests they can be avoided by adopting a superior justification for regularisations: the ‘autonomy argument.’ In the last response, Cecilia Menjívar reflects on some constraints conscientious policymakers may face when dealing with ethically dilemmatic choices, such as a policy landscape of government agencies with conflicting goals as well as foreign policy and international obligations, all of which are rooted in anti-immigrant backlash and racism around the globe. The working paper concludes with a rejoinder, in which Schmid discusses the contributors’ key points, outlines agreements and disagreements, and explores the bigger picture sketched by the working paper’s discussions. (shrink)

The paper argues that the concept of a civilizationally transformed state envisions a new governance paradigm that emphasizes moral values, collective responsibility, and compassion over traditional ideas of sovereignty and legality. This model emerges from the failure of conventional states to address global crises like climate change, economic instability, and democratic erosion. It proposes a state that prioritizes human dignity, justice, and the common good. Drawing from philosophical traditions such as Ubuntu, it seeks to foster mutual accountability and elevate compassion (...) as a guiding principle of governance to ensure care for the vulnerable. The 2024 Bangladeshi student-public uprising reflects this vision by rejecting repressive governance and demanding moral accountability. Realizing this transformation requires a cultural and ethical shift where the state serves as a moral authority inspiring pluralism, collective growth, and humanity's highest aspirations. (shrink)

While it is clear what those attracted to fascism today are against, it is less clear what they are for. Not in the sense of how they want to remake society—this is usually clear enough. What is less clear is the fundamental values that are driving their desire to create a different kind of order. Compounding this difficulty, too many liberals are stubbornly sticking to some conventional beliefs: that human nature is as liberals think it is, not something that is (...) fundamentally disputed; that facts are what liberals think they are, even if some people choose to ignore them; and that everybody is pursuing basically the same conception of the good, even if some of them are deluded as to where we are now and how to get where we want to go. -/- But this move to the right is not being driven simply by mistakes; it is a principled move, backed by a coherent, consistent, and historically well-sourced value system, even if this value system is perverse. Fascism has its own conception of the moral subject; of the need for a rigid social hierarchy of men; of the nature of individual rights; and of the importance of purity in blood, soil, and ideology. It believes in the unity of the people, the leader, and the state; it embraces very different and (to liberals) often disturbing moral ends; and it employs starkly different rules of social interaction. And it believes, in the end, that this all leads to the greatest expression of democracy ever invented. (shrink)

From the perspective of digital ethics, this book chapter outlines a model for dealing with the challenges posed by digital media environments in a responsible and appropriate manner. This concept is based on preliminary considerations of “digital citizenship”. At a time when digital technologies - the “data-sphere” - are being increasingly implemented and intensified, the question of humans' roles and skills in using these digital technologies in a sensible and meaningful way is becoming more and more urgent. In the age (...) of European Enlightenment, Western societies had already assigned a central role to people's maturity, which was to be achieved fundamentally through literacy and education in order to create free individuals and, ultimately, citizens capable of making decisions. In contrast, in the current age of digitality, characterized by networking and immersion that has prevailed since the 1990s, many people experience and participate in such life-worlds primarily as consumers. In this role, they increasingly appear as economic objects that are constantly encouraged to produce data sets. Social networking sites and applications of generative artificial intelligence in particular exert a certain pull, the functioning of which many people are at best instrumentally proficient in, but not reflexively. Against this background, Zöllner's article outlines the contours of the concept of "digital citizenship" from an ethical perspective. This form of citizenship should enable people to lead a free life in digital and networked environments in which they are not merely subject to the exploitation interests of digital corporations. (shrink)

Many political and moral philosophers try to reconcile freedom and equality. One such theory is left-libertarianism, which establishes exclusive property rights over one’s own body and egalitarian property rights over natural resources. These rights are realized through the policy of unconditional basic income. Recently, left-libertarianism has come under fire from another similar approach, reciprocal libertarianism. This concept combines exclusive rights over one’s own body with the requirement for an egalitarian distribution of the fruits of social cooperation among those who make (...) a fair contribution to its system. On the face of it, reciprocal libertarians reject basic income because it doesn’t satisfy the fair contribution condition. This article explores the case for a basic income from a reciprocal libertarian perspective. In particular, two institutional regimes will be examined: reciprocal left-libertarianism and libertarian socialism. Each is compatible with a basic income coupled with broader redistribution according to the principle of reciprocity. (shrink)

As a new praxis emerges, in Access to Information in Africa for the first time African scholars and practitioners reflect on recent advances on the continent, as well as the obstacles that must still be overcome if greater public access to information is to make a distinctive contribution to Africa's democratic and socio-economic future.

Open Government gilt vielfach als die universale Staatsdoktrin für das 21. Jahrhundert, ohne dass schon klar wäre, was sich im Einzelnen hinter diesem Schlagwort verbirgt und was daraus für die Praxis des Regierens und Verwaltens folgt. In diesem Band untersucht der Autor alle Bauteile dieser Konstruktion kritisch: das Paradigma der Offenheit, dem sich alles unterordnen soll, die drei Säulen Transparenz, Partizipation und Kollaboration, die das Ganze tragen sollen, aber auch die technischen und ideologischen Fundamente, auf denen das Modell ruht. Im (...) Zentrum steht dabei stets die Frage, was Open Government für Staat und Demokratie hierzulande bedeuten würde. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass dieses Konstrukt technokratische Züge trägt und aus einer »kalifornischen Ideologie« hervorgeht, die es erst noch politisch zu bewerten gilt. Wenn sowohl die Giganten des Internets als auch emphatische Aktivisten Open Government massiv propagieren, darf kritische Reflexion nicht auf der Strecke bleiben. Wewer bezweifelt, dass Open Government als Leitbild für das digitale Zeitalter taugt, dem im Prinzip alle Länder dieser Welt nacheifern könnten. Auch für die Erneuerung von Staat und Demokratie in Deutschland wirft es mehr Fragen auf, als es Antworten bietet. (shrink)

Managers of public organizations face strong, and increasing, demands to open up their internal processes to public scrutiny. A more active and critical role in society, advances in communications technology, the 24-hour media cycle and growing numbers of independent regulators all add to the pressure on governments to become more accountable and transparent. This book analyses these pressures by examining the key concepts of accountability and transparency and the main institutional mechanisms of open government. It also discusses the problems of (...) accountability and transparency that arise for public managers sharing responsibilities across jurisdictional boundaries and in public-private partnerships. Drawing on examples from around the world, this engaging and accessible text provides a balanced account of open government which emerges as both a challenge and an aid to more effective public management. (shrink)

Perhaps nothing has become more evident in the months and years since 9/11 than the tension that exists between the publics access to information and concerns about protecting national security. This tension raises fundamental questions regarding how and to what extent national security secrecy is consistent with American notions of democracy; how institutions governing determinations about secrecy and disclosure should be designed; and the proper role of Congress, the courts, the public, and the media when it comes to government assertions (...) of secrecy. The materials in this book will provide the interested reader a window into the current shape of the eternal push-and-pull between secrecy and access to information in a democracy. (shrink)

Today, the demand for transparency is omnipresent. In particular, transparency is considered a prerequisite for good governance, for political participation and democracy. On closer inspection, however, transparency proves to be ambivalent. For complete transparency has not yet been achieved anywhere. Moreover, measures to increase transparency can have the opposite effect and stir up mis-trust. Historians are just beginning to discover this topic. The volume aims at elucidating the opportunities and the restrictions of transparency in historical research. It assembles contributions covering (...) European history since the 19th century. The contributors focus on political and cultural history, but include also economic and media history as well as the history of ideas. They analyse publicly debated demands and efforts for transparency, conceived as the access to information or its disclosure. (shrink)

The article overviews all known approaches to formalization of a problem of Liberty / Freedom (« Liberty from », « Liberty for », « being for her/his own sake, not a other's », « absence of sovereign other », individual freeing in a context of the Master-Slave Dialectics, Social Freedom) and problems of emancipation (« restricting privileges of upper class minorities », « giving privileges to marginalized minorities – affirmative actions »). Then, the article discusses a version of formalization of (...) level of social freedom through comparison of what is allowed for an individuals in the society with what is allowed for «a sheep in herd »: each additional degree of freedom gives unit in plus, each additional restriction gives unit in minus. The proposed model was tested for a case of the post-Soviet transit, when the level of freedom evolved from minus two for the USSR up to plus two for the contemporary Russian Federation. It also shows the ways for further emancipation of people in Russia in « politically easy version » - i.e. without essential change of its political system. (shrink)