The Concept of Toleration

How can we know if a social order is threatened by the coexistence of different kinds of people living by different values? Does "tolerance" mean acceptance, or should it aspire only to benign neglect? Is intolerance a sign of community strength or weakness? With Shannon Jordon, Floyd Tesmer, and Don Peple.

In the literature on toleration, epistemic arguments are commonly equated with John Stuart Mill's fallibilism according to which toleration of opinions is a necessary means to the attainment of truth. This conflation does not capture the variety of those arguments and it results from the fact that a proper analysis of epistemic arguments for religious toleration and a systematic account of their different types are still lacking. The purpose of this article is to provide such an analysis and to argue (...) that those arguments come in four different types, which I name fallibilism, religious belief-forming process, epistemic parity, and differentiated access to religious truth or divine message. I also offer a mapping of those different types of arguments using the standard epistemic notions of justification, truth, and belief coupled with a distinction of focus in the epistemological approach – whether individually or socially focused. (shrink)

Liberal, democratic societies are facing the growing threat of radicalization1. As the last few years have proven, radicalization has not nor will ever be confined to destabilized regions or nations ruled by a brutal dictator.2 Nations that are seeming “beacons of hope” —liberal, western democracies— have seen increasing segments of their populations radicalized. Most tend to associate radicalization with Islamic terrorism rooted in the Middle East, but this is a mistake as it limits the scope of the problem of radicalization. (...) By linking radicalization to a path of violent action and limiting it to Muslims, we are missing potential segments of our population who are either vulnerable to or already in the process of radicalization. -/- Many modern social and political philosophers have debated the merits of respect and toleration to lessen injustice and promote freedom from harm. Currently, there is little work to tie together radicalization and counter-radicalization. I aim to bridge this gap. I believe that radicalization at its most basic level is a product of harm and one method to prevent citizens from being impacted by harm is implementing the practice of toleration. By extension then, if we practice toleration, we should see a decrease in the instances of radicalization. I am in this paper to make this clear and advocate for an adoption of a more inclusive and tolerant political society to defeat the system that allows for radicalization to occur. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around three issues: What is toleration? Should we tolerate and, if so, why? What should be tolerated? These questions are of central importance to social and political thought.

Traditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing (...) how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence. (shrink)

In this article we examine Kant’s understanding of toleration by including a study of all instances in which he directly uses the language of toleration and related concepts. We use this study to resolve several key areas of interpretative dispute concerning Kant’s views on toleration. We argue that Kant offers a nuanced and largely unappreciated approach to thinking about toleration, and related concepts, across three normative spheres: the political, the interpersonal and the personal. We examine shortcomings in earlier interpretations and (...) conclude by arguing that the theme of toleration in Kant’s work, while coherent and important, is neither as central nor as peripheral as suggested by previous interpretations. Further, while Kant is critical of the arrogance of toleration in the political sphere, he is more positive toward the role of toleration in the interpersonal and personal spheres since it promotes virtue. (shrink)

The task of this paper is to provide what is necessary for a conceptual analysis of toleration such that one would have a clear definition of this central liberal tenet. First, notions related to but different from toleration are discussed; this provides guidance by introducing the likely definitional conditions of toleration. Next, those conditions are explicated and defended. Putting the conditions together, we can say an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle refrains from interfering with an opposed other (...) (or their behavior, etc.), though she believes she has the power to interfere. This definition is neither normatively loaded nor sufficient for moral or political theory. Readers may also prefer a definition made with some subset of the conditions rather than all. (shrink)

In ‘Aeon’ magazine (2 August 2017), Professor Paul Russell claims that tolerance demands that criticism of ideologies be permitted; but it also demands that criticism of natural identities be suppressed. He says that the Left’s failure to distinguish ideological from non-ideological identities has led identity politics into intolerance. I argue that Russell’s position is self-contradictory, implying that his (ideological) liberal identity both should and should not be open to criticism. Tolerance must be extended to criticism of non-ideological identities. Laws against (...) ‘hate speech’ are incompatible with tolerance. (shrink)

I outline what I call a relational account of toleration. This relational account helps explain the apparent paradox of toleration in that it involves two competing moral stances, of acceptance and disapproval, towards the tolerated. It also helps clarify the way toleration is a normative ideal, and not a position one is forced into out of the practical need to accommodate or accept. Specifically, toleration is recommended out of respect for that which the tolerant agent also disapproves of. This combination (...) of respect entangled with disapproval results from two different evaluative perspectives of the tolerant agent. The relational account explains how an agent can hold these competing evaluative perspectives. I also discuss the proper scope of state toleration under this relational account. (shrink)

This book presents the author’s many and varied contributions to the revival and re-evaluation of American pragmatism. The assembled critical perspective on contemporary pragmatism in philosophy emphasizes the American tradition of cultural pluralism and the requirements of American democracy. Based partly on a survey of the literature on interest-group pluralism and critical perspectives on the politics of globalization, the monograph argues for reasoned caution concerning the practical effects of the revival. Undercurrents of “vulgar pragmatism” including both moral and epistemic relativism (...) threaten the intellectual and moral integrity of American thought – and have contributed to the present sense of political crisis. -/- The text chiefly contributes to the evaluation of the contemporary influence of the philosophy of John Dewey (1859–1952) and his late development of the classical pragmatist tradition. In comparison to Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), William James (1842–1910), and earlier currents of American thought, Dewey’s philosophy, dominated by its overall emphasis on unification, is weaker in its support for the pluralism of cultural and religious contributions which have lent moral self-restraint to American policy and politics, both foreign and domestic. With all due homage to Dewey’s conception of philosophy, centered on human problems and the need for our ameliorative efforts, the argument is that in the contemporary revival, Dewey’s thought has been too often captured by “post-modernist” bandwagons of self-promotion and institutional control. -/- This work defends democratic individualism against more collectivist and corporatist tendencies in contemporary neo-pragmatism, and it draws upon up-to-date political analysis in defense of America’s long republican tradition. Pragmatism will not and cannot be removed from, or ignored, in American intellectual and moral history; and its influence on disciplines from law to politics, sociology and literary criticism has been immense. However, pragmatism has often been weak in commitment to cultural pluralism and in its accounts of truth. (shrink)

Alfred Stepan’s “twin-tolerations” thesis (2000) is a model for explaining different ways that religious and political authority come to be reconciled. In this paper, we investigate some obstacles and challenges to realizing a reconciliation between religious and political authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that might result in a transition away from a theocratic monarchy to a more consultative form of political authority. Whereas most analyses of religion and politics in KSA focus on geopolitics, the rentier state model, (...) or economic and military aid from the United States, we also consider local factors that emphasize the agency of political and non-political actors within KSA, focusing in particular on education policy and how this policy is a barrier to political reform. Our position is not meant to replace the standard models, but rather to supplement them by offering a multi-variable perspective on the challenges and prospects for meaningful political reform in KSA. (shrink)

A religious worldview cannot expect the same kinds of tolerance as racial, gender, or sexual identities. Here’s why... -/- ... How should the Left understand and practise religious tolerance in the face of the emphasis that various groups now place on the value of their religious identities? This is a question that has, of course, become tangled up with overlapping issues, such as racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and various forms of nationalist xenophobia. But we should keep these issues separate and focus (...) on the difficult enough question of the relationship between religious toleration and identity politics. Much of the (New) Left analysis, which concentrates on the language and agendas of identity politics, has paid too little attention to a very significant distinction that falls within the various identities that have been proposed as a basis for rectifying various forms of social injustice and unequal treatment: the distinction between ideological and non-ideological identity commitments. A lack of clarity about this basic divide within identity politics has led to a serious failure to provide credible understanding of what tolerance requires when we are confronted with questions about the rights of different religious groups to be treated equally and with respect.... (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to reflect on the psyche of the West with respect to the changing cultural trends involving Christianity, Islam, and the human person. I propose that we first understand the context we find ourselves in regarding the apparent confusion surrounding Islam in the West. Then from there, in the second section, I suggest that it will be useful to define and examine some terms including religion, relativism, tolerance, and intolerance. This will help provide a clearer picture (...) of some of the conflicting and confusing ideas circulating throughout the media, academic institutions, and everyday life. Third, it will be important to provide an examination of the discourse on apologetics, while primarily focusing on Christian and Islamic apologetics. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)

Almost all philosophical understandings of tolerance as forbearance require that the reasons for objection and/or the reasons for withholding the power to negatively interfere must be of the morally right kind. In this paper, I instead put forward a descriptive account of an act of tolerance and argue that in the political context, at least, it has several important advantages over the standard more moralised accounts. These advantages include that it better addresses instances of intolerance and that it is able (...) to makes sense of state acts of tolerance. (shrink)

In this engaging and comprehensive introduction to the topic of toleration, Andrew Jason Cohen seeks to answer fundamental questions, such as: What is toleration? What should be tolerated? Why is toleration important? Beginning with some key insights into what we mean by toleration, Cohen goes on to investigate what should be tolerated and why. We should not be free to do everythingÑmurder, rape, and theft, for clear examples, should not be tolerated. But should we be free to take drugs, hire (...) a prostitute, or kill ourselves? Should our governments outlaw such activities or tolerate them? Should they tolerate “outsourcing” of jobs or importing of goods or put embargos on other countries? Cohen examines these difficult questions, among others, and argues that we should look to principles of toleration to guide our answers. These principles tell us when limiting freedom is acceptableÑthat is, they indicate the proper limits of toleration. Cohen deftly explains the main principles on offer and indicates why one of these stands out from the rest. This wide-ranging new book on an important topic will be essential reading for students taking courses in philosophy, political science and religious studies. (shrink)

Leibniz is not commonly numbered amongst canonical writers on toleration. One obvious reason is that, unlike Locke, he wrote no treatise specifically devoted to that doctrine. Another is the enormous amount of energy which he famously devoted to ecclesiastical reunification. Promoting the reunification of Christian churches is an objective quite different from promoting the toleration of different religious faiths – so different, in fact, that they are sometimes even construed as mutually exclusive. Ecclesiastical reunification aims to find agreement at least (...) on the most important doctrines. Religious toleration involves accepting and respecting disagreement even on the most important doctrines. If one regards these two projects as alternative rather than complementary strategies for dealing with religious diversity, Leibniz might more readily be characterised as an ecumenist rather than a tolerationist. Such appears to be the conclusion, at any rate, implicit in the balance of critical literature on these topics: whereas a steady stream of studies has discussed Leibniz’s project of ecclesiastical reunification, only a meager trickle has been devoted to his views on toleration; and some of these studies go so far as to conclude that Leibniz had no doctrine of toleration at all. This paper will attempt to show, on the contrary, that a robust, many-layered, and unusually inclusive doctrine of toleration can be gleaned from Leibniz’s writings. This doctrine operated at least at three different levels: philosophical, theological, and pragmatic. As this implies, the doctrine of religious toleration, rather than being in collision with Leibniz’s core project of ecclesiastical reunification, was an essential element of that very project: it should be seen, in other words, not as a competing goal, but as a necessary first step toward ecclesiastical reunification. Yet at the same time it will also emerge that Leibniz’s doctrine of toleration was no mere function of this intra-Christian project of reunification: rather it was a still more fundamental principle which extended beyond the ecumenical project as well. It had the resources for accepting and respecting irreducible religious diversity and disagreement on points of importance not only between Christian communities, but also between Christians and non-Christians, including, in principle, even the atheists. These points will emerge from a discussion of statements on the philosophical, theological, and pragmatic justifications of religious toleration scattered throughout Leibniz’s sprawling corpus of writings. (shrink)

Toleration and respect are often thought of as compatible, and indeed complementary, liberal democratic ideals. However, it has sometimes been said that toleration is disrespectful, because it necessarily involves a negative evaluation of the object of toleration. This article shows how toleration and respect are compatible as long as ‘ respect ’ is taken to mean recognition respect, as opposed to appraisal respect. But it also argues that recognition respect itself rules out certain kinds of evaluation of persons, and with (...) these, certain bases for toleration : if recognition respect is really distinct from appraisal respect, and if the fundamental rights assigned to people on the basis of recognition respect are to be equal rights, then recognition respect must itself involve a refusal to evaluate certain basic agential capacities of persons when deliberating about how to treat them. Even where ‘ respect ’ means recognition respect, then, there is some truth both in the thesis that toleration and respect are compatible, and in the thesis that they are incompatible. The different truths in these two theses help to shed light on the nature of toleration considered specifically as a liberal democratic virtue. This point can be illustrated by showing how the foregoing analysis provides a plausible solution to the so-called ‘paradox of the tolerant racist’. (shrink)

In attempting to clarify both the concept of toleration and its role in contemporary society several authors have interpreted it as based on the notion of respect for persons. Persons are due respect as moral agents and as such should be allowed to make their own choices, even if the content of those choices meets with our disapproval. According to a classical understanding of toleration, one can be said to tolerate something if one disapproves of it (this is commonly called (...) the ‘objection component’ of toleration); has the power to interfere with it (the ‘power component’); and yet abstains from interfering in the light of certain overriding reasons (the ‘acceptance component’ or ‘non-interference component’). Respecting people as autonomous and as able to formulate and follow a plan of life, individually or collectively, might well be thought to give us a reason for showing tolerance by supplying a basis for its acceptance component. However, the idea that toleration is an outcome of respect, rather than a distinct and sometimes conflicting notion, is far from uncontroversial. Indeed, the ideal of respect has sometimes been seen as incompatible with the objection component of toleration, which presupposes a negative evaluation and therefore seems to imply the other’s inferiority.The relation between respect and toleration therefore stands in need of further philosophical analysis. The articles in this collection aim to advance that analysis by addressing some of the core philosophical problems affecting the relative normative roles of respect and toleration understood as contemporary liberal democratic ideals. (shrink)

The idea of toleration (or tolerance—the terms are mostly used interchangeably) plays a paramount role in liberal theorizing with regard to the normative characterization of the relations between the state and citizens and between majority and minority groups in society. Toleration occurs when an agent A refrains from interfering negatively with an agent B’s practice x or belief y despite A’s opposition to B’s x-ing or y-ing, although A thinks herself to be in the position of interfering. So, the notion (...) of toleration necessarily incorporates the three following elements: (1) negative judgment—whether grounded in moral disapproval or “mere” dislike; (2) power to interfere—whether actual, perceived, or counterfactual; (3) reasons for noninterference—whether epistemological (fallibilism, skepticism), practical (balance of forces), or moral (value commitments). Is the forbearance of what one finds objectionable a strong enough normative ideal when it comes to establishing what we owe to each other in circumstances of moral disagreement? Does the request that we (possibly grudgingly) put up with someone’s objectionable lifestyle and convictions render toleration a condescending concession rather than the consequence of the recognition of everyone’s equal rights? In response, some have argued that we should interpret demands of toleration not as mere claims for noninterference but for the public recognition of the equal legitimacy of someone’s lifestyles and convictions (toleration as recognition). A recent line of debate concerns the kinds of relation that the ideal of toleration is apt to inform: is toleration primarily a political ideal qualifying the way in which liberal institutions should treat those who live under them or should toleration be invoked also to characterize horizontal relations between citizens? Whatever response is given to this question, limits to toleration must be established. As toleration is required of us vis-à-vis what we find objectionable, does it entail relativism? Liberals tend to think that reference to the harm principle should work as a limit for toleration: but what does count as a relevant (physical or symbolic) harm? Such questions acquire importance as the domain of toleration extends from the realm of religious conflicts, out of which it originated in the 16th and 17th centuries, to include a number of culture and ethics-related issues: should a liberal state permit pornography? What is the appropriate response to such cultural practices as female circumcision? Should neutral institutions prohibit the exhibition of religious symbols in public spaces? (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...) that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

This is a short systematic introduction to Political Philosophy.

Toleranz wird für gewöhnlich als eine Einstellung definiert, die sich aus Akzeptanz und Ablehnung gegenüber der tolerierten Praxis zusammensetzt. In einem Aufsatz in dieser Zeitschrift hat Achim Lohmar dieses klassische Verständnis von Toleranz angegriffen und einen alternativen Toleranzbegriff stark gemacht. Ich werde argumentieren, dass Lohmars Analyse von Toleranz verfehlt ist, und zeigen, wie sich der klassische Toleranzbegriff gegen Lohmars Kritik verteidigen lässt. Dennoch ist Lohmars Kritik nicht uninteressant. Denn obwohl Lohmars begriffliche Kritik unzutreffend ist, lässt sich auf Lohmars Kritik aufbauend (...) ein inhaltliches Argument gegen die derzeit prominenteste Rechtfertigung von Toleranz formulieren, das Rawls’sche Argument von vernünftiger Meinungsverschiedenheit. Abschließend argumentiere ich gegen Lohmar, dass der personale Toleranzbegriff vom politischen nicht kategorial verschieden ist. (shrink)

Toleration and respect are types of relations between different agents. The standard analyses of toleration and respect are attitudinal; toleration and respect require subjects to have appropriate types of attitudes towards the objects of toleration or respect. The paper investigates whether states can sensibly be described as tolerant or respectful in ways theoretically relevantly similar to the standard analyses. This is a descriptive question about the applicability of concepts rather than a normative question about whether, when and why states should (...) be tolerant or respectful. The problem of institutional application is that institutions in general and the state in particular arguably cannot have attitudes of the required kind. This problem is distinct from, and broader than, well-known problems about whether political toleration is normatively legitimate. To make sense of political toleration or respect, the paper proposes that the analysis of institutional toleration and respect should not be solely agent-centred or patient-centred. The analysis should also include features about the relation itself. We can describe institutions as tolerant or respectful in a sense relevantly similar to the standard analyses if we focus on the public features of the relation between institutions and citizens or groups, without ascribing attitudes in the problematic sense. (shrink)

This paper argues that the direct, vertical toleration of certain types of citizen by the Rawlsian liberal state is appropriate and required in circumstances in which these types of citizen pose a threat to the stability of the state. By countering the claim that vertical toleration is redundant given a commitment to the Rawlsian version of the liberal democratic ideal, and by articulating a version of that ideal that shows this claim to be false, the paper reaffirms the centrality of (...) vertical toleration in the Rawlsian liberal account of state-citizen relations. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that equal respect-based accounts of the normative basis of tolerance are self-defeating, insofar as they are unable to specify the limits of tolerance in a way that is consistent with their own commitment to the equal treatment of all conceptions of the good. I show how this argument is a variant of the long-standing ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection to Kantian-inspired, freedom-based accounts of the justification of systems of norms. I criticize Thomas Scanlon’s defence of ‘pure (...) tolerance’, Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s work on the relationship between tolerance, equal respect and recognition, and Arthur Ripstein’s recent response to the ‘conflict of freedoms’ objection. The upshot of my argument is that, while valuing tolerance for its own sake may be an appealing ideal, it is not a feasible way of grounding a system of norms. I close with a thumbnail sketch of two alternative, instrumental (i.e. non-Kantian) approaches to the normative foundations of tolerance. (shrink)

The ‘agents’ of toleration can be divided into three categories: public institutions, groups and individuals. If it is mostly accepted that both public institutions and individuals are capable of toleration, it is not clear that such a capacity can be attributed to groups, although in daily discourse we seem ready to say that a certain social group is (in)tolerant. This article aims to address this issue by investigating the relationship between collective agency and social groups. Formal groups (e.g. corporations) have (...) internal rules and collectively recognized decision-making procedures that constitute a collective behaviour. However, it is not clear if and in what sense such a capacity is also upheld by informal groups. This article discusses some competing criteria to define informal groups and proposes the shared convictions criterion. In conclusion, this criterion is applied to toleration-related issues, so as to reconcile our ordinary understanding of groups’ toleration with a more technical analysis. (shrink)

I argue that, in the second half of the second Millennium, three parallel processes took place. First, normative ethics, or natural morality, that had been a distinct subject in the education of European elites from the Renaissance times to the end of the eighteenth century, disappeared as such, being partly allotted to the Churches via the teaching of religion in State School, and partly absorbed by the study of history and literature, assumed to be channels for imbibing younger generations with (...) the shared values of the State, the Nation, or the People. Second, religion, or better the prevailing religion or, in most countries, the “State Religion,” became a compulsory subject in the State school. Both the State school and Religion as a discipline were indeed novelties. Third, a result of a tacit pact between two ruling groups was that the canon of European culture was transformed into something less consistent and less comprehensive than its previous post-Renaissance version had been. In more detail, the tradition to be transmitted to younger generations was construed around a fable, or better a lie, namely that the modern European is the ancient Greek’s grandson, and the ancient Hebrew had nothing to bequest to the Modern European. Besides, the canon was reduced to a bark without a kernel, in so far as literature and history took the place that used to belong to “philosophy” or to Studia Humanitatis. (shrink)

The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent, a church (...) tolerates homosexuality, a state tolerates a minority religion, a society tolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account. (shrink)

The concept of toleration plays a central role in pluralistic societies. It designates a stance which permits conflicts over beliefs and practices to persist while at the same time defusing them, because it is based on reasons for coexistence in conflict - that is, in continuing dissension. A critical examination of the concept makes clear, however, that its content and evaluation are profoundly contested matters and thus that the concept itself stands in conflict. For some, toleration was and is an (...) expression of mutual respect in spite of far-reaching differences, for others, a condescending, potentially repressive attitude and practice. Rainer Forst analyses these conflicts by reconstructing the philosophical and political discourse of toleration since antiquity. He demonstrates the diversity of the justifications and practices of toleration from the Stoics and early Christians to the present day and develops a systematic theory which he tests in discussions of contemporary conflicts over toleration. (shrink)

This article builds on the notion of legal tolerance and analyzes the scope of its definition. It situates the notion in the complex set of relations occurring between the major systems of society. Generally, legal tolerance, as a concept, is understood in light of the possibilities of the legal system of influencing other major systems? responses. On the other hand, tolerance is also the response of the legal system in respect to other major systems? communications. Although there is a common (...) understanding of tolerance as ?under punishing bias? in criminology or as political tolerance in political science, 1 the focus of this article is different. The central points here are, first, the analysis of legal tolerance as part of systemic communications and, second, the historicity of the transformations of the nation-state in its ability to cope with the growth of separate, distinct and partial systems of society. Tolerance seems relational and raises questions such as: ?How much can the legal system tolerate?? And also, ?Which societal topics belong to the social system's domain-matter?? These questions are relevant given that the concept of legal tolerance depends on the possibilities of a given system to steer, to direct or to influence other major systems? behavior, or to resist, respond or to address other systems, which are in its environment. The concept of legal tolerance requires an analysis of a cluster of related definitions to assess the implications of the concept. These definitions are the following: (1) The concepts that result from the historical process of structuration and that explain the emergence of social systems. (2) The definition of reflexivity and its relation with the ?second order cybernetics dilemma.? This is the place where heuristic and epistemological problems are found. Such problems result from both the problem of representation and from the ontological status of the real. This analysis will show why reflexivity is a key concept to explaining the transformations suffered by such systems. Then, legal tolerance is a newer development in respect to the idea of planning. As an alternative to hard planning, legal tolerance creates a fostering environment. Instead of a single system directing other systems, legal tolerance is relational and created collectively by the organizational national state using its (limited) power of legal creation. Legal tolerance also stems from the concerned subsystems of the society (economy, law, politics, science, along with others) by means of a variety of legislative products, public policies, alliances, and legal and other scientific communications that emerge as coordinating mechanisms among the alluded major subsystems. (shrink)

The idea that the exercise of state power should be limited so as to permit free choice in matters of personal conduct has been central to liberalism ever since John Stuart Mill defended the harm principle. However, this surface agreement conceals deeper disagreements. One disputed matter relates to the nature of the tolerant state: is it a state that refrains from improving our moral character by coercive means is it a state that takes no interest whatsoever in the moral character (...) of our lives? A second matter relates to the philosophical justification of tolerance. Should it be justified by relying on distinctively liberal values, such as personal autonomy and self-determination? Or is a less controversial justification available — one that can be endorsed by non-liberals as well as liberals? This article explores these issues. It examines the views of Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls and Joseph Raz, arguing that Rawls?s version of liberalism provides both the best conception and the best justification of the liberal ideal of tolerance. (shrink)

'What can you say to a man who tells you he prefers obeying God rather than men, and that as a result he's certain he'll go to heaven if he cuts your throat?'Voltaire's Pocket Philosophical Dictionary, first published in 1764, is a major work of the European Enlightenment. It is also a highly entertaining book: this is no 'dictionary' in the ordinary sense, nor does it treat 'philosophy' in the modern meaning of the term. It consists of a sequence of (...) short essays or articles, arranged in alphabetical order, and covering everything from Apocalypse and Atheism to Tolerance and Tyranny. The unifying thread of these articles is Voltaire's critique of established religion: ridicule of established dogma, attacks on superstition, and pleas for toleration. Witty and ironic, this is very much a work of combat, part of Voltaire's high-profile political struggle in the 1760s to defend the victims of religious and political intolerance. This new translation is based on the definitive French text, and reprints the edition that provoked widespread controversy and condemnation. In his Introduction Nicholas Cronk considers the work's continuing relevance to modern debates about religious intolerance and its consequences. (shrink)

It is often thought that tolerance must be painful; the absence of pain is taken as an indication of indifference, an indication that the agent does not really disapprove of the object of her professed tolerance. This article challenges that view by arguing that the association of tolerance and pain depends ultimately upon the contentious assumption that inner conflict is a form of dysfunction. By unsettling that assumption, it is possible to unsettle the idea that one?s tolerance of others must (...) be painful. More positively, coming to recognize the normality of inner conflict might actually serve to reinforce the disposition to tolerate, as the agent realizes that she must strive to contain and perpetuate the conflicts and tensions which form a necessary feature of her life. If this is right, then the emphasis often placed upon the etymological association of tolerance with patience and suffering could be unhelpful. It might be fruitful to devote more attention to the neglected notion of calmly abiding the behaviour of those of whom we disapprove. (shrink)

The ‘traditional’ conception of toleration, understood as the putting up with beliefs and practices by those who disapprove of them, has come under increasing attack in recent years for being negative, condescending and judgemental. Instead, its critics argue for a more positive, affirmative conception, perhaps best captured by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s idea of ‘toleration as recognition’. In this article, without denying that it is not always the most appropriate form of response to differences, I defend the traditional conception of toleration (...) against its critics. Two principal arguments are advanced in defence of it: the first articulates its role as part of a viable and realistic political theory of modus vivendi, while the second argues that it is only the traditional conception of toleration that makes possible the mutual accommodation of some values that are genuinely antithetical and hostlie to each other. Thus, there remains an important place for the traditional conception of toleration in both political theory and practice. (shrink)

The paper deals with tolerance and intolerance on the background of the tensions existing between the moral “No” and “Yes”, between the initial rejection of the values, beliefs of the others and respecting them. An indifferent tolerance of the people incapable of saying moral “Yes” or “No” is unveiled as an attitude emptied of spiritual and moral contents. It also shows the dilemmas of morally convinced people when facing the normative request to tolerate the values and beliefs of the others. (...) The conflict between “Yes” and “No” becomes the most burning if one’s moral belief is grounded in the existence of independent moral truths. In the light of Nietzsche’s critique of tolerance as “an incapability of Yes and No” the author asks the question, whether respecting moral truths is compatible with tolerating deviations which would go beyond the benevolent attitude of the believers to those morally confused. (shrink)

This article addresses the relationship of toleration and humour as virtues. It argues that our understanding of toleration as a virtue has been captured and shaped by the conception of tolerance as a duty and, through a critique of John Horton’s classic article on toleration as a virtue, seeks to show what a view freed from such captivity would look like. It then turns to argue that humour plays a fundamental role in relation to living a virtuous life. Finally, it (...) attempts to establish the practical necessity of the relationship between tolerance and humour setting out what I take to be significant structural relationships between them and between their formation as settled dispositions of character. (shrink)

How should a liberal state respond to a nonliberal state that is however a decent society? By “decent,” I mean, adopting John Rawls’s terminology, that the so described state is nonaggressive and recognizes the independence and equality of other states and that it also honors basic human rights. Should a liberal state tolerate such a nonliberal state? We can identify two possible conceptions of global toleration in this regard. One conception holds that liberal states ought to tolerate nonliberal states; the (...) second holds that liberal states ought not to tolerate nonliberal states. For convenience, I will call these the “internationalist” and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of global toleration, respectively. In this discussion, I attempt to analyze this dispute over global liberal toleration more basically in terms of two different views of liberalism and of the value of liberal toleration, which we may label “toleration-liberalism” and “autonomy-liberalism”. These different understandings of liberal toleration tend towards one or the other ideal of liberal global toleration. Then, in support of the cosmopolitan ideal, I will note certain advantages of autonomy-liberalism over toleration-liberalism. (shrink)