Die Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients / Studies in the History and Culture of the Islamic Orient ist die Reihe der "Beihefte" zur Zeitschrift Der Islam. Beide werden von der Abteilung für Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients, Asien-Afrika-Institut, Universität Hamburg herausgegeben. Die Abteilung wurde im Jahre 1908 noch vor der Universität Hamburg gegründet. Sie war unter ihrem ersten Direktor C. H. Becker das erste wissenschaftliche Zentrum in Deutschland, in dem die Lehre und Forschung sich auf die (...) historischen und kulturwissenschaftlichen und nicht allein die philologischen Aspekte bei der Erforschung der islamischen Welt konzentrierte. Viele führende Experten der deutschen Islamwissenschaft haben hier gelehrt und/oder studiert. Mit dem gleichen hohen Anspruch und der gleichen hohen Qualität wie Der Islamhaben die "Beihefte" zahlreiche Arbeiten über die Geschichte und Kultur der islamischen Welt publiziert, die jeweils Meilensteine in ihrem Feld darstellten. Die seit 2004 erscheinende "Neue Folge" der Beihefte baut auf dieser Tradition auf und bietet eine Plattform für die Publikation von Studien über die Geschichte und Kultur der islamischen Welt vom Beginn des Islams bis in die heutige Zeit. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

I HAVE to correct a mistake in my article in the last number of the C.Q., on p. 195, n. 1. The sentence containing it runs; ‘Thus, for the consular provinces of 51–50, the Senate picked out the two senior ex-consuls who had not yet held consular governorships.’ But, to begin with, it is apparent from Caesar, B.C. I. 6, 5, that Cotta, who had been consul in 65, and was therefore senior to Cicero and Bibulus, had not held a (...) consular province by 49. And secondly, as to what was done in determining who should have the consular provinces of 51–50, there seems to be no evidence. Cicero's statement in Ad Fam. III. 2, i, that praeter opinionem it had become necessary for him to go out to a province, may mean that he had counted on being unaffected by the regulations of 52, and that either a subsequent decree of the Senate or some arrangement made by a few senatorial leaders had upset his expectations. But of course praeter opinionem may refer to his not having expected before 52 that he would have to undertake a governorship. Nor can we tell whether his words, Vides ex senatus consulto provinciam esse habendam, refer to a decree prescribing who should draw lots for the consular provinces of 51–50, or merely to a decree which had the effect of obliging Appius to hand over Cilicia to a successor. However, the point that after 52 the Senate or its leaders had some power to determine what ex-magistrates should draw lots for provinces, seems to be sufficiently proved by Ad Fam. VIII. 8, 8, where praetorian provinces are concerned, and Caesar, B.C. I. 85, 9. (shrink)

Those rights are human rights which, in Professor Gewirth's phrase, “all persons equally have simply insofar as they are human.” His task is to demonstrate that there are human rights, and to demonstrate that such demonstration is necessary to the very existence of these rights. “That human rights exist…is a proposition whose truth depends upon the possibility, in principle, of constructing a body of moral justificatory argument from which that proposition follows as a logical consequence.” As philosophers we should no (...) doubt like to be able to prove the existence of human rights – prove that there are such rights in the event that the fool shall have said in his heart that there are none, even using his folly against him by showing his denial to entail its denial – but it is a bold claim that rights are things whose esse est demonstrari. (shrink)

Atque illo die certe Aricia rediens devertit Clodius ad se in Albanum: quod ut sciret Milo ilium Ariciae fuisse, suspicari tamen debuit eum, etiam si Romam illo die reverti vellet, ad villam suam, quae viam tangeret, deversurum. THIS passage is interesting in that its argument runs counter to the main picture which Cicero had earlier presented of the movements of Milo and Clodius before they met on the Appian Way in January 52 B.C. In an earlier passage Cicero says: ‘Interim (...) cum sciret Clodius–neque enim difficile erat id scire–xiter sollemne, legitimum, necessarium ante diem XIII Kalendas Februarias Miloni esse Lanuvium ad flaminem prodendum, quod erat dictator Lanuvii Milo, Roma subito ipse profectus pridie est, ut ante suum fundum, quod re intellectum est, Miloni insidias conlocaret.’ Cicero remains true to this latter version in all the relevant arguments concerning the motives and movements of Clodius and Milo. Milo had legitimate business at Lanuvium, and hence a legitimate reason for being on the road at the time of the affray; Clodius′ presence is explained by Cicero as due solely to the desire to place an ambush for his enemy at a convenient spot, i.e. in front of his farm, and for this reason he had set out from Rome a day before Milo, when his presence was really required in Rome. (shrink)

Atque illo die certe Aricia rediens devertit Clodius ad se in Albanum: quod ut sciret Milo ilium Ariciae fuisse, suspicari tamen debuit eum, etiam si Romam illo die reverti vellet, ad villam suam, quae viam tangeret, deversurum.THIS passage is interesting in that its argument runs counter to the main picture which Cicero had earlier presented of the movements of Milo and Clodius before they met on the Appian Way in January 52 B.C. In an earlier passage Cicero says: ‘Interim cum (...) sciret Clodius–neque enim difficile erat id scire–xiter sollemne, legitimum, necessarium ante diem XIII Kalendas Februarias Miloni esse Lanuvium ad flaminem prodendum, quod erat dictator Lanuvii Milo, Roma subito ipse profectus pridie est, ut ante suum fundum, quod re intellectum est, Miloni insidias conlocaret.’ Cicero remains true to this latter version in all the relevant arguments concerning the motives and movements of Clodius and Milo. Milo had legitimate business at Lanuvium, and hence a legitimate reason for being on the road at the time of the affray; Clodius′ presence is explained by Cicero as due solely to the desire to place an ambush for his enemy at a convenient spot, i.e. in front of his farm, and for this reason he had set out from Rome a day before Milo, when his presence was really required in Rome. (shrink)

A family of compelling intuitions work to keep "the problem of consciousness" systematically insoluble, and David Rosenthal, in a series of papers including the one under discussion, has been resolutely driving these intuitions apart, exposing them individually to the light, and proposing alternatives. In this instance the intuition that has seemed sacrosanct, but falls to his analysis, is the intuition that "sensory quality" and consciousness are necessarily united: that, for instance, there could not be unconscious pains, or unconscious subjective shades (...) of blue, or unconscious aromas of freshly roasted coffee beans. The particular airborne polymers that are the vehicles of freshly roasted coffee beans could exist, of course, in the absence of any observer, and hence of any consciousness, but the sensory quality of that aroma requires--according to well-entrenched intuition--not only an observer but a conscious observer. Such properties have no esse except as percipi. (shrink)

Neste artigo eu defendo que o conhecimento de proposições filosóficas pode e deve desempenhar o papel de ideal regulador das aulas de Filosofia no Ensino Médio. Grosso modo, penso haver dois tipos de conhecimento pressupostos nas aulas de Filosofia no Ensino Médio: o primeiro, que, por conveniência, chamarei de conhecimento filosófico disposicional, e o segundo, o conhecimento filosófico proposicional. O primeiro consiste naquele conhecimento que leva em conta apenas certas habilidades filosóficas de identificação de teses, de identificação e análise de (...) argumentos etc. O segundo envolve a garantia da verdade de uma proposição filosófica via justificação. Argumento que o conhecimento filosófico disposicional, embora seja um pressuposto epistemológico suficiente a ser tomado para a confecção de uma aula de Filosofia no Ensino Médio, não é necessário. Isso porque esse tipo de conhecimento não desempenha satisfatoriamente a função de objetivo último das aulas de Filosofia, se considerarmos uma característica fundamental da Filosofia: qual seja, aquela atividade que, através de seus autores, possui enquanto objetivo último obter conhecimento de certas proposições filosóficas. Além disso, argumento que o primeiro tipo de conhecimento é adequadamente desenvolvido somente se regulado por um ideal de conhecimento do segundo tipo. Assim considerado, além de fazermos, de fato, a Filosofia presente na sala de aula, tendemos a ter ganhos consideráveis para a postura dos alunos frente às questões filosóficas fundamentais. (shrink)

It is characteristic of realists to separate ontology from epistemology and of idealists to mix the two things up. By ‘idealists’ here I am mainly referring to the British neo-Hegelians but the charge of mixing up ontology and epistemology can be made against at least one ‘subjective idealist’, namely Bishop Berkeley, as his wellknown dictum ‘esse ispercipi’ testifies. The objective idealists rejected the correspondence theory of truth and on the whole accepted a coherence theory. The qualification is needed here because (...) H. H. Joachim, in The Nature of Truth, found the coherence theory unable to deal with the problem of error. (shrink)

Human beings are both needy and dignified. How should we think about the relationship between our neediness and our worth? Card argues well that our vulnerability to luck is intertwined in the very conditions of moral agency. We can see the merit of her approach even more clearly by turning to some difficulties the Stoics have in preserving dignity while removing vulnerability. Stoicism does, however, help us to sort through the difficulties involved as we try to combine love of particular (...) people with respect for all human life. Richardson is correct to suggest that love itself can animate the concern for all humanity; I also agree with him that institutions must play a major role in any solution to problems of inequality between nations. Although the “capabilities approach” offers an attractive account of one part of the goal of just political institutions, combining, as Moody‐Adams suggests, respect for difference with a commitment to universal norms, I now believe that the capabilities account should be combined with a form of Rawlsian political liberalism that protects spaces within which citizens may pursue the good as they understand it. (shrink)

O problema do ceticismo é colocado na seguinte questão: é possível obtero conhecimento como um todo? Há argumentos fortes que dizem quenão. Por exemplo, embora o K não possa descansar sobre dados brutos,todos os argumentos devem começar e terminar em algum lugar. Contudo,se nós não podemos justificar, conseqüentemente, não podemos aumentaro K genuíno. Assim, o problema é que, se podemos começar com argumentosdo ceticismo filosófico, que dizem que o K é impossível , então esses argumentos forçam a conexão de conhecimento (...) comjustificação para tentar refutar o ceticismo. Assim, o problema do ceticismoestá intimamente ligado com o problema da justificação. Podemos analisarse há um problema do ceticismo e se ele pode ser entendido comocolocamos inicialmente. Enfim, por que o problema do ceticismo é nossoproblema? Por que temos o ônus da prova? Não podemos inverter o ônusda prova para o cético?The issue of skepticism is put in the following question: is it possible togain knowledge as a whole? There are some strong arguments that sayno. For instance, although K can not rest over gross data, all argumentsmust start and finish somewhere. However, we cannot justify andconsequently enlarge the genuine K. The problem here is: if we can startwith arguments from the philosophical skepticism, the ones that say K is impossible , then such arguments impose that weconnect knowledge to justification on an attempt to refute skepticism. Theissue of skepticism is closely connected to the issue of justification. It ispossible to see whether or not there is a problem with skepticism or if itcan be understood according to our initial proposal. Finally, we ask: whyis the issue of skepticism our problem? Why do we have the burden ofproof? Can we send the burden of proof back to the skeptic? (shrink)

O artigo examina a relação entre paixão, democracia e deliberação no pensamento de Hobbes e no de Walzer. São apresentadas as razões pelas quais esses dois pensadores posicionam-se de forma crítica no concernente às deliberações no âmbito de governos democráticos. A relação entre razão e paixão é também examinada no interior do problema central de nosso estudo comparativo.

A consideration of the genetics of sociopathy suggests the following. The author's Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) types 2 to 4 are more likely than types 1 and 5 in crimes of violence, and there may not be an ESS for crimes of property or for sociopathy. Correlations between sociopathy and crimes of property are also more likely due to environmental than to genetic variants, and correlations between sociopathy and crimes of property are due more to environmental than genetic variants.

The introduction takes up the history and meaning of the term culture and concurs with Dawson’s holistic view that culture has both material and spiritualfoundations. What I call the incarnated character of culture as extensional from and expressive of human beings, taken as hylomorphic substances, then brings us to the overriding theme of the paper: the metaphysical structure of culture. What discloses itself, in this regard, is the accidentality of culture as a system of relational acts rooted in social reality. (...) Human society, in turn, is an accidental system of human substances in relation. Such substantial grounding of both society and culture will lead to the recognition that the human soul, through its substantial act or “esse,” manifests itself socially/culturally in the flesh. Culture is thereby the expression of the human soul. What then follows is a metaphysical investigation of why cultures live (this includes focuses on Aquinas, Eliade, Pieper) and why they die (focuses include Spengler, Schweitzer, Voegelin). The conclusion touches on the restoration of culture. (shrink)

The introduction takes up the history and meaning of the term culture and concurs with Dawson’s holistic view that culture has both material and spiritualfoundations. What I call the incarnated character of culture as extensional from and expressive of human beings, taken as hylomorphic substances, then brings us to the overriding theme of the paper: the metaphysical structure of culture. What discloses itself, in this regard, is the accidentality of culture as a system of relational acts rooted in social reality. (...) Human society, in turn, is an accidental system of human substances in relation. Such substantial grounding of both society and culture will lead to the recognition that the human soul, through its substantial act or “esse,” manifests itself socially/culturally in the flesh. Culture is thereby the expression of the human soul. What then follows is a metaphysical investigation of why cultures live (this includes focuses on Aquinas, Eliade, Pieper) and why they die (focuses include Spengler, Schweitzer, Voegelin). The conclusion touches on the restoration of culture. (shrink)

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) may apply to characters expressed across species for predation and feeding, because these characters are conservative. However, the evolution of complex, polymorphic behaviors is more difficult to define as an ESS. Lateralization may be selective for certain simple traits, but lateralization of complex traits is likely the result of coadaptation of otherwise non-lateralized features.

Resumo: Este texto tem por objeto a análise da intuição, das especificidades das definições bergsonianas e suas distinções em relação à visão moderna, sobretudo da doutrina kantiana, buscando mostrar os pontos de rompimento e avanço de Bergson em relação a essa concepção. O que se nota, em um primeiro momento, é como a obra de Bergson está de certo modo intimamente ligada a alguns temas clássicos da teoria do conhecimento já amplamente trabalhados na obra de Kant, razão pela qual esse (...) autor está presente desde o início de seu pensamento, desde o Ensaio sobre os dados da consciência, estendendo-se mesmo por quase todo o conjunto de sua obra. De fato, se se abordar os textos de Bergson pela sua referência à história da filosofia, será Kant, sem dúvida, que aparecerá como seu grande interlocutor; na maior parte das vezes como contrapondo a uma crítica que pode ser estendida a toda tradição filosófica, sobretudo àquela que teria subjugado a metafísica aos métodos e orientações da ciência. É natural, com efeito, que o autor da Crítica da Razão Pura surja como personagem importante na obra de Bergson. O pensamento de Kant está assentado em um momento importante quanto aos "rumos" da filosofia, especialmente no que diz respeito ao alcance da metafísica. E, se Bergson expressara, em sua doutrina, todo um esforço para reaver o lugar de direito da metafísica, ampliando mesmo, para além dos limites da análise científica, seu alcance, é certamente Kant que ele haveria de encontrar em suas investigações.: This text aims to analyze intuition, the specificities of the Bergsonian definitions relevant to it, and their distinctions relative to the modern view. Above all, we discuss the doctrine of Kant and seek to show Bergson's points of rupture and advancement in relation to this conception. What is noticeable at first glance is how Bergson's work is in a certain way intimately linked to some classical themes of the theory of knowledge already extensively treated in Kant's work. Kant is present from the beginning of Bergson's thought, ever since his An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, and his influence extends through almost all of Bergson's work. In fact, if one approaches the texts of Bergson in terms of his references to the history of philosophy, it is no doubt Kant who appears as the great interlocutor, in most cases advancing a critique that can be extended to the whole philosophical tradition, especially to that part which would subjugate metaphysics to the methods and orientations of science. It is natural, indeed, that the author of the Critique of Pure Reason emerges as an important character in Bergson's work. Kant's thinking appeared at an important moment in terms of the "directions" of philosophy, especially with regard to the attainment of metaphysics. Bergson expressed in his doctrine an effort to reclaim the rightful place of metaphysics, even extending its reach beyond the limits of scientific analysis, and thus it is certain that he would encounter Kant in his investigations. (shrink)

L'articolo presenta l'edizione di un gruppo di questioni sul numero, l'istante e il tempo discusse da Thomas Wylton in contesti teologici. Le questioni sono le seguenti: Q. 1 An numerus sit ens formaliter praeter animam ; Q. 2 An nunc secundum substantiam sit mensura propria rei generabilis et corruptibilis secundum esse permanens eius ; Q. 3: Utrum tempus habeat esse reale distinctum a motu secundum suum esse formale ; Q. 4: Utrum numerus qui oritur ex divisione continui addat aliquam rem (...) super continuum . L'edizione, riportata in appendice, è proceduta da una trattazione analitica di ciascuna questione, accompagnata da uno studio delle fonti. (shrink)

Mortal being is not being pure and simple, not posit-ive being alone, as the lived experience suggests it to be. Living being is always a living of mortal flesh, a living taunted by death as “the nothingness that wearies it.” This taunting doggedly pursues the living being and turns it inward in what Levinas terms “inter-esse.” In living its mortality, essence is always inter-esse — inside of itself — in the for-itself of self-interest. This paper attempts to track the opening (...) of essence from its “innocent” lived mortality, through the “thinking” awakening that brings it to an awareness of the violences entailed in its living, to its opening as an ethical being where self is abandoned, ruptured, sacrificed for the sake of the suffering other. This paper also addresses the larger question of what, if anything, is missing in Levinas’ account of living being. In his fidelity to a monadic view of isolated existence with its meaning-appropriations, is Levinas bound to maintain the “innocence” of all living beings, even in their most vile acts against others? Can Levinas account for the ability of the existent to leap outside his enclosed world to effect the destructive works that we witness every day in the human world? Can Levinas, committed to the “innocence” of living being, do justice to the injustices of the holocaust that motivate his work, or to the endless parade of holocausts that mark the history of the human species even to the present day? Finally, this paper entertains whether Levinas’ weddedness to this view of living being as isolated self-enclosure compels him to overlook the degree to which our meanings are preordained by the socio-politico-economic realities of our cultural contexts, whether the phenomenologist, as much as the existent, must remain blind to the powers of histories and institutions and systems to dictate the meanings that we find as the borders that give us the stable lifeworld. (shrink)

The construction of ν with the future has been hotly denied as impossible, so far as Attic Greek and indeed post-Homeric Greek generally are concerned. The opponents of the construction have had among their number such scholars as Dawes and Cobet; and of late, it seems, editors of texts generally. The view of Cobet is given on p. 469 of his Miscellanea Critica, with reference to Demosth. 9. 70 πάλαι τις δέως ν σως ρωτήσων κάθηται. Cobet, who has been followed (...) by later editors, altered ρωτήσων to ρωτήσας, commenting ‘ubi semel Constiterit δέως ν ρωτήσω, δέως ν πεύσομα aut simile quid pro ρωτήσαιμι vel πυθοίμην recte dici, turn demum librorum lectioni acquiescemus. quod equidem nunquam futurum esse satis scio.’ This view, which must of course be understood as excepting Homer from its scope, is nothing more than a blank denial of the possibility of the construction. We see more of an argument in Kühner-Gerth , where it is remarked that the construction, frequent in Homer, was later given up because ν with the optative was sufficient to express a future possibility; and that possibly emenders have done right to alter passages in Attic which contain it. This is not expressed with any great certainty. Nevertheless it has become to such an extent the prevailing view among editors that in modern texts it is extremely rare to find the construction allowed to remain. (shrink)

It would be generally accepted that G. E. Moore’s celebrated “Refutation of Idealism,” set forth at the turn of the century, constitutes the classic statement of modern realism. The seeming strengths of this position have been elaborated more recently by a notable realist proponent, Don Locke, who, following Moore, takes for granted what is, in effect, the basic assumption of the “Refutation”—the assumption, namely, that each and every variant of the idealist standpoint is embraced under the central Berkeleian contention that (...) “esse is percipi.” It will be my object to argue that the plausibility of Locke’s realism stems from a basic confusion of terms, and that, in its implications, the position becomes vacuous when set in opposition to idealism. (shrink)

Deely’s book will not be of great interest to anyone who is not overly interested in Scholastic thought. It will specifically appeal to the Thomistic philosophers who sense an affinity between Aquinas’s philosophy of being with its emphasis upon esse and the Heideggerian Seinsdenken. Its main thesis is curious. The Heideggerian Sein is indeed comparable to the Scholastic esse but on grounds hitherto overlooked. Heidegger’s experience of Being is profoundly phenomenological and hence, for Heidegger, Being always means the source of (...) manifestness or unconcealment. For Heidegger, Aquinas’s esse is a matter of simple "reality" or what in Being and Time is called existentia. Hence Deely contends the real affinity between Heidegger and the Scholastic tradition lies in what the Schoolmen called esse intentionale, being inasmuch as it is known or exists in the mind. One offshoot of this thesis is that Heidegger’s phenomenology of Being is closer to the pristine sense of intentionality than is either Brentano’s or Husserl’s. Thus Heidegger’s claim to have carried phenomenology back into its ultimate roots and to offer the more authentic phenomenology is thereby vindicated. The book follows a strange tact which is filled with difficulties, not the least of which is pointed out by Richardson’s observation that it is difficult to see how esse intentionale has anything to do with the historical character of Heidegger’s Sein. In a word: what can esse intentionale possibly have to do with Ereignis?—J. D. C. (shrink)

This study explores the impact of participation in a series of moral case deliberations (MCD) on the moral craftsmanship (MCS) of Dutch prison staff. Between 2017–2020, ten MCDs per team were implemented in three prisons (i.e., intervention group). In three other prisons (i.e., control group) no MCDs were implemented. We compared the intervention and control group using a self-developed questionnaire, administered before (pre-measurement) and after the series of MCDs (post-measurement). Results After the MCDs, participants scored significantly higher on 7 of (...) the 70 items related to MCS. On some items there were significant impact differences between the various professional disciplines. Discussion Possible explanations for a relatively low impact are discussed. A shorter and validated questionnaire is needed in order to further study the MCS of professionals and the impact of Ethics Support Services (ESS). Conclusions There was a positive development on some elements of MCS after participation in a series of MCDs. (shrink)

A presente coletânea é resultado de cooperação de pesquisadores brasileiros e portugueses, envolvidos com a docência no ensino superior e a consequente formação continuada dos professores universitários. A frequência no ensino superior é vista como uma conquista social dos ideais democráticos modernos e teria trazido novos públicos aos bancos escolares, o que tornaria esse ensino uma realidade de maneira qualitativa distinta com a qual decisores políticos, gestores, professores e estudantes devem aprender a lidar. Essas preocupações pretenderam motivar e nortear os (...) temas abordados nesta obra. (shrink)

Berkeley’s ‘esse is percipi’ has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea. Similarly, C. J. Boström, the dominating Swedish philosopher in the nineteenth century, was early scorned because his principle of esse est percipi allegedly contradicts the simultaneous claim that two spirits can perceive the same thing under qualitatively different appearances. Whereas the criticism against Berkeley is here regarded as valid, it is argued that Boström successfully (...) defended himself by employing a dual concept of meaning, resembling Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later, and by postulating an ontology that permits human minds to share in the divine ideas that constitute reality. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to propose an adequate interpretation of the concept esse ap-parens (apparent being) which was used by Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol (c. 1280 – 1322), especially focusing on his account of sensory perception. Basing on the analysis of relevant passages of the commentary on the Sentences by Auriol, first, I introduce his famous account of sensory illusions, and then his own claims about nature of esse apparens (Auriol refuses both that it is (...) separate entity serving as a mediator of perception, and that it is only extrinsic denomination of the perceived object). In the next part, I refuse the interpretation which esse apparens identifies with mental representation. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to engage this concept into the context of scholastic doctrine of objective or intentional being (popularized mainly by Duns Scotus and his disciples). In the end of the paper, I return to the Auriol’s account of illusions and show that it is compatible with esse apparens understood as mode of being. (shrink)

Les éditions des Meditationes parues du vivant de Descartes ont imprimé chaque Meditatio d’un seul tenant, sans mettre périodiquement le texte « à la ligne » pour sa lecture en paragraphes, c’est-à-dire en unités de sens prédivisées. Cet article montre, en prenant pour exemple la page la plus célèbre des Meditationes, à quel point la décision typographique de diviser le texte des Meditationes en alinéas a pu déterminer les lectures qui en ont été faites, et par conséquent les interprétations du (...) raisonnement cartésien, au point de l’avoir souvent faussé.Nelle edizioni delle Meditationes pubblicate Descartes vivente, il testo di ogni singola Meditatio è stato stampato tutto di seguito, senza andare periodicamente a capo per una lettura in paragrafi, ovvero in unità di senso pre-stabilite. Il presente articolo dimostra, prendendo ad esempio la pagina più celebre delle Meditationes, fino a che punto la decisione tipografica di suddividere il testo delle Meditationes in capoversi abbia potuto determinare le letture che ne sono state date e, conseguentemente, le interpretazioni che sono state date anche del ragionamento cartesiano, spesso « falsificandolo ». (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

This article focuses on Cornelio Fabro’s understanding and presentation of Thomas Aquinas’s argumentation for a real distinction and composition of essence and an act of existing (actus essendi) in finite beings, a theory that is closely connected with Aquinas’s notion of transcendental participation. It examines Fabro’s division of Aquinas’s arguments into five gradually developing major approaches. Fabro offers an interesting interpretation of the argument offered by the youthful Aquinas in the often discussed De ente et essentia, c. 4, and finds (...) that in his mature writings Aquinas developed and relied ever more heavily on a proof based on participation. (shrink)

In an entry of Papirer, located between the years 1842-1843 (IV C 100), entitled "On the concepts of Esse and Inter-Esse," Kierkegaard makes a fundamental methodological assertion: the various sciences should be ordered and built through the accent put on being (Vaeren - Esse). Thus, the ontology and mathematics, because they develop from a ground of elemental unity between thought and being, are a particular kind of science with epistemological well-defined characteristics. However, as Kierkegaard shows in Postscript, the same plea (...) can not be relied on what is named Inter-Esse. Thus, this paper aims to outline the general features of the concept of Inter-Esse as well as their connections with what, in that same entry, Kierkegaard calls "Existential Science" (Existentiel-videnskab). (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

A global information ethics that seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization must conjoin shared norms while simultaneously preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. I argue that a global information ethics may fulfill these requirements by taking up an ethical pluralism – specifically Aristotle’s pros hen [“towards one”] or “focal” equivocals. These ethical pluralisms figure centrally in both classical and contemporary Western ethics: they further offer important connections with the major Eastern ethical tradition of Confucian thought. Both traditions understand ethical (...) judgment to lead to and thus require ethical pluralism – i.e., an acceptance of more than one judgment regarding the interpretation and application of a shared ethical norm. Both traditions invoke notions of resonance and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures of connection alongside irreducible differences. Specific examples within Western computer and information ethics demonstrate these pluralisms in fact working in praxis. After reviewing further resonances and radical differences between Western and Eastern views, I then argue that emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand in fact constitute a robust, pros hen pluralism with Western conceptions. In both theory and in praxis, then, this pluralism thus fulfills the requirement for a global information ethics that holds shared norms alongside the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. (shrink)

Intercultural Digital Ethics faces the central challenge of how to develop a global IDE that can endorse and defend some set of universal ethical norms, principles, frameworks, etc. alongside sustaining local, culturally variable identities, traditions, practices, norms, and so on. I explicate interpretive pros hen ethical pluralism ) emerging in the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century in response to this general problem and its correlates, including conflicts generated by “computer-mediated colonization” that imposed homogenous values, communication styles, and so (...) on upon “target” peoples and cultures via ICTs as embedding these values in their very design. I contrast different kinds of ethical pluralisms as structural apparatus for understanding what differences may mean and allow for, as these emerged in the 1990s forwards with EP. As interwoven with phronēsis, a form of reflective judgment and virtue, EP more radically preserves irreducible differences and so fosters positive engagements across deep cultural differences. I show how EP emerged in the context of empirical research on “Cultural Attitudes towards Technology and Communication” beginning in 1998, and then in specific applications within Internet Research Ethics beginning in 2000. I summarize its main characteristics and trace how it has further been taken up in ICE, IRE, Intercultural Information Ethics, and virtue ethics more broadly. I respond to important criticisms and objections, arguing that EP thus stands as an important component for a contemporary IDE that seeks an ethical cosmopolitanism in place of computer-mediated colonization. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

Trust is essential to human society and the good life. At the same time, citizens of developed countries spend more and more time in virtual environments. This collection asks how far virtual environments, especially those affiliated with -Web 2.0-, challenge and foster trust? <BR> The book's early chapters establish historical, linguistic, and philosophical foundations for key concepts of trust, embodiment, virtuality, and virtual worlds. Four philosophers then analyze how trust - historically interwoven with embodied co-presence - may be enhanced through (...) online environments. Final contributions tackle the specific challenges of virtual child pornography and democratic deliberation online. <BR> This is the first collection devoted exclusively to the philosophical dimensions of trust and virtual worlds. It helps bring the reader up to date on the relevant concepts and issues, and on ways in which widely ranging insights and approaches may nonetheless cohere into a reasonably comprehensive account of trust.". (shrink)

In Stig Hjarvard’s characterization, mediatization studies move beyond the positivist origins of the social sciences, as they must in order to avoid the fundamental contradiction between original commitments to classical determinism vis-à-vis human agency as acknowledged within mediatization studies. In order to sustain and enhance Hjarvard’s vision of the coherence between human agency and mediatization studies as a species of social science, I first sharpen these theoretical tensions by developing a robust account of human freedom as informed by Kant and (...) virtue ethics. I then adopt precise understandings of complementarity and epistemological pluralism as initially developed in Quantum Mechanics and subsequently by Karen Barad and Judith Simon as frameworks that can coherently conjoin contemporary social science with strong accounts of human freedom. The resulting coherency—or entanglement—between ethics and science implies new ethical responsibilities for social scientists as ‘virtuous agents’. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

I trace the development of an emerging global Information and Computing Ethics , arguing that ethical pluralism – as found in both Western and Asian traditions – is crucial to such an ICE. In particular, ethical pluralism – as affiliated with notions of judgment , reson-ance, and harmony – holds together shared ethical norms alongside the irreducible differences that define individual and cultural identities. I demonstrate how such pluralism is already at work in both contemporary theory and praxis, including in (...) development projects in diverse cul-tures. I conclude with a number of resonances between this global pluralism and African thought and tradi-tions that thus suggest that such a pluralism may also succeed in the African context, as diverse African cultures and countries seek to benefit from ICTs while maintaining their cultural identities. (shrink)

Theology and Society is the most comprehensive study of Islamic intellectual and religious history, focusing on Muslim theology. With its emphasis on the eighth and ninth centuries CE, it remains the most detailed prosopographical study of the early phase of the formation of Islam. Originally published in German between 1991 and 1995, Theology and Society is a monument of scholarship and a unique scholarly enterprise which has stood the test of time as an unparalleled reference work.