This book examines the philosophical foremothers of women’s philosophy and explores what their work may have to offer modern theorizing in feminist ethics. Through such writers as Catharine Macaulay, Mary Wollstonecraft, and George Eliot, Gardner interprets a varied selection of moral philosophers in an attempt both to contribute to our understanding of their work, and perhaps even to encourage other philosophers to interpretive work of their own. She also looks into the reasons such forms as novels, letters, and poetry (...) have often been assigned non-philosophical status, while they seem to be prevalent in the work of women philosophers from the history of philosophy. (shrink)

“Archangel” explores the consequences of Marie's over‐parenting of her daughter, Sara, through the use of a neural implant (the Archangel) that allows Marie to track (and block) Sara's experiences. In attempting to fulfill her duty to protect Sara, Marie ultimately fails morally as a parent. What is fascinating is that different schools of philosophical thought – contemporary liberal philosophy, ancient Greek Aristotelian ethics, contemporary feminist ethics of care, and contemporary Wittgensteinian ethics – all reach the same conclusion about Marie's moral (...) failure, while teasing out different strands of this failure. (shrink)

"Examines the work of three nineteenth-century utilitarian feminist philosophers: Catharine Beecher, Frances Wright, and Anna Doyle Wheeler.

Having only emerged in the past few decades, Feminist Philosophy is rapidly developing its own thrust in areas of particular importance to feminism-and women more generally-while also reevaluating and reshaping most other fields of philosophy, from ethics to logic and Marxism to environmentalism.

Commentators on the work of Catharine Macaulay acknowledge her influence on the pioneering feminist writing of Mary Wollstonecraft. Yet despite Macaulay's interest in equal education for women, these commentators have not considered that Macaulay offered a self-contained, sustained argument for the equality of women. This paper endeavors to show that Macaulay did produce such an argument, and that she holds a place in the development of early feminism independent of her connections with Wollstonecraft.

Commentators on the work of Catharine Macaulay acknowledge her influence on the pioneering feminist writing of Mary Wollstonecraft. Yet despite Macaulay's interest in equal education for women, these commentators have not considered that Macaulay offered a self-contained, sustained argument for the equality of women. This paper endeavors to show that Macaulay did produce such an argument, and that she holds a place in the development of early feminism independent of her connections with Wollstonecraft.

: Catharine Beecher held that women possessed a moral power that could allow them to play a vital role in the moral and social progress of nineteenth century America. Problematically, this power could only be obtained through their subordination to the greatest social happiness. I wish to argue that this notion of subordination, properly framed within her ethico-religious system, can in fact lead to economic independence for women and a surprisingly robust conception of moral power.

In May of 2020, reports of so-called "long-COVID" began to surface. Long COVID is a collection of post-COVID-19 physical, cognitive and psychological symptoms, such as depression, brain fog, fatigue, and dizziness. As long-COVID is considered a "new" disease, it is not always covered by health insurance or government programs, moreover it is a set of constantly evolving symptoms.While severe cases of COVID-19 itself tend to be mostly in males over fifty-years-old, those individuals affected by long-COVID tend to be mainly female (...) and younger in age. Data supporting the existence of the long-COVID syndrome... (shrink)

Commentaries on the Treatise have not always been clear as to why Hume includes a discussion of the virtue of female chastity among the apparently different artificial virtues of justice, promises, and allegiance. Placing Hume's discussion of chastity within its specific historical location can illuminate its presence and role in Book 3 of the Treatise and demonstrate how chastity is a virtue of social utility. An examination of the "practice of the world" can show how female chastity was a necessary (...) virtue for the emerging "middling" classes of the eighteenth century in their pursuit of economic stability and social status. (shrink)

Catharine Beecher held that women possessed a moral power that could allow them to play a vital role in the moral and social progress of nineteenth century America. Problematically, this power could only be obtained through their subordination to the greatest social happiness. I wish to argue that this notion of subordination, properly framed within her ethico-religious system, can in fact lead to economic independence for women and a surprisingly robust conception of moral power.

Having only emerged in the past few decades, Feminist Philosophy is rapidly developing its own thrust in areas of particular importance to feminism-and women more generally-while also reevaluating and reshaping most other fields of philosophy, from ethics to logic and Marxism to environmentalism. It draws not only on feminist philosophers but criticizes, approves, or appropriates the work of the leading philosophers of all times.

This is a unique, groundbreaking study in the history of philosophy, combining leading men and women philosophers across 2600 years of Western philosophy, covering key foundational topics, including epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Introductory essays, primary source readings, and commentaries comprise each chapter to offer a rich and accessible introduction to and evaluation of these vital philosophical contributions. A helpful appendix canvasses an extraordinary number of women philosophers throughout history for further discovery and study.

The wrongness of rape -- Rationality and the rule of law in offences against the person -- Complicity and causality -- In defence of defences -- Justifications and reasons -- The gist of excuses -- Fletcher on offences and defences -- Provocation and pluralism -- The mark of responsibility -- The functions and justifications of criminal law and punishment -- Crime : in proportion and in perspective -- Reply to critics.

Law as a leap of faith -- Legal positivism : 5 1/2 myths -- Some types of law -- Can there be a written constitution? -- How law claims, what law claims -- Nearly natural law -- The legality of law -- The supposed formality of the rule of law -- Hart on legality, justice, and morality -- The virtue of justice and the character of law -- Law in general.

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement that a squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi) in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirement has been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent case of Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins can readily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but there is little (...) evidence of any need for intention before that case, and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanations for the source of this requirement are considered by the article (for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called ‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimately rejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason for this is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’ into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenth century. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which this happened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference to biographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgment in Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany but also took an active interest in German scholarship of the time. A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken, focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also considering the rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the development and refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by 19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges, to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeks to address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirement is a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory), or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter (the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solution by reference to the German sources and later English cases. Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pye reflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legal transplant’ into the common law. (shrink)

Is it possible to apply a theoretical approach to ethics? The French philosopher Catherine Chalier addresses this question with an unusual combination of traditional ethics and continental philosophy. In a powerful argument for the necessity of moral reflection, Chalier counters the notion that morality can be derived from theoretical knowledge. Chalier analyzes the positions of two great moral philosophers, Kant and Levinas. While both are critical of an ethics founded on knowledge, their criticisms spring from distinctly different points of (...) view. Chalier reexamines their conclusions, pitting Levinas against (and with) Kant, to interrogate the very foundations of moral philosophy and moral imperatives. She provides a clear, systematic comparison of their positions on essential ideas such as free will, happiness, freedom, and evil. Although based on a close and elegant presentation of Kant and Levinas, Chalier's book serves as a context for the development of the author's own reflections on the question "What am I supposed to do?" and its continued importance for contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This paper considers some aspects of the morality of complicity, understood as participation in the wrongs of another. The central question is whether there is some way of participating in the wrongs of another other than by making a causal contribution to them. I suggest that there is not. In defending this view I encounter, and resist, the claim that it undermines the distinction between principals and accomplices. I argue that this distinction is embedded in the structure of rational agency.

Pursuing difficult long-term goals typically involves encountering substantial evidence of possible future failure. If decisions to pursue such goals are serious only if one believes that one will act as one has decided, then some of our lives’ most important decisions seem to require belief against the evidence. This is the puzzle of difficult action, to which I offer a solution. I argue that serious decisions to φ do not have to give rise to a belief that one will φ, (...) but can instead be accompanied by a hope to φ. Hope can motivate and rationalize the various actions that we associate with serious commitment. It can also account for the existence of special pressures to adopt an agential stance toward one’s future. Because hope can be cognitively rational when belief is not, there is no problematic tension between the ideal of epistemic rationality and the phenomenon of difficult action. (shrink)

Introduction: Platonic dramatology -- The political and philosophical problems. Using pre-Socratic philosophy to support political reform: the Athenian stranger ; Plato's Parmenides: Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides ; Becoming Socrates ; Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good -- Paradigms of philosophy. Socrates' positive teaching ; Timaeus-Critias: completing or challenging Socratic political philosophy? ; Socratic practice -- The trial and death of Socrates. The limits of human intelligence ; The Eleatic challenge ; The trial (...) and death of Socrates -- Conclusion: Why Plato made Socrates his hero. (shrink)

But in this book, Catherine Malabou proposes a more radical meaning for plasticity, one that not only adapts itself to existing circumstances, but forms a ...

We often form intentions to resist anticipated future temptations. But when confronted with the temptations our resolutions were designed to withstand, we tend to revise our previous evaluative judgments and conclude that we should now succumb—only to then revert to our initial evaluations, once temptation has subsided. Some evaluative judgments made under the sway of temptation are mistaken. But not all of them are. When the belief that one should now succumb is a proper response to relevant considerations that have (...) newly emerged, can acting in line with one’s previous intention nonetheless be practically rational? To answer this question, I draw on recent debates on the nature of higher-order evidence and on what rationally responding to such evidence involves. I propose that agents facing temptation often have evidence of “deliberative unreliability”, which they ought to heed even when it is “misleading” (that is, even when their evaluative judgments are in fact proper responses to the relevant considerations then available). Because evidence of deliberative unreliability can “dispossess” agents of normative reasons for evaluative judgments and actions that they would otherwise have, being continent despite judging that one should now succumb can often be more rational than giving in. (shrink)

Prominent consumer depression manuals issued in recent years circulate a standard depression script as scientific knowledge. The script, asserting that a broad spectrum of depressions are brain illnesses that require antidepressant treatment, is in fact highly contested among researchers. This paper reviews the logical problematics of these manuals, and how such discourse promotes the diagnosis and pharmaceutical treatment of behaviors ranging from mild symptoms to severe depression. In keeping with the trends of pharmaceutical advertising and State health policy, these manuals (...) encourage consumers to self-scrutinize risky behavior, and to treat common behavioral and mood distresses with antidepressants. Ultimately, these activities of self-management function to produce a more productive citizen population. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Current philosophical literature is saturated with the debate on biomedical enhancement, where bio-liberals and conservatives alike make compelling arguments for and against the enterprise. However, this literature is yet to consider the impact such enhancement would have on the individual’s actual lived experience. This article seeks to remedy that by situating the bioethics debate within the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, specifically theorising how biomedical enhancement of the physical kind would impact Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-subject. The central issue arises when (...) the reciprocal relationship between the physical body and phenomenal world (termed “body/world dynamic”) is shown to be off-balance because of the rapid rate at which human beings continue to “enhance” their environment. In this, we see that the development of the world has outweighed that of the body to the extent that we, as body-subjects, have become maladapted to the place we call home. This article will suggest that we can attempt to resolve this by restoring the balance of the body/world dynamic with “restrictive” enhancement, thereby providing an ethical justification for the pursuit of the enterprise. (shrink)

Stoic work on ambiguity represents one of the most innovative, sophisticated and rigorous contributions to philosophy and the study of language in western antiquity. This book is both a comprehensive survey of the often difficult and scattered sources, and an attempt to locate Stoic material in the rich array of contexts, ancient and modern, which alone can guarantee full appreciation of its subtlety, scope and complexity. The comparisons and contrasts which this book constructs will intrigue not just classical scholars, and (...) philosophers, but also logicians, theoretical linguists, communication theorists and historians of grammar and of literary theory. The Stoics on Ambiguity is designed to be intelligible to readers with no Greek or Latin. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Women and Ancient Greek Philosophy is an essential reference source for cutting-edge scholarship on women, gender, and philosophy in Greek antiquity. The volume features original research that crosses disciplines, offering readers an accessible guide to new methods, new sources, and new questions in the study of ancient Greek philosophy and its multiple afterlives. Comprising 40 chapters from a diverse international group of experts, the Handbook considers questions about women and gender in sources from Greek antiquity spanning (...) the period from 7th c. BCE to 2nd c. BCE, and in receptions of Greek antiquity from the Roman Imperial period, through the European Renaissance to the current day. Chapters are organized into five major sections: I. Early Greek antiquity – including Sappho, Presocratic philosophy, Sophists, and Greek tragedy – 700s–400s BCE II. Classical Greek antiquity – including Aeschines, Plato, and Xenophon – 400s–300s BCE III. Late Classical Greek to Hellenistic antiquity – including Cyrenaics, Cynics, the Hippocratic corpus, and Aristotle – 300s–200s BCE IV. Late Greek antiquity to Roman Imperial period – including Pythagorean women, Stoics, Pyrrhonian Skeptics, and late Platonists – 200s BCE to 700s CE V. Later receptions – including Shakespeare, the European Renaissance, Anna Julia Cooper, W.E.B. DuBois, Jane Harrison, Sarah Kofman, and Toni Morrison The Routledge Handbook of Women and Ancient Greek Philosophy is a vital resource for students and scholars in philosophy, Classics, and gender studies who want to gain a deeper understanding of philosophy’s rich past and explore sources and questions beyond the traditional canon. The volume is a valuable resource, as well, for students and scholars from history, humanities, literature, political science, religious studies, rhetorical studies, theatre, and LGBTQ and sexuality studies. (shrink)

Analyse le lien entre le discours du philosophe E. Levinas et l'idée de Dieu qui sous-tend sa pensée. Parmi les thèmes abordés : la création, la prophétie, le temps, la sainteté.

Psychologists and philosophers have argued that the capacity for perseverance or “grit” depends both on willpower and on a kind of epistemic resilience. But can a form of hopefulness in one’s future success also constitute a source of grit? I argue that substantial practical hopefulness, as a hope to bring about a desired outcome through exercises of one’s agency, can serve as a distinctive ground for the capacity for perseverance. Gritty agents’ “practical hope” centrally involves an attention-fuelled, risk-inclined weighting of (...) two competing concerns over action: when facing the decision of whether to persevere, hopeful gritty agents prioritize the aim of choosing a course of action which might go very well over that of choosing a course of action which is very likely to go fairly well. By relying on the notion of a “risk-inclined attentional pattern” as a dimension of gritty agents’ practical hope, we can explain that form of hope’s contribution to their motivation and practical rationality, especially on a risk-weighted expected utility framework. The upshot is a more pluralistic view of the sources of grit. (shrink)

There is a moment when every child leaves color-blindness behind & enters the world of race consciousness. At that moment, there are two roads parents, educators, & therapists can take: they can follow the status quo, internalizing racial expectations, & become-consciously or unconciously-part of the problem. Or, they can question stereotypes, &, actively work against racism to become part of the solution. This book provides the tools we all need to become part of the solution. Beginning with racial segregation in (...) an integrated school situation, this book explores race relations & the development of racial identity from many different viewpoints. (shrink)

Hope is often seen as at once valuable and dangerous: it can fuel our motivation in the face of challenges, but can also distract us from reality and lead us to irrationality. How can we learn to “hope well,” and what does “hoping well” involve? Contemporary philosophers disagree on such normative questions about hope and also on how to define hope as a mental state. This article explores recent philosophical debates surrounding the concept of hope and the norms governing hope. (...) It also underlies hope's significance for the philosophy of emotion and the ethics of interpersonal relations. (shrink)

With the rise of place-based models of education, credence needs to be given to epistemological traditions that curate individual understandings of and relations to the social world (i.e., places). The epistemological traditions that have been shared across generations of North American settler colonialists are at the center of this article. The dominant epistemology of settler society provides racialized, anthropocentric, and capitalistic understandings of places. Relations to place are cultivated through particular conceptions of nature, private property, and personhood, which remain at (...) the epistemic foundation of Western society. These conceptions are concomitant to modes of domination like white supremacy and settler colonialism, and ultimately constitute an ideal white male settler actor. This article suggests that place-based education carries the potential to offer epistemic resistance to domination, but first needs to engage in a more comprehensive understanding of settler traditions of place. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that friendship can constitutively require epistemic irrationality against a recent, forceful challenge, raised by proponents of moral and pragmatic encroachment. Defenders of the “encroachment strategy” argue that exemplary friends who are especially slow to believe that their friends have acted wrongly are simply sensitive to the high prudential or moral costs of falsely believing in their friends’ guilt. Drawing on psychological work on epistemic motivation (and in particular on the notion of “need for closure”), I propose (...) a different picture of what friendship requires in the doxastic realm. I argue that contrary to what the encroachment strategy suggests, exemplary friends’ belief formation ought not be guided by a concern with accuracy or error avoidance, but instead by a need to avoid a “specific closure” – namely, a need to avoid concluding in their friends’ guilt. I propose that exemplary friendship often generates a defeasible, doxastic obligation to exemplify such a need, despite its inherent corrupting effects on exemplary friends’ epistemic faculties. (shrink)