With the concept of commom good reference has been made, along history, to those material and immaterial goods which are not circumscribed to a person, but remit to each and every member of society. Among those goods, basic elements for biological human survival, such as air and water, are usually included, but also the right to participate of the profits of cultural goods. In some cases, commom good has been made equivalent to common wellfare; in others, to the summation of (...) particular interests or to the benefit of the majority. Beyond the diverse interpretations, the promotion of common good continues at present to be a key aim of State in the democratic ideary and a recurrent issue in public ethics. In what follows, the concept of traditional common good has been reconstructed, making special reference to the works of Plato, Aristotle and St. Thomas, with the purpose of setting the basis for a new comprehension of the idea of common good in pluralist and democratic societies.Con el concepto de bien común se ha hecho referencia, a través de la historia, a aquellos bienes materiales e inmateriales que no se circunscriben a una persona sino que remiten a todos y cada uno de los miembros de la sociedad. Entre esos bienes suelen contarse elementos básicos para la supervivencia humana biológica, como el aire y el agua, pero también el derecho a participar en el usufructo de los bienes de la cultura. En algunos casos, el bien común es equiparado al bienestar general; en otros, a la suma de intereses particulares o al beneficio de la mayoría, como cuando se busca el mayor bien para el mayor número posible de individuos. Más allá de las diversas interpretaciones, la promoción del bien común sigue siendo en la actualidad un objetivo clave del Estado en el ideario democrático y un tema recurrente de la ética pública. En lo que sigue, se reconstruye críticamente el concepto tradicional de bien común, haciendo especial referencia a las obras de Platón, Aristóteles y Santo Tomas, con el fin de sentar bases para una nueva comprensión de la idea de bien común en sociedades pluralistas y democráticas. (shrink)

El presente texto aborda la problemática del aborto como una cuestión moral, y deja de lado otros enfoques relevantes, dado que estos, en opinión del autor, no tienen como horizonte último el punto de vista moral. A partir de los presupuestos conceptuales y metodológicos de la Ética del discurso, en tanto que ética de la corresponsabilidad solidaria no rigorista, se presentan conceptos ético-discursivos que pueden fundamentar las dos tesis siguientes: a) La interrupción arbitraria de la vida humana en la etapa (...) inicial de desarrollo es una práctica injusta; b) En determinados contextos de interacción y en situaciones específicas de decisión, el principio moral que exige no interrumpir voluntariamente la vida humana inicial puede ser no aplicable o su aplicación no exigible. The present text addresses the problem of abortion as a moral issue, and leaves aside other relevant approaches, since these, in the author's opinion, do not have the moral point of view as their ultimate horizon. From the conceptual and methodological assumptions of Discourse Ethics, as ethics of non-rigorous solidary co-responsibility, discourse-ethical concepts are presented that can support the following two theses: a) The arbitrary interruption of human life in the initial stage of development is an unjust practice; b) In certain contexts of interaction and in specific situations of decision, the moral principle that demands not voluntarily interrupting the initial human life may not be applicable or its application may not be enforceable. (shrink)

El artículo expone sintéticamente, en primer término, algunas ideas clave de la teoría ético-discursiva en relación con la resolución de conflictos. Luego se presentan las observaciones críticas que realiza Julio De Zan a la Ética del discurso en el sentido de que los discursos prácticos no serían aptos para resolver los conflictos de valores, los conflictos de intereses y los conflictos político-sociales, como también su propuesta de complementar la Ética del discurso con un aporte hermenéutico y una estrategia de cooperación (...) mutua para la solución de aquellos conflictos que no pueden ser resueltos mediante el discurso argumentativo. Esta estrategia no estaría orientada a alcanzar un consenso entre las partes, sino a lograr un modus vivendi razonable y pacífico. El artículo cierra con una ponderación crítica de las reflexiones de Julio De Zan y con la mención de algunos interrogantes que se plantean a partir de su propuesta de complementación de la Ética del discurso. (shrink)

el artículo presenta algunos de los conceptos clave de las teorías de la democracia deliberativa y la política discursiva, de Habermas, y de la política de la liberación, de Dussel, con el fin de establecer coincidencias y divergencias en vista de una interpretación actual de la democracia y de lo político.

The extent to which people anticipate and are influenced by the potential future consequences of their current behavior is called Consideration of Future Consequences. A well-established tool to measure this construct is the 14-item Consideration of Future Consequences Scale. The CFC-14 has shown appropriate psychometric properties in several languages. This scale comprises two factors: the CFC-Immediate and the CFC-Future. The main goal of this study was to assess the psychometric properties and internal consistency of the CFC-14 Scale in Spanish, using (...) an Argentine sample. A secondary goal was to determine its convergent validity with impulsivity, and determine differences across gender and age groups. Using a web-based survey, we collected data from 512 participants aged 13-74 years. Confirmatory Factor Analysis showed a 2-factor model as the best solution for 13-items version. Standardized regression weights ranged from.50 to.66 for CFC-F and between.43 and.83 for CFC-I. Composite reliability was also adequate: CFC-F achieve? =.80 and CFC-I? =.82. There were no differences across gender and age. The CFC-F subscale and UPPS-P subscales correlations, were negative and significant, highlighting the negative and moderate correlation between CFC-F and the lack of premeditation, a dimension strictly related to intertemporal decisions making. Thus, CFC-14 has adequate psychometric properties in an Argentinian population, although more studies are necessary to determine the robustness of these findings. (shrink)

In this study, we examine whether, how, and when corporate social responsibility increases promotive and prohibitive voices in accordance with ethical climate theory and multi-experience model of ethical climate. Data from 382 employees at two time points are examined. Results show that CSR is positively related to promotive and prohibitive voices. Other-focused and self-focused climates mediate the relationship between CSR and the two types of voice. Moreover, humble leadership moderates the positive relationship between CSR and other-focused climate. Such leadership moderates (...) the negative relationship between CSR and self-focused climate. Humble leadership also moderates the indirect effect between CSR and the two kinds of voice through other-focused and self-focused climates. The findings of this study provide important insights into how and when CSR influences employee voice. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

Die Philosophie Helmuth Plessners hat in den letzten Jahren eine Renaissance erfahren: Plessner wurde als relevanter Vertreter einer Biophilosophie (wieder) entdeckt, die nicht nur die uberkommene Trennung von Natur und Kultur, sondern auch die Gegenuberstellung disjunkter Wissenschaftskulturen in Frage stellt und ihr Verhaltnis neu bestimmt. DAs Buch nimmt die verschiedenen disziplinaren Faden auf, die die Konzeption von Plessners Biophilosophie insbesondere in den Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch (1928) verstandlich machen. ES stellt Plessners uberlegungen im Kontext von naturwissenschaftlichen (von Uexkull, (...) Buytendijk, Driesch, von Weizsacker, Portmann, Kohler) sowie philosophischen (Bergson, Misch, Hartmann, Scheler, Heidegger, Jonas) Theorien seiner Zeit vor. (shrink)

The general objective of this essay is to systematize Jean-Luc Nancy’s post- deconstructive reflections on the concept of evidence. A general claim of this paper is that the post-deconstructive concept of evidence is genuinely an epistemic concept of evidence insofar as it refers to structures involved in verification processes. Evidence is the presentation of a state of affairs that relates the presentation not only to what we claim about this state of affairs but also to the singular circumstances of its (...) production. Verification (the production of a claim’s truth) results directly from the singularities involved in the production or presentation of evidence. This means that evidence is never exhausted in the truth it produces or the knowledge it validates but remains a priori exposed or available to produce and validate unknown knowledge about unknown states of affairs. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a new account of scientific explanation for computer simulations. To this end, two questions are answered: what is the explanatory relation for computer simulations? And what kind of epistemic gain should be expected? For several reasons tailored to the benefits and needs of computer simulations, these questions are better answered within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Unlike previous efforts in the literature, I submit that the explanatory relation is between the simulation model and the (...) results of the simulation. I also argue that our epistemic gain goes beyond the unificationist account, encompassing a practical dimension as well. (shrink)

Following the revival in the last decades of the concept of “organism”, scholarly literature in philosophy of science has shown growing historical interest in the theory of Immanuel Kant, one of the “fathers” of the concept of self-organisation. Yet some recent theoretical developments suggest that self-organisation alone cannot fully account for the all-important dimension of autonomy of the living. Autonomy appears to also have a genuine “interactive” dimension, which concerns the organism’s functional interactions with the environment and does not simply (...) derive from its internal organisation. Against this background, we focus on a family of natural philosophical approaches that historically have already strongly taken in account this aspect of autonomy, notably going beyond Kant’s perspective on self-organisation. We thus review Hegel, Plessner, and Jonas’ different perspectives on living beings, focussing in particular on four points: the distinction between organic and inorganic, the theory of biological organisation, the processuality of the living, and the “boundary” between inside and outside, through which the organism establishes its relationship to the environment. We, then, compare the three perspectives on these four points, and finally address the question of what advantages their contribution present—especially compared to Kant’s theory—with respect to the topic of organism’s autonomy. This could help—we hope—to better understand what is at the stake still today. (shrink)

Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and other forms of models. This failure is unfortunate because there are important differences pertaining to their methodology and epistemology that favor their philosophical understanding. The core claim presented here is that simulation models are rich and complex units of analysis in their own right, that they depart from known forms of scientific models in significant ways, and that a proper understanding of the type of model simulations (...) are fundamental for their philosophical assessment. I argue that simulation models can be distinguished from other forms of models by the many algorithmic structures, representation relations, and new semantic connections involved in their architecture. In this article, I reconstruct a general architecture for a simulation model, one that faithfully captures the complexities involved in most scientific research with computer simulations. Furthermore, I submit that a new methodology capable of conforming such architecture into a fully functional, computationally tractable computer simulation must be in place. I discuss this methodology—what I call recasting—and argue for its philosophical novelty. If these efforts are heading towards the right interpretation of simulation models, then one can show that computer simulations shed new light on the philosophy of science. To illustrate the potential of my interpretation of simulation models, I briefly discuss simulation-based explanations as a novel approach to questions about scientific explanation. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

After preliminarily pointing to the undeniable differences between Jonas’ philosophical biology and Schelling’s philosophy of nature, I contend that, besides their divergencies, the two philosophers agree on several important points. I then show to what extent, based on these elements of convergence, their two approaches could even be taken as complementary. In the core of my paper I lay emphasis on what I believe to be the main ground for the complementarity of the two philosophical inquiries, that is to say, (...) their common radicalization and superseding of Kant’s principle of self-organization. In this respect – all differences considered – they both can be said to delineate a philosophy of the organic that can fruitfully contribute, even better than Kant’s input, to the currently widely discussed topic of biological autonomy. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

This collection presents stimulating and diverse essays by scholars from several different fields; the contributors have made important contributions to the ...

I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.

Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of (...) computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations. (shrink)

We propose a view of identity beyond the individual in what we call interpersonal interidentities (IIIs). Within this approach, IIIs comprise collections of entangled stabilities that emerge in recurrent social interaction and manifest for those who instantiate them as relatively invariant though ever-evolving patterns of being (or more accurately, becoming) together. Herein, we consider the processes responsible for the emergence of these IIIs from the perspective of an enactive cognitive science. Our proposal hinges primarily on the development of two related (...) notions: enhabiting and coenhabiting. First, we introduce the notion of enhabiting, a set of processes at the individual level whereby structural interdependencies stabilise and thereafter undergird the habits, networks of habits, and personal identities through which we make sense of our experience. Articulating this position we lean on the notion of a tendency towards an optimal grip, though offering it a developmental framing, whereby iterative states of selective openness help realise relatively stable autonomous personal identities with their own norms of self-regulation. We then extend many of the notions found applicable here to an account of social coenhabiting, in particular, we introduce the notion of tending towards a co-optimal grip as central to the development of social habits, networks of habits, and ultimately IIIs. Such structures, we propose, also emerge as autonomous structures with their own norms of self-regulation. We wind down our account with some reflections on the implications of these structures outside of the interactions wherein they come into being and offer some thoughts about the complex animations of the individual embodied subjects that instantiate them. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to (...) avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample. (shrink)

This book addresses key conceptual issues relating to the modern scientific and engineering use of computer simulations. It analyses a broad set of questions, from the nature of computer simulations to their epistemological power, including the many scientific, social and ethics implications of using computer simulations. The book is written in an easily accessible narrative, one that weaves together philosophical questions and scientific technicalities. It will thus appeal equally to all academic scientists, engineers, and researchers in industry interested in questions (...) related to the general practice of computer simulations. (shrink)

En este trabajo defiendo que la distribución desigual de bienes que los individuos piensan que objetivamente debieran distribuirse de modo igualitario genera un cierto tipo de envidia o resentimiento que es característico de la igualdad democrática. Dado que esta formulación suena como una objeción en contra de las distribuciones igualitarias, mi principal defensa aquí será el revindicar un sentido de envidia o resentimiento que es específicamente social y político en su naturaleza. Argumentare que el ben social del autorrespeto une la (...) igualdad democrática con ese tipo de envidia. En efecto. Este tipo de envidia emerge en casos en que la inequidad amenace el mutuo reconocimiento que los ciudadanos se deben los unos a los otros. (shrink)

We would like to thank the authors of the commentaries for their critical appraisal of our feature article, Who is afraid of black box algorithms?1 Their comments, suggestions and concerns are various, and we are glad that our article contributes to the academic debate about the ethical and epistemic conditions for medical Explanatory AI. We would like to bring to attention a few issues that are common worries across reviewers. Most prominently are the merits of computational reliabilism —in particular, when (...) promoted as an alternative to transparency—and CR as necessary but not sufficient for delivering trust. We finalise our response by addressing concerns about the place and role of artificial intelligence in medical decision-making and the physician’s responsibilities. We understand the concerns and reservations that some of the reviewers express regarding the epistemic merits of CR. We believe that, in part, this is due to a practice too deeply rooted in transparency. But on …. (shrink)

This article asks the question, ``what is reliable machine learning?'' As I intend to answer it, this is a question about epistemic justification. Reliable machine learning gives justification for believing its output. Current approaches to reliability (e.g., transparency) involve showing the inner workings of an algorithm (functions, variables, etc.) and how they render outputs. We then have justification for believing the output because we know how it was computed. Thus, justification is contingent on what can be shown about the algorithm, (...) its properties, and its behavior. In this paper, I defend computational reliabilism (CR). CR is a computationally-inspired off-shoot of process reliabilism that does not require showing the inner workings of an algorithm. CR credits reliability to machine learning by identifying reliability indicators external to the algorithm (validation methods, knowledge-based integration, etc.). Thus, we have justification for believing the output of machine learning when we have identified the appropriate reliability indicators. CR is advanced as a more suitable epistemology for machine learning. The main goal of this article is to lay the groundwork for CR, how it works, and what we can expect as a justificatory framework for reliable machine learning. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)