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  1. Naturalism Meets the Personal Level: How Mixed Modelling Flattens the Mind.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certain widely held thesis about the human mental (and cognitive) architecture: that it is divided into two distinct levels, the personal and the subpersonal, about the former of which we gain knowledge in a manner that effectively insulates such knowledge from the results of scientific research. -/- An empirically motivated alternative is proposed, according to which the architecture is, so to speak, flattened from (...)
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  2. The Priority of Preferences in the Evolution of Minds.David Spurrett - manuscript
    More philosophical effort is spent articulating evolutionary rationales for the development of belief-like capacities than for precursors of desires or preferences. Nobody, though, seriously expects naturally evolved minds to be disinterested epistemologists. We agree that world-representing states won’t pay their way without supporting capacities that prioritise from an organism’s available repertoire of activities in light of stored (and occurrent) information. Some concede that desire-like states would be one way of solving this problem. Taking preferences as my starting point instead of (...)
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  3. Mindreading and the philosophy of mind.Shaun Nichols - unknown - In J. Prinz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    In J. Prinz (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  4. The Science of Belief: A Progress Report (Expanded Reprint).Eric Mandelbaum & Nicolas Porot - forthcoming - In Joseph Summer Julien Musolino (ed.), The Science of Beliefs: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK:
    Expanded reprint of the WIREs Science of Belief paper for Julien Musolino, Joseph Sommer, and Pernille Hemmer's The Science of Beliefs: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Cambridge University Press.
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  5. Explainable AI lacks regulative reasons: why AI and human decision‑making are not equally opaque.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - AI and Ethics.
    Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems currently used for decision-making are opaque, i.e., the internal factors that determine their decisions are not fully known to people due to the systems’ computational complexity. In response to this problem, several researchers have argued that human decision-making is equally opaque and since simplifying, reason-giving explanations (rather than exhaustive causal accounts) of a decision are typically viewed as sufficient in the human case, the same should hold for algorithmic decision-making. Here, I contend that this argument (...)
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  6. Cultural Bias in Explainable AI Research.Uwe Peters & Mary Carman - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research.
    For synergistic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, AI outputs often need to be explainable to people. Explainable AI (XAI) systems are commonly tested in human user studies. However, whether XAI researchers consider potential cultural differences in human explanatory needs remains unexplored. We highlight psychological research that found significant differences in human explanations between many people from Western, commonly individualist countries and people from non-Western, often collectivist countries. We argue that XAI research currently overlooks these variations and that (...)
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  7. The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.
    The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...)
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  8. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology.Jesse J. Prinz (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  9. Implicit Social Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Implicit Cognition. Routledge.
    Positing implicit social cognitive processes is common in the social cognition literature. We see it in discussions of theories of mentalizing, empathy, and infants' social-cognitive capacities. However, there is little effort to articulate what counts as implicit social cognition in general, so theorizing about implicit social cognition is extremely disparate across each of these sub-domains. In this paper, I argue that Michael Brownstein’s account of implicit cognition promises to be a fruitful, unifying account of implicit cognition in general, and it (...)
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  10. Constructing Persons: On the Personal–Subpersonal Distinction.Mason Westfall - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-29.
    What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me’ and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level—the plurality problem. The things that plausibly qualify (...)
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  11. Why is knowledge faster than (true) belief?Evan Westra - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.
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  12. Scripts and Social Cognition.Gen Eickers - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (54):1565-1587.
    To explain how social cognition normally serves us in real life, we need to ask which factors contribute to specific social interactions. Recent accounts, and mostly pluralistic models, have started incorporating contextual and social factors in explanations of social cognition. In this paper, I further motivate the importance of contextual and identity factors for social cognition. This paper presents scripts as an alternative resource in social cognition that can account for contextual and identity factors. Scripts are normative and context-sensitive knowledge (...)
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  13. What’s inside is all that counts? The contours of everyday thinking about self-control.Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Samuel Murray, Louis Chartrand & Sergio Barbosa - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):33-55.
    Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...)
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  14. Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic?David Villena - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):317-334.
    Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesise that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypotheses about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case in (...)
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  15. Pascal Boyer's Miscellany of Homunculi: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Religion Explained.Robert Vinten - 2023 - In Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 39-52.
    In Pascal Boyer’s book Religion Explained inference systems are made to do a lot of work in his attempts to explain cognition in religion. These inference systems are systems in the brain that produces inferences when they are activated by things we perceive in our environment. According to Boyer they perceive things, produce explanations, and perform calculations. However, if Wittgenstein’s observation, that “only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it (...)
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  16. I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):24-43.
    Here I explore a new line of evidence for belief–credence dualism, the thesis that beliefs and credences are distinct and equally fundamental types of mental states. Despite considerable recent disagreement over this thesis, little attention has been paid in philosophy to differences in how our mindreading systems represent the beliefs and credences of others. Fascinatingly, the systems we rely on to accurately and efficiently track others’ mental states appear to function like belief–credence dualists: Credence is tracked like an emotional state, (...)
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  17. Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the outcome-sensitive folk concept of reasonable.Markus Kneer - 2022 - In P. Bystranowski, Bartosz Janik & M. Prochnicki (eds.), Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer Nature. pp. 25-48.
    This paper presents a series of studies (total N=579) which demonstrate that folk judgments concerning the reasonableness of decisions and actions depend strongly on whether they engender positive or negative consequences. A particular decision is deemed more reasonable in retrospect when it produces beneficial consequences than when it produces harmful consequences, even if the situation in which the decision was taken and the epistemic circumstances of the agent are held fixed across conditions. This finding is worrisome for the law, where (...)
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  18. Phenomenology of social explanation.Shannon Spaulding - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (3):637-653.
    The orthodox view of social cognition maintains that mentalizing is an important and pervasive element of our ordinary social interactions. The orthodoxy has come under scrutiny from various sources recently. Critics from the phenomenological tradition argue that phenomenological reflection on our social interactions tells against the orthodox view. Proponents of pluralistic folk psychology argue that our ordinary social interactions extend far beyond mentalizing. Both sorts of critics argue that emphasis in social cognition research ought to be on other elements of (...)
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  19. A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency: An Asymmetry in Knowledge Attributions for Affirmations and Negations.John Turri - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1795-1808.
    From antiquity through the twentieth century, philosophers have hypothesized that, intuitively, it is harder to know negations than to know affirmations. This paper provides direct evidence for that hypothesis. In a series of studies, I found that people naturally view negations as harder to know than affirmations. Participants read simple scenarios and made judgments about truth, probability, belief, and knowledge. Participants were more likely to attribute knowledge of an outcome when framed affirmatively than when framed negatively. Participants did this even (...)
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  20. Revelation and the intuition of dualism.Michelle Liu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11491-11515.
    In recent literature on the metaphysics of consciousness, and in particular on the prospects of physicalism, there are two interesting strands of discussion. One strand concerns the so-called ‘thesis of revelation’, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in experience. The other strand concerns the intuition of dualism, the intuition that consciousness is nonphysical. With a particular focus on the former, this paper advances two main arguments. First, it argues that the thesis of revelation is intuitive; it (...)
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  21. Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
    The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna by developing a (...)
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  22. Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 83 (C):102950.
    Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for (...)
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  23. Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies.Cameron M. Curtin, H. Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Alyssa N. Crittenden, Daniel Fessler, Simon Fitzpatrick, Michael Gurven, Martin Kanovsky, Stephen Laurence, Anne Pisor, Brooke Scelza, Stephen Stich, Chris von Rueden & Joseph Henrich - 2020 - Evolution and Human Behavior 41 (5):415-429.
    Decades of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic (WEIRD) societies have led many scholars to conclude that the use of mental states in moral judgment is a human cognitive universal, perhaps an adaptive strategy for selecting optimal social partners from a large pool of candidates. However, recent work from a more diverse array of societies suggests there may be important variation in how much people rely on mental states, with people in some societies judging accidental harms just (...)
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  24. Does empirical evidence support perceptual mindreading?Joulia Smortchkova - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):298-306.
    According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental properties, as (...)
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  25. Psicologia como Filosofia - Filosofia como Psicologia - Artigos e Avaliações 2006-2019.Michael Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...)
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  26. '이상한 루프입니다'에 관한 리뷰 (I am a Strange Loop) Douglas Hofstadter (2000).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 지구상의 지옥에 오신 것을 환영합니다 : 아기, 기후 변화, 비트 코인, 카르텔, 중국, 민주주의, 다양성, 역학, 평등, 해커, 인권, 이슬람, 자유주의, 번영, 웹, 혼돈, 기아, 질병, 폭력, 인공 지능, 전쟁. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 122-141.
    호프스타터 목사에 의해 근본주의 자연주의 교회의 최신 설교. 그의 훨씬 더 유명한 (또는 그 끊임없는 철학적 오류로 악명 높은) 작업 고델, 에셔, 바흐처럼, 그것은 피상적 인 타당성을 가지고 있지만, 하나는 철학적 인 것들과 실제 과학적 문제를 혼합 만연 한 사이언티즘것을 이해한다면 (즉, 유일한 진짜 문제는 우리가 재생해야하는 언어 게임이다) 다음 거의 모든 관심. 나는 진화 심리학과 비트겐슈타인의 작품에 기반한 분석을위한 프레임 워크를 제공합니다 (이후 내 최근 글에서 업데이트). 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 (...)
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  27. ДОБРО ПОЖАЛОВАТЬ В АД НА НАШЕМ МИРЕ.Michael Richard Starks (ed.) - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Америка и мир находятся в процессе краха от чрезмерного роста населения, большинство из них за последнее столетие, и теперь все это из-за третьего мира людей. Потребление ресурсов и добавление еще одного-двух миллиардов, около 2100 года, обрушит индустриальную цивилизацию и приведет к голоду, болезням, насилию и войне в ошеломляющих масштабах. Миллиарды погибнут, и ядерная война почти наверняка. В Америке это значительно ускоряется за счет массовой иммиграции и воспроизводства иммигрантов, в сочетании со злоупотреблениями, которые стали возможными благодаря демократии. Развратная человеческая природа неумолимо (...)
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  28. Witamy do Piekła na Ziemi - Dzieci, zmiany klimatu, bitcoiny, kartele, Chiny, demokracja, różnorodność, dysgenika, równość, hakerzy, prawa człowieka, islam, liberalizm, dobrobyt, sieć, chaos, głód, choroby, przemoc, sztuczna inteligencja, wojna.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Ameryka i świat są w trakcie upadku z nadmiernego wzrostu populacji, większość z nich w ostatnim stuleciu, a teraz wszystko to ze względu na 3-cia ludzi świata. Konsumpcja zasobów i dodanie jednego lub dwóch miliardów więcej około 2100 upadnie cywilizacji przemysłowej i doprowadzić do głodu, chorób, przemocy i wojny na oszałamiającą skalę. Miliardy umrą, a wojna nuklearna jest pewna. W Ameryce jest to znacznie przyspieszone przez masową imigrację i reprodukcję imigrantów, w połączeniu z nadużyciami możliwymi przez demokrację. Zdeprawowana ludzka natura (...)
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  29. 地獄へようこそ : 赤ちゃん、気候変動、ビットコイン、カルテル、中国、民主主義、多様性、ディスジェニックス、平等、ハッカー、人権、イスラム教、自由主義、繁栄、ウェブ、カオス、飢餓、病気、暴力、人工知能、戦争.Michael Richard Starks (ed.) - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    アメリカと世界は過剰な人口増加から崩壊し、そのほとんどが前世紀に及び、現在は第3世界の人々のために崩壊しています。資源の消費と1または200以上のca.2100の追加は、産業文明を崩壊させ、驚異的な規 模で飢餓、病気、暴力と戦争をもたらすでしょう。何十億人もの人が死んで、核戦争は確実です。アメリカでは、これは大規模な移民と移民の生殖によって非常に加速されており、民主主義によって可能になった虐待と組み 合わされています。堕落した人間性は、民主主義と多様性の夢を犯罪と貧困の悪夢に変えます。崩壊の根本的な原因は、私たちの生来の心理学が現代世界に適応できないことであり、人々は無関係な人を共通の利益を持って いるかのように扱う。これは、基本的な生物学と心理学の無知に加えて、民主的な社会を支配する部分的に教育を受けた人々のソーシャルエンジニアリングの妄想につながります。一人の人を助けた場合、誰かに危害を加え る人はいませんが、無料のランチはなく、誰もが消費するアイテムが修復を超えて地球を破壊することを理解している人はほとんどいません。その結果、至る所の社会政策は持続不可能であり、利己主義に対する厳格な統制 なしに、すべての社会が一つ一つ無政府状態または独裁に崩壊する。劇的かつ即時の変化がなければ、アメリカの崩壊や民主主義システムに続く国を防ぐ望みはありません。したがって、私のエッセイ「民主主義による自殺 」。 また、中国を支配する7つの社会主義者が第三次世界大戦に勝っていることも明らかであり、私の結論エッセイも明らかです。唯一の大きな脅威は、私が簡単にコメントする人工知能です。 私たちについてのすべてに関する鍵は生物学であり、オバマ、チョムスキー、クリントン、民主党、教皇のような何百万人もの賢い教育を受けた人々が、地球上の地獄に無尽蔵にまっすぐにつながる自殺ユートピアの理想を 提唱するのは、それに気づかない。 Wが指摘したように、見るのが最も難しいのは、常に私たちの目の前にあるものです。 私たちは意識的な審議言語システム2の世界に住んでいますが、無意識の自動反射システム1がルールを定めています。これは、サールの表現型錯覚(TPI)、ピンカーのブランクスレートとトゥービーとコスミデスの標 準的な社会科学モデルによって記述された普遍的な失明の源です。 記事の最初のグループは、理論的な妄想のない私たちがどのように振る舞うかについての洞察を与えようとします。次の3つのグループでは、持続可能な世界を妨げる3つの主な妄想(技術、宗教、政治(協力グループ)に ついてコメントします。人々は社会が彼らによって救われると信じているので、私はこれが有名な作家による最近の本の短い記事やレビューを通じて起こりそうにない理由について、本の残りの部分でいくつかの提案を提供 します。 別のセクションでは、宗教的な妄想について説明しています – 私たちを救ういくつかの超能力があります。 次のセクションでは、システム2の言語ゲームとシステム1の自動化を混同するデジタル妄想について説明します。 他のデジタル妄想は、システム2によって作成されたコンピュータ/AI/ロボティクス/ナノテク/遺伝子工学によって、システム1の純粋な悪(利己主義)から救われるということです。 ノーフリーランチ校長は、重大でおそらく致命的な結果が起こる可能性があることを教えてくれます。 最後のセクションでは、私たちが皆と協力するために選ばれたこと、そして民主主義、多様性、平等のユーフォニアの理想が、物事を正しく管理するだけでユートピアに導くという大きな幸せな家族の妄想(政治の可能性) について説明します。 繰り返しますが、ノーフリーランチ原則は、それが真実であるはずがないと警告する必要があり、厳格なコントロール、利己主義、愚かさがなければ優位に立ち、すぐにこれらの妄想を受け入れる国を破壊することを歴史と 現代世界全体で見ています。さらに、猿の心は未来を急激に割引するので、私たちは一時的な快適さのために子孫の遺産を販売することに協力し、問題を大きく悪化させます。 .
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  30. Recensione di The Stuff of Thought di Steven Pinker (2008) (recensione rivista nel 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra: Bambini, Cambiamenti climatici, Bitcoin, Cartelli, Cina, Democrazia, Diversità, Disgenetica, Uguaglianza, Pirati Informatici, Diritti umani, Islam, Liberalismo, Prosperità, Web, Caos, Fame, Malattia, Violenza, Intellig. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 71-83.
    Comincio con alcuni commenti famosi del filosofo (psicologo) Ludwig Wittgenstein perché Pinker condivide con la maggior parte delle persone (a causa delle impostazioni predefinite della nostra psicologia innata evoluta) certi pregiudizi sul funzionamento della mente, e perché Wittgenstein offre approfondimenti unici e profondi sul funzionamento del linguaggio, del pensiero e della realtà (che ha visto come più o meno coetantana) non trovati altrove. Ilre è solo riferimento a Wittgenstein in questo volume, che è più sfortunato considerando che era il più (...)
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  31. परोपकारिता का भ्रम: समावेशी फिटनेस और सभ्यता का पतन.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    आनुवंशिक गड़बड़ी हमारे करीबी रिश्तेदारों ("परोपकारिता"), जो अफ्रीका के मैदानों पर हमारे पूर्वजों में अस्तित्व के लिए महत्वपूर्ण था हजारों की दसियों हजारों साल पहले की मदद करने के लिए, एक भीड़ दुनिया में एक घातक दोष है जहां हमारे पड़ोसियों अब बारीकी से संबंधित है और अस्तित्व के लिए एक जीवन और मौत के संघर्ष में लगे हुए हैं । मैं ' के रूप में एक बड़ा खुश परिवार भ्रम ' का उल्लेख किया है और यह राजनीतिक छोड़ दिया (...)
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  32. Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.
    How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others’ mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don’t perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...)
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  33. When is mindreading accurate? A commentary on Shannon Spaulding’s How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition. [REVIEW]Evan Westra - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):868-882.
    In How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, Shannon Spaulding develops a novel account of social cognition with pessimistic implications for mindreading accuracy: according to Spaulding, mistakes in mentalizing are much more common than traditional theories of mindreading commonly assume. In this commentary, I push against Spaulding’s pessimism from two directions. First, I argue that a number of the heuristic mindreading strategies that Spaulding views as especially error prone might be quite reliable in practice. Second, I argue that current (...)
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  34. Folk personality psychology: mindreading and mindshaping in trait attribution.Evan Westra - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8213-8232.
    Character-trait attribution is an important component of everyday social cognition that has until recently received insufficient attention in traditional accounts of folk psychology. In this paper, I consider how the case of character-trait attribution fits into the debate between mindreading-based and broadly ‘pluralistic’ approaches to folk psychology. Contrary to the arguments of some pluralists, I argue that the evidence on trait understanding does not show that it is a distinct, non-mentalistic mode of folk-psychological reasoning, but rather suggests that traits are (...)
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  35. Justification, Conversation, and Folk Psychology.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1):73-88.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a version of the so-called conversational hypothesis of the ontogenetic connection between language and mindreading (Harris 1996, 2005; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Hughes et al. 2006). After arguing against a particular way of understanding the hypothesis (the communicative view), I will start from the justificatory view in philosophy of social cognition (Andrews 2012; Hutto 2004; Zawidzki 2013) to make the case for the idea that the primary function of belief and desire (...)
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  36. Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology.Harmen Ghijsen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5395-5413.
    According to pluralistic folk psychology (PFP) we make use of a variety of methods to predict and explain each other, only one of which makes use of attributing propositional attitudes. I discuss three related problems for this view: first, the prediction problem, according to which (some of) PFP’s methods of prediction only work if they also assume a tacit attribution of propositional attitudes; second, the interaction problem, according to which PFP cannot explain how its different methods of prediction and explanation (...)
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  37. The complementarity of mindshaping and mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.
    Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...)
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  38. Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social Effects on Social Cognition.Julius Schönherr & Evan Westra - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):27-52.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...)
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  39. Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our real selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- A review of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the hidden determinants of human behavior –author’s official authoritative edition’ 412p (2012)(original edition 1995)(review revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 353-357.
    I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, ideas, (...)
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  40. Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005)(review revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 309-324.
    A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying the mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue to dominate cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that they were powerfully countered by W and later by Searle and others. -/- There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc. but never a clear mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our genetically programmed innate behavior. (...)
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  41. Psychology as Philosophy, Philosophy as Psychology--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019.Michael Starks - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to (...)
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  42. La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en los escritos de Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle (revisado en 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4TH Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 2-102.
    Proporciono un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de Wittgenstein y Searle sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein, que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos — confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo que todas las soluciones son las mismas — observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que (...)
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  43. Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy.Evan Westra - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2821-2846.
    Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally involve character-trait (...)
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  44. Do Apes Attribute Beliefs to Predict Behavior?Kristin Andrews - 2018 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 25:89-110.
    I defend a Mengzian version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, according to which humans think about one another’s beliefs and desires—and reasons for action—in order to solve our social living problems through cooperation, rather than through competition and deception, as the more familiar Machiavellian version has it. Given this framework, and a corresponding view about the function of belief attribution, I argue that while apes need not attribute propositional attitudes to pass the “false belief task,” we should not conclude that (...)
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  45. A Dispositional Account of Aversive Racism.Carole J. Lee - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Cognitive Science Society.
    I motivate and articulate a dispositional account of aversive racism. By conceptualizing and measuring attitudes in terms of their full distribution, rather than in terms of their mode or mean preference, my account of dispositional attitudes gives ambivalent attitudes (qua attitude) the ability to predict aggregate behavior. This account can be distinguished from other dispositional accounts of attitude by its ability to characterize ambivalent attitudes such as aversive racism at the attitudinal rather than the sub-attitudinal level and its deeper appreciation (...)
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  46. Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading.Spaulding Shannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4009-4030.
    Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...)
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  47. Character and theory of mind: an integrative approach.Evan Westra - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1217-1241.
    Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system (...)
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  48. More stereotypes, please! The limits of ‘theory of mind’ and the need for further studies on the complexity of real world social interactions.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
  49. Folk psychology as mental simulation.Luca Barlassina & Robert M. Gordon - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mindreading (or folk psychology, Theory of Mind, mentalizing) is the capacity to represent and reason about others’ mental states. The Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the main approaches to mindreading. ST draws on the common-sense idea that we represent and reason about others’ mental states by putting ourselves in their shoes. More precisely, we typically arrive at representing others’ mental states by simulating their mental states in our own mind. This entry offers a detailed analysis of ST, considers theoretical (...)
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  50. Pučka psihologija: znanstvene perspektive realizma, eliminativizma i instrumentalizma.Marin Biondić - 2017 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 37 (3):559-578.
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