In diesem Band sind Beitrage aus kulturell und disziplinar unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln auf das Thema 'Schopenhauer und die Philosophien Asiens' zusammengefasst: Sie gehen auf Vortrage zuruck, die auf zwei internationalen Tagungen der ...

resumo No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que a concepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada como formalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemas racionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crise na filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de Friedrich Schlegel: "É igualmente mortal (...) ao espírito ter um sistema e não ter nenhum". Fichte e Schopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição e pensamento. palavras-chave Schopenhauer; Fichte; pensamento; intuição. (shrink)

No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que aconcepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada comoformalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemasracionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crisena filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de FriedrichSchlegel: "É igualmente mortal ao espírito ter um sistema e não (...) ter nenhum". Fichte eSchopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição epensamento. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Pure Subject of Cognition The Artist as Pure Subject of Cognition Notes References Further Reading.

I would like to know who of mycontemporaries should be more competent inKantian philosophy than me.(Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 18371)In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is (...) apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition. (shrink)

Die Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers ist geprägt durch eine konsequente Umkehrung der traditionellen Hierarchie von Intellekt und Wille. Die Deutung der Welt unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Leiblich-Triebhaften sowie das Aufzeigen von Kontemplation, Mitleid und Askese als Wege aus der Leidensstruktur des Lebens bilden die zentralen Elemente seiner Lehre. Das Handbuch gibt einen Überblick über Schopenhauers Leben, präsentiert alle wichtigen Werke und Werkgruppen und legt den philosophischen Kontext dar, in dem sie entstanden sind. Ausführlich wird auch seine Wirkung auf Philosophie, Literatur, Musik (...) und Bildende Kunst dargestellt. (shrink)

Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...) debate unscathed. (shrink)

Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that both (...) the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck. -/- In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury’s approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman’s account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury’s as well as Zimmerman’s accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck. (shrink)

Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on long-lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against local theories, localists cannot explain these effects away by conjecturing that subjects are phenomenally conscious of features that (...) they cannot report. We also discuss alternative explanations that localists could offer. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question whether some morally normative content is grounded in the dialogical practice that both Apel and Habermas call argumentative discourse, and if so how to demonstrate that it is so grounded. Apel (unlike Habermas) claims that discourse has rationally necessary conceptual presuppositions; that morally normative content is part of such presuppositions; and that this can be ascertained in transcendendal reflection, i.e. by a kind of transcendental argument. I argue that these claims can be charitably interpreted (...) but require clarifications of their key concepts, i.e. “discourse”, “validity claims”, “performative self-contradiction”, and “community of communication”. I argue that discourse as a practice of reason-sensitive agents who are communicatively connected via argumentation can be explained by its normatively constitutive aim, namely fixing the true values of our reasons; that the primary level of validity claims are claims concerning good reasons; that performative self-contradictions are pragmatic-cum-logical inconsistencies that we can know apriori to be incompatible with discourse’s constitutive aim; and finally, that competent discourse participants can know apriori that they would be performatively inconsistent if they flouted a moral kernel that is intrinsic in discourse. (shrink)

To study consciousness, scientists need to determine when participants are conscious and when they are not. They do so with consciousness detection procedures. A recurring skeptical argument against those procedures is that they cannot be calibrated: there is no way to make sure that detection outcomes are accurate. In this article, I address two main skeptical arguments purporting to show that consciousness scientists cannot calibrate detection procedures. I conclude that there is nothing wrong with calibration in consciousness science.

In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in _Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik_ (1884) and the status of cross-sortal identity claims with side glances at _Grundgesetze der Arithmetik_ (vol. I 1893, vol. II 1903). As far as I can see, this topic has not yet been discussed in the context of _Grundlagen_. I show why Frege’s strategy in the case of the projected definitions of real and complex numbers in (...) _Grundlagen_ is modelled on his definitional introduction of cardinal numbers in two steps, tentatively via a contextual definition and finally and definitively via an explicit definition. I argue that the strategy leaves a few important questions open, in particular one relating to the status of the envisioned abstraction principles for the real and complex numbers and another concerning the proper handling of cross-sortal identity claims. (shrink)

Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a (...) realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)

This book considers Robert Brandom's philosophy and presents an original and exciting analysis of the semantic argument in legal argumentation.

Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the present paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from the shortcomings of radical (...) positivism, instrumentalism, and other forms of scientific antirealism. On the whole, it will be seen that logical empiricism and scientific realism are essentially compatible with each other. Especially Kaila’s invariantist approach to science (and nature) comes quite close to what nowadays is discussed under the label ‘structural realism.’ This, in turn, necessitates a fundamental reevaluation of Kaila’s role in the logical empiricist movement in particular and in twentieth-century philosophy of science in general. (shrink)

Die Beiträge zur Altertumskunde enthalten Monographien, Sammelbände, Editionen, Übersetzungen und Kommentare zu Themen aus den Bereichen Klassische, Mittel- und Neulateinische Philologie, Alte Geschichte, Archäologie, Antike Philosophie sowie Nachwirken der Antike bis in die Neuzeit. Dadurch leistet die Reihe einen umfassenden Beitrag zur Erschließung klassischer Literatur und zur Forschung im gesamten Gebiet der Altertumswissenschaften.

American critical realism was defended in two versions, an “essentialist” and an “empirical.” The main proponent of the essentialist version was George Santayana, who in his Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923) outlined a critical realist account of epistemology based substantially on an articulate doctrine of essences. In the present paper, an attempt is made to critically examine the resulting approach, particularly in relation to perception. It will be argued that Santayana failed to develop a sufficiently convincing essentialist view of perception, (...) and that his actual significance in terms of the impact of the critical realist movement was, contrary to what is often claimed, quite limited. (shrink)

In diesem Open-Access-Buch wird eine Verteidigung des nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus gegen den Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus entwickelt. Der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus besagt im Kern, dass mentale Eigenschaften zwar nicht mit physischen Eigenschaften identisch sind, sie aber dennoch so eng an physische Eigenschaften gebunden sind, dass man sinnvollerweise von einer auf grundlegender Ebene rein physischen Welt sprechen kann. Der Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus wendet gegen den nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus ein, dass aus seiner Grundidee folgt, dass es keine mentale Verursachung gibt: Wenn mentale Eigenschaften tatsächlich nicht mit (...) physischen Eigenschaften identisch sind, sondern lediglich eng an sie gebunden sind, dann können mentale Eigenschaften niemals kausal wirksam werden. Die in diesem Buch entwickelte Verteidigung beruht auf einer Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Begriffen der Kausalität: Kausaler Produktion und kausaler Abhängigkeit. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus zwar darauf festgelegt ist, dass es keine mentale Verursachung im Sinne von kausaler Produktion gibt. Diese Konsequenz kann jedoch akzeptiert werden. Denn aus dem nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus folgt keineswegs, dass es keine mentale Verursachung im Sinne von kausaler Abhängigkeit gibt. (shrink)

In his paper `Finitism', W.W.~Tait maintained that the chief difficulty for everyone who wishes to understand Hilbert's conception of finitist mathematics is this: to specify the sense of the provability of general statements about the natural numbers without presupposing infinite totalities. Tait further argued that all finitist reasoning is essentially primitive recursive. In our paper, we attempt to show that his thesis ``The finitist functions are precisely the primitive recursive functions'' is disputable and that another, likewise defended by him, is (...) untenable. The second thesis is that the finitist theorems are precisely those $\Pi^0_1$-sentences that can be proved in. (shrink)

Introspection is the capacity by which we know our own conscious mental states. Several theories aim to explain it. According to acquaintance theory, we know our experiences by being acquainted with them. Acquaintance is non-causal, non-inferential, and non-observational. I present a dilemma for the acquaintance theory of introspection. Either subjects are always acquainted with all their experiences; or some attentional mechanism selects the relevant experiences (or aspects of experiences) for introspection. The first option is implausible: it implies that subjects are (...) omniscient about their own experiences. The second option is also implausible: if acquaintance is a non-causal relation, introspection cannot target specific (aspects of) experiences without violating the principle of causal closure of the physical. (shrink)

This comprehensive volume gives a panorama of the best current work in this lively field, through twenty specially written essays by the leading figures in the field. All essays deal with foundational issues, from the nature of mathematical knowledge and mathematical existence to logical consequence, abstraction, and the notions of set and natural number. The contributors also represent and criticize a variety of prominent approaches to the philosophy of mathematics, including platonism, realism, nomalism, constructivism, and formalism.

Phänomenologie der Normativität ist der Versuch zu zeigen, wie Normativität in der menschlichen Natur gründet. Im Anschluss an die phänomenologische Anthropologie Max Schelers und Helmuth Plessners stellt der Autor die Strukturen menschlichen Lebens heraus, die alle menschlichen Lebensformen fundieren. Menschen sind Lebewesen, die einen Leib haben, und dieses Phänomen ist ursprünglicher als die Unterscheidung von Körper und Geist. Hält man sich dies vor Augen, werden bestimmte Formen menschlicher Normativität verständlich: Die menschliche Lebensweise ist auf ein Gleichgewicht verschiedener Formen des Miteinanders (...) angelegt, das nur möglich ist, weil es leiblich vermitteltes Ausdrucksverstehen gibt. Mitfühlen mit dem anderen und Liebe zu ihm fundiert das Erkennen, und was menschliche Würde ist, verstehen wir, weil wir wissen, wie die Integrität des Leibes geschützt, aber auch verletzt werden kann. (shrink)

For several decades, Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The book series is international in orientation and reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The series is led by an international team of editors.

Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory. (shrink)

Matthias Vogel challenges the belief, dominant in contemporary philosophy, that reason is determined solely by our discursive, linguistic abilities as communicative beings. In his view, the medium of language is not the only force of reason. Music, art, and other nonlinguistic forms of communication and understanding are also significant. Introducing an expansive theory of mind that accounts for highly sophisticated, penetrative media, Vogel advances a novel conception of rationality while freeing philosophy from its exclusive attachment to linguistics. Vogel's media (...) of reason treats all kinds of understanding and thought, propositional and nonpropositional, as important to the processes and production of knowledge and thinking. By developing an account of rationality grounded in a new conception of media, he raises the profile of the prelinguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of rationality and advances the Enlightenment project, buffering it against the postmodern critique that the movement fails to appreciate aesthetic experience. Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media--books, movies, newspapers, the Internet, and television--while offering an original and exciting contribution to media theory. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 80-99, January 2022.

Nancy Cartwright has been a dominant figure in the philosophy of science for more than twenty years. In the early eighties she wrote her influential book "How the Laws of Physics Lie" which was generally perceived to be a challenge to a realistic conception of scientific theories. Over the last decade her focus has shifted to issues concerning what she calls "fundamentalism". This is the position that laws of nature are basic and that other things come from them. Cartwright rejects (...) this story and replaces it by the view that capacities are basic and that laws obtain "on account of the repeated Operation of a system of components with stable capacities in particularly fortunate circumstances". This book focuses mainly on Cartwright's recent work on laws and capacities. It is the outcome of the second series of the Munster lectures in philosophy which took place on May 5-6, 1998. This volume comprises a revised version of Cartwright's evening talk, 12 colloquium papers which Cartwright considered to be "extremely thought provoking", followed by replies Cartwright makes to each of them. (shrink)

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions.

Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain (...) without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument. (shrink)

The current global COVID-19 pandemic has led to a deep and multidimensional crisis across all sectors of society. As countries contemplate their mobility and social-distancing policy restrictions, we have a unique opportunity to re-imagine the deliberative frameworks and value priorities in our food systems. Pre-pandemic food systems at global, national, regional and local scales already needed revision to chart a common vision for sustainable and ethical food futures. Re-orientation is also needed by the relevant sciences, traditionally siloed in their disciplines (...) and without adequate attention paid to how the food system problem is variously framed by diverse stakeholders according to their values. From the transdisciplinary perspective of food ethics, we argue that a post-pandemic scheme focused on bottom-up, regional, cross-sectoral and non-partisan deliberation may provide the re-orientation and benchmarks needed for not only more sustainable, but also more ethical food futures. (shrink)

Transdisciplinarity includes the assumption that within new institutional settings, scientific research becomes more closely responsive to practical problems and user needs and is therefore often subject to considerable application pressure. This raises the question whether transdisciplinarity affects the epistemic standards and the fruitfulness of research. Case studies show how user-orientation and epistemic innovativeness can be combined. While the modeling involved in all cases under consideration was local and focused primarily on features of immediate practical relevance, it was informed by theoretical (...) insights from basic research. Conversely, industrial research turns out sometimes to produce theoretical understanding. These findings highlight an interactive relationship between science and technology (moderate emergentism), which is distinct from the traditional view of a one-sided dependence of technology on science (cascade model) and from the newly received independence account (emergentism). (shrink)