According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of (...) language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts. In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i.e., argumentative strategies). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil, and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods. While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular. As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence. (shrink)

Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal language philosophy. I (...) argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show how much of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates about and within linguistic philosophy. Specifically, arguments by ideal language philosophers support experimental philosophy. (shrink)

The idea that thought and language can be clarified through logical methods seems problematic because, while thought and language are not always exact, logic (by its very nature) must be. According to Kuusela, ideal (ILP, represented by Frege and Russell) and ordinary language philosophy (OLP, represented by Strawson) offer opposed solutions to this problem, and Wittgenstein combines the advantages of both. I argue that, given Kuusela’s characterisation of OLP, Strawson was not an OLP’er. I suggest (...) that, instead of seeing ILP and OLP as opposed to one another, it is better to regard OLP as an extension of ILP. (shrink)

Recently, there has been growing interest in methodological issues of non-ideal theoretical philosophy. While some explicitly commit to non-ideal theorising, others doubt that there is anything useful about the ideal/non-ideal distinction in theoretical philosophy. The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I propose a way of doing non-ideal theoretical philosophy, once we realise how limited certain idealised projects are. Since there is a big overlap between projects that are (...) called non-ideal and applied, the second aim is to distinguish between these categories in order to show that applied theoretical philosophy is only worth pursuing if it operates in a non-ideal framework. I argue that we should be pluralistic about possible non-ideal theories and view the ideal/non-ideal differences as a matter of degree, rather than kind. As an example, I show how my version of non-ideal theory is useful to a concrete debate in philosophy of language. My proposal allows us to identify already existing non-ideal approaches to linguistic meaning and encourages us to further engage in the debate on non-ideal theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

Starting with Gottlob Frege's foundational theories of sense and reference, Miller provides a useful introduction to the formal logic used in all subsequent philosophy of language. He communicates a sense of active philosophical debate by confronting the views of the early theorists concerned with building systematic theories - such as Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the logical positivists - with the attacks mounted by sceptics - such as W.O. Quine, Saul Kripke, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This leads to important excursions (...) into related areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science that present the more recent attempts to save the notions of sense and meaning by philosophers such as Paul Grice, John Searle, Jerry Fodor, Colin McGinn, and Crispin Wright. Miller then returns to the systematic program by examining the formal theories of Donald Davidson, concluding with a chapter surveying the relevance of philosophy of language to the broader metaphysical debates between realists and anti-realists. Miller's clear, engaged, and coherently structured approach makes Philosophy of Language an ideal text for undergraduate courses. The guides to further reading provided in each chapter help the reader pursue interesting topics further and facilitate using the book in conjunction with primary sources. (shrink)

There’s an interesting debate in moral and political philosophy about the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theory. In this paper we discuss whether an analogous distinction can be drawn in philosophy of language. Our conclusion is negative: Even if you think that distinction can be put to work within moral and political philosophy, there’s no useful way to extend it to work that has been done in the philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>language. (shrink)

Designed for readers new to the subject,_ Reading Philosophy of Language_ presents key texts in the philosophy of language together with helpful editorial guidance. A concise collection of key texts in the philosophy of language Ideal for readers new to the subject. Features seminal texts by leading figures in the field, such as Austin, Chomsky, Davidson, Dummett and Searle. Presents three texts on each of five key topics: speech and performance; meaning and truth; knowledge (...) of language; meaning and compositionality; and non-literal meaning. A volume introduction from the editors outlines the subject’s principal concerns. Introductions to each chapter locate the pieces in context and explain relevant terminology and theories. Interactive commentaries help readers to engage with the texts. (shrink)

Abstract Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and (...) philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the assumption of an artificial language methodology. (shrink)

The notion of an ‘ideal language’ or ‘concept-script’ is explicated and defended, and constraints upon formal systems imposed by the ideal of transparency are explored. It is argued that non-singular symbolisms, including non-singular variables, largely fail to satisfy such constraints. In general, the semantics of non-singular expressions do not transparently reflect the corresponding ontic categories. The conditions for the possibility of transparent non-singular assertions, freed from the concept of identity, are briefly explored. The questionable influence within (...) class='Hi'>philosophy of the ‘Classical’ Weltanschaung is highlighted. (shrink)

This Handbook brings together philosophical work on how language shapes, and is shaped by, social and political factors. Its 24 chapters were written exclusively for this volume by an international team of leading researchers, and together they provide a broad expert introduction to the major issues currently under discussion in this area. The volume is divided into four parts: Part I: Methodological and Foundational Issues Part II: Non-ideal Semantics and Pragmatics Part III: Linguistic Harms Part IV: Applications The (...) parts, and chapters in each part, are introduced in the volume's General Introduction. A list of Works Cited concludes each chapter, pointing readers to further areas of study. The Handbook is the first major, multi-authored reference work in this growing area and essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of language and its relationship to social and political reality. (shrink)

The Philosophy ofLanguage belongs to the foundations of philosophical reflexion. In this volume, its central problems and strategies are explained, and the nature of sentences and other elements of language are analysed. The didactical exposition of the most important schools and thinkers makes the volume particularly interesting for readers new to the subject.

Table of Contents: -/- Panu Raatikainen: Varieties of Ideal Language Philosophy. Jani Sinokki: Descartes on Language: How Signification Leads to Direct Reference. Matti Eklund: Carnapian Frameworks Revisited. Joseph Almog & Andrea Bianchi: The Semantics of Common Nouns and the Nature of Semantics. Gabriel Sandu: The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference: Some Afterthoughts. Genoveva Martí: Experimental Results on Kind Terms: A Critical Reflection. Michael Devitt: Type Specimens and Reference. Jussi Haukioja: Conceptual Engineering for Externalists. Panu (...) Raatikainen: Fictional Names Revisited. Teemu Tauriainen: Indeterminism about Discourse Domains. Anandi Hattiagandi: Is Logic Normative? Jaakko Reinikainen: Constitutive Rules and Internal Criticism of Assertion. Aleksi Honkasalo: What Could and What Should Be Said? On Semantic Correctness and Semantic Prescriptions. Pasi Valtonen: Rearticulated Psychological View of Generics and Worldly Truthmakers. Joonas Pennanen: The Dual Character of Essentially Contested Concepts. Teemu Toppinen & Vilma Venesmaa: Unified Metasemantics for Expressivists. (shrink)

This paper is inter-disciplinary. Its disadvantage is that the author is not sufficiently conversant with the disciplines it is inter. He may however, like Lord Wavell, claim that at least the thread that binds them is his own.The paper is of philosophic interest in that it is inspired by, and hopes to shed some light on, the notion of an ideal language. It is of interest to social anthropology in that its main subject is kinship structure. It may (...) be of interest to mathematicians in setting a task. (shrink)

Pursuing a line of progression articulated by Prof. Quine, Dr. Pasch (Experience and the Analytic) argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction rests on mere convention. Further, that the use of this distinction by present day empiricists--especially the rational reconstructionists--has caused empiricism to take a departure from traditional empiricism. I observe, in opposition, 1) the natural language firmament is itself an amorphous construct, 2) the natural language might be the language of experience but not of empiricism, 3) the (...) class='Hi'>ideal language is tied to experience by primitives for what perceptually appears, and 4) if one claims the primitives must be tested in scientific inquiry, a case should be made for this philosophical position. (shrink)

This book argues that the major traditions in the philosophy of language have mistakenly focused on highly idealized linguistic contexts. Instead, it presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language that contends that the essential function of language is to direct attention for the purpose of achieving diverse social and political goals. Philosophers of language have focused primarily on highly idealized linguistic contexts in which cooperative agents are working toward the shared goal of gaining information (...) about the world. This approach abstracts away from important issues like power, ideology, social position, and diversity of goals which are crucial to explaining linguistic phenomena both at the semantic and pragmatic levels. This book begins by examining the work of some of the pioneers of this tradition--primarily David Lewis, Paul Grice, and Robert Stalnaker. The author shows that various problems have their source in idealizations made at the foundational level of linguistic theory and proposes to rebuild from the ground-up. She presents a non-ideal foundational theory of language which retains the major insights of traditional frameworks while rejecting the social idealizations that guide them. Then, she explores the social and political applications of her account to issues such as dog whistling, propaganda, slurs and racist speech, silencing, and manipulation. Non-Ideal Foundations of Language will appeal to researchers and advanced students in philosophy of language who are interested in the social and political applications of language, as well as traditional metasemantic theory. (shrink)

For the first time in English, this anthology offers a comprehensive selection of primary sources in the history of philosophy of language. Beginning with a detailed introduction contextualizing the subject, the editors draw out recurring themes, including the origin of language, the role of nature and convention in fixing form and meaning, language acquisition, ideal languages, varieties of meanings, language as a tool, and the nexus of language and thought, linking them to representative (...) texts. The handbook moves on to offer seminal contributions from philosophers ranging from the pre-Socratics up to John Stuart Mill, preceding each major historical section with its own introductory assessment. With all of the most relevant primary texts on the philosophy of language included, covering well over two millennia, this judicious, and generous, selection of source material will be an indispensable research tool for historians of philosophy, as well as for philosophers of language, in the twenty-first century. A vital tool for researchers and contemporary philosophers, it will be a touchstone for much further research, with coverage of a long and varied tradition that will benefit today's scholars and enhance their awareness of earlier contributions to the field. (shrink)

This paper is based on the "cratylus", although there is occasional reference to other dialogues. In plato's contrast between the language of the gods and the language of mortals, we may discern something like the contrast between ideal and ordinary language. By names he means terms which have both reference and sense necessarily; such terms are also verbs, for verbs are names of actions and actions are realities; for instance, a blow. The criterion for the identity (...) of names is that they mean the same thing. "statements".unlike names, statements have meaning without necessarily having any reference. A word is a name "only" if what it names exits, whereas a statement may be false. A statement achieves meaning by purely internal criteria as to its composition. "the structure of statements". A statement is not a list of names; it is a unity and has meaning only in its character as a unity. Ryle's view that the terms in a sentence are not independent constituents and that their meaning is contextual is presented. The author concludes that plato is undecided on this matter. (shrink)

Philosophy of science as a scholarly discipline exists today side by side with other disciplines within an interdisciplinary framework of the history and philosophy of science or science and technology studies. The rationale for this “joint venture” is commonly seen in the division of labor. The history of science focuses on the rise and development of scientific theories in the past; the sociology of science deals with science as a social institution; the psychology of science investigates the mechanisms (...) of creativity and one’s personal impact upon scientific discoveries; and finally, the philosophy of science is responsible for the logical and methodological analysis of the structure and growth of the scientific knowledge, mostly within the context of justification. This allegedly fruitful division of labor presumes an independent existence of social, personal and cognitive domains, and the desired interdisciplinary communication between the correspondent disciplines aims to account for the complementary understanding of science. But in fact no sufficient exchange of meanings takes place for every discipline insists upon its independence and prior significance. Under these conditions, neither a consistent picture of science appears to be possible nor might science policy be construed and justified basing on this disintegrated conglomerate of knowledge. A way out of the situation is as follows: to acknowledge non-independent character of the philosophy of science; to learn more from social philosophy; to revisit the epistemological status of the natural sciences as the only cognitive ideal; to focus on the social and the human sciences in search of a new methodological experience; to cease considering concrete case studies as a new version of the “neutral language of observation”, which gives a “crucial justification” of a theory, and to view new philosophical interpretations a necessary feature of any case study. (shrink)

Tracing the deep connections between philosophy and education, Ryan McInerney argues that we must use philosophy to reflect on the significance of educational practice to all human endeavour. He uses a broad approach which takes in the relationships governing philosophy, education, and language, to reveal education's fundamental achievements and metaphysical significance. The realization of educational ideals and policies are read alongside growing skepticism regarding the theoretical and practical significance of philosophical thinking, and the emphasis on resource (...) efficiency and measurable outcomes which characterise schooling today. It is from this context that McInerney defends the value inherent to the philosophy of education. Drawing upon contemporary continental and analytic thinkers including Nietzsche, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein, McInerney charts the role of education in shaping the child's metaphysical transformation through language acquisition. Connecting early years and primary school education, McInerney pinpoints rationality as the crucial factor which produces critical, thinking beings. He presents the pursuit of philosophically minded education as a rational pursuit which enables us to philosophise and educate others in turn, dispensing with the epistemological and conceptual foundationalisms of the past. (shrink)

For a discourse on the spectacle of the transcendental world to be received in its comprehensible and coherent totality, its needs to get rid of the arbitrariness of the dominion of tremulous shapes of the sensitive, which is merely the sphere of opinions. This is what Plato suggests, following the course of reflection of the first thinkers: in order to compensate the deficiencies that entail elision of reality and to transform language into a vehicle of authentic intellection of the (...) fundamental concepts of philosophical thinking, he sets it into the center of a rigorous speculation. In the same way as his predecessors Heraclitus and Parmenides, the philosopher reveals logofilia at exerting himself to build a new discursive structure, different from that of common man and thereby stirring, in the field of philosophy, a revolution that had become indispensable: he elaborates a founding model - the beginning of a permanent order as the prelude to the edification of a formal and abstract language that refers to entities that the majority of humans cannot visualize by themselves. Only through it will the universal truth of the divine Forms be able to shine, which, at lending their names to the endless series of sensible particulars, clarifies them and confers them signification. Through the theories he develops based on them and exposes in the Dialogues,the philosopher aims at inducing the reader to prepare himself to methodically operate the conversion of his soul to the level of these super-sensitive ideal beings and grasp, thus, the reality that founds and turns everything cognizable.Para que um discurso sobre o espetáculo do mundo transcendente seja acolhido como totalidade inteligível e coerente, urge desvencilhar-se da arbitrariedade do domínio de trêmulos contornos do sensível, esfera de opiniões apenas. É o que propõe Platão, na esteira das reflexões dos primeiros pensadores: para suprir deficiências que causam a elisão da realidade e transformar a linguagem num veículo de intelecção autêntica dos conceitos essenciais de um pensar filosófico, ele a coloca no centro de uma especulação rigorosa. Tal como seus antecessores Heráclito e Parmênides, Platão revela logofilia ao empenhar-se na construção de uma nova estrutura discursiva, diferente daquela do homem comum, desencadeando no campo da Filosofia uma revolução que se tornara indispensável: elabora um modelo fundador - princípio de uma ordem permanente propedêutica à construção de uma linguagem formal e abstrata - referente a entes que os homens, na maioria, por si mesmos não conseguem visualizar. Somente nela poderá reverberar a verdade universal das Formas que, ao emprestarem seus nomes à infindável série dos particulares sensíveis, os clarifica e lhes confere significação. Com as teorias que a partir das Formas desenvolve e expõe nos Diálogos, o filósofo visa induzir o leitor a preparar-se para operar, metodicamente, a conversão de sua alma ao plano desses seres ideais, supra-sensíveis, e apreender, assim, a realidade que tudo fundamenta e torna cognoscível. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of science many theories of explanation are rooted in positivist or post-positivists accounts of explanation. This paper attempts to ground a phenomenological account of scientific explanation by using the works of Werner Heisenberg and Patrick Heelan. To explain something for Heisenberg is to describe what can be intersubjectively observed and conceptualized in an adequate language. However, this needs to be qualified, as not any adequate account will do. While Heisenberg thinks that Kant is right to (...) think that a priori concepts are the conditions which make science, and thus explanation, possible, he also believes pure a priori concepts have a limited range of applicability. Neils Bohr shared this belief with Heisenberg, but thinks human thought can go no further. However, Heisenberg never gave up on the idea that we could create new concepts that act as a priori grounds for quantum entities. To go beyond Heisenberg, I believe that we should look to Husserl’s account of Evidenz and the material a priori to help us think about a phenomenological account of explanation. (shrink)

Philosophy of Religion for OCR is an ideal guide for students taking the Philosophy of Religion component of the OCR Religious Studies AS and A Level course. Drawing on insights gained from many years of teaching experience, Dennis Brown and Ann Greggs’ landmark book follows the OCR specification closely and includes: ·clear and comprehensive discussion of each topic in the specification ·discussion of both historical and cutting-edge philosophical approaches ·use of excerpts from primary sources to engage students (...) in philosophical debate ·profiles of important philosophical and religious thinkers, a glossary and helpful chapter summaries ·discussion questions, activity boxes, thought points and suggestions for further reading ·practical ideas on study skills, essay-writing and assessment objectives Philosophy of Religion for OCR provides a clear, accessible and comprehensive introduction to each of the topics on the course, including ancient philosophy, mind, body and soul, arguments for and against God’s existence, religious experience and religious language. Written by two experienced teachers and textbook authors, Philosophy of Religion for OCR will assist students of every ability to achieve their best. This book, which covers component 01 of the OCR H173 and H573 specifications, should be paired with Religion and Ethics for OCR, by Dennis Brown and Mark Coffey, which covers component 02. (shrink)

This paper tries to determine the philosophical nature of language, its functions, structure and content. It also explains the concept of natural language, ordinary and ideal language i.e. how there is a need of artificial perfect logical language without errors and unclearness in that language. This paper further shows the logical form of language with its syntactical, semantical, innate and acquired criteria for the evaluation of the languages. It deals with the analysis of (...) language to clear what is unclear, to know what is unknown, to make definite what is vague. In this paper I used the method; logical method for interpretation and argumentation, analytical method for simplification, and critical method to investigate the real domain of language. This paper does not deal with ordinary functions of the language but it deals with the conceptual and modular functions of the language. The fundamental aim of this written up is to determine the analytical approach of Wittgenstein to sketch the ‘language as a tool to discuss the state of affairs or facts of the worlds that is also what philosophy does. This paper describes the contributions of rationalism and empiricism in the field of knowing the truths of language. (shrink)

I first give a brief summary of a critique of the traditional theories of approximation and idealization; and after identifying one of the major roles of idealization as detaching component processes or systems from their joints, a detailed analysis is given of idealized laws – which are discoverable and/or applicable – in such processes and systems (i.e., idealized model systems). Then, I argue that dispositional properties should be regarded as admissible properties for laws and that such an inclusion supplies the (...) much needed connection between idealized models and the laws they `produce'' or `accommodate''. And I then argue that idealized law-statements so produced or accommodated in the models may be either true simpliciter or true approximately, but the latter is not because of the idealizations involved. I argue that the kind of limiting-case idealizations that produce approximate truth is best regarded as approximation; and finally I compare my theory with some existing theories of laws of nature.We seem to trace [in KingLear] ... the tendency of imagination toanalyse and abstract, to decomposehuman nature into its constituentfactors, and then to construct beings in whomone or more of these factors isabsent or atrophied or only incipient. (shrink)

Already in his 1913 Ideen I, Husserl claimed that there are two types of intuition: experiencing, that is, sense, intuition and ideal intuition. The former provides us with contingent facts, whereas the latter provides essences. Commenting on this dichotomy in his own book-length work, Appearance and Sense, published in 1914, Shpet believed Husserl had overlooked an important and distinct type of phenomenon that we call “social” and thereby omitted a corresponding third type of intuition that reveals the social function (...) or purpose of a thing. This oversight on Husserl’s part led him to claim that an “I,” or ego, stood behind or possessed the human individual’s consciousness. Husserl failed to notice that we can and do meaningfully speak of a social consciousness that, as such, belongs to no single individual. Apart from the “evidence” of ordinary language, Husserl’s strict dichotomy leaves unaddressed how we can proceed from external appearances to their understanding, which cognitively is always in terms of concepts, traditionally called “universals.” That is, we frame our experiences and express them verbally, the words employed being meaningful to us and hopefully to “the other.” Realizing the problem of transiting from the intuition of the contingent to that of the ideal, Shpet in early 1917 downplayed the difference, preferring to call them different degrees of seeing with different conscious attitudes. He called the conscious “seeing” associated with an understanding of words “intelligible intuition.” With an interest in historical methodology predating his acquaintance with phenomenology, Shpet recognized that the only tool available to the historian is the words appearing on documents, which serve as signs. How we understand these signs forms the study of hermeneutics, which functions as the epistemology of history. However, the fear remains that if we conceive the understanding of signs and “intelligible intuition” subjectively, we lapse into a psychologism. We must not forget the social origin of language, that language is no more the possession of an individual than is consciousness. The sense of words is established in an intersubjective context. Thus, Shpet turned to a study of language much as he had previously turned to consciousness and saw neither as subjective. (shrink)

The lucidity of Mr. Copilowish's argument makes the task of the reviewer very pleasant, even if he disagrees as completely as I do with the conclusion, which is the main thesis Mr. Copilowish attempts to prove. Only at one minor point does his exposition not quite suit my taste. He chose to preface his argument with a string of quotations supposedly supporting the position he wishes to defend. It seems to me that with the proper historical precautions these passages allow (...) for a very different interpretation. Yet I shall not pursue this matter, partly because I believe that Mr. Copilowish merely followed a literary stereotype, but mainly because the issue ought to be discussed on its merits rather than through the clouds of witness one could adduce on either side. (shrink)

BY THE middle of the nineteenth century, serious difficulties in carrying out the Cartesian project of explaining through attention to our ideas how we may know things as they really are had become evident. A satisfactory account of the connection between occurrences of ideas in us and the properties of things apart from our ideas of them, an account promised by Descartes in the Meditations, had not been forthcoming. Descartes' claim that God's omnipotence guarantees that the members of some recognizable (...) class of our ideas, the class of clear and distinct perceptions, represent things as they really are became clearly unsatisfactory as part of a realist theory of knowledge as soon as Hume and Kant had shown the unsoundness of Descartes' proofs of the existence of God. Whether or not God's omnipotence guarantees that we can know things as they are, it had become evident that we lack adequate grounds for claiming to know that this is the case. Consequently, there developed by the middle of the nineteenth century a consensus that we lacked a satisfactory account of how our ideas enable us to know things. (shrink)

It Has Been Rightly Said That Only A True Philosopher May Give A Practical Shape To Education. Philosophy And Education Go Hand In Hand. Education Depends On Philosophy For Its Guidance While Philosophy Depends On Education For Its Own Formulation. Teaching Methods Are Very Much Concerned With The Philosophy Of Education The Teacher Holds. The Philosophical Systems Of Education Govern The Teacher S Attitude To The Method Of Teaching. With A View To Comprehend The Close Relationship (...) Of Philosophy And Education And Their Great Significance In The Modern Times, The Present Book Philosophy Of Education Has Been Written.The Book Aims At Presenting The Western Isms Of Philosophy As Well As Indian Philosophy Of Education Beginning From The Vedas To The Contemporary Philosophies. It Elucidates The Philosophical Issues And Attempts To Draw The Philosophical Implications Of Every Isms. Invaluable Viewpoints On Education Of Eminent Educators Like Rousseau, Russell, Swami Dayanand, Annie Besant, M.K. Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore And Many Others, And The Influence Of Their Philosophies Have Been Studied In Depth. It Acquaints The Readers With The Varied Aims And Ideals Of Education, Methods And Principles Of Teaching, Role And Influence Of Teachers As Propounded By The Great Philosophers.Written In A Simple Language And Lucid Style, The Book Is Expected To Serve As An Ideal Textbook On The Subject. It Will Prove Indispensable For The Students And Teachers Of Education. Question Bank At The End Of The Book Is An Added Advantage Provided To The Students Which Would Prove Helpful In Preparation For Examination. Even The General Readers Will Find This Book Worth-Reading. (shrink)

Will language as we know it cease to exist? What could this mean for the way we live our lives? Shining a light on the technology currently being developed to revolutionise communication, The Future of Language distinguishes myth from reality and superstition from scientifically-based prediction as it plots out the importance of language and raises questions about its future.From the rise of artificial intelligence and speaking robots, to brain implants and computer-facilitated telepathy, language and communications expert (...) Philip Seargeant surveys the development of new digital 'languages', such as emojis, animated gifs and memes, and investigates how conventions of spoken and written language are being modified by new trends in communication. From George Orwell's fictional predictions in Nineteen Eighty-Four to the very real warnings of climate activist Greta Thunberg, Seargeant explores language through time, traversing politics, religion, philosophy, literature, and of course technology, in the process. Tracing how previous eras have imagined the future of language, from the Bible to the works H. G. Wells, and from Star Wars to Star Trek, the book reveals how perfecting language and communication has always been a vital component of utopian dreams of the future. Questioning the potential ramifications of recent and future developments in communication on society and its ideals, The Future of Language is a no holds barred investigation into the state of civilisation and the impact that changes in language could have on our lives"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

As idealized descriptions of mathematical language, there is a sense in which formal systems specify too little, and there is a sense in which they specify too much. On the one hand, formal languages fail to account for a number of features of informal mathematical language that are essential to the communicative and inferential goals of the subject. On the other hand, many of these features are independent of the choice of a formal foundation, so grounding their analysis (...) on a particular choice of a formal system introduces unnecessary specificity. This chapter begins to map out the design features of mathematical language without descending to the level of formal implementation, drawing on examples from the mathematical literature and insights from the design of computational proof assistants and their libraries. (shrink)

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles (...) in conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology. (shrink)

Jessica Keiser’s Non-Ideal Foundations of Language is a serious, sustained attempt to engage in systematic philosophy of language while leaving aside some of th.

This is the definitive companion to the study of the philosophy of history. It provides an accessible and comprehensive introduction to all the major philosophical concepts, issues and debates raised by history. Ideal for undergraduate students in philosophy and history, the structure and content closely reflect the way the philosophy of history is studied and taught. -/- The book offers a lucid treatment of existing approaches to the philosophy of history and also breaks new ground (...) by extending the major debates in this area of growing philosophical interest. Subjects examined include: the centrality of historical language; objections to historical truth and realism; the relationship between the philosophy of history and the philosophy of science; historical interpretation and narrative; philosophical accounts of historical reasoning from the evidence. The text clearly presents and criticizes the arguments of the major philosophers and historians who have contributed to our understanding of the philosophy of history. -/- Mark Day's rigorous analysis is supplemented by useful pedagogical features, including key examples from historical and philosophical writing; summaries of core debates; study questions; and guides to further reading. (shrink)

When Thomas Luckmann, a pioneer of the “linguistic turn” in sociology, regarded Émile Durkheim as a source for the sociology of language, he had lifeworldly community–building in mind. However, the French sociologist himself understood language in the context ofcivil society–building. To Durkheim, language was a “social thing in the highest degree” that enabled general ideas and intermediated them to people. Abstract human ideals like the civil religion since the French Revolution could be shared through (a common) (...) class='Hi'>language. Thus, Durkheim took the exclusive use of French in the Third Republic’s laic public education for granted, ignoring the patois in the country: This “child of the Enlightenment” considered French to be a universal language ofGesellschaftand, beyond ethno-communal elements, to work as a basis for the organic solidarity of French national civil society where the social division of labor was progressing. Durkheim’s theory was predicated on civil-linguistic, not ethnolinguistic, nationalism. (shrink)

The philosophy of science has lost its self-confidence. Structures in Science (2001) is an advanced textbook that explicates, updates and integrates the best insights of logical empiricism and its main critics. This "neo-classical approach" aims at providing heuristic patterns for research.The book introduces four ideal types of research programs (descriptive, explanatory, design and explicative) and reanimates the distinction between observational laws and proper theories without assuming a theory-free language. It explicates various patterns of explanation by subsumption and (...) specification as well as structures in reductive and other types of interlevel research. Its threefold analysis of theory evaluation leads to new characterizations of confirmation, empirical progress, and truth approximation. What emerges are partial analogies between progress in nomological research, presented in detail in From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) and progress in explicative and design research. Finally, special chapters are devoted to design research programs, computational philosophy of science, the structuralist approach to theories, and research ethics.The present synopsis of Structures in Science highlights the main topics, the final emphasis being on design research and research ethics. (shrink)

Heidegger's interpretations of the poetry of Hölderlin are central to Heidegger's later philosophy and have determined the mainstream reception of Hölderlin's poetry. Gosetti-Ferencei argues that Heidegger has overlooked central elements in Hölderlin's poetics, such as a Kantian understanding of aesthetic subjectivity and a commitment to Enlightenment ideals. These elements, she argues, resist the more politically distressing aspects of Heidegger's interpretations, including Heidegger's nationalist valorization of the German language and sense of nationhood, or Heimat.In the context of Hölderlin's poetics (...) of alienation, exile, and wandering, Gosetti-Ferencei draws a different model of poetic subjectivity, which engages Heidegger's later philosophy of Gelassenheit, calmness, or letting be. In so doing, she is able to pose a phenomenologically sensitive theory of poetic language and a "new poetics of Dasein," or being there. (shrink)

For fifty years, Willard Van Orman Quine's books and articles have stimulated intense debate in the fields of logic and the philosophy of language. Many scholars in fact, regard Quine as the greatest living English-speaking philosopher; yet his views remain widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. This book provides the first major explication and defense of Quine's systematic philosophy and is ideally suited for use as a required or supplementary text in a wide variety of undergraduate and graduate courses (...) in philosophy and linguistics.The book explores the far-reaching implications of Quine's views on language for contemporary analytic philosophy. It is unique in providing a lucid and rich description and reconstruction of the historical context from which Quine's work grew, focusing in particular on the role that Russell and Wittgenstein played in shaping the problems inherited by Quine. It presents Quine's difficult later views in an accessible fashion, bringing out as no other study has the very radical nature of his position. One of the book's highlights is its careful examination and assessment of Tarski's theory of truth as it relates to the traditions of Russell and Wittgenstein and to Quine's own philosophy.George D. Romanos took his Ph.D. in philosophy under George D. W. Berry and Paul T. Sagal at Boston University. This book grew out of his dissertation with the active criticism and support of Quine himself. (shrink)

The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The (...) weakness comes in a certain unevenness. While generally convincing and well written, the book has low points which may leave the reader confused or unconvinced. Davidson is the hero in this book, and our hero is sometimes over idealized. (shrink)

As Nelson Goodman highlighted, there are two main senses of “abstract” that can be found in discussions about abstract art. On the one hand, a representation is abstract if it leaves out certain features of its target. On the other hand, something can be abstract to the extent that it does not represent a concrete subject. The first sense of “abstract” is well-known in philosophy of science. For example, philosophers discuss mathematical models of physical, biological, and economic systems as (...) being abstract in this sense. However, it is the second sense that dominates discussions of abstract art in aesthetics. For example, abstract art was (and is) considered revolutionary precisely for being non-figurative. Through an analysis of artists including Kandinsky, Malevich, and Mondrian, we develop a reading of this second sense, which we call “generative abstraction,” as opposed to “subtractive” abstraction. Generative abstraction is a process in which a new artifact is created which does not represent the initial concrete target system that inspired it (if there was one), where the artifact’s features are explored for their own sake, and where the “language” of the new artifact is in some way more “universal.” Focusing on this sense of abstraction is helpful in revealing the complexity of the process of crafting an abstract artifact, in problematizing the notion that abstraction can always be un-done (or concretized), as well as revealing new ways for abstractions to be epistemically (un)successful. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between speaking and spoken speech, and the relation between the two, in his Phenomenology of Perception. Against a common interpretation, I argue on exegetical and philosophical grounds that the distinction should not be understood as one between two kinds of speech, but rather between two internally related dimensions present in all speech. This suggests an interdependence between speaking and spoken aspects of speech, and some commentators have critiqued Merleau-Ponty for claiming a priority of speaking over (...) spoken speech. However, there is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty is right to emphasize the priority, namely, in terms of the ontological priority of the speaking subject with respect to language understood as a constituted cultural ideality. The latter only maintains its ontological status insofar as it is taken up by a language community. I favorably contrast Merleau-Ponty’s views on this question to those of the late Heidegger and de Saussure, and suggest potential applications of this clarified position for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language. (shrink)

What is the status of belief in God? Must a rational case be made or can such belief be properly basic? Is it possible to reconcile the concept of a good God with evil and suffering? In light of great differences among religions, can only one religion be true? The most comprehensive work of its kind, Reason and Religious Belief, now in its fourth edition, explores these and other perennial questions in the philosophy of religion. Drawing from the best (...) in both classical and contemporary discussions, the authors examine religious experience, faith and reason, the divine attributes, arguments for and against the existence of God, divine action (in various forms of theism), Reformed epistemology, religious language, religious diversity, religion and science, and much more. Retaining the engaging style and thorough coverage of previous editions, the fifth edition features revised treatments of omnipotence, miracles, and providence and updated suggestions for further reading. A sophisticated yet accessible introduction, Reason and Religious Belief, Third Edition, is ideally suited for use with the authors' companion anthology, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Fifth Edition (OUP, 2015). (shrink)

Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, the Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress at Stanford, is heavily weighted towards technical problems of logic, foundations of mathematics, and the special sciences, especially psychology, economic models, and structural linguistics, with little discussion of general problems of the philosophy of science. Problems about the idealization involved in the relation of theories to the world become problems about probabilistic models at various levels of abstraction ; induction becomes a problem in decision (...) theory ; language becomes the subject-matter of formalized syntactics, and so on. There is nothing in the least undesirable about these inquiries in a Philosophy of Science Congress, but there is a danger that, if they are not balanced by more informal discussions, real points of dispute are missed, or decided over-hastily in the brief preliminaries of formalization. The philosopher's job ought sometimes to be the more irritating one of returning to these points of dispute; a job which is well done in some of the contributions to this volume, but one could wish to find it being done in more. In what follows I shall have to restrict myself to commenting on only a handful of these more philosophical papers. (shrink)

Nietzsche holds that people lack freedom of the will in any sense that would be sufficient for ascriptions of moral responsibility; that the conscious experience we have of willing is actually epiphenomenal with respect to the actions that follow that experience; and that our actions largely arise through non-conscious processes (psychological and physiological) of which we are only dimly aware, and over which we exercise little or no conscious control. At the same time, Nietzsche, always a master of rhetoric, engages (...) in a “persuasive definition” (Stevenson 1938) of the language of “freedom” and “free will,” to associate the positive valence of these terms with a certain Nietzschean ideal of the person unrelated to traditional notions of free will. (shrink)