Results for 'minimal phenomenal selfhood'

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  1. Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, (...)
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  2.  27
    What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  3. Comment: Minimal conditions for the simplest form of self-consciousness.Adrian J. T. Smith - 2010 - In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Henningsen (eds.), The embodied self: Dimensions, coherence, disorders. Schattauer.
    Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.
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  4.  16
    What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.
    The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal intentionality is the question of how to account for the intentional properties of de se thought-contents---i.e., thoughts about oneself as oneself. Here, I aim to describe and consider the significance of a phenomenological perspective on self-consciousness in its application to de se thought. I argue that having de se thoughts can be explained in terms (...)
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  5.  86
    What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.
    The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal intentionality is the question of how to account for the intentional properties of de se thought-contents---i.e., thoughts about oneself as oneself. Here, I aim to describe and consider the significance of a phenomenological perspective on self-consciousness in its application to de se thought. I argue that having de se thoughts can be explained in terms (...)
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  6.  97
    The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood.Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its (...)
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  7. The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is (...)
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  8. Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...)
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  9. Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
    This is the first in a series of instalments aiming at a minimal model explanation for conscious experience, taking the phenomenal character of “pure consciousness” or “pure awareness” in meditation as its entry point. It develops the concept of “minimal phenomenal experience” as a candidate for the simplest form of consciousness, substantiating it by extracting six semantic constraints from the existing literature and using sixteen phenomenological case-studies to incrementally flesh out the new working concept. One empirical (...)
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  10.  19
    The Problem of Explaining Phenomenal Selfhood: A Comment on Thomas Metzinger's Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Kenneth Himma - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Thomas Metzinger argues that phenomenal selves are appearances produced by the ongoing operations of a “self-model” that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the system’s states to itself – and not substantial things. In this essay, I explain the nature of phenomenal selfhood and then describe the most important problem that arises in connection with explaining phenomenal selfhood. I then argue that, by itself, the self-model theory of subjectivity lacks sufficient resources to wholly solve this (...)
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  11.  10
    Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account.Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson & Louis Sass - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or “minimal self”. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly “essential” or “universal” nature of minimal self with respect to (...) awareness and (2) the critical implications of alterations of self-experience in schizophrenia that involve heightened or exaggerated sense of self. In the second part, we tentatively explore how a (non-egological) transparency-view of consciousness may offer an alternative way of understanding the experiential abnormalities involved in self-disorders in schizophrenia. We discuss how such a transparency-view (1) may account for loss-of-self experiences; (2) is compatible with the key notion of “hyper-reflexivity”; and (3) can help explain instances of self-disorder involving increased sense of self. In conclusion, we consider some possible advantages of this alternative view for research on self-disorders and clinical approaches. (shrink)
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  12.  44
    Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Zoran Josipovic & Vladimir Miskovic - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  13.  54
    The ‘We’ in ‘Me’: An Account of Minimal Relational Selfhood.Joe Higgins - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):535-546.
    Many philosophers contend that selfhood involves a uniquely first-personal experiential dimension, which precedes any form of socially dependent selfhood. In this paper, I do not wish to deny the notion of such a “minimal” experiential dimension as encapsulating the very givenness of experience as for a certain subject, such that experiences are accessible to this subject in a way that they are not for others. However, I do wish to deny any temptation to view minimal experiential (...)
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  14.  70
    The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  15.  37
    Habits and the Diachronic Structure of the Self.Michael G. Butler & Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - In Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. pp. 47-63.
    In this chapter, we explore the role of habit in giving shape to conscious experience and importantly to our pre-reflective awareness of ourselves which includes the sense of mineness that accompanies our conscious experience. For the most part, discussions in philosophy of mind and phenomenology concerning pre-reflective self-awareness are focused on determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. For this reason perhaps, the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness is usually appealed to as evidence for a form of (...) that appears within conscious experience as a component of its synchronic unity. In this chapter, however, we will concern ourselves with the pre-reflective sense of ourselves that appears in conscious experience as it pertains to the diachronic unity of the self—that is the sense of a unitary self as existing over the course of multiple episodic experiences. Our aim is to provide a phenomenological account of the relationship between the minimal, pre-reflective sense of self and what is often termed the ‘narrative self.’ We will argue that habits play a role in preserving the significance of our past in our present experience and in unifying our experience as a self for whom the world is present across disparate episodes of experience. (shrink)
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  16.  34
    More than our Body: Minimal and Enactive Selfhood in Global Paralysis.Miriam Kyselo - 2019 - Neuroethics 13 (2):203-220.
    This paper looks to phenomenology and enactive cognition in order to shed light on the self and sense of self of patients with locked-in syndrome. It critically discusses the concept of the minimal self, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimension. Ontologically speaking, the self is considered to be equal to a person’s sensorimotor embodiment. This bodily self also grounds the minimal sense of self as being a distinct experiential subject. The view from the minimal bodily self (...)
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  17.  83
    Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74 (C):102770.
  18. Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
    In some philosophical arguments an important role is played by the claim that certain situations differ from each other with respect to phenomenology. One class of such arguments are minimal pair arguments. These have been used to argue that there is cognitive phenomenology, that high-level properties are represented in perceptual experience, that understanding has phenomenology, and more. I argue that facts about our mental lives systematically block such arguments, reply to a range of objections, and apply my critique to (...)
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  19. Beyond the Minimal Self.Di Huang - 2021 - Philosophy Today 65 (3):691-708.
    This article reconstructs Sartre’s theory of selfhood against the background of the contemporary debate between minimal-self theories and narrative-self theories. I argue that Sartre’s theory incorporates both an emphasis on the singular first-person perspective, which is characteristic of minimal-self theories, and an emphasis on the practical intelligibility of experience, which is characteristic of narrative-self theories. The distinctiveness of the Sartrean combination of these motifs consists in its idea of the necessary ideal-relatedness of consciousness. According to Sartre, the (...)
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    Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 86:103031.
    Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality (...)
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  21.  88
    Phenomenal Presence.Christopher Frey - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. pp. 71-92.
    I argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call core transparency. Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. The objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to core transparency, it is in the disclosure (...)
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  22.  34
    Mentalization and Embodied Selfhood in Borderline Personality Disorder.E. S. Neustadter, A. Fotopoulou, S. K. Fineberg & M. Steinfeld - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):126-157.
    Aberrations of self-experience are considered a core feature of borderline personality disorder (BPD). While prominent aetiological accounts of BPD, such as the mentalization-based approach, appeal to the developmental constitution of self in early infant–caregiver environments, they often rely on a conception of self that is not explicitly articulated. Moreover, self-experience in BPD is often theorized at the level of narrative identity, thus minimizing the role of embodied experience. In this article, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning (...)
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  23. The “minimal self” in psychopathology: Re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum☆.Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin & Josef Parnas - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of (...)
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  24.  20
    Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self.Joe Higgins - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):433-454.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception (...)
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  25.  35
    Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self.Joe Higgins - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In a recent paper, Kyselo argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” ). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception (...)
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  26.  7
    Minimal Subjectivity and Reflexive Awareness.Matthew MacKenzie - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (5):37-61.
    This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. On this account, minimal subjectivity is an inherent feature of human phenomenal consciousness. This minimal subjectivity is then understood as, in Indian Buddhist terms, mere reflexive awareness (svasamvedanamātra), or in Western phenomenological terms, minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. This minimal subjectivity is also distinguished from the richer phenomenon of the sense of self. It is possible to have consciousness without a (...)
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  27.  85
    Between Minimal Self and Narrative Self: A Husserlian Analysis of Person.Jaakko Belt - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (4):305-323.
    ABSTRACTThe distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between passivity and activity, and (...)
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  28. Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia.Andrew R. Bailey - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary
    This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical , and those who implicitly or explicitly treat (...)
     
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  29. Moral significance of phenomenal consciousness.Neil Levy & Julian Savulescu - 2009 - Progress in Brain Research.
    Recent work in neuroimaging suggests that some patients diagnosed as being in the persistent vegetative state are actually conscious. In this paper, we critically examine this new evidence. We argue that though it remains open to alternative interpretations, it strongly suggests the presence of consciousness in some patients. However, we argue that its ethical significance is less than many people seem to think. There are several different kinds of consciousness, and though all kinds of consciousness have some ethical significance, different (...)
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  30.  48
    The Phenomenal Separateness of Self: Udayana on Body and Agency.Chakravathi Ram-Prasad - 2011 - Asian Philosophy 21 (3):323-340.
    Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar (...)
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  31.  54
    Perceptual awareness or phenomenal consciousness?A dilemma.Peter Carruthers & Christopher F. Masciari - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (2):1-5.
    We present Birch and colleagues with a dilemma. On one interpretation, they aim to chart the distribution of a sort of minimal perceptual awareness across the animal kingdom, where that awareness can be fully characterized in third-person psychological terms. On this interpretation, the project is worthy but dull, since it doesn’t touch the question that has excited most people: whether other animals are phenomenally conscious. On an alternative interpretation, in contrast, they hope to resolve this latter question, arguing that (...)
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  32. A phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal self.Brett Welch - 2015 - Dissertation, University of St Andrews
    The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs (...)
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  33. A New Deflationary Account of the “Primitive Sense of Selfhood”.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):309-328.
    _ Source: _Page Count 20 This paper proposes a new deflationary reading of the metaphor of the “primitive sense of selfhood” in perception and proprioception, usually understood as an “experiential self-reference” that takes place before reflection and any use of concepts. As such, the paper is also a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness is a highly complex mental phenomenon that requires equally complex concepts. The author’s defense is a clear case of inference to the best (...)
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  34.  8
    Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness.István Fazakas, Mathilde Bois & Tudi Gozé - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Contemporary phenomenological psychopathology has raised questions concerning selfhood and its possible alterations in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although the notion of the self is central to several accounts of anomalies, it remains a question how exactly the radically minimal experiential features of selfhood can be altered. Indeed, the risk is to reduce the notion of selfhood so drastically, that it can no longer account for alterations of experience. Here we propose to give thickness to the minimal (...)
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  35. Thought Insertion and the Minimal Self.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 14 (2):32-41.
    This paper contributes to the debate in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the relation between thought insertion in schizophrenia and the sense of selfhood. Some scholars have suggested that thought insertion presents a case where the sense of selfhood is lacking. Other scholars have disputed this by proposing that a form of minimal selfhood is a necessary feature of consciousness that is still present in thought insertion, albeit in a disturbed manner. Herein, I argue that the (...)
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  36. Naïve Realism and Minimal Self.Daniel S. H. Kim - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):150-159.
    This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. I argue that naïve (...)
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  37. I Am Mine: From Phenomenology of Self-Awareness to Metaphysics of Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):67-85.
    I aim to show that, contrary to standard deflationary or eliminativist theories of the self, we can argue from the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness for the thesis that subjects of experience are substances. The phenomenological datum of subjectivity points to a specific metaphysical structure of our experience, that is, towards the substance view rather than the bundle or the minimal self view. Drawing on modern philosophical accounts of pre-reflective self-awareness, mineness and (self-) acquaintance, I will argue that a subject (...)
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  38.  78
    Naked Subjectivity: Minimal vs. Narrative Selves in Kierkegaard.Patrick Stokes - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):356-382.
    In recent years a significant debate has arisen as to whether Kierkegaard offers a version of the “narrative approach” to issues of personal identity and self-constitution. In this paper I do not directly take sides in this debate, but consider instead the applicability of a recent development in the broader literature on narrative identity—the distinction between the temporally-extended “narrative self” and the non-extended “minimal self—to Kierkegaard's work. I argue that such a distinction is both necessary for making sense of (...)
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  39.  27
    Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):78-85.
    I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self-awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
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    All things considered: Surrogate decision-making on behalf of patients in the minimally conscious state.L. Syd M. Johnson & Kathy L. Cerminara - 2020 - Clinical Ethics 15 (3):111-119.
    The minimally conscious state presents unique ethical, legal, and decision-making challenges because of the combination of diminished awareness, phenomenal experience, and diminished or absent comm...
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  41.  55
    Alterations in the three components of selfhood in persons with post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms: A pilot qEEG neuroimaging study.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2018 - Open Neuroimaging Journal 12:42-54.
    Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of (...)
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  42.  45
    Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Selfhood.Michael Strawser - 2014 - International Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):59-74.
    In this paper I first examine the claim that the phenomenological tradition unanimously affirms that the core self is to be found in pre-reflective consciousness. I argue that the notion of the minimal self as first-person subjective givenness is problematic in important ways. Then, following the recent attention given to Kierkegaard as phenomenologist, I ask how Kierkegaard relates to the phenomenology of selfhood. Rather than proceeding directly, however, I argue that we must first consider Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of love (...)
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  43.  35
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):509-520.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects (...)
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  44.  60
    The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: A psychological perspective.Nini Praetorius - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):325-338.
    The paper argues that Zahavi’s defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. “identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena”, and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object “feels” like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the (...)
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  45.  51
    Selfless Activity and Experience: Radicalizing Minimal Self-Awareness.Daniel D. Hutto & Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza - 2018 - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explicates how we might positively understand the distinctive, nonconceptual experience of our own actions and experiences by drawing on insights from a radically enactive take on phenomenal experience. We defend a late-developing relationalism about the emergence of explicit, conceptually based self-awareness, proposing that the latter develops in tandem with the mastery of self-reflective narrative practices. Focusing on the case of human newborns, Sect. 1 reviews and rejects claims that the capacities of actors to keep track of aspects (...)
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  46.  76
    Existe-t-il des phénomènes mentaux?Arnaud Dewalque & Denis Seron - 2014 - Philosophie (124):105-126.
    Nous nous attribuons naturellement une vie mentale, au sens minimal où il nous semble intuitivement que quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit. Mais que veut dire « quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit »?La formule est singulièrement obscure, et les philosophes y consacrent depuis toujours de patientes recherches. Au sens le plus naturel et immédiat, elle semble signifier quelque chose de ce...
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  47.  18
    How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits.Zixuan Liu - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-32.
    Husserl characterizes sleep with the idea of “the relaxation of the will.” One finds a similar approach in the work of Maine de Biran, who explains sleep as “the suspension of the will.” More recently, Brian O’Shaughnessy and Matthew Soteriou have argued that mental actions constitute wakeful consciousness. In clinical practice, patients with disorders of consciousness who show “purposeful” behavior are classified as “minimally conscious,” while those in an “unresponsive wakeful state” merely behave reflexively. To what extent and how are (...)
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    Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self.Anna Bortolan - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):67-84.
    In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, (...)
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  49. Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi.C. Petitmengin - 2011 - Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):270-274.
    Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question.
     
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  50. The shadow of a puppet dance: Metzinger, Ligotti and the illusion of selfhood.James Trafford - 2008 - Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development 4:185-207.
    This peer-reviewed essay is an intervention into the emerging field of 'Speculative Realism', which has links to the field of Speculative Aesthetics. The work is essentially an attempt to develop a theory of perception (and more broadly consciousness) that is not at odds with the scientific worldview. In this respect, the dominant views of aesthetic perception (Kantian / neo-Kantian phenomenology) are critiqued in favour of neurophilosophical views stemming from Thomas Metzinger. In order to position myself, I go on to analyse (...)
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