Phenomenal Presence

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. pp. 71-92 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that the most common interpretation of experiential transparency’s significance is laden with substantive and ultimately extraneous metaphysical commitments. I divest this inflated interpretation of its unwarranted encumbrances and consolidate the precipitate into a position I call core transparency. Core Transparency is a thesis about experience’s presentational character. The objects of perceptual experience are there, present to us, in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. According to core transparency, it is in the disclosure of that which is central to experience’s presentational character, an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience I call phenomenal presence, that transparency’s significance principally consists. Phenomenal presence is uniquely positioned to illuminate the relationship between perceptual experience’s most important features: its intentionality and its phenomenality. The position I defend comprises two main claims. (1) The representational features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence. Consequently, the representational features of experience neither determine completely nor explain exhaustively experiential phenomenality. (2) Phenomenal presence is not representational, but is nevertheless the minimal realization of experiential intentionality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relationalism and the problems of consciousness.William Fish - 2008 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):167-80.
Phenomenal Presence.Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance.Paul Livingston - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5 - 6.
Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-30

Downloads
88 (#197,303)

6 months
8 (#415,941)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Frey
University of Tulsa

Citations of this work

Beatrice Edgell’s Myth of the Given.Uriah Kriegel - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (3):587-605.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.
Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references