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  1. Two Modes of Being Together: The Levels of Intersubjectivity and Human Relatedness in Neuroscience and Psychoanalytic Thinking.Riccardo Williams & Cristina Trentini - 2022 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16.
    The notion of intersubjectivity has achieved a primary status in contemporary psychoanalytic debate, stimulating new theoretical proposals as well as controversies. This paper presents an overview of the main contributions on inter-subjectivity in the field of neurosciences. In humans as well as—probably—in other species, the ability for emotional resonance is guaranteed early in development. Based on this capacity, a primary sense of connectedness is established that can be defined inter-subjective in that it entails sharing affective states and intentions with caregivers. (...)
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  • Phenomenology of Intuitive Judgment: Praecox-Feeling in the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia.Marcin Moskalewicz, Michael A. Schwartz & Tudi Gozé - 2018 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 9 (2):63-74.
    This paper argues that intuition plays a role in the diagnosis of schizophrenia and presents its phenomenological rationale. A discussion of self-assessment questionnaires and empirical studies in the clinical setting provides evidence that despite the prevalence of operational diagnosis, the intuitive judgment of schizophrenia continues to take place. Two related notions of intuitive diagnosis are presented: Minkowski’s diagnostic by penetration and Rümke’s praecox feeling. Further on, the paper explores and clarifies the phenomenology behind the praecox feeling. First, it is argued, (...)
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  • Development of Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS): Exploring Everyday Experiences Induced by Anomalous Self-Representation.Tomohisa Asai, Noriaki Kanayama, Shu Imaizumi, Shinichi Koyama & Seiji Kaganoi - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Mapping the Psychotic Mind: A Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.Pablo López-Silva - 2018 - The Psychiatry Quarterly 89 (4):957-968.
  • Phenomenal Minimalist Ontology of the Self.Dmitry S. Tourko - 2021 - Антиномии 21 (4):7-30.
    The article discusses the problem of whether the self, or the subject, is real. There are several realist and anti-realist solutions to this problem. The author interprets all possible positions concerning this issue as conceptions of a certain relationship between the phenomenal self and the ontological self. In line with what is called phenomenal, or experiential minimalism, the author concludes that the experiential dimension of the self is sufficient for it to be real without qualification. Providing an argument against anti-realism, (...)
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  • Embodied movement consciousness.Arturo Leyva - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):161-180.
    In two recent papers, I introduced the idea of embodied Rilkean movement knowledge and perception into the current philosophical debate on sports knowledge. In this paper, I offer a new analysis of how embodied movement knowledge and perception help us to identify and define movement consciousness. I develop a phenomenological account of embodied movement consciousness and show how it is closely linked to self-consciousness by generating anticipations and affordances that implicate pre-reflective self-awareness. I also expand Rowlands’ Rilkean memory notion to (...)
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  • Me and I Are Not Friends, Just Acquaintances: On Thought Insertion and Self-Awareness.Pablo López-Silva - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):319-335.
    A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...)
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  • Multiple Realities and Hybrid Objects: A Creative Approach of Schizophrenic Delusion.Michel Cermolacce, Katherine Despax, Raphaëlle Richieri & Jean Naudin - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...)
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  • Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: Dialoguing Between the Cognitive Sciences and Phenomenology.Frank Larøi, Sanneke de Haan, Simon Jones & Andrea Raballo - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):225-240.
    Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) are a highly complex and rich phenomena, and this has a number of important clinical, theoretical and methodological implications. However, until recently, this fact has not always been incorporated into the experimental designs and theoretical paradigms used by researchers within the cognitive sciences. In this paper, we will briefly outline two recent examples of phenomenologically informed approaches to the study of AVHs taken from a cognitive science perspective. In the first example, based on Larøi and Woodward (...)
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  • Why Dialogue is Effective in Schizophrenia Treatment: Insights From the Open Dialogue Approach and Enactive Cognitive Science.Laura Galbusera & Miriam Kyselo - 2019 - Humana Mente 12 (36).
    In this paper we focus on the psychiatric approach of Open Dialogue and seek to explain why the intersubjective process of dialogue, one of OD’s core clinical principles, is effective in schizophrenia treatment. We address this question from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, by linking the OD approach with a theoretical account of the self as endorsed by enactive cognitive science. The paper is structured as follows: first, we introduce the OD approach and focus in particular on the principles that are characteristic (...)
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  • Schizophrenia: An Impairment in the Capacity to Perceive Affordances.Nam-Gyoon Kim & Hakboon Kim - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Mineness Without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...)
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  • Schizophrenia: A Disorder of Intersubjectivity : A Phenomenological Analysis.Van Duppen Zeno - unknown
    This dissertation combines two scientific disciplines and research fields, namely philosophy and psychopathology. Within such a wide field of investigation, two precise perspectives are to be adopted in this inquiry: stemming from the first field, the phenomenological perspective on subjectivity and intersubjectivity; stemming from the second, the psychopathological perspective on schizophrenia. The combination of philosophy and psychopathology has often proven fruitful. Moreover, the main motivation for such combined approach is justified by the strong belief that, when critically used, phenomenology offers (...)
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  • Ar Descartes klydo? Keletas naujų cogito architektūros aspektų.Valery Yevarouski - 2017 - Problemos 92:77.
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  • The Disoriented Self. Layers and Dynamics of Self-Experience in Dementia and Schizophrenia.Michela Summa - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):477-496.
    This paper explores the question concerning the relationship between basic and higher layers of experience and self-experience. The latter distinction implicitly presupposes the idea of a univocal foundation. After explaining the formal ontological law of foundation, an attempt is made to clarify how the idea of foundation may be suitable to understand the relationship among moments, or layers, of self-experience. To this aim, the phenomenological descriptions of self- and world-experience in dementia and schizophrenia are compared. The comparison between these two, (...)
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  • The Pre-Reflective Experience of “I” as a Continuously Existing Being: The Role of Temporal Functional Binding.Peter A. White - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 31:98-114.
  • Mysticism and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Structure of Consciousness in the Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders.Josef Parnas & Mads Gram Henriksen - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 43:75-88.
  • Which Body for Embodied Cognition? Affordance and Language Within Actual and Perceived Reaching Space.Ettore Ambrosini, Claudia Scorolli, Anna M. Borghi & Marcello Costantini - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1551-1557.
    The mental representation of one’s own body does not necessarily correspond to the physical body. For instance, a dissociation between perceived and actual reach-ability has been shown, that is, individuals perceive that they can reach objects that are out of grasp. We presented participants with 3D pictures of objects located at four different distances, namely near-reaching space, actual-reaching space, perceived-reaching space and non-reaching space. Immediately after they were presented with function, manipulation, observation or pointing verbs and were required to judge (...)
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  • The Paradoxical Self: Awareness, Solipsism and First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
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  • Bodily Self and Schizophrenia: The Loss of Implicit Self-Body Knowledge.Francesca Ferri, Francesca Frassinetti, Francesca Mastrangelo, Anatolia Salone, Filippo Maria Ferro & Vittorio Gallese - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1365-1374.
    Schizophrenia spectrum has been associated with a disruption of the basic sense of self, which pertains, among others, the representation of one’s own body. We investigated the impact of either implicit or explicit access to the representation of one’s own body-effectors on bodily self-awareness, in first-episode schizophrenia patients and healthy controls . We contrasted their performance in an implicit self-recognition task and in an explicit self/other discrimination task. Both tasks employed participant’s own and others’ body-effectors. Concerning the implicit task, HCs (...)
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  • Body and Self in Dolphins.Louis M. Herman - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):526-545.
    In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin’s conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational “body image” system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and ownership of their actions and may (...)
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  • Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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