This chapter begins with an overview of John Rawls's four‐stage sequence account of how to apply justice as fairness to institutions. It focuses on the facets of institutional design: (i) How should basic democratic institutions and processes be structured so as to realize the fair value of the basic political liberties? (ii) What kinds of educational and health institutions are needed to secure fair equality of opportunity? (iii) How do principles of justice apply to the family? (iv) (...) What implications does the difference principle have for the structure of a market economy? Rawls's extension of the original position via the four‐stage sequence proceeds against the background of three kinds of pluralism. According to Rawls, occupational choice means that there is a diversity of positions open to all citizens, and no one is forced to hold or pursue specific kinds of employment. (shrink)

Assesses critically the work of Rawls, Walzer, and Habermas and presents a theory of justice that responds to two senses of pluralism.

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. (...) Also I argue that it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice. (shrink)

L’un des objectifs centraux du livre de Kyle Johannsen,A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, consiste à défendre l’idée selon laquelle nous devrions concevoir la justice comme une valeur fondamentale pouvant entrer en conflit avec d’autres valeurs fondamentales. Ce type de pluralisme est principalement associé aux travaux de G.A. Cohen et à sa critique de la théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Dans le cadre ce commentaire, je propose une esquisse des implications du pluralisme de Cohen et de (...) ce à quoi pourrait ressembler un ethos de justice à la Cohen. (shrink)

Spheres of Global Justice analyzes six of the most important and controversial spheres of global justice, each concerning a specific global social good. These spheres are democratic participation, migrations, cultural minorities, economic justice, social justice, and intergenerational justice. Together they constitute two constellations dealt with, in this collection of essays by leading scholars, in two different volumes: Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy and Fair Distribution. These essays illustrate each of the spheres, delving into their differences, (...) commonalities, collisions and interconnections. Unlike many writings on global justice, Spheres of Global Justice does not content itself with describing the painful and advantageous effects of the globalization process as being inches per secondo facto a global injustice or a just global order. Rather, this multidisciplinary collection of essays, from a pluralist inspiration, combines empirical analysis with theoretical approaches and ethical principles, paying close attention to two aspects of the effects of the globalization process. These aspects are the causal relationships that lead to such effects and the kinds of obligations, or of normative relationships between global rights and correlative duties, that applies to each specific individual case. This volume illustrates how diverse global obligations are, and how they can be, grounded in diverse relationships (identity, ability to provide help, causal responsibility, past injustices, protection of agency and promotion of independence, et cetera). These essays also demonstrate that an ethical global approach has not only international or transnational, but also domestic, local and interpersonal dimensions. (shrink)

With the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls not only rejuvenated contemporary political philosophy but also defended a Kantian form of Enlightenment liberalism called “justice as fairness.” Enlightenment liberalism stresses the development and exercise of our capacity for autonomy, while Reformation liberalism emphasizes diversity and the toleration that encourages it. These two strands of liberalism are often mutually supporting, but they conflict in a surprising number of cases, whether over the accommodation of group (...) difference, the design of civic education, or the promotion of liberal values internationally. During the 1980’s, however, Rawls began to jettison key Kantian characteristics of his theory, a process culminating in the 1993 release of Political Liberalism and completing the transformation of justice as fairness into a Reformation liberalism. -/- Reconstructing Rawls argues that this transformation was a tragic mistake because it jeopardized the most important features of his theory, viz. the lexical priorities of right, liberty, and fair equality of opportunity as well as the difference principle. Controversially, this book contends that Rawls’s so-called “political turn,” motivated by a newfound interest in diversity and the accommodation of difference, has been unhealthy for autonomy-based liberalism and has pushed liberalism more broadly towards cultural relativism, be it in the guise of liberal multiculturalism or critiques of cosmopolitan distributive-justice theories. The book then demonstrates that the central elements of justice as fairness can only be defended within the context of a Kantian Enlightenment liberalism and that Rawls’s hope for a more pluralistic grounding for his theory, endorsed by a wide variety of belief systems present in modern democratic societies, is illusory. -/- Reconstructing Rawls is the first book to systematically compare Rawls’s and Kant’s theories and the first to offer an internal critique and reconstruction of justice as fairness, reconceiving it as a comprehensive, universalistic Kantian liberalism. By doing so, it gives us both the vision of a liberal world order—“a republicanism of all states, together and separately,” as Kant put it—and a mode of justification addressed to all men and women, not as members of particular nations, races, and faiths, but as human beings, as citizens of the world. In short, it reclaims Rawls for the Enlightenment. (shrink)

This article identifies the main issues of justice that arise in international trade and critically evaluates contemporary philosophical debates over how to understand them. I focus on three central questions of distributive justice, as applied to trade. What is it about trade that makes it a subject of justice? Which aspects of the international trading system should our principles of justice regulate? What do duties of justice or fairness in trade demand? I show how (...) debates over these questions turn not only on empirical disagreements specific to trade but also on deeper and more general disputes in moral and political philosophy. I argue that trade is a domain in which diverse moral concerns complexly intersect and that a satisfying account of it must do justice to this complexity by itself exhibiting substantial pluralism. (shrink)

This article identifies the main issues of justice that arise in international trade and critically evaluates contemporary philosophical debates over how to understand them. I focus on three central questions of distributive justice, as applied to trade. What is it about trade that makes it a subject of justice? Which aspects of the international trading system should our principles of justice regulate? What do duties of justice or fairness in trade demand? I show how (...) debates over these questions turn not only on empirical disagreements specific to trade but also on deeper and more general disputes in moral and political philosophy. I argue that trade is a domain in which diverse moral concerns complexly intersect and that a satisfying account of it must do justice to this complexity by itself exhibiting substantial pluralism. (shrink)

Rawls theorizes principles of justice as defining a ‘pact of reconciliation’ between diverse conceptions of the good. What does fulfillment of this pact entail when reasonable pluralism is recognized as having an environmental dimension? Fair acknowledgment of the plurality of citizens’ relationships with the natural world challenges the neutrality of aims conventionally used to justify ecocide, including the promotion of economic growth and development. This paper explores how ecocide constitutes a violation of equal basic liberties and state neutrality as (...) per Rawlsian political liberalism. It further considers hard cases in which ecocide is enacted for meeting citizens’ basic needs. (shrink)

Some of us were introduced to political philosophy as an activity of identifying, criticising, and revising the moral basis of existing social institutions. We asked questions about the nature of the good or the just society, and some few of us thought that once we knew and advocated the truth, it would win out. We, or some appropriate revolutionary or reforming group or class, would with reason, truth, and history on our side, bring about the society of our ideals. When (...) we first read John Rawls's A Theory of Justice we read it as continuing the traditional tasks of political philosophy. Justice as Fairness was a moral theory which addressed a political subject matter. From the moral point of view it told us what any just society aiming to realise the values of liberty and equality would be like. This comported nicely with liberal cosmopolitanism, and also with more widely shared philosophical views that the task of political philosophy is to construct a vision of an ideal society, perhaps more sensitive to justice in implementation than would be required in pre-modern, pre-democratic societies, but nevertheless an ideal which in the long run we would hope to see all societies converge on. That kind of liberalism gave those of us who think that Rawlsian justice is the right or true justice a license to go on the offensive in promoting liberal ideals and practices in our own society, and, at the very least, a critical vantage point from which to judge other societies. (shrink)

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. What values and principles should inform the regulation of new human genetic technologies? To adequately answer this question we need an account of genetic justice. That is, an account of what constitutes a fair distribution of genetic endowments that influence our expected life-time acquisition of natural primary goods. These are goods that every rational person has an interest in. The decisions we now make regarding the regulation of human genetic technologies will determine how quickly (...) and effectively these benefits are brought into existence, as well as who receives these benefits. In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of a defensible account of genetic justice is that it must track genetic complexity. Genetic complexity encompasses phenomena such as polygenetic traits, gene-gene interactions and complex environmental influences. More specifically, I argue that pluralistic prioritarianism is a theoretical position well-suited for tracking genetic complexity. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that in order to secure the commitment of believers in reasonable comprehensive doctrines to political liberalism a third principle of justice needs to be adopted in the Original Position. Rawls acknowledges that neutral legislation by the liberal state may negatively affect some reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and I offer a third principle of justice to help alleviate this problem. This principle, which I believe is in keeping with the United States constitutional history especially where (...) church-state relations are concerned, maintains that a constitutional regime should, insofar as possible, avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those comprehensive doctrines which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

There can be no doubt that Brian Barry has made an enormous contribution to the clarification of the ideas of justice current in contemporary political thought. In Barry’s Justice as Impartiality he explicitly distinguishes and sets in competition three models of justice: justice as mutual advantage; justice as reciprocity; and justice as impartiality, and he argues that we should prefer the last of these. What I want to do here is to consider four questions. (...) First, what is this competition a competition about? Second, has Barry adequately characterised the contenders? Third, can the competition be won on the grounds Barry suggests? Fourth, is it a competition that we should want to be won by a single theory? By contrast I want to argue that there are advantages in retaining a pluralist perspective in which all three approaches remain in play. (shrink)

The fact of reasonable pluralism in liberal democracies threatens the stability of such societies. John Rawls proposed a solution to this problem: The different comprehensive moral doctrines endorsed by the citizens overlap on a shared political conception of justice, e.g. his justice as fairness. Optimally, accepting the political conception is for each citizen individually justified by the method of wide reflective equilibrium. If this holds, society is in full reflective equilibrium. Rawls does not in detail investigate the (...) conditions under which a full reflective equilibrium is possible or likely. This paper outlines a new strategy for addressing this open question by using the formal model of reflective equilibrium recently developed by Beisbart et al. First, it is argued that a bounded rationality perspective is appropriate which requires certain changes in the model. Second, the paper rephrases the open question about Rawlsian full reflective equilibrium in terms of the model. The question is narrowed down by focusing on the inferential connections between comprehensive doctrines and political conception. Rawls himself makes a demanding assumption about which connections are necessary for a full reflective equilibrium. Third, the paper presents a simulation study design that is focused on simplicity. The results are discussed, they fit with Rawls’s assumption. However, because of the strong idealisations, they provide a useful benchmark rather than a final answer. The paper presents suggestions for more elaborate study designs. (shrink)

Despite more than half a century of reform efforts, access to civil justice is still understood to be in a state of crisis. Part of the reason for this is because there is no consensus among the legal community on the meaning of justice in this context. This paper seeks to provide a much-needed theoretical underpinning to the access-to-civil-justice movement. It advances ‘justice as fairness,’ as articulated by the American philosopher John Rawls, in conjunction with (...) Lesley Jacobs’ model of equal opportunities, as a suitable theory in which to frame the access-to-civil-justice movement. I explain why this framework is appropriate for pluralistic democracies like Canada and how it can be used to define measures of justice. This exercise is thus not simply a theoretical discussion, but rather is intended to be used as a practical framework to assess current and proposed policy initiatives. (shrink)

This dissertation extends John Rawls’s mature theory of justice out to address the environmental challenges that citizens of liberal democracies now face. Specifically, using Rawls’s framework of political liberalism, I piece together a theory of procedural justice to be applied to a constitutional democracy. I show how citizens of pluralistic democracies should apply this theory to environmental matters in a four stage contracting procedure. I argue that, if implemented, this extension to Rawls’s theory would secure background environmental (...) class='Hi'>justice. I explain why the theory can be viewed as a partially specified political conception of environmental pragmatism, and how it relates to public environmental policy and discourse. While the framework is anthropocentric, it is one that reasonable non-anthropocentrists can endorse. Using this theory, I argue that liberal democracies must take measures to secure basic environmental rights for all presently existing and future citizens. Measures must also be in place to secure a minimum of social goods (including environmental goods) that guarantees that all citizens (present and future) can exercise their basic rights and liberties. Moreover, disparities in environmental goods should only be tolerated if they arise in accord with Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity. I discuss carbon taxes, as well as carbon allocation trading schemes. I also argue that free democracies should employ precautionary reasoning when attempting to meet the demands of background environmental justice. (shrink)

This article considers whether any interpretation of the idea of equal claims to the natural world can resolve the Canyon Dilemma (i.e. can justify protecting the Grand Canyon but not a small canyon from mining by a poor generation). It first considers and ultimately rejects the idea of subjecting natural resource rights to an intergenerational equal division. It then demonstrates that a pluralist theory of environmental justice committed to both respect for the separateness of persons and to the collective (...) good can justify a type of intergenerational non-absolute equal division of natural resource rights that can navigate the Canyon Dilemma. (shrink)

Many liberal political philosophers hold that the state should not impose or even promote any particular conception of the good life or human flourishing. It should not, for instance, enact laws and policies designed to elevate citizens' tastes, to refine their sensibilities or to perfect their characters. Instead, the state should restrict itself to maintaining a fair framework of rights and opportunities within which all citizens can pursue their own beliefs about what constitutes a good life. Against this backdrop, Collis (...) Tahzib develops a version of perfectionist political philosophy. Whereas previous perfectionists have argued that the promotion of flourishing ways of life is permissible or legitimate, Tahzib casts perfectionism as a doctrine of justice. On this view, the implementation of laws and policies designed to promote sound ideals of the good life--ideals such as moral, intellectual and artistic excellence--is not merely a legitimate complement to justice but an essential constituent of justice. Over the years, perfectionism has faced various objections: that it is premised on values and judgements that are controversial within modern pluralistic societies; that it is unduly restrictive of freedom or autonomy; that it treats citizens as if they are children, unable to run their own lives; that it expresses the meddlesome mentality of a village busybody; that it mistakenly assumes that there are objective truths about human flourishing; and that it risks the abuse of power by incompetent, overzealous or corrupt state officials. These ideas represent some of the deepest, most vibrant and most powerful strains in liberal thought. In defending perfectionism against these charges, the arguments in A Perfectionist Theory of Justice make a novel and important contribution to longstanding debates about the philosophical foundations of liberalism. (shrink)

O texto apresenta uma perspectiva cristológica plural na relação interreligiosa, a partir da visão de que cada expressão religiosa tem a sua proposta salvífica e de fé que devem ser aceitas, respeitadas, valorizadas e aprimoradas a partir de um diálogo e aproximação mútuas. Tal perspectiva não anula nem diminui o valor das identidades religiosas - no caso da fé cristã, a importância de Cristo -, mas leva-as a um aprofundamento e amadurecimento, movidos pelo diálogo e pela confrontação justa, amável e (...) corresponsável. Assim, a fé cristã, por exemplo, seria reinterpretada a partir do confronto dialógico e criativo com as demais fés. O mesmo deve se dar com toda e qualquer tradição religiosa. Consideramos que tal visão, em certo sentido, supera outros modelos como aquele que considera Jesus Cristo e a Igreja como caminho exclusivo de salvação; o que considera Jesus Cristo como caminho de salvação para todos, ainda que implicitamente, o que se denominou inclusivismo; e a perspectiva relativista na qual Jesus é o caminho para os cristãos, enquanto para os outros o caminho é a sua própria tradição, sem maiores esforços de autocríticas, revisões e mútua interpelação. Na visão pluralista, os elementos chaves da vivência religiosa e humana em geral são alteridade, respeito à diferença e o diálogo e cooperação prática e ética em torno da busca da justiça, da paz e do bem-comum. A aproximação e o diálogo entre grupos de distintas expressões religiosas cooperam para que elas possam construir ou reconstruir suas identidades e princípios fundantes. Palavras-Chave : Teologia das religiões. Cristologia pluralista. Diálogo inter-religioso. Asbtract This essay presents a plural Christological perspective towards inter-religious relationships, from the perspective that every religious expression has its own faith and salvific proposal that should be accepted, respected, properly valued and improved through mutual approach and dialogue. Such perspective does not negate nor diminishes the value of religious identities – in the case of the Christian faith, the importance of Christ – but leads them to deepen and mature themselves, being moved by dialogue and fair confrontation, one that is loving and co-responsible. Thus, the Christian faith, for instance, would be reinterpreted by means of creative dialogical confrontation vis-a-vis other faiths. The same should take place with each and every religious tradition. We consider that this understanding, in a certain way, supersedes other models such as that which considers Jesus Christ and the Church as the only and exclusive means of salvation; the one that considers Jesus Christ as the way of salvation for everyone, even if implicitly stated, what has been termed as inclusivism; and the relativistic perspective, in which Jesus is the way for Christians, while for others the way is their own tradition, without greater efforts on self-criticism, self-revision and mutual interpellation. In the pluralist perspective, the key elements of religious life and human life in general are alterity, respect for differences, dialogue and mutual practical and ethical cooperation for justice and common well-being. The mutual approach and dialogue between groups belonging to distinct religious expressions cooperate in order for them to construct or reconstruct their identities and founding principles. Keywords: Theology of religions. Pluralist Christology. Inter-religious dialogue. (shrink)

Rawls says in Political Liberalism that “the focus of an overlapping consensus is [more likely to be] a class of liberal conceptions” than a single one. In conceding that members of the well-ordered society are unlikely to live up to justice as fairness, Rawls would seem to have conceded that they are also unlikely to live autonomously. This is exactly the conclusion some commentators have drawn. I contend that the likelihood of “reasonable pluralism about justice” does not (...) have the implication for Rawls’s project that it is said to have: political autonomy remains available even when such pluralism obtains. (shrink)

Contemporary society involves a number of different persons, groups, and ways of life that are deeply divided and very often opposed on fundamental matters of deep concern. Today, many contemporary philosophers regard this 'fact of diversity' as a problem that needs to be addressed when assessing the principles employed to organize society. In this paper, I discuss the fact of diversity, as it is understood by the notion of reasonable pluralism, and explain why it is thought by some to challenge (...) the stability of a society's political morality. I examine the leading attempt to offer an account of the stability of a political morality and I argue that John Rawls's attempt to account for the stability of Justice as Fairness fails for reasons applicable to all political moralities because the very notion of a stable political morality is implausible. Diversity, as reasonable pluralism understands it, is not a problem that can be solved either by identifying a stable political morality or by modifying a political morality in some way that will make it more stable. Instead, the fact of diversity indicates only that disagreements on all aspects of society's organization, including its organizing principles and matters of value, is a permanent feature of social life that cannot be ignored, wished away, or solved. (shrink)

While psychologists and political scientists have long investigated issues of interest to philosophers, the development of political experimental philosophy has remained limited. This slow progress is surprising, given that political philosophers commonly acknowledge the relevance of empirical data for normative theorizing. In this chapter, we illustrate the importance of empirical data by outlining recent developments in three domains related to theories of justice, where empirical results reinforce or endanger popular philosophical theories. Our first showcase concerns the boundaries of the (...) concept of fairness. While both libertarian thinkers and social egalitarians have united in rejecting the concept of natural injustice, we show that people do consider that unpreventable natural inequalities can be described as unfair. Second, we take the example of impartiality devices, such as the veil of ignorance or the idea of an impartial spectator, to show that such devices are efficient at shifting people’s intuitions in a more impartial manner. Third, we review empirical data on fairness intuitions to show that people conform to a pluralist theory of justice, valuing desert, needs-satisfaction, and equality at the same time. However, distribution according to desert enjoys a privileged position: people mostly care for the satisfaction of basic needs of deserving recipients, and people are willing to tolerate large inequalities in meritocratic contexts. The centrality of desert leads to dilemmas for mainstream egalitarian theorists, as theories that do not recognize the value of desert could fail to find support or legitimacy within the population. (shrink)

I defend affirmative action on the ground that it increases certain people’s ability to exercise their basic liberties, rather than because it rectifies injustice in the narrow context of educational admission procedures. I present this justification using a Rawlsian contractualist framework to forge a “nonideal principle of justice.” Drawing on social science, I argue that this principle supports affirmative-action policies like those in the contemporary U.S., and blocks the objection that such policies are unfair. In closing, I show how (...) my account can be used to refine some features of contemporary affirmative-action policies, and I reflect more generally on the value of nonideal principles of justice for tackling exigent topics. (shrink)

This paper considers the environmental justice issues presented by the proposed open-pit lithium mine in Thacker Pass, Nevada (Peehee mm’huh). Unlike the environmental destruction wrought from fossil fuel extraction, lithium is used to create lithium-ion batteries for storing and using electricity from “green energy” sources. Can the potential reduction in carbon emissions resulting from the lithium mined morally and politically justify the destruction of the Pass’s sagebrush sea – a critical wildlife habitat and sacred land to the People of (...) Red Mountain? Justice issues of this kind (e.g., clashes between the “renewable energy” industry and indigenous rights) are likely to become more prevalent as the industrial economy transitions from fossil fuels to vastly more spatially extensive forms of energy production (e.g., wind and solar farms, hydroelectric dams, and biofuels). I consider the case through the concept of ecocide and explore how liberal political respect for eco-relational pluralism offers grounds on which ecocide ought to be prohibited in a fair and just society. The goal of this paper is to ensure that states, in the pursuit of environmental justice, proceed in a manner aligned with their commitment to liberalism, by refraining from prioritizing economic growth and development at the expense of other reasonable conceptions of the good. (shrink)

We typically associate sovereignty with the modern state and presuppose the coincidence of political rule, public power, government, legitimacy and jurisdiction with territorially delimited states. We are also used to referencing liberal principles of justice, egalitarian ideals of fairness, republican conceptions of non-domination and separation of powers, and democratic ideas of popular sovereignty, for the standards that should constitute, guide, limit and legitimate the exercise of sovereign power. This Article addresses an important challenge to these principles: the reemergence (...) of theories and claims to jurisdictional/political pluralism on behalf of non-state “nomos groups” within well-established liberal-democratic polities. Theories of jurisdictional political pluralism purport to account for the independent sovereign authority of the corporate religious, while providing a “postmodern,” “permeable,” “pluralist” conception of sovereignty allegedly more appropriate descriptively to twenty-first century reality and more attractive normatively, than the modern statist version. This Article analyzes and assesses these claims. It criticizes the disassociation of the sovereignty concept from publicly accountable power, challenges the displacement of rights-holders from individuals to corporate groups, and offers a different, federal alternative to anachronistic or normatively flawed modern monistic statist conceptions. My purpose is to preserve the key achievements of democratic constitutionalism and to apply them to every level on which government, power, rule, and/or domination is exercised. (shrink)

Social Darwinism covers a set of particulars bearing a family resemblance including, but not limited to the extension of evolutionary biology to social phenomena, a biological explanation for the success of certain more biologically "fit" groups over others, an acceptance of the use of force by the "fit" to succeed over the "unfit" in the life struggle, and a preference for competition in the marketplace and a laissez-faire ideology. The serpent of Social Darwinism leaves a trail of the eugenics movement (...) in its wake. Evidence can be found that Oliver Wendell Holmes's judicial and non-judicial philosophy fits each of these instantiations.This paper first explains the origins of Social... (shrink)

How should a liberal state treat its citizens who subscribe to religion and enjoy its component goods? This thesis explores the possibility of reconciling religion and justice. It argues for (1) a proper understanding of religion and the kind of good it constitutes; (2) the possibility of a liberal theory of justice which takes fully into account the claims of believers; and (3) an arrangement of social institutions which protects the engagement of citizens with faith with the goods (...) of religion. There have been several recent liberal approaches to the question which promise to accommodate the claims of believers in societies characterized by pluralism. They aim at the coexistence of citizens with faith with other citizens who are either non-adherents or even opposed to religion. However, so this thesis argues, these approaches are not successful. In particular, they fail to establish more than a mere doctrine of non-discrimination against believers. As a result, these liberal frameworks fail to address the central question of how liberal justice ought to treat religious goods. In reaction, some theorists of religion have claimed that there is a deep incompatibility between liberalism and a proper understanding of what a life devoted to religion is. In contrast, this thesis proposes a novel approach which starts from a unified view of religion, and proceeds to develop a liberal framework to accommodate the claims of believers. It argues that whilst non-discrimination is obviously necessary and fundamental, a more ambitious, proper understanding of religious goods and religious needs can contribute to a more coherent liberal strategy towards citizens with faith. It could also help motivate social policies and institutions to treat believers and non-believers in a just and fair manner. (shrink)

How should a liberal state treat its citizens who subscribe to religion and enjoy its component goods? This thesis explores the possibility of reconciling religion and justice. It argues for (1) a proper understanding of religion and the kind of good it constitutes; (2) the possibility of a liberal theory of justice which takes fully into account the claims of believers; and (3) an arrangement of social institutions which protects the engagement of citizens with faith with the goods (...) of religion. There have been several recent liberal approaches to the question which promise to accommodate the claims of believers in societies characterized by pluralism. They aim at the coexistence of citizens with faith with other citizens who are either non-adherents or even opposed to religion. However, so this thesis argues, these approaches are not successful. In particular, they fail to establish more than a mere doctrine of non-discrimination against believers. As a result, these liberal frameworks fail to address the central question of how liberal justice ought to treat religious goods. In reaction, some theorists of religion have claimed that there is a deep incompatibility between liberalism and a proper understanding of what a life devoted to religion is. In contrast, this thesis proposes a novel approach which starts from a unified view of religion, and proceeds to develop a liberal framework to accommodate the claims of believers. It argues that whilst non-discrimination is obviously necessary and fundamental, a more ambitious, proper understanding of religious goods and religious needs can contribute to a more coherent liberal strategy towards citizens with faith. It could also help motivate social policies and institutions to treat believers and non-believers in a just and fair manner. (shrink)

In this book, Maskivker argues that there ought to be a right not to participate in the paid economy in a new way; not by appealing to notions of fairness to competing conceptions of the good, but rather to a contentious (but defensible) normative ideal, namely, self-realization. In so doing, she joins a venerable tradition in ethical thought, initiated by Aristotle and developed in the work of important eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers including Smith, Hume, and Marx.The book engages (...) on-going debates (in both philosophical and real world political and social policy circles) about the provision of basic income grants, necessary to make the possibility of self-realization real for all. Traditional defenses of unconditional welfare benefits emphasize ideals of state neutrality when they claim that society should not discriminate against preferences for leisure in favor of preferences for work. According to these views, the state ought not to interfere with people’s choices about what constitutes the "good life." In contradistinction, Maskivker offers an innovative argument in defense of a particular ideal of the "good life," namely, life-goals directed at the pursuit of self-realization. However, her understanding of self-realization appeals to modern and contemporary values of freedom and pluralism. In a refreshingly new light, the book strikes a balance between fascinating debates on the conditions of human flourishing on the one hand, and heated discussions about the Welfare State on the other. (shrink)

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has reoriented western philosophic thought, starting a new period of reflection on justice. Designed so as to offer “one” theory, this work does not present a dogmatic purpose; however, it does propose principles of justice, resulting from a hypothetical original agreement, to constitute what it calls “justice as fairness”, characterized by the foundation of the rules of “fair” in the institutions. Through the “veil of ignorance” imposed to men in (...) their “original position”, Rawls makes the design of such principles the result of a rational common sense among individuals, trying to achieve a moral ideal that works as an alternative for the utilitarian doctrine and as the basis for a fair democratic society. The importance of Rawls’s complete work can be assessed by the great attention and comments it has received in the academic world, becoming responsible for the rebirth of discussions related to fundamental issues concerning ethics and political philosophy. This has not prevented criticism to the author’s thinking from arising. The paper aims demonstrate that the vehement disagreement used by Rawls’s critics when attacking the argument of original sense decreases the importance of his theory. (shrink)

In contemporary debates about justice, political philosophers take themselves to be engaged with a subject that’s narrower than the whole of morality. Many contemporary liberals, notably John Rawls, understand this narrowness in terms of context specificity. On their view, justice is the part of morality that applies to the context of a society’s institutions, but only has indirect application to the context of citizens’ personal lives. In contrast, many value pluralists, notably G.A. Cohen, understand justice’s narrowness in (...) terms of singularity against a plural background. On their view, justice is one fundamental value amongst a plurality of fundamental values. The purpose of my thesis is to establish that the pluralist conception of justice’s narrowness is theoretically significant and true. To establish its theoretical significance, I argue that proper attention to the ways in which different understandings of narrowness inform the work of contemporary egalitarians explains a considerable amount of disagreement between them concerning the content and scope of distributive justice. On the one hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in the manner Cohen and other pluralists do, i.e., understand a conception of justice to be a conception of a particular fundamental value, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context are compelling. On the other hand, I’ll argue that if we understand justice’s narrowness in a contextual manner, i.e., understand justice to comprise one or more all-things-considered principles adopted for the institutional context, then both luck-egalitarianism and the claim that justice extends to the personal context prove implausible. To establish the truth of the pluralist conception of narrowness, I argue first, that the contextual understanding is only plausible if fairness should be understood procedurally instead of substantively; and second, that substantive fairness cannot be eliminated, as specifying the content of procedural fairness requires a substantive criterion. The upshot is that justice’s narrowness is best understood in terms of singularity against a plural background, rather than in terms of context specificity. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that the European Union is presently suffering from a lack of social justice. Yet there is significant disagreement about what the relevant injustice consists in: Federalists believe the EU can only remedy its justice deficit through the introduction of direct interpersonal transfers between people living in separate states. Intergovernmentalists believe the justice-related purpose of the EU is to enable states to cooperate fairly, and to remain internally just and democratic in the face of (...) increased global pressure on welfare states. I suggest that despite their fundamental differences, many of the most reasonable and prominent philosophical accounts of social justice in the EU nonetheless converge in their institutional prescriptions. In particular, they may each serve as a justificatory basis for introducing the European social minimum, an EU-wide income support scheme. (shrink)

BackgroundThe expectation of pandemic-induced severe resource shortages has prompted authorities to draft and update frameworks to guide clinical decision-making and patient triage. While these documents differ in scope, they share a utilitarian focus on the maximization of benefit. This utilitarian view necessarily marginalizes certain groups, in particular individuals with increased medical needs.Main bodyHere, we posit that engagement with the disability critique demands that we broaden our understandings of justice and fairness in clinical decision-making and patient triage. We propose (...) the capabilities theory, which recognizes that justice requires a range of positive capabilities/freedoms conducive to the achievement of meaningful life goals, as a means to do so. Informed by a disability rights critique of the clinical response to the pandemic, we offer direction for the construction of future clinical triage protocols which will avoid ableist biases by incorporating a broader apprehension of what it means to be human.ConclusionThe clinical pandemic response, codified across triage protocols, should embrace a form of justice which incorporates a vision of pluralistic human capabilities and a valuing of positive freedoms. (shrink)

Equal Justice: Fair Legal Systems in an Unfair World, by Wilmot-SmithFrederick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. 256.

If someone assaults you, should they get a milder penalty if they are rich than if they are poor? We wouldn't dream of passing a law that formalized such an arrangement. But the design of our legal systems in the US, UK, and elsewhere, which permits people with sufficient money to pay for better lawyers, means that wealth often does make a difference to legal outcomes. Justice, then, depends not only on the substance of the laws we pass, but (...) on the design of the system that administers and enforces them. Philosophers and legal theorists, however, have paid relatively little attention to what justice demands of the general design and structure of the legal system. Equal Justice argues among other things that market principles should not determine access to legal resources. If, for example, a large corporation sues a small startup, either the corporation has to use a law firm of the quality that the startup can afford or--which would be preferable, given the corporation's in-house lawyers--the startup would be given a subsidy to afford a top firm. The author builds on this core idea of equal access to resources to work out how the court system and the legal profession should be structured in order to ensure a generally just legal system. (shrink)

Much of the human research conducted in the United States or by U.S. researchers is regulated by the Common Rule. The Common Rule reflects the decision of 17 federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, to require that investigators follow the same rules for conducting human research., though there is significant overlap with the Common Rule.) Many of the obligations delineated in the Common Rule can be traced back to the work of the National Commission for the (...) Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The National Commission was appointed in 1974 as part of the National Research Act in response to revelations about serious abuses involving human subjects, most notably the Tuskegee/United States Public Health Service Syphilis Study. (shrink)

A comprehensive understanding of the ethics of the COVID-19 pandemic priorities must be sensitive to the influence of social inequality. We distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post relevance of social inequality for COVID-19 disadvantage. Ex-ante relevance refers to the distribution of risks of exposure. Ex-post relevance refers to the effect of inequality on how patients respond to infection. In the case of COVID-19, both ex-ante and ex-post effects suggest a distribution which is sensitive to the prevalence social inequality. On this basis, (...) we provide a generic fairness argument for the claim that welfare states ought to favour a healthcare priority scheme that gives particular weight to protecting the socially disadvantaged. (shrink)

It is a central tenet of most contemporary theories of justice that the badly-off have a right to some of the resources of the well-off. In this paper, I take as my starting point two principles of justice, to wit, the principle of sufficiency, whereby individuals have a right to the material resources they need in order to lead a decent life, and the principle of autonomy, whereby once everybody has such a life, individuals should be allowed to (...) pursue their conception of the good, and to enjoy the fruits of their labour in pursuit of such conception. I also endorse the value of fairness, whereby the right person or institution makes the decision as to whether to bring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can be satisfied only if we all enjoy a combination of private and collective rights over the world. In making that case, I shall argue that the set of ownership rights I advocate differs from readily available conceptions of restricted private ownership in two important respects. First, it is such that in some circumstances, two individuals or more can have control rights over the same property at the same time, not, as is standardly the case in legal systems, by contracting with one another (through gifts and joint purchase), but simply on grounds of justice. Second, it allows that, if necessary, property-owners be expropriated from their property without compensation. (shrink)

It is a central tenet of most contemporarytheories of justice that the badly-off have aright to some of the resources of the well-off.In this paper, I take as my starting point twoprinciples of justice, to wit, the principle ofsufficiency, whereby individuals have a rightto the material resources they need in order tolead a decent life, and the principle ofautonomy, whereby once everybody has such alife, individuals should be allowed to pursuetheir conception of the good, and to enjoy thefruits (...) of their labour in pursuit of suchconception. I also endorse the value offairness, whereby the right person orinstitution makes the decision as to whether tobring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can besatisfied only if we all enjoy a combination ofprivate and collective rights over the world.In making that case, I shall argue that the setof ownership rights I advocate differs fromreadily available conceptions of restrictedprivate ownership in two important respects.First, it is such that in some circumstances,two individuals or more can have control rightsover the same property at the same time, not,as is standardly the case in legal systems, bycontracting with one another (through gifts andjoint purchase), but simply on grounds ofjustice. Second, it allows that, if necessary,property-owners be expropriated from theirproperty without compensation. (shrink)

There is growing interest for a communitarian approach to the governance of genomics, and for such governance to be grounded in principles of justice, equity and solidarity. However, there is a near absence of conceptual studies on how communitarian-based principles, or values, may inform, support or guide the governance of genomics research. Given that solidarity is a key principle in Ubuntu, an African communitarian ethic and theory of justice, there is emerging interest about the extent to which Ubuntu (...) could offer guidance for the governance of genomics research in Africa. To this effect, we undertook a conceptual analysis of Ubuntu with the goal of identifying principles that could inform equity-oriented governance of genomics research. Solidarity, reciprocity, open sharing, accountability, mutual trust, deliberative decision-making and inclusivity were identified as core principles that speak directly to the different macro-level ethical issues in genomics research in Africa such as: the exploitation of study populations and African researchers, equitable access and use of genomics data, benefit sharing, the possibility of genomics to widen global health inequities and the fair distribution of resources such as intellectual property and patents. We use the identified the principles to develop ethical guidance for genomics governance in Africa. (shrink)

Religious freedom is included among the basic liberties to which persons are entitled in John Rawls’s account of Justice as Fairness. Rawls’s revised presentation of this as a political conception of justice in Political Liberalism aims to show how it can be (along with the other parts of Justice as Fairness) the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. As an example, Rawls contends that his understanding of religious freedom is consistent with that (...) of the Roman Catholic Church, at least since the Second Vatican Council. I argue that he was mistaken in this in so far as other aspects of his political conception, especially its characterization of citizens as normatively having the power to form their own conceptions of the good, puts it at odds with the teaching of the Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis humanae. This suggests more generally that the limits of consensus in modern pluralist societies are greater than Rawls’s theory holds. (shrink)

This essay examines conceptual difficulties with one of the ways in which justice has been understood and applied the ethical and regulatory review of human research. Justice requires the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. Class membership is seen as justifying inclusion in higher hazard-no benefit research from which members of potentially vulnerable classes, such as children, typically would be excluded. I argue that class membership does not do the justificatory work it is thought to (...) do and that the use of class membership to justify inclusion in higher hazard-no benefit research leads to unjustified discrimination of sick children and offers special protections to healthy children. (shrink)