Justice as fairness, progress and perfection

Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 15:21-40 (2020)
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Abstract

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. Also I argue that it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice.

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References found in this work

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Democracy and Education.John Dewey - 1916 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Nicholas Tampio.
Democratic Education.Amy Gutmann - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1):68-80.
Freedom and Culture.John Dewey - 1939 - New York: Putnam.

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