In philosophical reflections on geoethics, it is primarily the question of what it means to be ‘part’ of the Earth system that is critically reflected upon. As the current geological era of the Anthropocene disrupts the dichotomy between Human agency and the Earth system, philosophers criticise a humanist account of geoethics and call for a post-humanist account. In this chapter, we critically engage with one specific proponent of the post-humanist position, Timothy Morton. We introduce his version (...) of the post-humanist position by focussing on his call for the ‘end-of-the-world’ in the Anthropocene. We subsequently criticise Morton’s rejection of the World for three reasons. We show that the emergence of the Anthropocene is primarily an ontological phenomenon, namely a shift in our ‘being-in-the-world’ and that the concept of World is needed to understand the meaning of our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’ in contrast with our ‘being-in-the-Holocene’. We introduce a twofold between our ‘being-in-the-world’ as a symmetric relation and our ‘being-on-Earth’ as an asymmetric relation that constitutes our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’. This asymmetry disrupts the post-humanist position and calls for a conceptualisation of the human ethos beyond the post-humanist position. This conceptualisation of the human ethos also has consequences for our understanding of geoethics as geo-ethos. (shrink)

Storey, Lyndon Positive humanism is based on the idea that there is a positive potential in human beings. This includes the potential to help others, to find joy and meaning in life, and to use reason and creativity. It is not a guarantee of future perfection, but a positive potential. Acknowledging and nurturing this potential can improve an individual's chances of finding happiness and fulfilment in life, and a society's chances of becoming more harmonious and fulfilling for its members. Positive (...) humanism focusses on exploring and supporting a human-based path to happiness and fulfilment. (shrink)

AimTo investigate the status of positive mental characters and humanistic care ability among Chinese nursing students, and confirm the association between positive mental characters and humanistic care ability.MethodsA cross-sectional survey was conducted. Nine hundred eighty-one Chinese nursing students were recruited from hospitals and community healthcare services in Changsha, Hunan, China. Three different self-reported questionnaires were applied: The Demographic Characteristics Questionnaire, Humanistic care ability of Nursing Undergraduates Assessment Scale and Positive Mental Characters Scale for Chinese College Students. Pearson correlation analysis and (...) multiple liner regression analysis were performed to analyze the association between positive mental character and humanistic care ability for Chinese nursing students.ResultsThe mean scores of nursing students' humanistic care ability and positive mental character were 125.94 ± 21.19, 233.18 ± 38.59, respectively. The Pearson correlation results showed that positive mental character was significantly associated with humanistic care ability. Multiple liner regression analysis indicated that positive mental characters, four dimensions of courage, humanity, justice and transcendence in positive mental character, care from classmates were found to be independent predictors of humanistic care ability.ConclusionPositive mental characters are important considerations in the development, implementation and evaluation of humanistic care ability interventions. (shrink)

RésuméOn prend comme point de départ la crise actuelle de l'idée de raison, en envisageant la possibilité de son dépassement au moyen d'une reposition de cette idée, pour arriver ainsi à un rationalisme nouveau que l'on peut appeler » humaniste «. Ce rationalisme doit prendre conscience, tout d'abord, de la condition strictement humaine de notre savoir en tant que différente d'une connaissance intellectuelle absolue, dans un sens tout à fait opposé à la vision rationaliste de l'époque moderne. Dans cette ligne, (...) l'on fait remarquer l'aspect » compositif « et » divisif « de notre démarche rationnelle et son caractère dynamique, en exposant les possibilités explicatives de cette compréhension dynamique en face des mathématiques et des sciences de la nature. Il faut aussi donner raison du fait métaphysique dans lequel naturellement débouche le rationnel. Le kantisme est considéré dans sa position programmatique et historique, en soulignant chez lui la forte empreinte rationaliste, qui amène à une fermeture à l'égard du dynamisme propre de la science. L'on constate, enfin, les limitations épistémologiques du réalisme aristotélicien, entraǐnant une certaine absolutisation de l'immédiat sensible, qu'un réalisme actuel pourrait bien dépasser par la noétique dynamique et humaniste.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser geht von der heutigen Krisis der Vernunftidee aus, um durch eine Wiederherstellung derselben Idee, die zu einem neuen Rationalismus, als humanistischer Humanismus gedacht, leiten muss, eine mögliche Überwindung dieser Krisis anzuzeigen. Dieser Rationalismus soll, im Gegensatz zur modernen intellektualistischen Anschauung, das spezifisch Menschliche unserer Erkenntnis als etwas Verschiedenes von einem rein intellektuellen Wissen darlegen. In diesem Sinne merkt man das » compositive « und » divise « Verfahren unserer Vernunft und ihren eigenartigen Dynamismus vor, um die erklärenden Möglichkeiten dieser dynamischen Auffassung in Verbindung mit der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Tatsache vorzustellen. Auch die Metaphysik soll als natürliche Vollendung des rationalen Strebens erkannt werden. Der Kantismus wird in seiner programmatischen und geschichtlichen Lage betrachtet, um seine mächtige rationalistische Prägung, in eine gründliche Blindheit vor der dynamischen Gestait der Wissenschaft leitend, zu bemerken. Endlich werden die episte‐mologischen Mängel des aristotelischen Realismus festgestellt, die ein heutiger Realismus durch eine dynamische und humanistische Erkenntnislehre überwinden kann.The critical attitude actually taken towards the idea of reason supplies the starting point; it is considered possible to overcome the resulting crisis by positing this idea anew, in order to establish a new rationalism which might be termed » humanist «. That rationalism should first of all duly record the fact that our knowledge is strictly human and differs as such from an absolutely intellectual knowledge, in a sense which contrasts with the present rationalist outlook. Following that line, the writer stresses the » compositive « and » divisive « aspects as well as the dynamic character of our rational activity, in the process of presenting the explicative possibilities of this dynamic understanding with reference to mathematics and natural science. The metaphysical fact into which the rational is bound to flow must be accounted for. Kantism is examined in its historical and programmatical position, stressing how deep the rationalist imprint is there, making it a blind alley as far as scientific dynamics are concerned; it is held that they could be overcome by present day realism, thanks to a dynamic and humanist noetic doctrine. (shrink)

ObjectiveWith the improvement in health awareness, humanistic care ability of nurses has become a focus of public attention. The aim of the study was to confirm the relationship between psychological capital and humanistic care ability of nurses, and to provide suggestions on improving the humanistic care ability of nurses.MethodsA cross-section survey was conducted. Three hundred thirty-nine nurses were recruited from a tertiary general hospital in Taizhou, China. Psychological capital and humanistic care ability were measured using a self-reported questionnaire. Correlation analysis (...) and stepwise multiple regression analysis were performed to analyze the correlation between psychological capital and humanistic care ability.ResultsThe psychological capital and humanistic care ability scores were 91.57 ± 13.96 and 189.08 ± 20.37, respectively. Differences in psychological capital scores across professional titles, departments, years of work, and marital status were statistically significant. There were statistical differences for the humanistic care ability scores among nurses based on marital status. The total psychological capital scores and the four sub-dimensions scores were positively correlated with the humanistic care ability scores among nurses. Self-efficacy was the main predictor of nurses’ humanistic care ability.ConclusionPsychological capital positively affected the humanistic care ability of nurses. Self-efficacy was the main predictor of humanistic care ability. Nursing managers can formulate strategies from the perspective of positive psychology to improve humanistic care ability of nurses. (shrink)

"Why, in present-day French writing, are we most likely to encounter the word "humanist" only as a term of glib dismissal? In this introduction to the controversy over "humanism", Kate Soper explains how the argument (developed by existentialists and Marxist humanists), that human experience and action play a fundamental role in "making history", has fallen into disrepute. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' shows how the "humanist" standpoint emerged in the post-war period, out of a convergence of arguments derived from Hegel, (...) Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger, then traces its elaboration within existentialism and Marxism, and finally examines the "anti-humanist" reaction in the works of Lèvi-Strauss, Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, and Derrida. Soper clearly explains what is at stake in the debate between "humanists" and "anti-humanists", and contends that this can be understood only in the context of Cold War politics and the crisis for Marxism presented by Stalinism. 'Humanism and anti-humanism' is written from a position of critical sympathy with "humanism" and is aimed chiefly at readers with no previous knowledge of Continental philosophy." -- book cover. (shrink)

The Corporate Social Performance (CSP) model (Wood, Acad Manag Rev 164:691–718, 1991) assesses a firm’s social responsibility at three levels of analysis—institutional, organizational and individual—and measures the resulting social outcomes. In this paper, we focus on the individual level of CSP, manifested in the managerial discretion of a firm’s principles, processes, and policies regarding social responsibilities. Specifically, we address the human resources management of employees as a way of promoting CSR values and producing socially minded outcomes. We show that applying (...) the humanist philosophy to the managerial discretion of a business organization leads to the creation of an “autonomy supportive work environment”—as defined by the self-determination theory—which in turn, facilitates the internalization of social values, citizenship behaviors, and cooperation. The objective of promoting self-determination at work (i.e., the core of a humanist management) fits well with the ontology of social responsibility since autonomy and consideration of individuals as moral actors are central tenets. Furthermore, we show that applying humanistic management philosophy to the discretion of managers can lead to socially responsible outcomes. First, intra-organizational stakeholders (e.g., employees) are treated with respect and focus is put on their well-being, satisfaction, and self-actualization at work. Second, as employees’ need of self-determination is addressed by managers, it is likely that pro-social behaviors toward other stakeholders of the organization will be adopted, leading to socially responsible outcomes for extra-organizational stakeholders (Gagné, Motiv Emot 77:58–75, 2003). Thus, this paper ultimately posits that humanistic management applied to the HRM can be a solution for developing and maintaining socially responsible outcomes as determined at the individual level of the CSP model, through managerial discretion. (shrink)

Discusses the significance of the concept of dignity for psychology. The article is grounded in the writings of E. Husserl and the humanism of Sartre and examines the humanistic position underlying psychology with that of positivism and determinism. Through an examination of Sartre's formulation of the cogito and intersubjectivity, the authors argue that humanism more than any other orientation current in psychology is concerned with the human status of the individual and the recognition of dignity as central to that (...) status. The authors further argue that dignity is fundamental to the structure of human existence and is achieved only by holding the other as human in status rather than reducing the other to the status of an object. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Vico's earliest extant scholarly works, the six first statement of ideas that Vico would continue to refine throughout his life. Delivered between 1699 and 1707 to usher in the new academic year at the University of Naples, the orations are brought together here for the first time in English in an authoritative translation based on Gian Galeazzo Visconti's 1982 Latin/Italian edition. In the lectures,Vico draws liberally on the classical philosophical and legal traditions as he explores the relationship between the Greek (...) dictum "Know thyself' and liberal education. As he sets forth the values and goals of a humanist curriculum, Vico reveals the beginnings of the anti-Cartesian position he will pursue in On the Study Methods of Our Time. Also found in the orations are glimpses ofVico's later views on the theory of interpretation and on the nature of language, imagination, and human creativity, along with many themes that were to be fully developed in his magnum opus, The New Science. On Humanistic Education will be welcomed by Vichians and their students, intellectual historians, and others in the fields of philosophy, literary theory, history and methods of education, classics, and rhetoric. (shrink)

Everyday Humanism seeks to move the discussion of humanism's positive contributions to life away from the macro-level to focus on the everyday, or micro-dimensions of our individual and collective existence. How might humanist principles impact parenting? How might these principles inform our take on aging, on health, on friendship? These are just a few of the issues around everyday life that needed interpretation from a humanist perspective. Through attention to key issues, the volume seeks to promote the value (...) of humanism at the level of the ordinary, typical occurrences and conditions of our existence. (shrink)

A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity of (...) every man,” it is easy to understand how this humanistic image developed. Spinoza’s deep interest in, and extensive discussion of, human nature may have contributed to the emergence of this image as well. In this paper, I will argue that this common perception of Spinoza is mistaken and that Spinoza was in fact the most radical anti-humanist among modern philosophers. Arguably, Spinoza rejects any notion of human dignity. He conceives of God’s - and not man’s - point of view as the only objective perspective through which one can know things adequately, and it is at least highly questionable whether he allows for any genuine notions of human autonomy or morality. The notions of ‘humanism’ and ‘anti-humanism’ have been discussed extensively -mainly among continental philosophers - since the end of World War II. Because these notions carry a variety of historical, ideological, and philosophical meanings, it is important to provide at the outset at least a rudimentary clarification of my use of these two terms. By ‘humanism’ I mean a view which (1) assigns a unique value to human beings among other things in nature, (2) stresses the primacy of the human perspective in understanding the nature of things, and (3) attempts to point out an essential property of humanity which justifies its elevated and unique status. This definition of philosophical humanism has only little in common with the historical notion of Renaissance humanism, and seems to match quite well the common understanding of philosophical humanism suggested by current philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This notion of humanism should be understood in contrast to two competing positions. On the one hand, in contrast to the theocentric position that considers humanity to be radically dependent upon God, humanism affirms at least some degree of human independence. On the other hand, in contrast to the naturalist position which endorses the scientific examination of human beings just like any other objects in nature, humanists affirm the existence of a metaphysical and moral gulf between humanity and nature. This gulf assigns a special value to humanity and does not allow us to treat human beings like any other things in nature. For many humanists the nature/humanity gulf does not allow the application of the methods of natural sciences to the disciplines of the humanities. Humanism does not begin with modernity. In order to see how far back we can trace this position, we may recall Protagoras’ saying: “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.” In modern philosophy, the humanistic position had regained dominant status since the Renaissance, and variants of this position were vigorously argued for by prominent thinkers such as Pico della Mirandola, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and finally, Hegel. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza was a foe, and not a friend, of this tradition. I suggest that, in contrast to these humanist philosophers, Spinoza considers man as a marginal and limited being in nature, a being whose claims and presumptions far exceed its abilities. “To what length will the folly of the multitude not carry them?.... [T]hey imagine Nature to be so limited that they believe man to be his chief part.” Arguably, Spinoza locates the origin of our most fundamental metaphysical and ethical errors in a human hubris which not only tries to secure humanity an exceptional place in nature but also attempts to cast both God and nature in its own human image. (shrink)

Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.

The aim of this chapter is to reflect and provide a tentative answer to the question posited in the title. The first section provides a brief summary of the origin of that “humanism” typical of Modernity. The second section attempts to demonstrate the intrinsically individualistic and atheistic dimension entailed in this Modernist vision of man. In the third part, which can be considered the nucleus of this chapter, we present an exposition of how, from the basic characteristics of this “humanistic” (...) individualism, a new and revolutionary vision of the economy emerged – a vision now paradigmatic but still fraught with perhaps fatal ambiguities and difficulties. This vision can be seen as an “anthropological inversion” which drove the humanism of the Enlightenment. The last part, and by way of conclusion, provides some suggestions as to how, from a Christian conception of man, it might be possible to advance a more realistic and practical view of the economy. (shrink)

This chapter describes some of the varieties of philosophical humanism and different conceptions of, and attitudes towards, the natural sciences. I focus on three kinds of humanism evident in 20th century European philosophy – humanism as essentialism, humanism as rational subjectivity, and existential humanism. Some are strongly allied to the sciences, others are antipathetic to them, while others offer subtler positions. By emphasising this diversity, I want to oppose claims about the inevitability of an 'alliance' of science to humanism, and (...) that claim that to be a humanist is something we must approve or applaud. At best, those 'alliances' and that praiseworthiness will only be true of certain varieties of humanism. (shrink)

Pragmatism is a humanist philosophy that tells an antifoundationalist and antirepresentationalist story of progress and emancipation. While most theoretical approaches since the 1960s have radically rejected the humanist legacy, in pragmatism a particular understanding of humanism has persisted. This persistence of humanism is of the utmost importance, since one can only grasp the unique contemporary significance of pragmatism when one appreciates how pragmatism, humanism, anti-authoritarianism, and postmetaphysics are interlinked, and how this link has gained in importance after the (...) exhaustion of antihumanist theories. This essay combines the endeavor to elucidate the idea of a pragmatist humanism with a discussion of the relationship between pragmatism and aesthetic form. The essay is divided into three parts. While the first part explains why pragmatism is a humanist philosophy, the second part discusses why most pragmatists have been unwilling to consider the significance of form. It develops the central idea that Dewey’s naturalist aesthetics does not offer a convincing conception of form. The final part advances the argument that a pragmatist humanism that refuses to historicize the concept of form and is reluctant to regard the act of form-giving as a kind of poetic agency weakens its own position. (shrink)

Humanistic management theory and religiously grounded business ethics are both important research avenues for the study of business management. This paper links these two domains by examining to what extent a religiously grounded business ethics can potentially contribute to the broad and burgeoning literature on humanistic management through an exploration of the case of Jewish business ethics. Specifically, this paper examines three distinct ways of doing Jewish business ethics. These three ways are labeled here as traditionalist, integrationist, and constructivist. Each (...) of these distinct paths begins with a different conception of the fundamental relationship between Judaism and business. Traditionalists believe that the creation of wealth is a legitimate practice, but only because Judaism says so. Integrationists, by contrast, consider wealth creation as a legitimate practice on its own terms. From this perspective, wealth creation is viewed as a positive human activity, independent of its grounding in religious thought. Judaism contributes to wealth creation by setting and guarding its appropriate boundaries and limits and by serving as an external source of morality and meaning, often invoking broad aspirational Jewish values like tikkun olam. Finally, constructivists agree with the integrationists about the stand-alone value of wealth creation. Constructivists push even further, though, and assert that business is not only a legitimate practice, but it is a potentially meaningful one. Business is imagined as an ongoing and open-ended constructive project, one that includes a broad and complex set of human values including wealth creation, but potentially other values like covenantal leadership, kindness, everyday redemption, and other higher purposes. Here, business is no longer viewed merely as a source of material wealth for society but business is envisioned as a potentially important location and source of human meaning and fulfillment. For the constructivists, the role of Jewish business ethics is not to judge business from the outside, but it is to actively participate and contribute to an expansive dialogue with other business ethics voices, centered on the construction of new and evolved forms of business as a human enterprise. (shrink)

The contributors to this volume were asked the following questions: The term "Humanism" is widely used, as are the terms "ethical" Humanism, "scientific" Humanism and "religious" Humanism. What is Humanism? Can you define it? If there is in your judgment no clear definition in the literature, you may wish to propose one. You may also wish to focus on the relationship of Humanism to atheism, science, its ethical position, or some other theme. Those who have contributed represent a wide (...) spectrum of Humanist opinion in the world today. They are primarily philosophers, psychologists, social scientists, ethical and religious leaders. Among the themes they discuss are historic roots of Humanism, the general problem of definition, the relationship of Humanism to ethics and morality, Humanism and religion, Humanism and atheism and Humanism on the world scene. Most of the varieties of Humanism are represented, including naturalistic Humanism, liberal Humanism, atheistic Humanism, humanistic psychology, behaviourism, Marxism, and Zen. If there is a common thread running throughout this volume, it is the conviction that Humanism is committed to the method of reason as the chief means of solving problems and the belief that mankind can survive and humans can enjoy a significant life. This conviction and this belief, however, can be realized only if men continue to have confidence in their own natural powers and abilities and the courage to use them. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reception of Frankfurt School critical theory in Communist Romania. After some opening remarks concerning the relevance of this topic, Section 2 sketches the evolving political and historical contexts that circumscribed this philosophical reception. The content and configuration of the Romanian reception of critical theory is then discussed in a double sequence: first (Section 3), by surveying and analysing the main clusters of arguments developed in these texts, which are filtered and classified into four categories: a) general (...) considerations and strategic approach to critical theory; b) positive assessments; c) philosophical critiques; d) politico-practical critiques. Then, Section 4 attempts to delineate the divergent paths adumbrated in this field of critical reception, which it illustrates through the specific authorial trajectories of the main Romanian interpreters (Tertulian, Marga and Tismăneanu). Finally, the concluding remarks are devoted to some brief comparative and historical considerations on the meaning, value and amplitude of this critical reception. (shrink)

This chapter is meant to give an interpretation of humanism and to indicate what this implies for the hopes one might have for the future. A meaning frame is a set of assumptions, principles, and values embedded in a cultural environment, in groups and organizations, social institutions, and, last but not least, in (memories of) important life experiences and a network of relatives, friends, exemplary figures. A meaning frame provides orientation with a sense of direction, stability, identity, continuity, and with (...) the criteria to evaluate situations and life course. Interpreting humanism as a meaning frame implies that it is more than a moral, ethical, and political position. The ethical aspect of a meaning frame is often a very important one, but the meaning frame is not an ethical frame only. In principle there are as many meaning frames as there are human beings. (shrink)

The article engages the current debate between humanistic' and anti-humanistic' alternatives for an ecological philosophy by putting Heidegger and Hegel into dialogue. It is argued that Heidegger's portrait of Hegel's philosophy as a form of humanism' which foreshadows the modern logic of domination and exploitation of nature is highly misleading. Hegel's humanistic' position can allow for a genuinely ecological vision of nature, which, while not as radically ecological as Heidegger's, may in fact avoid some of the problems of Heidegger's (...) view. (shrink)

The three books presented in this volume, _Integral Humanism_, _Freedom in the Modern World_, and _A Letter on Independence_, were all written in the early 1930s, a time of dire trouble for France. France was then surrounded by enemies preparing for war and was itself so violently split between parties of Left and Right that it seemed on the verge of Civil War. In this collection, Jacques Maritain accepts the responsibility of a Christian philosopher to actively address the agonizing practical (...) problems of the time. Maritain discusses major political issues such as the relation of freedom and religion, the opposition of democracy to any form of totalitarianism, the relation of the spiritual and the temporal, the need for an integral and Christian humanism, and the prospects for a new Christian civilization, all in opposition to the materialism of both communism and capitalism. Against the fierce antagonism of the parties of the political Left and Right, Maritain declares a plague on both their houses and strongly affirms the need for independence from both of them. He does so by distinguishing between two senses of the terms Left and Right, one denoting a temperamental or physiological disposition, the other a definite political position. In the latter sense, Maritain asserts that he is an independent, while acknowledging that he is, by temperament, a man of the Left. (shrink)

In this essay, I investigate the human act of spectatorship as found in the work of John Dewey and Paulo Freire. I will show that each is thoroughly anti-watching when it comes to educational practices. I then problematize their positions by looking at their spectatorial commitments in the realm of aesthetics. Both Dewey and Freire have a different opinion about spectatorship when it is a matter of watching art. I claim that this different in opinion derives from the practice of (...) ‘educational humanism’. By educational humanism, I mean the tendency to posit stock human traits that derive from pedagogical practices. Ultimately, I will take a stand against educational humanism, against the process of back-forming, from educational circumstances, the desirability, or the undesirability, of human traits. (shrink)

Now‐a‐days various discussions are taking place with regard to humanistic thought in the Islamic world of the Middle Ages. These discussions are usually related to historical academic debates on the position of Islam and Muslims within the Western context. Attention has especially been directed towards issues like human rights, justice, democracy, gender relationships, freedom of expression, and religious freedom. This chapter investigates the circumstances under which humanistic views flourished in Islam. It clarifies how these ideas developed by analysing the (...) opinions of Muslim theologians (especially those of the Mu'tazilite school) and philosophers from the Middle Ages, on the relationship between Islam and humanism. The chapter subsequently discusses the consequences of this development, particularly for the dialogue between Islam and humanism in the West. It addresses the ethical and methodological issues that emerge for discussion when humanism and Islam meet. (shrink)

A sociologist who has to confront him/herself with social change cannot avoid running into subjectivity, which is seen as a clear indicator of the most recent tendencies that are going through contemporary society. The demand for subjectivity, generically considered as self-consciousness and the need for self-fulfilment, is undoubtedly a distinguishing feature of our age. The central role this concept has gained within recent sociological literature, however, coincides with the rise of a postmodern sociology, which tends to put forward a precise (...) image of subjectivity that I would call ?minimalist.? Through its call for subjectivity, postmodern sociology intends to celebrate indeed a radical freeing from the ethical, social, and relational constraints that would have oppressed human beings during modernity, which was characterized by a high degree of sociocentrism. Although I share all the contentions that aim at underlining the positive achievements of subjectivity over the constrictions and the de-personalizing forces that distressed the so-called homo sociologicus, I think we need nonetheless to distance ourselves from this new reductionism, which levels out subjectivity to its postmodern conception, and to underline instead the existence of a dual aspect in contemporary subjectivity. As a matter of fact, along with its minimalist and disengaged aspect, conceptualized in the homo psychologicus, another possible expression, called ?significant subjectivity? is emerging, which is a typical feature of the kind of human I propose to define civicus, a human who distinguishes him/herself because of the ability to become the bearer of an authentic form of responsible freedom. Consequently, we can identify two different aspects, at least, in contemporary subjectivity, notably a minimalist and a significant aspect. (shrink)

Resuming the so-called ‘great campaign’ for resilience of Jaap van Praag, the founding father of contemporary Dutch humanism, this paper proposes a hermeneutical theory that unveils, from a humanistic point of view, the possibility of a relational autonomous ‘will’ in the relationship with exemplary inspirational figures. It will be demonstrated that relational autonomy can be realized from a resilient position toward the heteronomous contagion of our daily life ‘will’ through mimesis, as it is understood in mimetic theory.

In this paper, we explore a new perspective on digital humanism, emphasizing the centrality of multi-stakeholder dialogues and a bottom-up approach to surfacing stakeholder values. This approach starkly contrasts with existing frameworks, such as the Vienna Manifesto's top-down digital humanism, which hinges on pre-established first principles. Our approach provides a more flexible, inclusive framework that captures a broader spectrum of ethical considerations, particularly those pertinent to the digital realm. We apply our model to two case studies, comparing the insights generated (...) with those derived from a utilitarian perspective and the Vienna Manifesto's approach. The findings underscore the enhanced effectiveness of our approach in revealing additional, often overlooked stakeholder values, not typically encapsulated by traditional top-down methodologies. Furthermore, this paper positions our digital humanism approach as a powerful tool for framing ethics-by-design, by promoting a narrative that empowers and centralizes stakeholders. As a result, it paves the way for more nuanced, comprehensive ethical considerations in the design and implementation of digital technologies, thereby enriching the existing literature on digital ethics and setting a promising agenda for future research. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno has been quoted as responding to the Humanist Union stating ‘I might possibly be willing to join if your club had been called an inhuman union, but I could not join one that calls itself “humanist”’. Adorno’s opposition to forms of humanism (both liberal and Marxist) which posit the existence of our humanity is reflected in readings of The Frankfurt Institute’s history such as that produced by Martin Jay. While this is the case, one of Adorno’s (...) highly admired students, Alfred Schmidt, commemorated his teacher by proclaiming him a ‘philosopher of Real Humanism’. In categorising Adorno’s work as embodying a ‘Real Humanism’, Schmidt points towards an understanding and orientation towards the human (and our understanding of it) which cannot be accurately characterised through the philosophies of Humanism and Anti-Humanism as oppositional viewpoints. Rather, the Real Humanism of Adorno (as well as some of his fellow travellers) understands the human as the negative image of our currently existing society’s inhumanity, and urges us to take an ethical orientation towards the constitution of the human through the abolition of our inhumanity. If we, like Adorno, are to believe in the new categorical imperative that we must make sure ‘that Auschwitz never repeats itself, so that nothing similar ever happen[s] again’, then we must fundamentally orient ourselves towards the goal of ‘real humanism’ – a society free from the domination of ourselves and the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism and Truth: Valla Writes against the Donation of ConstantineRiccardo FubiniTranslated by Anastasia Ananson and William ConnellThere has existed for a long time now in studies of Renaissance humanism (and not only as these have developed in a single country or disciplinary area) a tendency to consider from a prevalently formalist point of view what was instead an innovative and complex cultural experience. A particularly privileged position has (...) been reserved for the ars rhetorica, which, considered in its “purely formal instrumentality,” has been treated as though immune from ideological contamination. 1 The fear of becoming entangled in matters of ideological interpretation may, in turn, give rise to new and more seriously flawed readings. Although this is a matter which I shall not now emphasize, it should be clear that when the interpretation of a text is limited to its “purely formal instrumentality,” the vacuum that results can be filled more easily with matter that is new and different. Ideology chased from the doorstep may yet sneak in through the window, sometimes completely stripped of its real historical context. However, what is more important to note here as a premise to my discussion is that, along with the formalism already referred to, one finds in recent studies a tendency to diminish or minimize the significance of writings that were celebrated by the historical traditions of the last century and felt to belong to a shared cultural, religious, or political legacy.Among such writings the De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione of Lorenzo Valla has certainly played an important part, beginning at least with the clamor that was raised on its behalf by Ulrich von Hutten and Martin Luther. Yet it is quite typical that the work’s most recent [End Page 79] editor, who has dedicated much careful research to Valla’s treatise and its reception, should have attempted to disconnect the meaning of Valla’s treatise in its own time from the influence it would later have, concluding that “the influence [of Valla’s work] manifested itself in accents quite different from those that have resulted from [current] interpretation.” 2 In the view of this scholar, at the time of the composition of Valla’s work, Constantine’s alleged “donation” was no longer a matter of contemporary relevance; rather, it furnished the theme for a brilliant exercise in legal rhetoric. He writes: “By then the Donation of Constantine was no longer an urgent theme for political theory. (Die Konstantinische Schenkung war damals kein beherrschendes Thema der politischen Theorie mehr.)” 3My discussion takes its cue from this point. Without dwelling at length on the various contributions of other scholars, I shall begin first by trying, on the basis of documentary evidence, to restore Valla’s treatise to life, to the climate of its day, in order then to gather and present its meaning along interpretative lines I have already laid out elsewhere. 4According to that usually trustworthy Florentine chronicler, Giovanni Cavalcanti, Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, at the end of 1443 made a diplomatic avance toward Florence. Principal among the issues dividing the two powers had been the protection afforded by the regime of Cosimo de’ Medici to Francesco Sforza, then holed up in his fiefdoms in the March of Ancona. The Duke now proposed that they should unite in common defense against the Pope, insofar as the latter was sovereign lord of the March. Beyond these particular circumstances, the accord was supposed to find its warrant in the partners’ shared interest in affirming the superiority of civil over ecclesiastical jurisdiction. So the Duke, according to Cavalcanti, advanced his proposal with words that allow us to suspect an early but not surprising echo of Valla’s treatise (first circulated in that very year): “It so happens that even if Constantine consigned to Sylvester so many and such rich gifts—which is doubtful, because such a privilege can nowhere be found—he could only have granted them for his [Sylvester’s] lifetime, [because] the Empire takes precedence over any lordship.” No differently from Valla, Duke Filippo Maria thought the sovereign impersonality of the [End Page 80] law was the prerogative only of the Empire (and... (shrink)

Heidegger's attacks against humanism have come under renewed scrutiny, especially in France, as the latest wave of polemics over his political engagement has metamorphosed into a debate over the nature of humanism itself. Yet these recent discussions give rise to a number of perplexities. Firstly, for all their differences, it is remarkable how Heidegger's critics and defenders alike distort his position. On the one side, his French defenders hold that humanism is the attribution of a fixed essence to man, (...) according to which definition "even Nazism is a humanism." The fact that the early Heidegger was still enmeshed in the snares of humanism is then invoked to explain his political views in the thirties. (shrink)

Posthumanist and New Materialist thought attempts to undo the supremacy and distinction of the human being through accounting for the agential capacities of the animal and material world. New Materialism in particular constructs a vision of a vital natural world in order to turn us away from humanism and toward a more holistic understanding of nature, and political actants. In this article, I argue that there can be a humanist new materialist position that sees the vitalism of the (...) natural world while maintaining the uniqueness of the human being. This position can be found in the natural science of the eighteenth century in the work of Georges-Louis LeClerc de Buffon and Charles Bonnet. Reminding ourselves of this alternative mode of thinking about a vital nature, and its vision of a self-regenerating human being in a vital and regenerative universe, is a path toward regenerating humanism itself in contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

Storey, Lyndon Humanism is an approach to life in its own right: it is not simply the rejection of religion. Nor is it just the continuing on of religiously inspired values without an accompanying belief in God. Humanism relies on exploring human potential, including our potential for such things as compassion, love, and to find a path to a fulfilling and meaningful life. Humanism is an essentially social set of beliefs with its emphasis on common humanity and it can inspire (...) people to positive social action and compassion for others. (shrink)

Darwinian humanism proposes that environmental philosophers pursue their work in full recognition of an irreducible ambiguity at the heart of human experience: we may legitimately regard moral action as fully free and fully natural at the same time, since neither perspective can be taken as the whole truth. A serious objection to this proposal holds that freedom and nature may be unified as an organic whole, and their unity posited as a matter of substantive truth, by appeal to teleology. In (...) particular, I consider Hegel's account of the emergence of Absolute Spirit, weigh its advantages and disadvantages as an approach to human moral experience and as a strategic move for environmentalists, and conclude with a refinement of Darwinian humanism and a clarification of its implications for environmental ethics. (shrink)

The paper critiques the relationship between personalist ethics and institutional economics, and accepts that institutional economics can be difficult to reconcile with humanistic management that builds on personalist ethics. Even so the paper connects impersonalist ethics with institutional economics. On this ground, the paper demonstrates how theory and practice of personalist humanist management can lean on impersonalist ethics, i.e., institutional economics. Three pathways are laid out for such leanings. It is argued that to understand these alignments is important to (...) improve the success of humanistic management, when a market economy context is given. The paper further contends that personalist humanistic management may imply abandoning the market economy when it positions itself in opposition to institutional economic reasoning that underpins the market economy. (shrink)

In this article, I motivate for the view that the best account of the foundations of morality in the African tradition should be grounded on some relevant spiritual property - a view that I call ‘ethical supernaturalism’. In contrast to this position, the literature has been dominated by humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics, which typically is accompanied by a direct rejection of ‘ethical supernaturalism’ and a veiled rejection of non-naturalism . Here, primarily, I set out to (...) challenge and repudiate humanism as the best interpretation of African ethics; I leave it for a future project to develop a fully-fledged African spiritual meta-ethical theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis):Grassi's Platonic Rhetoric between Gadamer and KristellerRocco RubiniToday's situation is such that in our desacralized and demythologized world we believe in no annunciations, in no purely directive statements, in no evangelist, be it a God or a prophet. We turn to rational thought, to proofs and reasons in order to free ourselves from the subjectivity and relativity of appearances.... Thus not only is every access to (...) religious sacred texts closed to us but so also is the possibility of a metaphysics, a science that tells us about the "essence of man" (Humanism).—Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as PhilosophyDonald P. Verene commemorated Ernesto Grassi by recognizing that his work allows for a fresh approach to Vico, Heidegger, Renaissance, and rhetorical studies (1996, 295–303). While Grassi's authority on Vico remains undisputed, examination of his relevance to other fields of study is still wanting. As for Martin Heidegger, his students have been too numerous and successful for Grassi to easily claim pride of place among them. In turn, as Verene notes, American Renaissance scholarship has failed to realize that Grassi's work represents a direct alternative to that of Paul Oskar Kristeller, another student of Heidegger. Kristeller's influential characterization of Renaissance [End Page 242] humanism as a rhetorical and thus, in his view, nonphilosophical tradition often causes Grassi to be simply dismissed.1 Finally, his reception in rhetorical studies remains problematic and limited in its own right.In his Foreword to the reprint of Grassi's Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), Timothy W. Crusius clearly expresses the confused deference that has caused rhetoricians to steer clear of the "anomaly" Grassi represents. Crusius laments that scholars have not attempted to bring Grassi into conversation with partisans of rhetoric like Hans-Georg Gadamer and that very little attention has been paid to works such as The Primordial Metaphor (1994) or to the overall religious dimension of his thought. Crusius attributes this general neglect to the American rhetoricians' unfamiliarity with the Latin-humanist rhetorical tradition: Grassi, in direct opposition to Heidegger, would have fashioned his philosophy from Roman rather than Greek sources (2001, xiii–xviii).This essay closely narrates2 how Grassi's notions of metaphysics and "rhetoric" developed in his early writings in order to dispel some of the misconceptions that have prevented readers from entering what Grassi himself defines as the "originary tension" awakening his own and, indeed, any philosopher's concerns, interests, and pathos (1994, 5–6). For if Grassi often lamented Heidegger's philhellenism—an aversion to romanitas at which he and other "Latin" students such as José Ortega y Gasset took personal offense (1988, 347)—we shall see that his philosophy was originally grounded on a nontraditional reading of Greek sources. Indeed, a reader would be at pains to recover a sustained reading of Cicero or Quintilian in his entire corpus, while between 1932 and 1946 Grassi published three volumes dedicated to an original interpretation of Plato.3Whereas the following account might make Grassi's notion of "rhetoric as philosophy" even more idiosyncratic—originally founded neither on a recovery of Roman eloquence nor, as we shall see, on a rehabilitation of the Sophists—his early Platonism makes him conversant with Gadamer and provides insight into his religiosity. Grassi's distinctive Platonism also spurs consideration of his missed confrontation with Kristeller and of the mutual disregard between American Renaissance scholars and rhetoricians in the latter part of the twentieth century. The following pages place the reader in a position to appreciate the relevance of Grassi's work to current scholarship.Heidegger's Anti-Platonism and Recent Plato StudiesThe belated and ongoing publication of Heidegger's lectures prior to Being and Time (1927) has led us closer to the experience of his students and offered [End Page 243] clear insight into his preference for Aristotle over Plato. The WS 1924–25 lecture course on the Sophist—one of Heidegger's most sustained confrontations with Plato before his Plato's Doctrine of Truth (1942)—begins with the assertion "What Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (1997, 8). By developing... (shrink)

The essay explores humanism’s modernity by inquiring into the way the fifteenth-century humanist cultural program posited moral values and, at the same time, contributed to a sense of moral confusion. While Niccolò Niccoli, Pier Paolo Vergerio, and Leonardo Bruni associated ethical enlightenment with learning and even social acclaim, Leon Battista Alberti criticized these assumptions not only for their susceptibility to political manipulation but also for their failure to cultivate the attributes they promised: virtue, and by extension happiness and tranquillity. (...) The tensions in humanist culture between conformity and dissent, rational certainty and sense of mutability, generated the creative energy that we, as moderns, have come to attribute to this culture. (shrink)

Sartre presented ‘Existentialism and Humanism’ to a popular audience in Paris late in 1945. As he implies in the discussion which is appended to the text of the lecture (pp. 57–58), he was here simplifying his views so as to make them intelligible to a wide audience. In this he succeeded only too well; the lecture has become exceedingly well known and has been regarded as a definitive presentation not only of Sartre's philosophy at the time, but also of ‘existentialism’. (...) One thing I hope to show in this essay is that this is not a sensible view to take; Sartre's text requires a good deal of interpretation and qualification in the light of his other writings of the period, and what emerges is a position which is uniquely his own. One way in which this can be seen is by considering Heidegger's ‘Letter on Humanism’ of 1947 which is a response to Sartre's lecture and is, indeed, Heidegger's only direct response to Sartre's work. In the lecture Sartre had associated Heidegger with himself as an ‘existential atheist’ (p. 26), but in his letter Heidegger emphatically dissociates himself both from atheism and from existentialism as characterized by Sartre, and goes on to criticize the position advanced by Sartre in the lecture. Yet despite the popular exaggeration of the significance of Sartre's lecture, it is certainly worth studying; for not only is it short and accessible, though in some respects misleading, it is also one of Sartre's few indications of the positive ethical theory which so many of his writings require but do not supply. (shrink)

Sartre presented ‘Existentialism and Humanism’ to a popular audience in Paris late in 1945. As he implies in the discussion which is appended to the text of the lecture (pp. 57–58), he was here simplifying his views so as to make them intelligible to a wide audience. In this he succeeded only too well; the lecture has become exceedingly well known and has been regarded as a definitive presentation not only of Sartre's philosophy at the time, but also of ‘existentialism’. (...) One thing I hope to show in this essay is that this is not a sensible view to take; Sartre's text requires a good deal of interpretation and qualification in the light of his other writings of the period, and what emerges is a position which is uniquely his own. One way in which this can be seen is by considering Heidegger's ‘Letter on Humanism’ of 1947 which is a response to Sartre's lecture and is, indeed, Heidegger's only direct response to Sartre's work. In the lecture Sartre had associated Heidegger with himself as an ‘existential atheist’ (p. 26), but in his letter Heidegger emphatically dissociates himself both from atheism and from existentialism as characterized by Sartre, and goes on to criticize the position advanced by Sartre in the lecture. Yet despite the popular exaggeration of the significance of Sartre's lecture, it is certainly worth studying; for not only is it short and accessible, though in some respects misleading, it is also one of Sartre's few indications of the positive ethical theory which so many of his writings require but do not supply. (shrink)

This article challenges conventional readings of Michel Foucault by examining his fascination with neoliberalism in the late 1970s. Foucault did not critique neoliberalism during this period; rather, he strategically endorsed it. The necessary cause for this approval lies in the broader rehabilitation of economic liberalism in France during the 1970s. The sufficient cause lies in Foucault's own intellectual development: drawing on his long-standing critique of the state as a model for conceptualizing power, Foucault concluded, during the 1970s, that economic liberalism, (...) rather than “discipline,” was modernity's paradigmatic power form. Moreover, this article seeks to clarify the relationship between Foucault's philosophical antihumanism and his assessment of liberalism. Rather than arguing that Foucault's antihumanism precluded a positive appraisal of liberalism, or that the apparent reorientation of his politics in a more liberal direction in the late 1970s entailed a partial retreat from antihumanism, this article contends that Foucault's brief, strategic, and contingent endorsement of liberalism was possible precisely because he saw no incompatibility between antihumanism and liberalism—but only liberalism of the economic variety. Economic liberalism alone, and not its political iteration, was compatible with the philosophical antihumanism that is the hallmark of Foucault's thought. (shrink)

This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds, he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s (...) class='Hi'>position is best construed as that of a humanist rather than a post-modernist. Ultimately, it appears that, in his view, the positive element of religion—i.e. the idea of religion as a social gospel—has been absorbed and transformed into a utopian striving which humanists associate with the ideal of democracy. Hence, in this regard, religion can be considered obsolete. Yet, without explicitly invoking the usual epistemic grounds, Rorty’s arguments for excluding religion from the public sphere remain rather thin, and an interest in reforming rather than excluding religion would have been more consistent with his general outlook. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay will be to garner humanistic values in the Indian and Chinese philosophical traditions and to illustrate the need for an awareness of these positions in business ethics. From the point of view of the latter, one could doubt the relevance of these traditions. Indian philosophical systems are commonly thought of being preoccupied with otherworldly concerns; the feudal backdrop of antique Chinese positions appears unsettling today. Could anything at all, one could ask, be gleaned from (...) them even in debates which, for example, try to enumerate transnational ethical norms to guide one’s business conduct? (shrink)

In _Facing the Planetary_ William E. Connolly expands his influential work on the politics of pluralization, capitalism, fragility, and secularism to address the complexities of climate change and to complicate notions of the Anthropocene. Focusing on planetary processes—including the ocean conveyor, glacier flows, tectonic plates, and species evolution—he combines a critical understanding of capitalism with an appreciation of how such nonhuman systems periodically change on their own. Drawing upon scientists and intellectuals such as Lynn Margulis, Michael Benton, Alfred North Whitehead, (...) Anna Tsing, Mahatma Gandhi, Wangari Maathai, Pope Francis, Bruno Latour, and Naomi Klein, Connolly focuses on the gap between those regions creating the most climate change and those suffering most from it. He addresses the creative potential of a "politics of swarming" by which people in different regions and social positions coalesce to reshape dominant priorities. He also explores how those displaying spiritual affinities across differences in creed can energize a militant assemblage that is already underway. (shrink)

This book shows that atheism need not be only reactionary (against religion and God), but rather provides a clear set of constructive principles to live by that establish atheism as a positive worldview. The book encourages and guides the reader through the process of formulating his or her own set of personal beliefs.

This paper examines Honig’s use of Rancière in her book ‘Democracy and the Foreigner’. In seeking to clarify the benefits of ‘foreignness’ for democratic politics it raises the concern that Honig does not acknowledge the ways in which her own democratic cosmopolitanism may be more akin to Rancière’s police than politics. By challenging Honig’s assertion that democracy is usually read as a romance with the suggestion that it is more commonly read as a horror, I unpick the interstices of Honig’s (...) and Rancière’s work to separate foreignness from democratic cosmopolitanism. Instead, although I posit democratic cosmopolitanism’s potential as a police more conducive to politics I also suggest that the particular salience of Honig’s ‘foreigner’ figure is that it supplements Rancièrian politics, demonstrating a praxis of ‘looking anew’ at our ordinary social practices. By making these seem strange to us, we can discover a new critical perspective from which to question and subvert, thereby furthering the potential of Rancièrian democratic politics. (shrink)

This article challenges the view, originating in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, according to which Sartre’s thought remains wedded to a substantial, “humanist,” conception of the subject. Beginning with an account of Heidegger’s critique in the Letter, I examine the idea that humanism posits the human as a mode of entity in the world, thus precluding an originary enquiry into its nature. Next, I show how Heidegger is wrong to attribute such a view to Sartre. Turning to The Transcendence of (...) the Ego, we see how Sartrean phenomenology reveals human beings as essentially worldly. Further, this engagement with Sartre allows us to see how we can reject humanism while maintaining a distinct meaning for the human. Specifically, interpreting Being and Nothingness makes clear how, when the human is conceptualized as the modification of world that is nothingness, it can have a distinctive being without existing as humanism’s subject-entity. Cet article met à l’épreuve l’idée qui prend son origine dans la Lettre sur l’humanisme de Heidegger selon laquelle la pensée de Sartre demeure attachée à une conception substantielle, « humaniste », du sujet. En commençant par un examen de la critique hei-deggérienne dans la Lettre, je considère l’idée qui veut que l’humanisme pose l’être humain comme un mode d’étant dans le monde et rende ainsi impossible un questionnement de sa nature. Ensuite, je montre comment Heidegger a tort d’attribuer une telle perspective à Sartre. Si l’on se tourne vers La transcendance de l’ego, on voit que la phénoménologie sartrienne révèle l’être hu-main comme essentiellement mondain. De plus, cet engagement avec la pensée sartrienne nous permet de voir comment on peut re-jeter l’humanisme tout en maintenant un sens distinct pour l’être humain. Plus spécifiquement, une relecture de L’E tre et le ne ant clarifie comment une conceptualisation de l’être humain comme la modification du monde qu’est le néant permet d’attribuer à l’être humain un être distinct sans pour autant en faire l’étant-sujet de l’humanisme. (shrink)

Running like a leitmotif through Peter Roberts’ recently published philosophico-educational writings there is a humanistic thread, which this article picks out. In order to ascertain the quality of this humanism, Roberts is positioned in relation to a pair of extant humanisms: radical and integral. Points of comparability and contrast are identified in several of the writer’s genre-crossing essays. These texts, it is argued, rectify deficiencies in how the two humanisms envision alternatives to capitalism. Roberts skilfully teases out the non-obvious futurological (...) implications of the work of a diverse array of authors, spanning the boundaries of philosophy, social criticism, and literature. In so doing, he underscores the intimate connection between personal self-transformation and ideal-driven social transformation. Further, Roberts challenges humanists of both radical and integral stripes to reconsider the moral grounds of their critique of capitalism. (shrink)