Berthold-Bond (philosophy, Bard College) traces the project through Hegel's epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of history. Paper edition ($18.95) not seen. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The idea of “place” has become a topic of growing interest in environmental ethics literature. I explore a variety of issues surrounding the conceptualization of “place” in bioregional theory. I show that there is a necessary vagueness in bioregional definitions of region or place because these concepts elude any purely objective, geographically literal categorization. I argue that this elusiveness is in fact a great meritbecause it calls attention to a more essential “subjective” and experiential geography of place. I use a (...) reading of Aldo Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac as an example of the value of a non-literalistic geography for the understanding of place. (shrink)

The idea of “place” has become a topic of growing interest in environmental ethics literature. I explore a variety of issues surrounding the conceptualization of “place” in bioregional theory. I show that there is a necessary vagueness in bioregional definitions of region or place because these concepts elude any purely objective, geographically literal categorization. I argue that this elusiveness is in fact a great meritbecause it calls attention to a more essential “subjective” and experiential geography of place. I use a (...) reading of Aldo Leopold’s Sand Country Almanac as an example of the value of a non-literalistic geography for the understanding of place. (shrink)

This book shows how an understanding of the nature and role of insanity in Hegel's writing provides intriguing new points of access to many of the central themes of his larger philosophic project.

There is a strongly entrenched ambiguity in Hegel's philosophy between two opposed ways of describing the End, or "completion" of history: the "absolutist" and the "epochal" readings. Either Hegel's eschatological vision is of a completely final End, where no further progress in history or knowledge is possible, or it is an epochal conception, where the completion he speaks of is the fulfillment of an historical epoch. Passages in Hegel's texts may be found to support either of these alternatives. A non-absolutist (...) reading of Hegel's philosophy is shown to be preferable through a consideration of 1) his unorthodoxly historical interpretation of the Christian eschatological End, to which he lends great importance; 2) the implication that if Christianity were to usher in a radical completion of history and time, spirit would cease to be spirit and God would cease to be God, since for Hegel God is irreducibly the logos, or Word, or spirit; and 3) a closer look at Hegel's conception of the "new world," which shows the paralyzing sacrifice of the dialectical soul necessary to an absolutist reading of Hegel's philosophy. Any attempt to harmonize the absolutist and epochal readings must inevitably fall into confusion. (shrink)

In this article I will discuss various aspects of Hegel’s radical critique of metaphilosophy. This critique announces a clear-cut departure from the widely held conviction in the philosophic tradition that in order to gain a firm foundation for science, a preliminary examination of the capacity and nature of knowledge is required. Hegel’s position is that such a propaedeutic is impossible. In the first part of this article, I will show how Hegel’s position can be illuminated in terms of his criticism (...) of Kant’s philosophic methodology and in terms of a comparison with Plato’s solution to the Meno paradox. In the second part, I will ask the question whether Hegel’s own philosophic method is consistent with his criticism of metaphilosophy. This question arises most clearly when we reflect on Hegel’s frequent claim that in order for the philosopher to write the science of knowledge, he or she needs “only to watch” or “merely to look on” at the way consciousness develops its knowledge of objects. We must consider whether such a “language of spectatorship,” as we might call it, does not contradict the evident conclusion of Hegel’s critique of metaphilosophy, viz., that the philosopher cannot attain a distanced perspective from knowledge without at the same time abandoning knowledge. (shrink)

The article engages the current debate between humanistic' and anti-humanistic' alternatives for an ecological philosophy by putting Heidegger and Hegel into dialogue. It is argued that Heidegger's portrait of Hegel's philosophy as a form of humanism' which foreshadows the modern logic of domination and exploitation of nature is highly misleading. Hegel's humanistic' position can allow for a genuinely ecological vision of nature, which, while not as radically ecological as Heidegger's, may in fact avoid some of the problems of Heidegger's view.

While neither Hegel nor Marx can be called “ecologists” in any strict sense of the term, they both present views of the human-nature relationship which offer important insights for contemporary debates in philosophical ecology. Further, while Marx and Engels began a tradition of sharply distinguishing their own views of nature from those of Hegel, careful examination reveals a substantial commonality of sentiment. The essay compares Hegel and Marx (and Engels) in terms of their basic conceptions of nature, their critiques of (...) Romanitic nature-worship, their notions of how a meaningful unity with nature requires the act of socially transforming nature, their respective calls for a new science of nature, and their attitudes towards technology. I argue that we can uncover a largely shared humanistic orientation toward nature, and I situate this view within contemporary debates about the anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric foundation of ecological thinking. (shrink)

While neither Hegel nor Marx can be called “ecologists” in any strict sense of the term, they both present views of the human-nature relationship which offer important insights for contemporary debates in philosophical ecology. Further, while Marx and Engels began a tradition of sharply distinguishing their own views of nature from those of Hegel, careful examination reveals a substantial commonality of sentiment. The essay compares Hegel and Marx (and Engels) in terms of their basic conceptions of nature, their critiques of (...) Romanitic nature-worship, their notions of how a meaningful unity with nature requires the act of socially transforming nature, their respective calls for a new science of nature, and their attitudes towards technology. I argue that we can uncover a largely shared humanistic orientation toward nature, and I situate this view within contemporary debates about the anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric foundation of ecological thinking. (shrink)

Introduction : Rorschach tests -- A question of style -- Live or tell -- Kierkegaard's seductions -- Hegel's seductions -- Talking cures -- A penchant for disguise : the death (and rebirth) of the author in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche -- Passing over : the death of the author in Hegel -- Conclusion : the melancholy of having finished -- Aftersong : from low down.

This book presents a sophisticated, ambitious, and very valuable reading of Hegel's "absolute idealist" philosophy as being committed to a position of epistemological realism. Westphal's method of approach incorporates two basic levels of analysis. First, the work gives a very close examination of the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit, tracing out the structure of Hegel's argument for epistemological realism and the way in which a successful realism requires a socio-historical grounding of knowledge. Second, Westphal spends a good deal of (...) time showing how Hegel's concerns are intimately related to attempts within the history of philosophy to develop epistemologies which could withstand certain fundamental challenges of skepticism. Here he relies on a close reading of a number of Sextus Empiricus' most basic arguments. He considers the efforts of Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston, and argues that each in different ways fails to meet these challenges, while a careful reconstruction of Hegel's own position yields a more successful result. This second level of Westphal's analysis serves the much needed goal of emphasizing how Hegel's theory of knowledge ought to be placed within the mainstream of epistemological debates. (shrink)