In this major new work the leading philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues that philosophical materialism has failed to meet the key scientific, theoretical and political challenges of the modern world, from relativity theory and quantum physics to Freudian psychoanalysis and the failure of twentieth-century Communism. To bring materialism up to date, Žižek proposes a new foundation for dialectical materialism. He argues that dialectical materialism is the only true philosophical inheritor of what Hegel designates as the speculative approach of thought - all (...) other forms of materialism fail. In Absolute Recoil, Žižek offers a startling reformulation of the ground and possibilities of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical review and discussion of three recent major theories of epistemic scepticism. Odegard and Rescher both agree that real knowledge entails certain beliefs. But they both fail to see how beliefs could be absolutely certain. Klein’s book, Certainty: A Refutationof Scepticism, presents the strongest possible view in favor of absolute certainty. I pay attention to its technical details and development by Klein. My conclusion is that Klein’s theory rests on some presupposed ideas that are either (...) counterintuitive or then make the theory trivial: one’s certainty of truth becomes the same as the truth itself. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical review and discussion of three recent major theories of epistemic scepticism. Odegard and Rescher both agree that real knowledge entails certain beliefs. But they both fail to see how beliefs could be absolutely certain. Klein’s book, Certainty: A Refutationof Scepticism, presents the strongest possible view in favor of absolute certainty. I pay attention to its technical details and development by Klein. My conclusion is that Klein’s theory rests on some presupposed ideas that are either (...) counterintuitive or then make the theory trivial: one’s certainty of truth becomes the same as the truth itself. (shrink)

I show first that freedom is the lever that brings about the sublation (Aufhebung) of religion into absolute knowing. Then I prove that exteriority, with its intrinsic contingency and opacity, is an essential moment of absolute knowing.

Bernard Bosanquet was an idealist with a taste for the rich complexities of ordinary human life, an appreciation for logic and science, and a dedication to experience. He was also fond of Plato, but I think he was a Platonist of a special kind, close to the Cambridge Platonism which Locke mixed with his own empiricism and which figures in the thinking of Isaac Newton. Of the partisans of the Absolute, Bosanquet is certainly the easiest to defend against the (...) anti-metaphysical philosophers of the twentieth century. Among moderate sympathisers with metaphysics one may still find philosophers whose thought resembles his in important respects. Though she was probably not aware of it, elements of his philosophy are very close to certain doctrines recently expounded by Iris Murdoch. And the idealism of Nicholas Rescher is not so distant. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on the way Hegel reconciles consciousness and self-consciousness in absolute knowing. What I want to suggest is that in absolute knowing the conscious subject comes to understand itself in terms of these conditions, providing it with the content of a new form of consciousness. It is in conceiving of itself in terms of these objective conditions for knowledge, which supersede the singularity of the self and yet are the conditions for consciousness, that the (...) conscious subject is to be understood as self-transcending. (shrink)

Auch wenn einige der bedeutendsten philosophischen Positionen nach Descartes mit ihm darin übereinkommen, daß sie das Ich in der einen oder anderen Weise zum Prinzip der Philosophie erheben, so weichen sie doch in entscheidenden Punkten in der Bestimmung dieses Prinzips voneinander ab. Dazu gehören etwa seine strukturelle Charakterisierung oder auch die Abgrenzung des Bereichs, in dem es seine Prinzipienfunktion erfüllt. Hier soll anhand der Weiterführung des Cartesianischen Ansatzes durch Kant und Fichte der Frage besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden, in welcher Weise (...) diese Autoren dem Ich jeweils Existenzgewißheit oder gar absolutes Sein zusprechen und welche strukturellen Analysen diesen Prädikationen zugrundeliegen. Denn bei Descartes kann das Subjekt vor allem deswegen uneingeschränkte Prinzipienfunktion übernehmen, weil seine Existenz mit unerschütterlicher Gewißheit einleuchtet. Die subjektivitätstheoretische Fundierung solcher Existenzgewißheit kann dabei hier zunächst vernachlässigt werden. Wichtig ist, daß sich das Ich nach Descartes nicht auf sein eigenes Denken beziehen kann, ohne zugleich seines eigenen Daseins inne zu sein. In dieser Weise ist das existierende Ich unerschütterliches Fundament der Philosophie und zugleich derjenige Gegenstand, der für den Philosophen als erstes und am leichtesten zu erkennen ist. Denn mit jedem Bewußtsein eines Gegenstandes offenbart sich nicht nur das Sein des Subjekts, sondern auch die Bestimmungen seines Vollzuges, die den Gegenstand als Wahrgenommenen, Gedachten etc. auszeichnen. (shrink)

Auch wenn einige der bedeutendsten philosophischen Positionen nach Descartes mit ihm darin übereinkommen, daß sie das Ich in der einen oder anderen Weise zum Prinzip der Philosophie erheben, so weichen sie doch in entscheidenden Punkten in der Bestimmung dieses Prinzips voneinander ab. Dazu gehören etwa seine strukturelle Charakterisierung oder auch die Abgrenzung des Bereichs, in dem es seine Prinzipienfunktion erfüllt. Hier soll anhand der Weiterführung des Cartesianischen Ansatzes durch Kant und Fichte der Frage besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden, in welcher Weise (...) diese Autoren dem Ich jeweils Existenzgewißheit oder gar absolutes Sein zusprechen und welche strukturellen Analysen diesen Prädikationen zugrundeliegen. Denn bei Descartes kann das Subjekt vor allem deswegen uneingeschränkte Prinzipienfunktion übernehmen, weil seine Existenz mit unerschütterlicher Gewißheit einleuchtet. Die subjektivitätstheoretische Fundierung solcher Existenzgewißheit kann dabei hier zunächst vernachlässigt werden. Wichtig ist, daß sich das Ich nach Descartes nicht auf sein eigenes Denken beziehen kann, ohne zugleich seines eigenen Daseins inne zu sein. In dieser Weise ist das existierende Ich unerschütterliches Fundament der Philosophie und zugleich derjenige Gegenstand, der für den Philosophen als erstes und am leichtesten zu erkennen ist. Denn mit jedem Bewußtsein eines Gegenstandes offenbart sich nicht nur das Sein des Subjekts, sondern auch die Bestimmungen seines Vollzuges, die den Gegenstand als Wahrgenommenen, Gedachten etc. auszeichnen. (shrink)

Wer Fichtes Programm der Wissenschaftslehre in der Ersten Einleitung betrachtet, in der er sie als Lehre des Grundes »des Systems der vom Gefühle der Nothwendigkeit begleiteten Vorstellungen« beschreibt, kann über die Verwendung des Begriffs der Notwendigkeit in 1812 nur erstaunt sein. Denn in diesem Vortrag verwendet Fichte in seinen Diskussionen mit Spinoza und Schelling, aber auch schon in 1811, den Begriff der Notwendigkeit - vielleicht bloß scheinbar - metaphysisch als bezogen auf das Absolute selbst. Die erstgenannten Bemerkungen und die (...) weiteren Bestimmungen im Rahmen der Wissenschaftslehren zeigen, daß sich Fichte zeitlebens über die Bedeutung der Modalkategorien durchwegs im klaren war. Dennoch stellt sich später folgende Frage: Wenn die Modalkategorien auf das Absolute bezogen werden, erneuert Fichte dann in seiner letzten Schaffensphase eine Metaphysik des Absoluten, oder betrachtet er diese Diskussion der vormaligen Metaphysik nur deshalb, um in einer negativen Folie seine eigene Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre als Sicherscheinung des Absoluten klarzumachen? (shrink)

Wer Fichtes Programm der Wissenschaftslehre in der Ersten Einleitung betrachtet, in der er sie als Lehre des Grundes »des Systems der vom Gefühle der Nothwendigkeit begleiteten Vorstellungen« beschreibt, kann über die Verwendung des Begriffs der Notwendigkeit in 1812 nur erstaunt sein. Denn in diesem Vortrag verwendet Fichte in seinen Diskussionen mit Spinoza und Schelling, aber auch schon in 1811, den Begriff der Notwendigkeit - vielleicht bloß scheinbar - metaphysisch als bezogen auf das Absolute selbst. Die erstgenannten Bemerkungen und die (...) weiteren Bestimmungen im Rahmen der Wissenschaftslehren zeigen, daß sich Fichte zeitlebens über die Bedeutung der Modalkategorien durchwegs im klaren war. Dennoch stellt sich später folgende Frage: Wenn die Modalkategorien auf das Absolute bezogen werden, erneuert Fichte dann in seiner letzten Schaffensphase eine Metaphysik des Absoluten, oder betrachtet er diese Diskussion der vormaligen Metaphysik nur deshalb, um in einer negativen Folie seine eigene Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre als Sicherscheinung des Absoluten klarzumachen? (shrink)

Paul Churchland's philosophical work enjoys an increasing popularity. His imaginative papers on cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology are widely discussed. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), his major book, is an important contribution to the debate on realism. Churchland provides us with the intellectual tools for constructing a unified scientific Weltanschauung. His network theory of language implies a provocative view of the relation between science and common sense. This paper contains a critical examination of Churchland's network (...) theory of language, which is the foundation of his philosophy. It is argued that the network theory should be seen as deriving its point from traditional empiricism. The network theory enables the empiricist to resist the phenomenalistic temptations inherent in his position, and to build a realist philosophy on the basis of the representative theory of perception. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the representative theory is presupposed by Churchland's main argument in favour of the network view. Churchland tends to conceive of himself as a naturalistic epistemologist. But the philosophical faction to which Churchland belongs is rather that of modern neo?Kantianism. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was apparently looking for someone else. It was because he had not been successful that he had knocked at the Leavises’ door, to bide his time there before he looked again. On entering the house, he immediately peered through the window into the street. Yet after a moment he turned and said abruptly: “You’ve got a gramophone, I see—I don’t suppose you’ve anything worth playing.” And “Then,” so Leavis continues the description,with a marked change of tone, he exclaimed “Ah!”: (...) from the repository just at hand he pulled out the album of Schubert’s Great C Major Symphony and put the first record on the machine. A moment after the music began to sound he lifted the tone-arm, altered the speed, and lowered... (shrink)

Die Sittenlehre von 1812 wurde vom Standpunkt des Absoluten geschrieben. Dieses wird als der Ideal- und Real-Grund von allem, sowohl von der Welt als vom Ich und seiner Freiheit gedacht, mit Vorliebe für den Realismus. Der Weg dazu ist die Abstraktion, der Begriff des Übrigbleibenden und der ontologische Beweis; alle drei werden hier diskutiert. Außer dem absoluten Sein ist wahrhaftig nur das Wissen da, als seine Äußerlichkeit und bloße Erscheinung, und es soll sich als solche verstehen, also seine vermeinte eigene (...) Realität vernichten. So geschieht es auch mit dem Ich, seiner Urerscheinung: es ist zum Wissen und Erkenntnis des wahren Seins, also zur Vernichtung seines scheinbar eigenen Selbsts vor dem Begriff und vor der Gemeinde bestimmt. Hier herrscht eine objektivsubjektive Parmenideische Logik, die am Ende fast eine Dinglogik ist. (shrink)

Die Sittenlehre von 1812 wurde vom Standpunkt des Absoluten geschrieben. Dieses wird als der Ideal- und Real-Grund von allem, sowohl von der Welt als vom Ich und seiner Freiheit gedacht, mit Vorliebe für den Realismus. Der Weg dazu ist die Abstraktion, der Begriff des Übrigbleibenden und der ontologische Beweis; alle drei werden hier diskutiert. Außer dem absoluten Sein ist wahrhaftig nur das Wissen da, als seine Äußerlichkeit und bloße Erscheinung, und es soll sich als solche verstehen, also seine vermeinte eigene (...) Realität vernichten. So geschieht es auch mit dem Ich, seiner Urerscheinung: es ist zum Wissen und Erkenntnis des wahren Seins, also zur Vernichtung seines scheinbar eigenen Selbsts vor dem Begriff und vor der Gemeinde bestimmt. Hier herrscht eine objektivsubjektive Parmenideische Logik, die am Ende fast eine Dinglogik ist. (shrink)

Das systematische Gewicht dieser These ist bekannt. Mit ihr hat Fichte eine Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gebracht, die er als Entfaltung einer ursprünglichen Evidenz verstand, die am Beginn seines philosophischen Lebensweges stand. In ihr sind der Sache nach auch jene Einreden gegen die frühe Fassung der Wissenschaftslehre berücksichtigt und aufgenommen, wie sie vor allem von Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Friedrich Hölderlin und Friedrich von Hardenberg vorgebracht worden sind. Sie alle kommen darin überein, daß das Fichtesche Prinzip des Wissens nicht selbstgenügsam ist und (...) seinen Grund in einem Sein hat, das dem Wissen und der Reflexion entzogen ist. Darüber hinaus steht Fichtes These von der Grenze des Wissens für die Alternative zu Hegels Überzeugung von der Reichweite und Leistungskraft der Philosophie. (shrink)

Das systematische Gewicht dieser These ist bekannt. Mit ihr hat Fichte eine Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gebracht, die er als Entfaltung einer ursprünglichen Evidenz verstand, die am Beginn seines philosophischen Lebensweges stand. In ihr sind der Sache nach auch jene Einreden gegen die frühe Fassung der Wissenschaftslehre berücksichtigt und aufgenommen, wie sie vor allem von Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Friedrich Hölderlin und Friedrich von Hardenberg vorgebracht worden sind. Sie alle kommen darin überein, daß das Fichtesche Prinzip des Wissens nicht selbstgenügsam ist und (...) seinen Grund in einem Sein hat, das dem Wissen und der Reflexion entzogen ist. Darüber hinaus steht Fichtes These von der Grenze des Wissens für die Alternative zu Hegels Überzeugung von der Reichweite und Leistungskraft der Philosophie. (shrink)

Seit dem Beginn meines philosophischen Forschens vor vielen Jahren begleitet mich die Problematik von Vierfachstrukturen in den Philosophien der Menschheit. Während meine Aufmerksamkeit zunächst vor allem auf viergliedrige Aussagemuster gerichtet war - der schriftliche Niederschlag davon liegt als dickes Buch vor –, sah ich es, angeregt und bestätigt durch Funde von Materialien in Quellentexten, zunehmend als erforderlich an, die genannten Urteils- und Prädikationsformen bzw. -formeln im mir zunächst unerklärlichen Zusammenhang mit vier Elementen, und wie ich heute weiß, den vier Elementen (...) des sich selbst reflektierenden und auslegenden Verstandes zu bedenken. Ich habe mein geistiges Ringen um den Fragekomplex, der daraus erwächst, unter das Leitwort »Tetralogos« gestellt, wobei sich der Schwerpunkt allmählich hin zur Geistmetaphysik, einer in der modernen Gelehrtenwelt allgemein als veraltet angesehenen Disziplin, verschob. Die Antworten, die daraus erwachsen, sollen irgendwann in einem weiteren der bis zum zweiten Band realisierten Tetralogie meiner Hauptwerke zusammengefaßt werden. (shrink)

Seit dem Beginn meines philosophischen Forschens vor vielen Jahren begleitet mich die Problematik von Vierfachstrukturen in den Philosophien der Menschheit. Während meine Aufmerksamkeit zunächst vor allem auf viergliedrige Aussagemuster gerichtet war - der schriftliche Niederschlag davon liegt als dickes Buch vor –, sah ich es, angeregt und bestätigt durch Funde von Materialien in Quellentexten, zunehmend als erforderlich an, die genannten Urteils- und Prädikationsformen bzw. -formeln im mir zunächst unerklärlichen Zusammenhang mit vier Elementen, und wie ich heute weiß, den vier Elementen (...) des sich selbst reflektierenden und auslegenden Verstandes zu bedenken. Ich habe mein geistiges Ringen um den Fragekomplex, der daraus erwächst, unter das Leitwort »Tetralogos« gestellt, wobei sich der Schwerpunkt allmählich hin zur Geistmetaphysik, einer in der modernen Gelehrtenwelt allgemein als veraltet angesehenen Disziplin, verschob. Die Antworten, die daraus erwachsen, sollen irgendwann in einem weiteren der bis zum zweiten Band realisierten Tetralogie meiner Hauptwerke zusammengefaßt werden. (shrink)

Among Tolstoy's absolute statements are those that exhibit characteristics of both biblical commands and proverbs—and of other types of absolute statements as well. He also draws, for example, on logical propositions, mathematical deductions, laws of nature and human nature, dictionary definitions, and metaphysical assertions. The language of all these forms is timeless, anonymous, and above all categorical. Their stylistic features imply that they are not falsifiable and that they are not open to qualification: they characteristically include words like (...) "all," "each," "every," "only," and "certainly" and phrases like "there neither is nor can be," "the human mind cannot grasp," and "it is impossible that." Even in sentences that omit such phrases, the very refusal to use a qualifier of any kind can assert unqualifiability. When Tolstoy's absolute statements take the form of syllogisms, the use of the word "therefore" or some explicit or implicit equivalent carries the force of logical inevitability. It carries the same force with Tolstoy's enthymemes, which omit the major premise for the reader to reconstruct. [An example] from The Death of Ivan Ilysch,1 cited above, for instance, contains a minor premise and a conclusion of a syllogism; the reader himself must supply the major premise, which would be: "The simpler and more ordinary a life is, the more terrible it is."· 1. "Ivan Ilysch's life was the most simple and the most ordinary, and therefore the most terrible."Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilysch, ed. John Bayley, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude , p.225.Gary Saul Morson is an associate professor of Russian literature at the University of Pennsylvania, and the author of The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer and the Traditions of Literary Utopia, and The Broken Frame: The Anti-tradition of Russian Literature. The present article is from a theoretical study of literary creativity and the biography of authors. (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman. Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva). The idea behind this, then, is that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an Advaitin sense: (...) through a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman. I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism. I then challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-Brahman. I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience. I conclude by showing that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. (shrink)

This paper undertakes two tasks. It will endeavour, first of all, to establish that there is a difficult discipline called Absolute-theory - Aristotle called it First Philosophy or Theology - which builds itself around the concept of a unique something which exists in an unqualified and necessary manner, and to which everything not itself attaches, or from which it in one manner or another derives. We shall try to distinguish the different strands or strata in the conception of an (...) Absolute, and shall then consider the alternative ways in which such a concept can be developed. For though, if there is or can be anything Absolute, it is one and unique and without rivals or alternatives, there are for us a large number of alternative ways of conceiving of what is absolute, some of which are arguably better and less exposed to antinomy than others. And of course there is always for us the alternative of not conceiving or not believing in any Absolute at all. And we shall briefly glance at the great historical dynasty of Absolutes: the infinitely arbitrary, anthropomorphic, of the Judaic-Christian-Islamic tradition, the less arbitrary Aristotelian-Neoplatonic Absolute of Thomas Aquinas, the Substantial Absolute of Spinoza, the Leibnizian-Wolffian Absolute of which Kant made his Ideal of Pure Reason, the Upanishadic Absolute of Shanaracharya, the infinitely vacuous Absolute of Mahayana Buddhism, the Deistic and Materialistic Absolutes of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, the absolute Space-Time of modern physicists, the Aussersein of Alexius Meinong and the Logical Space of Ludwig Wittgenstein. If the construction of Absolutes is an unrewarding language-and thought-game, it is none the less one which practically all the more intense thinkers have tried to play. I shall next, in the second part of my paper, try to establish that Hegel is by far the subtlest and the most successful of all the Absolute-theorists. His whole philosophy may be regarded as an essay in Absolute-theory, in that it throughout does nothing but try out, modify or discard categories of thought and forms of being because they fail to measure up to an adequate conception of an Absolute. And in his vast rehearsal of categories and forms of being Hegel arguably works up to a conception of the Absolute which takes account of a far wider and richer array of issues, and forestalls a more varied assemblage of objections than any other exercise in Absolute-theory. Sometimes Hegel anticipates thought-moves that will occur long after his death: the moves, e.g., of John Stuart Mill regarding the Syllogism’s being a Petitio Principii, and inductive reasoning’s being really an inference from particulars to particulars. And it will be our contention, finally, that Hegel is by far the most successful of Absolutists, in that he, and he alone, has worked out a many-sided Logic which, whatever its imperfections, is the only sort of instrument with which Absolute-theory can be tackled. In arguing in this manner I shall be contributing to the main theme of this Congress, the nature of the Universe, for the Universe, I believe, is a very vague and degenerate sort of Absolute. (shrink)

This paper defends Fichte’s conception of the absolute I by interpreting it as a modification of the reflection theory. It firstly provides a short outline of Dieter Henrich’s idea of Fichte’s “original insight,” before delineating the problems of Fichte’s “original insight” as they are presented by Henrich. It then analyzes Fichte’s concept of the absolute I by reconstructing its deduction in the Foundations of the Science of Knowledge (1794). With the concept of the absolute I delineated in (...) this manner, it then argues against Henrich’s objections. It concludes that Fichte’s conception of the absolute I is not a rejection of the reflection theory, but rather a radical re-interpretation of it. (shrink)

Acquaintance with the Absolute is the first collected volume of essays devoted to the thought of Yves r. Simon, a thinker widely regarded as one of the great teachers and philosophers of our time. Each piece in this collection of essays thoughtfully complements the others to offer a qualifiedly panoramic look at the work and thought of philosopher Yves R. Simon. The six essays presented not only treat some major areas of Simon’s thought, pointing out their lucidity and originality, (...) but also his underpinning metaphysics, so central to his thought. Rather than attempt to present all aspects of this patient, careful, and penetrating thinker, these essays select enough to situate Simon’s philosophical excavations – especially his moral, political and action theory – among contemporary Thomistic philosophy. In defending philosophy as a valid way of knowing, Simon gives us an approach we can use to avoid contemporary dilemmas in the philosophy of science. Simon holds that philosophical truths both justify scientific method as a way of knowing the real and provide a basis for distinguishing what is ontologically significant in a scientific theory from what is not. This view allows us to avoid the apparently irrational conclusions of quantum mechanics without reducing scientific theories to being mere projections of our conceptual systems. Though aspects of some of the essays are suited for students of Simon’s thought, the essays as a whole introduce the less familiar reader to this great thinking and, further, invite him or her to pursue Simon’s own texts. The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a definitive Yves R. Simon bibliography 1923-1996. The annotated bibliography is cross-reference in detail, revealing the astonishing variety of topics Simon treated. (shrink)

Acquaintance with the Absolute is the first collected volume of essays devoted to the thought of Yves r. Simon, a thinker widely regarded as one of the great teachers and philosophers of our time. Each piece in this collection of essays thoughtfully complements the others to offer a qualifiedly panoramic look at the work and thought of philosopher Yves R. Simon. The six essays presented not only treat some major areas of Simon's thought, pointing out their lucidity and originality, (...) but also his underpinning metaphysics, so central to his thought. Rather than attempt to present all aspects of this patient, careful, and penetrating thinker, these essays select enough to situate Simon's philosophical excavations - especially his moral, political and action theory - among contemporary Thomistic philosophy. In defending philosophy as a valid way of knowing, Simon gives us an approach we can use to avoid contemporary dilemmas in the philosophy of science. Simon holds that philosophical truths both justify scientific method as a way of knowing the real and provide a basis for distinguishing what is ontologically significant in a scientific theory from what is not. This view allows us to avoid the apparently irrational conclusions of quantum mechanics without reducing scientific theories to being mere projections of our conceptual systems. Though aspects of some of the essays are suited for students of Simon's thought, the essays as a whole introduce the less familiar reader to this great thinking and, further, invite him or her to pursue Simon's own texts. The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a definitive Yves R. Simon bibliography 1923-1996. The annotated bibliography is cross-reference in detail, revealing the astonishing variety of topics Simon treated. (shrink)

The final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is generally considered by interpreters to inaugurate an absolute knowing that eliminates any significant opposition between subject and object. Such an understanding of Hegel, however, fails to do justice to the numerous passages in the Phenomenology in which Hegel criticizes just such a reduction of the opposed moments of spirit. In this essay, I argue for an alternative to this traditional interpretation of absolute knowing.

Robert R. Williams, in Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God, offers an important examination of the notion of absolute spirit, a central but under-examined notion in Hegel’s thought. Williams argues that absolute spirit, along with Hegel’s other core notions such as the concept and the absolute idea, is best conceived as an organic whole. This approach, he claims, best captures the self-determination and dynamism of the whole. What absolute spirit seeks to describe is (...) how spirit can both produce itself and legitimate itself. I argue that the model of the organism, and any onto-theological claim for absolute spirit, misses the post-critical aspiration of this notion. (shrink)

In a companion volume on Schelling published by Yale in 1983, Alan White had considerable success in tracing the tortuous path of Schelling’s lengthy philosophical career. Here his project is even more ambitious: to rescue metaphysics from the widespread contempt and neglect that has befallen it by recasting and vindicating it in terms of Hegel’s “transcendental ontology.” This White interprets as continuing Kant’s “critical philosophy” insofar as it presents foundational categories of thought as conditions of the possibility of experience rather (...) than making dogmatic pretensions to knowledge of supersensible entities—and as overcoming the limitations of the Kantian enterprise insofar as it “grounds knowledge in the realms of the transcendental and the practical as well as in that of the empirical.” Two strategies are employed. One is to abjure trying to force from Hegel’s often ambiguous texts a consistent transcendental ontology to the exclusion of the theology of Absolute Spirit commonly said to be found there. “I rather attempt to establish that if and only if the fundament of his system is so interpreted can it stand as a consequent first philosophy.” The other is to use Schelling as foil. Schelling, after all, was Hegel’s first critic, made or anticipated all the major objections to Hegelianism developed since then, and inspired the fundamentally anti-philosophical, praxis-oriented reaction of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and the Marxists—a mind set that still prevails. (shrink)

In a companion volume on Schelling published by Yale in 1983, Alan White had considerable success in tracing the tortuous path of Schelling’s lengthy philosophical career. Here his project is even more ambitious: to rescue metaphysics from the widespread contempt and neglect that has befallen it by recasting and vindicating it in terms of Hegel’s “transcendental ontology.” This White interprets as continuing Kant’s “critical philosophy” insofar as it presents foundational categories of thought as conditions of the possibility of experience rather (...) than making dogmatic pretensions to knowledge of supersensible entities—and as overcoming the limitations of the Kantian enterprise insofar as it “grounds knowledge in the realms of the transcendental and the practical as well as in that of the empirical.” Two strategies are employed. One is to abjure trying to force from Hegel’s often ambiguous texts a consistent transcendental ontology to the exclusion of the theology of Absolute Spirit commonly said to be found there. “I rather attempt to establish that if and only if the fundament of his system is so interpreted can it stand as a consequent first philosophy.” The other is to use Schelling as foil. Schelling, after all, was Hegel’s first critic, made or anticipated all the major objections to Hegelianism developed since then, and inspired the fundamentally anti-philosophical, praxis-oriented reaction of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and the Marxists—a mind set that still prevails. (shrink)

Fichte claims that it is a severe misinterpretation of his philosophy if one understands it as an absolutization of thinking or consciousness. Even more misguided is the assumption that this special thinking or consciousness can be achieved by abstracting from all empirical evidence. Nevertheless the term ‚pure knowledge‘ is of importance within the WL and it means precisely a formal knowledge which has been cleaned from all empirical contents. Therefore, Fichte’s claim shall be examined by contrasting the pure knowledge with (...) the absolute knowledge in the WL 1804-II. The hypothesis here followed is that no pure entity like the pure knowledge can be found at the head of the system of the WL 1804. The highest point within the realm of thought, meaning the first entity of knowledge, is in fact the absolute knowledge, which differs essentially from the pure knowledge.Fichte beteuert, dass es eine schwere Fehlinterpretation seiner Philosophie sei, wenn man sie als Verabsolutierung des Denkens oder des Bewusstseins verstünde. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn angenommen wird, dass dieses Denken zudem lediglich aus der Abstraktion von allem Empirischen und auf Grund dieses vermeintlich reinigenden Abstraktionsprozesses entstanden ist. Dennoch spielt das reine Wissen eine zentrale Rolle in der WL. Entsprechend soll Fichtes Beteuerung runtergebrochen auf das Verhältnis von reinem Wissen und Absolutem Wissen in der zweiten Vorlesung zur Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahr 1804 überprüft werden. Die hier vertretene These lautet: Nicht eine reine Instanz, hier konkret: nicht das reine Wissen, ist das Höchste in der Wissenschaftslehre 1804. Das denkbar Höchste, bzw. die erste Instanz innerhalb des Wissens, ist vielmehr das Absolute Wissen. Und dieses ist – darauf kommt es an – wesentlich unterschieden von dem reinen Wissen. (shrink)

This paper draws out the "speculative" consequences of Husserl's late philosophy which centers around the two major forms of life, the prephilosophical and philosophical attitude. Husserl also calls the philosophical sphere that of the "absolute," since every other form of life is relative upon it. The way to attain this state is, as I try to show, carried out in a certain "dialectical" fashion which attempts to synthesize both at first seemingly contradictory attitudes. In conclusion, I am drawing out (...) a critique of this idea. (shrink)

This paper draws out the "speculative" consequences of Husserl's late philosophy which centers around the two major forms of life, the prephilosophical and philosophical attitude. Husserl also calls the philosophical sphere that of the "absolute," since every other form of life is relative upon it. The way to attain this state is, as I try to show, carried out in a certain "dialectical" fashion which attempts to synthesize both at first seemingly contradictory attitudes. In conclusion, I am drawing out (...) a critique of this idea. (shrink)

The ultimate purpose of Alan White’s careful and detailed confrontation of Hegel with Schelling is to rehabilitate first philosophy itself. In this effort, White argues two subtheses: that first philosophy is possible as “Hegelian transcendental ontology”; and that Hegel’s thought makes sense only as “transcendental ontology.” Defending Hegel against Schelling is crucial in two senses: first, Schelling’s Hegel-critique contains, “in at least rudimentary form, all of the fundamental criticisms that have ever been made” of Hegel ; second, because Schelling generally (...) takes Hegel’s thought to be theological, rather than ontological, in character, showing how he often misses Hegel’s point provides an opportunity to disengage fundamental features of an “ontological” reading of Hegel. (shrink)

The ultimate purpose of Alan White’s careful and detailed confrontation of Hegel with Schelling is to rehabilitate first philosophy itself. In this effort, White argues two subtheses: that first philosophy is possible as “Hegelian transcendental ontology”; and that Hegel’s thought makes sense only as “transcendental ontology.” Defending Hegel against Schelling is crucial in two senses: first, Schelling’s Hegel-critique contains, “in at least rudimentary form, all of the fundamental criticisms that have ever been made” of Hegel ; second, because Schelling generally (...) takes Hegel’s thought to be theological, rather than ontological, in character, showing how he often misses Hegel’s point provides an opportunity to disengage fundamental features of an “ontological” reading of Hegel. (shrink)

Even though the last decade has seen more original and significant work on Fichte, the flow of studies on his rival and "successor," Schelling, seems to continue uninterrupted. Beyond so many short and often quite modest writings, Kasper's huge book is towering, and not only because of its size. Kasper, like Horst Fuhrmans to whom he seems to be the most indebted and who is not in Schelling studies, is a Roman Catholic theologian who commands an immense and impressive knowledge (...) of the history of theological speculation from the Greek Fathers to the nineteenth century school of Tübingen. Like most major studies on Schelling, the present one must struggle its way through the evolution of the many phases of his thought before getting down to the more systematic investigation. Such an endeavor must express a "preference" for one of those phases, and, as is usually the case today, the greatest appreciation is directed towards the Spätphilosophie. The core and kernel of the book is the beautiful and highly concentrated exposition on "God as the ground and the Lord of history" where historicity itself receives its ontological deduction from the premisses of theism. The book concludes with the concrete modalities of the divine mediation of history through the great issues of the fall, mythology, and revelation. For more than a decade Walter Schulz's interpretation of Schelling's late philosophy has seemed to overshadow, and to dismiss, all more Weltanschauung-orientated research. It has long been time for a study focusing on Schelling, the philosopher of Christianity, which is what Schelling considered himself to be for the last forty-five years of his life.--M. J. V. (shrink)