Foucault rejects the subject as a center, i.e. as a transparent self-conscious being, who gives meaning to his actions. However, ideas about subjects that think and will autonomously go on functioning within modern culture. Discourses on subjectivity call for an archeological and genealogical explanation. This compels Foucault to resort increasingly to subjectivity: as product and target of power, but also as a source of resistance and as an agent. After all, Foucault defines power as ‘actions about actions’. In the end, (...) Foucault started to circumscribe the teleology of his philosophical ethos as the production of new forms of subjectivity, in terms of freedom and autonomy. Concern is more with a continuous circling transgression, apprehending subjectivity as an aimless self-negation, than it is about a return of the subject. (shrink)

De filosofen willen de wereld niet alleen verschillend interpreteren, maar ook veranderen! Wat blijft er van dat project in het hedendaagse 'denken in Parijs': nu Sartre en Althusser verdwenen, de politiek en de cultuur sterk ge.

I show first that freedom is the lever that brings about the sublation (Aufhebung) of religion into absolute knowing. Then I prove that exteriority, with its intrinsic contingency and opacity, is an essential moment of absolute knowing.

Foucault rejects the subject as a center, that is to say, as a transparent self-conscious being who gives meaning to his actions. However, ideas about subjects that are thinking and willing autonomously are still functioning within modern culture. Discourses on subjectivity thus call for an archeological and genealogical explanation. This compels Foucault to view subjectivity increasingly not only as a product and a target of power, but also as a source of resistance and as an agent; for Foucault defines power (...) as “actions about actions.” In his latest writings, Foucault starts to define the teleology of his philosophical ethos as the production of new forms of subjectivity, in terms of freedom and autonomy. I argue that Foucault was always particularly concerned with circling (around) transgression, apprehending subjectivity as an aimless self-negation, rather than with a “return of the subject.”. (shrink)