Abstract
In a companion volume on Schelling published by Yale in 1983, Alan White had considerable success in tracing the tortuous path of Schelling’s lengthy philosophical career. Here his project is even more ambitious: to rescue metaphysics from the widespread contempt and neglect that has befallen it by recasting and vindicating it in terms of Hegel’s “transcendental ontology.” This White interprets as continuing Kant’s “critical philosophy” insofar as it presents foundational categories of thought as conditions of the possibility of experience rather than making dogmatic pretensions to knowledge of supersensible entities—and as overcoming the limitations of the Kantian enterprise insofar as it “grounds knowledge in the realms of the transcendental and the practical as well as in that of the empirical.” Two strategies are employed. One is to abjure trying to force from Hegel’s often ambiguous texts a consistent transcendental ontology to the exclusion of the theology of Absolute Spirit commonly said to be found there. “I rather attempt to establish that if and only if the fundament of his system is so interpreted can it stand as a consequent first philosophy.” The other is to use Schelling as foil. Schelling, after all, was Hegel’s first critic, made or anticipated all the major objections to Hegelianism developed since then, and inspired the fundamentally anti-philosophical, praxis-oriented reaction of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and the Marxists—a mind set that still prevails.