Hegel: Logic

El presente escrito ofrece una serie de reflexiones acerca del concepto especulativo del saber. Con este fin, son reconstruidas las doctrinas del ser y del concepto en sus dimensiones sistemáticas. El acto de “decidirse a filosofar” y la noción de totalidad exhibirán, al final del camino, el sentido circular del “discurso del método hegeliano”.

This essay discusses how, for Hegel, freedom can be realized in nature in a rudimentary fashion in solar systems. This solves a problem in Kant’s account of freedom, namely, the problem that Kant only gives a negative argument for why freedom is not impossible but does not give a positive account of how freedom is real. I give a novel account of Kant’s negative argument. Then, I show how, according to Hegel, solar systems can be considered as exhibiting freedom in (...) a rudimentary fashion. Finally, I lay out how Hegel systematically develops this point about the freedom of solar systems in the ‘Mechanism’-chapter of the Science of Logic. In doing so, he uses Kant’s negative argument in a ‘purified’ form to arrive at an account of an ‘intimate token-type relation’ between the planets in a solar system and the law that governs their motion. The essay as a whole provides a concrete example of how Hegel is an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant, both with respect to freedom’s reality and with respect to philosophical method. (shrink)

This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel's Logic”: (1) Hegel's justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel's account of the concepts “being”, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel's case for beginning a science of logic (...) with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel's treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel's Science of Logic. (shrink)

Review of Vols 1 & 2 of Stephen Houlgate's 'Hegel on Being'.

El presente artículo aborda el problema hegeliano del comienzo de la ciencia filosófica desde el prisma de la circularidad constitutiva del proceso lógico y, en consecuencia, de la vinculación especulativa entre el comienzo y el resultado. Siguiendo una metodología hermenéutica, la exposición está organizada en tres secciones. En la primera de ellas, el comentario se atendrá a la cuestión de la actualidad del comienzo de la Lógica. La segunda sección ofrecerá una aproximación al concepto del método, con la intención de (...) dilucidar en su naturaleza extensivo-intensiva el fundamento de la circularidad especulativa de lo lógico y de la integración dialéctica de sus momentos. En la última parte, la argumentación se enfocará en determinar la relevancia de dicha operación circular para la comprensión de la totalidad del programa filosófico hegeliano. (shrink)

Este libro alberga tres motivos entrelazados -uno estético, uno práctico y uno teórico-. El motivo estético consistió en llegar a exponer tres niveles de análisis en el interior de una sola gran historia. El motivo práctico gravitó en la reducción lógica del argumento, para poder darle "musculatura" al texto, y mostrar así su concepto de la manera más clara y directa posible. Ambos motivos quedaron relativamente bien resueltos. El problema teórico residió ante todo en poder hacer de la unidad un (...) movimiento de la libertad, cuestión que requirió primero elevar la unidad a su forma suprema. A partir de ese dilema apareció además la necesidad de responder a la pregunta ¿por qué Hegel? Dicho en pocas palabras, porque a partir de su filosofía es posible pensar la unidad como autodeterminación múltiple. De ahí que el objeto de este libro no sea tanto defender la "diferencia" y la "multitud", cuanto más bien se trata de mostrar que la unidad puede ser en sí misma libre y diferente. La realización de esta unidad negativa e infinita debe entonces conjugar con lo otro, razonar lo heredado, asumirse como la totalidad de las diferencias y considerar a aquella diferencia como su verdad. Pero estas formas de unidad desarrolladas -unidades masivas, relativas y plenas; unidades concomitantes, constituyentes y soberanas; unidades singulares, particulares y universales, o unidades silogísticas- tienen lugar únicamente cuando ha sido forjado un bastidor de tejidos programáticos, o un juego metódico de conceptos. En ellos se realiza entonces y al fin la circulación efectiva entre las esferas disyuntivas que despliegan la vitalidad creadora del "espíritu de un pueblo". Este problema, en cambio, aún no está resuelto, y es más bien una tarea por hacer. (shrink)

Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: “The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal.” Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remain unclear. -/- In this book, Robb (...) Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel’s “problem of beginning”, locating it within Hegel’s account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. Dunphy’s discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel’s views on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic. -/- Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic. (shrink)

In his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel affirms that truth is ‘usually’ understood as the agreement of thought with the object, but that in the ‘deeper, i.e. philosophical sense’, truth is the agreement of a content with itself or of an object with its concept. Hegel then provides illustrations of this second sort of truth: a ‘true friend’, a ‘true state’, a ‘true work of art’. Robert Stern has argued that Hegel's ‘deeper’ or ‘philosophical’ truth is close to what Heidegger labelled ‘material’ (...) truth, namely a property attributed to a thing on the basis of the accordance of that thing with its essence. It has since been common to think of Hegel's concept of ‘philosophical’ truth as ‘ontological’, ‘objective’ or ‘material’ in contrast to ‘epistemological’ or ‘propositional’ definitions. In this paper, I wish to add an important nuance to the existing literature on this subject: even though things have a truth-value for Hegel, the latter is always negative. I argue that Hegel's criterion of ‘philosophical’ truth, which is best formulated as ‘agreement with self’, is first and foremost intended to examine the truth-value of thought-determinations. I then argue that even though this criterion may also be applied to examine the truth-value of things (namely, even though things have a truth-value), things never fall under this definition. After reviewing several of Hegel's explicit remarks on the matter, I provide an alternative explanation to those features of Hegel's ‘philosophical’ truth which have led scholars to view it as a truth in things. Especially, I argue that what are generally seen as Hegel's examples (‘true friend’, ‘true state’, ‘true work of art’) are not intended as examples but only as imperfect illustrations of ‘philosophical’ truth. (shrink)

This paper deals with Walter Jaeschke’s Hegels Philosophie. It begins with Hegel’s early writings, focusing on the relationship between logic and metaphysics. It goes on to explore central moments of Hegel’s philosophy: the relationship with Kant, the nature of categories, the philosophy of history, and the concept of the State. Jaeschke’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought is that of a paradigmatic thinker, whose fundamental philosophical breakthrough lies in the concept of Geist.

This project retraces activations of Kierkegaard in the development of polit­ical theology. It suggests alternative modes of states of exception than those attributed to him by Schmitt, Taubes and Agamben. Several Kierkegaardian themes open themselves to 'something like pure potential' in Agamben, namely: living death, animality, criminality, auto-constitution, modification, liturgy, love and certain articulations of improbabilities. Attention is drawn to a modal ontology and auto-constitution at work in Kierkegaard's writings, as well as a complicated and indissociable operation between killing and (...) letting-live in legalist exceptionalism, comparable to similar functions found in Foucault regarding the biopowers and necropolitics of territorial and governmental apparatuses. It closes in consideration of Kierkegaard's critique of enumeration, large numbers, and statistical probability alongside contemporary tele-technoscientific social controls via the online datafication of people by surveillance or platform capitalisms. After Kierkegaard, such apparatuses are perhaps suspect as calculated to tranquilize humanity into more docile subhumans as it fools folk into becoming part of its numbers. (*Accompanying file includes only front matter, abstract, and endnotes*). (shrink)

Reading Hegel‘s Science of Logic - Irfan Ajvazi.

Review of Fred Moseley and Tony Smith, eds, Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic: A Reexamination, Brill, Leiden and Boston MA, 2014. vii + 336 pp., £98.00 hb., 9789004209527.

In his "Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit," which includes his 1930-31 lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit," Heidegger states not only that Hegelian phenomenology “begins absolutely with the absolute,” but also that this phenomenological beginning is a necessary beginning of Hegel’s “system of science.” Although Heidegger acknowledges that the “proper” or “appropriate” beginning or “ground” of this system is the logical beginning (the beginning posited by Hegelian logic), he insists not only that there is also a second beginning of the system, (...) namely the one provided by the "Phenomenology of Spirit," but also that this beginning is necessary. Thus, Heidegger subscribes to the paradoxically-sounding thesis that Hegel’s system of science must have two beginnings. The present paper attempts, first, to flesh out this thesis (§§2-4), and, second, to uncover Heidegger’s argument for (or justification of) the claim that the phenomenological beginning is necessary to the Hegelian system of science (§§5-6). (shrink)

Cette thèse porte sur la question du fini et de l’infini dans la philosophie de Hegel. L’objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à retracer l’influence exercée par la philosophie antique (principalement Platon et Aristote) et par la philosophie moderne (pour l’essentiel Kant et certains postkantiens) sur l’élaboration hégélienne des catégories de la finité et de l’infinité. En second lieu, elle étudie le développement systématique de la logique de l’infinité hégélienne à la lumière de cette influence. Il s’agit d’étudier, (...) à travers une approche historique et critique, comment Hegel résout l’opposition traditionnelle du fini et de l’infini par sa théorie des deux infinis. A l’aune des conceptions de l’infinité-finie (la mauvaise infinité) et de l’infinité véritablement infinie (la véritable infinité), Hegel montre que le processus de la détermination du fini est un processus d’idéalisation qui supprime la contradiction du fini et de l’infini. Ainsi, l’enquête sur des concepts de finité et d’infinité permet de découvrir que l’idéalité spéculative est pour Hegel une réponse non seulement au problème traditionnel de leur articulation, mais aussi, plus généralement, aux problèmes soulevés par la caractérisation des idéalismes antiques et modernes. (shrink)

In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems,” where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.

This paper argues firstly that the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is necessary for the justification of the beginning of his logical project, and secondly that Hegel's attempt to secure the beginning of his Science of Logic by relying upon the argument of the Phenomenology fails. I argue firstly that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of the Phenomenology to justify it. I then (...) offer some support for the view of the relationship between the two texts defended by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be. (shrink)

Hegel begins the third main part of the Science of Logic, the “logic of the concept,” with the dialectic of universality. This dialectic, however, proves to be insufficient for the exposition of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, because it is dominated by the perspective of self-identity. For this reason speculative logic develops a dialectic of particularity whose domain is dominated by the perspective of difference. While the dialectic of universality made explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is universal, the (...) dialectic of particularity aspires to make explicit the meaning of the conflicting proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is particular. The present paper attempts a detailed reconstruction of this dialectic and thereby a disclosure of the meaning of the onto-logical claim that being-as-concept is particular. It is first shown how Hegel’s account of the particular relates to the expression of a totality of particulars. Next it is argued that the speculative notion of the particular is extremely complex and that this complexity can be decoded by means of four dimensions. Third, it is explained how abstraction comes to be regarded by Hegel as the essence of the particular. I end the paper by discussing how the collapse of the dialectic of particularity gives rise to the category of the individual and its peculiar dialectic. (shrink)

Erkenne dich selbst sei die schwierigste Zumutung, die einem Menschen gemacht worden ist – so proklamierte Finnischer Philosoph und Hegelianer J.V. Snellman (1806–81) in der Ein-leitung zum seinen ersten philosophischen Hauptwerk. In diesem Werk ("Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit", Tübingen 1841) kommentierte Snellman sowohl G.W.F. Hegels (1770–1831) Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes als auch die Diskussion unter deutschen Hegelianern. Laut Snellman setzt die Durchführung der Idee der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes eine engere Verbindung zwischen spekulativer Logik und Geistesphilosophie (...) vor. Im Vortrag stelle ich die Frage, was für eine Verbindung Snellman tatsächlich im Auge hatte. (shrink)

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel—even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in (...) Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being. (shrink)

Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various (...) works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality. (shrink)

Since some time the metaphor of logical space has been used to open new approaches to Hegel’s “Science of Logic”. Frequently it is noticed that in such an interpretation logical space must be understood as dynamic. However, as far as I can see, nobody has done yet the step to introduce the concept of logical time into the discussion, even though this step seems to suggest itself. The following contribution seeks to develop this thought and arrives at some new conceptions, (...) such as the curvature of logical space, logical actuality and semantic present, which may seem strange at first sight, but which follow consistently from the explication of the fundamental idea. The first aim in doing this is to broaden our conceptual repertoire do deal with Hegel’s Logic. This may open new perspectives of interpretation which may prove inspiring. Secondarily, the article also defends a systematic thesis which stands on its own and lays claim to truth. This claim goes far beyond a mere interpretation of Hegel and implies a fundamental critique of his philosophy. The comprehension of logical time-space leads to the requirement of logical chance event – and not only real chance. This goes against Hegel claim to absolute necessity in the dialectical development of his Logic and leads to a new philosophic comprehension of logic as such. (shrink)

A fate similar to Kant’s sometimes befalls Hegel: the importance of their meditation on art is not always given its full due. In Kant’s case the Critique of Judgement becomes an elaborate afterthought, filling some of the gaps left by the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Particularly with English-speaking commentators, Kant is read from the First Critique forwards, never also from the Third Critique backwards. Hegel, we add, did not lend himself to such a unilinear (...) reading of Kant; yet his own concern with art is frequently subject to a similar consideration. Despite the fact that Hegel unabashedly ascribes to art a certain absoluteness, his reflections on art tend not to be placed close to the core of his philosophy as a whole. As in commentaries on Kant, so also with Hegel: towards the end of involved exegeses, we get a quick run-through of their aesthetic views, as if both too did write on these matters, yet somehow in a not central way. Art comes after the hard work is done, it does not shape their thought from the beginning. We may marvel at the astonishing breadth of culture displayed by Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, all the more surprising, given Hegel’s reputation as an unbending rationalist. In them we may find many rich reflections on art’s significance. Yet these tend to be detached from the general principles of Hegel’s philosophy, and praised or criticized in isolation. Even when due weight is given to the general principles of Hegel’s thought, and even when these principles are held to reveal something of art’s significance, the significance of art for philosophy itself tends to remain unexplored. How the art work enters intimately into Hegel’s ideal of philosophical thinking is not always entertained for the central question that it is. (shrink)

Kant’s “transcendental” or “critical” philosophy is an instance of what can be called the “critique of immediacy.” As part of his critical project, Kant argues that one cannot merely assume that there is a reestablished harmony between thought and being. Instead, one must effect a “return to the subject” and examine the forms of thought themselves, in order to determine the extent to which thought and being are commensurable. As a result of his “transcendental turn,” Kant concludes that what at (...) first appears as immediately given to thought is always already (at least partly) the result of some kind of activity or mediation on the part of the thought itself. Hegel approves of Kant’s critical orientation: Kant correctly demanded to know “how far the forms of thought were capable of leading to the knowledge of truth,” and correctly concluded that “the forms of thought must be made into an object of investigation.” However, for Hegel, the problem with Kant was that he aimed to examine the forms of thought as if they were necessarily separated from being itself. Thus the Kantian strategy, for Hegel, led to a twofold absurdly. (shrink)

The concept of essence is thought by many political theorists to be a residue of the patriarchal onto-theological tradition of metaphysics that needs to be (or has been) overcome by more progressive aims. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of essentialism in light of the treatment of the concept of essence in Hegel’s Science of Logic, and within the context of recent issues in critical race theory and feminism. I will argue that the role of an (...) essence underlying appearance is a valuable one within a Hegelian framework, and that it is politically important to reassess it. There are reasons that we should want to uphold the distinction between essence and an inessential appearance. We should want to uphold the irreducibility of essence to the Hegelian self-determining concept, and I argue in this paper that there is a basis for doing so in Hegel’s own text. Despite the well established impossibility of claiming that there is a property or set of properties that all women share, to dissolve essence as an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance is both to misunderstand essence, and to relinquish a tool needed in the struggle for justice. Essence cannot be dismissed by claiming that it is an illusory side-effect of the show of appearance because essence and the inessential do not exhibit the characteristic of reciprocity. (shrink)

" Cet ouvrage a pour but de laisser parler le cœur de la pensée hégélienne, sa Logique afin de la voir parvenir au bout de ce qu'elle peut. Patiemment mis au contact de ce que cette pensée comporte de plus puissant, le lecteur est paradoxalement conduit à la regarder se renverser de l'intérieur. La philosophie hégélienne n'est pas une opinion offerte à une réfutation protéiforme, elle n'est ni une simple représentation ni une supplémentaire conception du monde, mais une nef colossale (...) dont il ne suffit pas de contredire avec plus ou moins d'inspiration l'une ou l'autre base pour espérer la faire chavirer. Cette œuvre relève le vertigineux défi de déployer un mouvement qui précède son lecteur. On ne "sort" de ce cercle que pour l'étendre, l'enrichir et y contribuer. C'est un fait : la pensée de Hegel est, sur son terrain, indépassable, ou, en dehors de son terrain, jamais atteinte puisque ce n'est pas d'elle que l'on parle quand on croit la mettre en cause. Nous voyons ainsi, plus que pour toute autre pensée, deux camps ennemis s'affronter autour du système hégélien : d'une part, ceux qui, croyant préserver la "liberté" de leur "esprit critique", ne veulent ni lire véritablement, ni comprendre en profondeur, ni entendre parler de Hegel, d'autre part, ceux qui n'en sortent plus et répètent Hegel comme on répète encore une pièce quand on la joue pour la millième fois. Conscient de ces deux écueils, nous avons voulu suivre la voie d'une herméneutique phénoménologique : laisser apparaître l'œuvre comme elle se donne. Attentif aux métamorphoses de cette notion d'identité qui est l'expressive figure dans laquelle se lisent les diverses motions de l'Idée absolue, nous laissons cette dernière s'ouvrir, révéler ses différents aspects et nous conduire d'elle-même à ce qu'elle veut nous dire. La méditation de la notion d'identité fait précisément apparaître les différents moments de la rythmique hégélienne et en fait pénétrer le sens ontologique. Chemin faisant, si l'affaire s'expose, elle s'expose intégralement, et elle se met donc également à nu. Un cohérent principe de connivence avec une grande pensée ne s'interdit nullement les voies de la clairvoyance ; il produit au contraire les conditions de sa juste et saine apparition. Cet ouvrage est donc une exposition ou une manifestation du penser hégélien au terne de laquelle doit logiquement apparaître l'essence de ce dernier, car l'objet d'une méditation approfondie laisse non seulement apparaître le tout, mais il laisse aussi tout apparaître, c'est-à-dire des limites et des inconséquences qui sont désormais les siennes et non celles que l'arbitraire critique importe pour la commodité de ses préjugés. Cette méditation se donne donc à la fois comme un cours sur la pensée hégélienne et comme une irrémédiable prise de distance. ". (shrink)

This engaging work explores how Hegel's philosophy both entails and is entailed by a certain conception of Christianity. What distinguishes Burbidge's exploration is the emphasis that he places on an interpretation of Hegel's logic, in which a central role is assigned to the understanding. The first set of essays elaborates the operation of the understanding in relation to the operations of dialectic and speculative reason in Hegel's logic. The first essay concentrates on Hegel's attempt to display the universal movement of (...) pure thought in terms of all three operations. Complementing his earlier work, On Hegel's Logic, Burbidge argues that, given the appropriate interpretation of these operations, the absolute difference between "being" and "nothing" can be said to be sustained, even as these concepts are held together in "becoming," which in turn disappears into "a being". Burbidge's second essay presents an interpretive sketch of Hegel's logic as a whole, based upon a consistent, thorough, and self-referential application of the understanding. The essay's title "Transition or Reflection" refers to the distinction, characteristic of dialectical development, between inherent and posited concepts. The movement of thought between members of the first set of concepts is immediate and hence a "transition," while that between members of the second set is mediated by "reflection." Burbidge argues that the logic of concepts in Part 3 of Hegel's logic, construed as the understanding applied to itself, specifies within itself these two contradictory moments. The same theme informs Burbidge's third essay as he identifies the understanding, not as the beginning, but as the culmination of Hegel's logic, holding together in the disjunctive judgment of the logic of concepts both the dialectic emphasized by the left wing of Hegel scholars and the speculation championed by the right wing. Burbidge argues for what might be called the ironic interpretation of Hegel's claim to an absolute method, namely, the understanding that "no immediate transition, no comprehensive vision, and no philosophical wisdom will ever be the last word". The final essay of this first part discussed the necessity of contingency in the context of Hegel's logic. (shrink)

Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorical system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the Science of Logic if he had lived (...) to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This new translation of The Science of Logic (also known as 'Greater Logic') includes the revised Book I (1832), Book II (1813), and Book III (1816). Recent research has given us a detailed picture of the process that led Hegel to his final conception of the System and of the place of the Logic within it. We now understand how and why Hegel distanced himself from Schelling, how radical this break with his early mentor was, and to what extent it (...) entailed a return (but with a difference) to Fichte and Kant. In the introduction to the volume, George di Giovanni presents in synoptic form the results of recent scholarship on the subject, and, while recognizing the fault lines in Hegel's System that allow opposite interpretations, argues that the Logic marks the end of classical metaphysics. The translation is accompanied by a full apparatus of historical and explanatory notes. (shrink)

Hegel's Doctrine of Essence is the central part of his Logic. The Doctrine of Essence is of central importance, since it is a critical description of traditional categories which functions also as the justification of Hegel's speculative understanding of essence. It is the most difficult text he ever penned, and due to his sudden death in 1831, Hegel never got to carry out its planned revision. This study takes an historical approach, giving flesh to Hegel's often forbiddingly abstract argument by (...) seeing it as a confrontation with his predecessors, especially Fichte and Schelling. Finally, the book shies away from an uninformative reiteration of the Logic's dialectical sequences, choosing instead to show how the Doctrine of Essence intersects with some perennial philosophical questions (above all, the relationship between freedom and determinism). (shrink)

Este artículo intenta elucidar el carácter dual de la razón que ha propuesto la filosofía de Hegel. A partir de ello investiga la coincidencia que logran estos dos momentos, la negatividad y la creatividad de la razón con la realidad efectiva [Wirklichkeit], proponiendo una serie de pares categoriales que nos permitan pensar este específico doble concepto de razón y su posible vínculo con la primera obra de Slavoj Žižek, El sublime objeto de la ideología. Abstract: This paper tries to clarify (...) the dual nature of reason proposed by Hegel's philosophy. Based on this research the coincidence that achieve these two moments, negativity and creativity of reason with actuality [Wirklichkeit], proposing a series of categorical couple that allow us to think this double specific concept of reason, and its possible link to the first work of Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. (shrink)