This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

This ground-breaking book brings together researchers from a wide range of disciplines to discuss the control and coordination of processes involved in perceptually guided actions. The research area of motor control has become an increasingly multidisciplinary undertaking. Understanding the acquisition and performance of voluntary movements in biological and artificial systems requires the integration of knowledge from a variety of disciplines from neurophysiology to biomechanics.

This book is a critical examination of Michel Foucault's relation to ancient Greek thought, in particular his famous analysis of Greek history of sexuality. Wolfgang Detel offers a new understanding of Foucault's theories of power and knowledge based on modern analytical theories of science and concepts of power. He offers a fresh and complex reading of the texts which Foucault discusses, covering topics such as Aristotle's ethics and theory of sex, Hippocratic diatetics, the earliest treatises on economics, and Plato's (...) theory of love. The result is a philosophically rich and probing critique of Foucault's later writings, and a persuasive account of the relation between ethics, power and knowledge in classical antiquity. His book will have a wide appeal to readers interested in Foucault and in Greek thought and culture. (shrink)

Elaborating on the substantial parallels between Molina’s and Kant’s attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge and natural causal determinism respectively, my aim is to establish a proper historical connection as well. Leibniz is shown to be the crucial mediator in two respects: (i) Kant knew Molina’s account of divine knowledge in general in its Leibnizian version through Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In this work, scientia media plays no role in the explication as to how God knows absolute future contingents. (ii) (...) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant resorted to doctrines similar to Molina’s in his criticism of Leibniz’s alternative explication which drew on complete concepts of monads. (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

Against the prevailing opinion expressed, e.g., by L. Couturat it is argued that the so-called „intensional“ point of view which Leibniz mostly preferred to the nowadays usual extensional interpretation is neither „confuse et vague“ nor may it be made responsible for the alleged „échec final de son système“ . We present a precise definition of an „intensional“ semantics which reflects the Leibnizian ideas and which may be proven to be equivalent to standard extensional semantics.

There is a tacit assumption that interpretation comes naturally, that human beings live by constantly interpreting. In this sense, we might even rephrase Descartes by saying: We interpret, therefore we are. While such a basic human disposition makes interpretation appear to come naturally, the forms it takes, however, do not. In this work, Iser offers a fresh approach by formulating an "anatomy of interpretation" through which we can understand the act of interpretation in its many different manifestations. For Iser, there (...) are several different genres of interpretation, all of which are acts of translation designed to transpose something into something else. Perhaps the most obvious example of interpretation involves canonical texts, such as the Rabbinical exegesis of the Torah or Samuel Johnson's reading of Shakespeare. But what happens when the matter that one seeks to interpret consists not of a text but of a welter of fragments, as in the study of history, or when something is hidden, as in the practice of psychoanalysis, or is as complex as a culture or system? Iser details how, in each of these cases, the space that is opened up by interpretation is negotiated in a different way, thus concluding that interpretation always depends on what it seeks to translate. For students of philosophy, literary and critical theory, anthropology, and cultural history, Iser's elucidation of the mechanics by which we translate and understand, as well as his assessment of the anthropological roots of our drive to make meaning, will undoubtedly serve as a revelation. (shrink)

This paper is on dangerous human experimentations with drugs against trypanosimiasis carried out in the former German colonies of German East Africa and Togo. Victory over trypanosomiasis could not be achieved in Berlin because animals were thought to be unsuitable for therapeutic laboratory research in the field of trypanosomiasis. The colonies themselves were necessarily chosen as laboratories and the patients with sleeping sickness became the objects of therapeutical and pharmacological research. The paper first outlines Robert Koch's trypanosomiasis research in the (...) large sleeping sickness laboratory of German East Africa and then focuses on the escalating human experiments on trypanosomiasis in the German Musterkolonie Togo, which must be interpreted as a reaction to the starting signal given by Robert Koch in East Africa. (shrink)

Morality in context is a timely topic. A debate between philosophers and social scientists is a good way to approach it. Why is there such a booming interest in morality and why does it focus on context? One starting point is the change in the sociostructural and sociocultural conditions of modern societies. This involves change in the empirical conditions of moral action and in the social demand on morality. As these changes are accounted for and analyzed in the social sciences, (...) new perspectives emerge that give rise to new ways of framing issues and problems. These problems are best addressed by way of cooperation between philosophers and social scientists. As Habermas (1990) has pointed out in a much cited paper, philosophers depend on social science to fill in the data they require to answer the questions raised by philosophy in its "placeholder" function. The reverse also holds true: Social science needs the conceptual clarifications that philosophy can provide. With respect to morality, such mutual interchanges are of particular importance the contributions to this book show convincingly. (shrink)

On the Lisbon earthquake of 1755; its effects on thinking of the time.

Abelard: Logic This article describes and reconstructs Peter Abelard’s logic of the twelfth century. Much of what he regarded as logic is now classified as ontology or philosophical semantics. The article concentrates on his treatment of the relation of consequence. Abelard’s most important logical innovations consist of two points: The distinction between two kinds of … Continue reading Abelard: Logic →.

The paper pleads for compatibilism by distinguishing the first-person’s normative and the observer’s empirical perspective. In the normative perspective one’s own actions are uncaused and free, in the empirical perspective they are caused and may be predetermined. Still, there is only one notion of causation that is able to account for the relation between the causal conceptions within the two perspectives. The other main idea for explicating free will by explaining free actions or intentions as appropriately caused in a specified (...) way is acknowledged, but not discussed. The paper finally argues that the normative and the empirical perspective are on a par; none is prior; even from within the empirical perspective the normative perspective is ineliminable. (shrink)