This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

We present a reconstruction of so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics using a notation which we believe is more legible than that of earlier accounts, and lends itself easily to computer implementation, for instance in PROLOG. By drawing from, and emending, earlier work of Balzer and Dawe (1986,1997), the present account presents the three most important lines of development of classical genetics: the so-called Mendel's laws, linkage genetics and gene mapping, in the form of a theory-net. This shows that the (...) set theoretic representation format used in the structuralist approach to the philosophy of science also applies to the domain of genetic theories. There construction is intended to lend more clarity to theme thodological, philosophical and didactical discussions of the foundations of genetics, and on the other hand to defend a formally, logically minded view of theories which seems to have become contested through the work of Feyerabend, Kuhn and Kitcher. (shrink)

SummaryA simple and precise definition is offered of “term t of theory T being T‐theoretical” which can be applied to any formalized theory. The definition is in line with and emends traditional accounts of theoreticity. Its adequacy is demonstrated by application to three examples: exchange economics, classical mechanics and collision mechanics.

A comprehensive model for describing various forms of developments in science is defined in precise, set-theoretic terms, and in the spirit of the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. The model emends previous accounts in centering on single systems in a homogenous way, eliminating notions which essentially refer to sets of systems. This is achieved by eliminating the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as a primitive, and by introducing the notion of intended links. The force of the model (...) is demonstrated by formally incorporating many of the important, precise meta-theoretic concepts occurring in the literature. (shrink)

Gibt es Elemente, Bestandteile, Strukturen, die in allen Wissenschaftsbereichen, Disziplinen und Theorien fast gleich sind? Dieses Buch stellt ein neues und originelles Modell für Theorien, Theoriennetze und dynamische Entwicklungen vor, das für empirische Untersuchungen in den Sozialwissenschaften, für Computersimulationen, aber auch für praktisch-politische Anwendungen geeignet ist. Die Grundelemente in diesem Modell sind Ereignisse, Fakten, Modelle, Netze und Wahrscheinlichkeit.

A new approach to analyze scientific methods as patternsof state transitions is proposed and exemplified by the two mostimportant, general methods: induction and deduction. Though only`local' states of science are considered in this paper, includinghypotheses, data, approximation and degree of fit, the approach caneasily be extended to more comprehensive kinds of states. Two `pure'forms of induction are distinguished, enumerative and hypothesisconstruction induction. A combination of these two forms is proposedto yield a more adequate picture of induction. While the pure forms (...) ofinduction are clearly distinct from the deductive pattern, the patternof the combined form of induction is very similar to the latter. Thepresent account of scientific methods not only points out thedifferences between different methods but – in contrast to usualdiscussions of methodology – also clarifies what they have in common. (shrink)

Mit der vorliegenden Arbeit verfolgen wir drei Ziele. Erstens exemplifizieren wir einige wissenschaftstheoretische Fragen und die zugehörigen Antworten am sehr einfachen Beispiel der klassischen Stoßmechanik. Zweitens läßt sich an diesem Beispiel besonders klar der Begriff des Meßmodells darstellen; insbesondere erhalten wir eine vollständige Übersicht über alle Meßmodelle. Und drittens erhalten wir ein schönes Beispiel für den Begriff der Reduktion einer Theorie auf eine andere, denn die Stoßmechanik läßt sich auf einfache Weise auf eine Spezialisierung der Klassischen Partikelmechanik reduzieren.

We reconstruct “the classical transformational theory” of Chomsky, and fit it into the structuralist theory of science. We describe both the formal and the empirical features of this classical account, so that one basic hypothesis of this theory – where central notions are used – can be formulated, and in which Chomsky’s “classical” distinction between surface structure and deep structure is clarified. In the empirical claim of this theory are words, sentences and high-structured entities in an inseparable way intertwined. We (...) claim that the formal structure of a natural language is not approximately the same as that of an empirical theory in general. We clarify two special points which affect the structure of the notion of an empirical theory, namely: the delineation of intended applications and the fit between data and models. We hold that the concept of the empirical claim for a linguistic theory should be generalized in comparison with the “standard” structuralist approach. (shrink)

We clarify the notions scientific process and social process with structuralist means. Three questions are formulated, and answered in the structuralistic, set-theoretic framework. What is a scientific process, and a process in science? What can be meant by a non-social process? In which sense a non-social process can be a part of a scientific process in social science? We are specifically interested in social processes. Our answers use the notion of the generalized subset relation applied to set-theoretical structures, and the (...) set of structuralistically reconstructed empirical theories. (shrink)

The notions of freedom and equality in a group are precisely defined in terms of individual exertions of influence or power. Freedom is discussed in the version ‘freedom from’ influence rather than in the version ‘freedom to do’ what one wants. It is shown that at the ideal conceptual level complete freedom implies equality. Given the plausibility of the definitions this shows that political ‘folk rhetorics’ in which freedom and equality often are put in opposition are misled and misleading. Quantitative (...) notions of ‘more freedom’ and ‘more equality’ are introduced and shown to be independent of each other. The bearing of these conceptual exercises on the comparison of political systems is discussed. (shrink)

The notions of freedom and equality in a group are precisely defined in terms of individual exertions of influence or power. Freedom is discussed in the version ‘freedom from’ influence rather than in the version ‘freedom to do’ what one wants. It is shown that at the ideal conceptual level complete freedom implies equality. Given the plausibility of the definitions this shows that political ‘folk rhetorics’ in which freedom and equality often are put in opposition are misled and misleading. Quantitative (...) notions of ‘more freedom’ and ‘more equality’ are introduced and shown to be independent of each other. The bearing of these conceptual exercises on the comparison of political systems is discussed. (shrink)

Reconstruimos la teoría central de las redes bayesianas n-dimensionales de forma clara y completa en el marco estructuralista. Nuestra formulación también incluye los n espacios de probabilidad unidimensionales y un espacio de probabilidad n-dimensional. Explicamos los sistemas previstos y la afirmación empírica de la teoría de las redes bayesianas n-dimensionales. En nuestra formulación, se destaca el concepto de dimensión, y discutimos si los eventos o las oraciones (enunciados, proposiciones) podrían usarse como bloques de construcción básicos.

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of Neoclassical (...) General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)