Gottlob Frege has exerted an enormous influence on the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy, yet the real significance of that influence is still very much a matter of debate. This book provides a completely new and systematic account of Frege's philosophy by focusing on its cornerstone: the theory of sense and reference. Two features distinguish this study from other books on Frege. First, sense and reference are placed absolutely at the core of Frege's work; the author shows that no adequate account (...) of the theory can avoid analysing the notion of thought that underpins it, or explaining how it has clarified our concept of judgement. Second, the theory is situated within the development of Frege's thought; the author reveals how the theory caused Frege to alter many of his fundamental views. In doing so the author presents a clearer picture of the problems the theory was intended to solve, and delineates more sharply the characteristic features of Frege's philosophy. (shrink)

The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions (...) of knowledge which includes the availability of the notion of the I. It is clarified what the determination of apperception as an 'act of spontaniety' amounts to (B: 132). Kant's scattered remarks on the ability of having the representation of the I, of using the word 'I', are considered in order to show that what he called 'the logical I' has something to do with the capacity of performing an act of judgment. It is argued that such an account is not to be found in contemporary discussions of 'essential indexicals', 'first-person view' and mental self-ascriptions. (shrink)

What are the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the history of science and the philosophy of science? This selection of essays by Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994) presents exemplary studies on the philosophy of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, on the history of physics and on the scope and limitations of scientific explanation, and a realistic understanding of science and truth. In his treatment of leading currents in 20th century philosophy, Krüger presents new and original arguments for a deeper (...) understanding of the continuity and dynamics of the development of scientific theory. These result in significant consequences for the claim of the sciences that they understand reality in a rational manner. The case studies are complemented by fundamental thoughts on the relationship between philosophy, science, and their common history. (shrink)

Self-reference and self-knowledge are constitutive for being a person and presuppose the use of the first-person pronoun. The book gives an extensive account of the various uses of this word and argues for a new theory of the first-person point of v.

Der Band versammelt acht Vorträge, die im Rahmen eines Kolloquiums des Philosophischen Seminars der Universität Göttingen in Verbindung mit der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen aus Anlaß des sechzigsten Geburtstags von Lorenz Krüger im Sommer 1993 gehalten wurden.Die Beiträge sind durch die Verwandtschaft miteinander verknüpfter Themenstellungen geprägt, welche die Schwerpunkte und die Breite der wissenschaftlichen Interessen des 1994 verstorbenen Lorenz Krüger sichtbar machen.

In his early Freiburg lectures Heidegger developed various theories of the self that differ substantially from his later ideas about the selfhood of everyday Dasein in Being and Time. Exploration of these differences facilitates the explanation of a concept of self that provides a substantial contribution to contemporary discussions of the topic.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 295-299.