The composition of a timeline depends on purpose, perspective, and scale – and of the very understanding of the word, the phenomenon referred to, and whether the focus is the idea or concept, an instance of an idea or a phenomenon, a process, or an event and so forth. The main function of timelines is to provide an overview over a long history, it is a kind of a mnemotechnic device or a particular kind of Knowledge Organization System (KOS).b (...) The entries in the timeline should be brief and indisputable. Therefore, timelines often identify the first occurrences rather than the most widespread or most qualified instances leaving the fuller and more complex, and possibly disputable story out. But even first occurrences are often difficult to establish. The first occurrence is most often only the first finding of an instance. Older instances may be found and competing definitions develop either within a field or in different fields. This is further complicated since the phenomena, their names, and their meanings may change over time. Former meanings may become redundant, or they must accommodate and coexist with new meanings. The time and place of the composition of the timeline are to be considered in interpreting the things listed. The following note will discuss these issues as they occur in the development of the notions of text, e-text and hypertext, and the origin of machine translation. (shrink)

This paper delves into the deconstruction of the notion of responsibility, drawing a correlation with the process of decomposition of the concept of sovereignty as discussed by Derrida in his last research works. We explore Derrida’s consideration of absolute responsibility as no longer passing through the figure of the sovereign. Derrida’s thought takes its distance from the philosophical and hegemonic determination of the notion of responsibility, for the conceptual system of its axiomatic defines responsibility based on the sovereign individual’s freedom (...) and makes responsibility the effect of his power. Yet, this definition condemns ethics to failure, since it does not account for the other supposed in the idea of response. Derrida incorporates absolute singularity, and consequently secrecy, into the structure of responsibility, enabling thought to encounter the absolute other. The text outlines the influence of Nietzsche and Celan in Derrida’s thought and develops an approach that sees in his work the effort to create a poetic revolution in the history of philosophy and knowledge by opening thought to radical alterity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 24.1 (2004) 117-133 [Access article in PDF] Emptiness, Kenōsis, History, and Dialogue: The Christian Response to Masao Abe's Notion of "Dynamic Śūnyatā " in the Early Years of the Abe-Cobb Buddhist-Christian Dialogue Charles B. Jones The Catholic University of America Introduction Between 1980 and 1993, the Japanese Zen scholar Masao Abe resided in the United States, teaching in various places.1 This brought him into contact with (...) many American scholars and theologians, among whom was John Cobb, a Protestant theologian then working in the area of process theology. Many of the ideas that Abe brought from Japanese Buddhism and particularly from the "Kyōtō School" of Japanese philosophy appeared to Cobb intriguingly congruent with his theological work, and the two began a series of dialogues that came to include a larger and larger circle of Christian theologians2 and (mostly Western) Buddhist scholar-practitioners. The end result was a series of informal encounters as well as a series of three formal "International Buddhist-Christian Conferences" (1980, 1984, 1987; a second series of dialogues were held without Abe's attendance starting in 1998 after a hiatus under the name "International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter"3 ). From these encounters came an impressive number of publications from Abe and from a variety of other participants in what is sometimes known as the "Abe-Cobb Encounter."The agenda, following Cobb's suggestion and vocabulary, was to allow each side to "cross over" into the other; in other words, to study and internalize the worldview of the other in as much depth as possible without converting or losing one's connection with one's home tradition, abiding in the other side as a guest. Later, one was to "cross back," come home to one's own tradition and reflect on the benefits gained in wearing the other's shoes for a time.4 This agenda, which emphasized understanding the other's worldview and concepts of ultimate reality, suited the highly intellectual style of the dialogues, focused as they were on philosophical and theological concerns. [End Page 117]Nevertheless, even given the concern to study and understand the other's philosophical standpoint, a curious disconnect emerges when one studies the literature produced in this dialogue. During the early phase of these encounters in the 1980s, each side, Buddhist and Christian, appears to have taken one text as normative for the entirety of the other's tradition. For Abe, following his predecessors in the KyōtōSchool, the emblematic textfor Christianity was avery short one: the hymn toChrist recorded by Paul in Philippians 2:6-11. He was particularly drawn to the concept of kenōsis, "emptying," which he thought might serve as a cognate for the Buddhist idea of "emptiness" (Skt: śūnyatā ). While the Christians participating in the dialogueaccepted this as a point of contact, albeit with some reservations, others have objected strenuously to this approach, saying that Abe's method of interpreting this text did not hold to responsible methods of exegesis, and at any rate the passage was much too minute to support an entire theology of God and creation.5The Christian side by and large adopted much the same strategy in coming to grips with Buddhist thought, choosing a brief text as the paradigmatic statement of the Buddhist view of ultimate reality: the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Root Stanzas on the Middle Way; hereafter the MMK) of the second-century Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. In this instance, objections from the Buddhist side were not forthcoming, because Abe himself took the MMK as a normative statement of Buddhist thought. Nevertheless, his own presentation of Buddhism, especially his key notion of "dynamic śūnyatā, " went considerably beyond Nāgārjuna's presentation and thus elicited some objections from the Christian side for not hewing to their own understanding of Nāgārjuna. Because Abe never responded to these objections directly, the misunderstanding was left unresolved... (shrink)

‘It is not possible to settle on a method of classifying manuscripts in the abstract; the lost works whose content is being reconstructed can be dated more or less precisely and the classification only acquires significance if it is accompanied by the history of the text. Then many apparent anomalies of tradition automatically disappear […]. In several of his articles Paul Maas has helped to clarify the notion of Byzantine conjecture; it would have been nice if he had placed (...) greater emphasis in his summary on the importance of a critical history.’. (shrink)

More than a simple expository history, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History sketches the outlines of a renewed materialist philosophy of history in the tradition of Fernand Braudel, Gilles Deleuze, and F lix Guattari, while also engaging the critical new understanding of material processes derived from the sciences of dynamics.Following in the wake of his groundbreaking War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Manuel De Landa presents a radical synthesis of historical development over the last one thousand (...) years. More than a simple expository history, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History sketches the outlines of a renewed materialist philosophy of history in the tradition of Fernand Braudel, Gilles Deleuze, and F lix Guattari, while also engaging the critical new understanding of material processes derived from the sciences of dynamics. Working against prevailing attitudes that see history as an arena of texts, discourses, ideologies, and metaphors, De Landa traces the concrete movements and interplays of matter and energy through human populations in the last millennium. De Landa attacks three domains that have given shape to human societies: economics, biology, and linguistics. In every case, what one sees is the self-directed processes of matter and energy interacting with the whim and will of human history itself to form a panoramic vision of the West free of rigid teleology and naive notions of progress, and even more important, free of any deterministic source of its urban, institutional, and technological forms. Rather, the source of all concrete forms in the West's history are shown to derive from internal morphogenetic capabilities that lie within the flow of matter-energy itself. (shrink)

Electronic text can be defined on two different, though interconnected, levels. On the one hand, electronic text can be defined by taking the notion of “text” or “printed text” as the point of departure. On the other hand, electronic text can be defined by taking the digital format as the point of departure, where everything is represented in the binary alphabet. While the notion of text in most cases lends itself to being independent of medium and embodiment, it is also (...) often tacitly assumed that it is in fact modeled on the print medium, instead of, for instance, on hand-written text or speech. In late 20th century, the notion of “text” was subjected to increasing criticism, as can be seen in the question that has been raised in literary text theory about whether “there is a text in this class.” At the same time, the notion was expanded by including extralinguistic sign modalities (images, videos). A basic question, therefore, is whether electronic text should be included in the enlarged notion that text is a new digital sign modality added to the repertoire of modalities or whether it should be included as a sign modality that is both an independent modality and a container that can hold other modalities. In the first case, the notion of electronic text would be paradigmatically formed around the e-book, which was conceived as a digital copy of a printed book but is now a deliberately closed work. Even closed works in digital form will need some sort of interface and hypertextual navigation that together constitute a particular kind of paratext needed for accessing any sort of digital material. In the second case, the electronic text is defined by the representation of content and (some parts of the) processing rules as binary sequences manifested in the binary alphabet. This wider notion would include, for instance, all sorts of scanning results, whether of the outer cosmos or the interior of our bodies and of digital traces of other processes in-between (machine readings included). Since other alphabets, such as the genetic alphabet and all sorts of images may also be represented in the binary alphabet, such materials will also belong to the textual universe within this definition. A more intriguing implication is that born-digital materials may also include scripts and interactive features as intrinsic parts of the text. The two notions define the text on different levels: one is centered on the Latin, the other on the binary alphabet, and both definitions include hypertext, interactivity, and multimodality as constituent parameters. In the first case, hypertext is included as a navigational, paratextual device; whereas in the second case, hypertext is also incorporated in the narrative within an otherwise closed work or as a constituent element on the textual universe of the web, where it serves the ongoing production of (possibly scripted) connections and disconnections between blocks of textual content. Since the early decades of early 21st century still represent only the very early stages of the globally distributed universe of web texts, this is also a history of the gradual unfolding of the dimensions of these three constituencies—hypertext, interactivity, and multimodality. The result is a still-expanding repertoire of genres, including some that are emerging via path dependency; some via remediation; and some as new genres that are unique for networked digital media, including “social media texts” and a growing variety of narrative and discursive multiple-source systems. (shrink)

‘Spirit consonance engendering a sense of life’ (Qi Yun Sheng Dong) as the first law of Chinese painting, originally proposed by Xie He (active 500–535?) in his six laws of painting, has been commonly echoed by numerous later Chinese artists up to this day. Tracing back the meaning of each character of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ from Pre-Qin up to the Six Dynasties, along with a comparative analysis on the renderings of ‘Qi Yun Sheng Dong’ by experts in Western academia, (...) I establish ‘spirit consonance’ as the rendering of ‘Qi Yun’. By examining texts on painting by significant critics in Chinese art history, and by referring to specific works by painters from the Six Dynasties up to the Yuan Dynasty, I present the merits and demerits of the different interpretations by Western experts, and explore the essence of ‘Qi Yun’. Once the painter successfully captures ‘spirit consonance’ as the essential character or ‘internal reality’ of the object, and transmits it into the work, ‘Qi Yun’ further implies the expressive quality of the work beyond formal representation. Additionally, the fusion of expressive and representative functions also leaves space for further explaining the aesthetic interaction among artist, object, work, and audience. From the Six Dynasties onwards, Chinese painters have practised the expressive pursuit beyond epresentation on the basis of the unification of ‘Qi Yun’ (spirit consonance) and formal representation, although spirit consonance was valued more highly than formal likeness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REFLECTIONS ON GADAMER'S NOTION OF SPRACHLICHKEIT by Deborah Cook The works of Hans-Georg Gadamer recall the works of Martin Heidegger as those of Plato memorialize Socrates. The history of philosophy is constituted in such iterations. Indeed, die relationship between Gadamer and Heidegger offers us a paradigm for the understanding of die history of philosophy, manifesting as it does how this history is less marked by change (...) than by a ceaseless repetition of the same. Nevertheless, whUe Gadamer reappropriates the Heidegger of Being and Time, he does so with a different aim in mind; an aim very similar to that of Wilhelm Dilthey: to give to die human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) a solid epistemological foundation for their judgments of cultural artifacts. This foundation would also unsetde the truth value of scientificjudgments about natural objects by reinterpreting them. Heidegger's goal, on die odier hand, was to understand why diere is somediing radier dian nodiing. This led him to propose a fundamental ontology in Being and Time which he later based on die word (verbum). From the beginning, Gadamer could see in the word die power and importance Heidegger had neglected in Being and Time. Thus, on die basis of a philosophy or phenomenology of language, Gadamer pursues his end with the aid of Heidegger's original and ontologically significant formulation of die hermeneutic circle. For Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle of understanding (Verstehen), interpretation (Auslegung), and application (Anwendung) is a movement inscribed primarily in language. Using the literary text as the prototype for any object understood in the circle, he accounts for our appropriation of 84 Deborah Cook85 objects by attributing it to the power diat dwells in language. Gadamer terms this characteristic ofunderstanding its Sprachlichkeit or linguisticality. In our dealings with die world, we understand everytiring in it linguistically. As Heidegger suggested in his Letter on Humanism, language is the house of Being. It is language and language alone which accounts for die fact that we understand die world. Gadamer takes up this view diat language is die house of Being and claims diat understanding, interpretation, and application must be interpreted as linguistic phenomena because diey embody a unified whole — die understanding must not be divorced from interpretation — and because our traffic with objects takes a form analogous to mat of dialogue. It is my aim in mis discussion to consider this Sprachlichkeit as described in Truth and Method first in relation to the Heidegger ofBeing and Time and the later Heidegger and then with respect to our understanding of texts in reading. The Heidegger of Being and Time portrays the much celebrated hermeneutic circle in an original and ontologically significant way. The circle is, for Heidegger, an existentiale characterizing Dasein's very mode of being in the world and its meaning structures. It is no longer primarily a mediod. What is originally meaningful is not language but die structures of significance (the Zeichen ofequipment and the Bedeutsamkeit ofdie world) which are prior to language and from which language is derived. The circle is first and foremost a prelinguistic understanding of tiiose structures of significance toward which Dasein always transcends itself in its projects. The world and equipment are meaningful because Dasein invests diem with meaning. It is thus Dasein diat is responsible for die meaning of the world and equipment. Nonedieless, this meaning is not, for all that, arbitrary ; what underlies it, or makes it possible, is Being. Being (Sein) is die ontological foundation of pre-linguistic significance. It is that upon which meaning is grounded. While objects, dien, do not have meaning, meaning is bestowed on them by the Dasein diat seeks to render diem intelligible to itselfon die basis ofits immediate and pre-ontological understanding of Being. The hermeneutic circle characterizes die way in which diis prelinguistic and pre-ontological relationship to the world and to objects is deployed. In Heidegger's words, "To every understanding of die world, existence is understood with it and vice versa. All interpretation, moreover, operates in the forestructure which we have already characterized. Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted." Heidegger then goes on to claim that even the "... derivative ways... (shrink)

The present study aims at giving factual support to the thesis that the Parmenides is serious in intention, rigorous in logical demonstration, and stylistically meticulous in its original composition. While this consideration may be tedious, still it is useful. Against a past history which has claimed to find the tone hilarious, the logic fallacious, the work inauthentic, the text in need of bracketing by divination, the whole incoherent— against these eccentricities a certain firm sobriety seems called for. I hope (...) that my conclusions find support and persist through fluctuations of philosophic and philological styles.The main difficulty with my thesis is that the text as we now have it (in Burnet's and Dies' editions) shows exceptions to every rule that might apply to style and even to logical structure. Thus it is almost but not quite uniformly true that each theorem opens with a theorem statement; that each is marked by a "questioning" response; that each deduction is valid when formalized in propositional calculus; and so on. Are the exceptions the result of careless composition; are they deliberate warnings not to take the proofs too seriously; or are they the result of errors in transmission? One way to test this is to reconstruct early versions of the text: if these show more logical rigor than the later versions the notion of a wholly valid original is supported; if they do not, the result may point toward the need for a less serious interpretation. A second thing to look for is the possibility that, here and there, parts of a coherent original text are uniquely conserved in sources other than the principal mss, B,T, and W. This assumes, of course, that the "original" text in question is the one with the best logical form, and that assumption seems justified. As a matter of fact, later copyings almost universally show deterioration, not improvement in style and logic.My textual findings are more compatible with some lines of interpretation than with others. Thus I offer some reasons for not accepting treatments of the work as a joke, mystical revelation, or abrupt metaphysical revision. The structure of the dialogue is best explained, I think, by reading it as an indirect proof that some non-Platonic interpretations of the theory of forms are unsatisfactory. In particular, these are the Megarian version (represented in the first part of the dialogue by Zeno, in the second by the First Hypothesis), and the Anaxagorean version put forward by Eudoxus (represented in the first part by Cephalus and his friends from Clazomenae, in the second by the Second Hypothesis). At the same time, the dialogue shows the need for a philosophic method other than the "hypothetical— deductive" way of dianoia; presumably this other method is the "dialectic" discussed in Republic VII. It also follows that any interpretation of the Phaedo which falls into either the Eudoxian or Megarian difficulties was not— at least at the date of the Parmenides—Plato's intended reading.Findings concerning the relations and reliability of the manuscripts of this dialogue also apply to the texts of the other Platonic dialogues which these mss contain.Further, the Parmenides is such an important work both historically and intrinsically that any insight which textual study can bring to its interpretation is a contribution to Western philosophy. (shrink)

In this text, I consider two examples in the history of emancipation and manumission of enslaved, Black populations in the Caribbean and South America in order to theorize a colonial mode of conceiving of freedom at play in the first half of the nineteenth century. This mode is marked by the figure of the promise, enacting a notion of freedom as a constantly deferred, external compensation. Indeed, instead of an immediate decision deeming the practice of enslavement and trade of (...) human beings unacceptable, and an effective liberation of the enslaved Black populations in these different emancipation proclamations, the various histories of manumission in Latin America and the Caribbean show a long series of political and legal attempts to reduce and limit the extent of the slave trade that deferred the process of liberation for decades. Moreover, in many of these territories the practice did not end with the official proclamation of emancipation but was continued by illegal practices and mutations into legal forms of exploitation and oppression that are still operative today. After outlining this first trajectory, reconstructing the promise of manumission in the historical examples of Martinique (as read by Édouard Glissant) and La Gran Colombia and the Republic of Nueva Granada (contemporary Panamá, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador), I analyze a second mode of investigation in examples of individual and collective strategies of liberation coming from the enslaved themselves, as reconstructed by contemporary feminist scholars in South America. These strategies appropriate liberation not as a promise, but as a negotiation and calculation that begins with the enslaved’s resistance to their oppressive conditions and that ultimately depends on the external concession by juridical authorities. In the third section of the chapter, I read these practices not as marronage, as they are sometimes approached, but as a different mode of turning back to these glimpses of freedom that more effectively challenge the narrative of emancipation and, with it, the promise of manumission in our present. -/- . (shrink)

Premesh Lalu's 'In the Event of History' was written in 2000, before the publication of his first book, The Deaths of Hintsa: Postapartheid South Africa and the Shape of Recurring Pasts in 2009, as a preparatory statement for his doctoral study on which it was based. 'In the Event of History' is published here for the first time, lightly revised. While the outlines of the argument of the Hintsa book are clear enough, it is addressed, as it is (...) not in The Deaths of Hintsa, to the field of public history. Noting how productive public history's notion of 'making history' has been as discussed in the introduction to this special issue and in 'In the Event of History', it foregrounds the ways in which the past is mediated in and by the present Lalu identifies a limit to public history: it leaves the spatio-temporal signifier, 'the present', largely unthought. To think through the genealogy of this problematic, Lalu turns to different nationalist narrations and commemorations of Hintsa, the nineteenth century Xhosa king who was killed by British soldiers in 1835. Attuned to the numerous critiques of nationalism, what Lalu aims to abide by here are 'the openings that nationalism established within its concept of the present'. The paper juxtaposes public history and nationalist texts of memory 'to define a crisis for the discipline of history, as Lalu writes, 'a crisis where critical history may set about doing its work'. That work, for Lalu, is a practice of reading, in a present that offers anything but a secure and stable ground. The argument is made twice, as it were, in the content and form of Lalu's deft readings, and in the disjunctive present in which he will have returned to the figure of Hintsa. If Lalu's reading of 'the present' puts it in question, 'the present' from which he reads is one that is, at once, sedimentary, fragmentary, and, in the psychoanalytic terms he deploys, one of afterwardsness. This paper drafted more than 20 years ago not only engages the theme of this special issue, but it also uncannily addresses and questions our present. (shrink)

This is a very welcome addition to the invaluable Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Originally published in France as La Notion d’ a priori in 1959, this book is chronologically as well as logically central to Dufrenne’s thinking as it has been expressed from the time of Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence, written with Paul Ricoeur in 1947, through Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique in 1953, to Le Poétique and Jalons in 1963 and 1966. Perhaps it (...) cannot be fully understood without reference to these other books, which it must be hoped will be translated into English. Dufrenne has written several articles in English, as well as the Mahlon Powell Lectures for 1959, published as Language and Philosophy all of which are listed in a Dufrenne bibliography which the translator has appended to the present book. He has translated as preface Paul Ricoeur’s near-definitive review of the book in Esprit, March 1961. Apart from his own very helpful introduction and index the translator has done intensive research in tracking down sources which throw light on the often cryptic allusions sewn into the text in Dufrenne’s highly-condensed style, which in spite of his eulogy to the poetic offers no concessions to readability, and few to the imagination. (shrink)

We all seem to have a sense of what good and bad arguments are, and there is a long history—focusing on fallacies—of trying to provide objective standards that would allow a clear separation of good and bad arguments. This contribution discusses the limits of attempts to determine the quality of arguments. It begins with defining bad arguments as those that deviate from an established standard of good arguments. Since there are different conceptualizations of “argument”—as controversy, as debate, and as (...) justification—and since arguments in each of these senses can be used for different purposes, a first problem is that we would need a large variety of standards for “good” arguments. After this, the contribution focuses in particular on proposals made in the literature on how to assess the quality of arguments in the sense of justification. It distinguishes three problems of assessment: How to determine whether reasons are acceptable, whether reasons are sufficient to justify the conclusion, and how to identify arguments in real-world speech acts and texts? It is argued that limitations of argument assessment result from unavoidable relativism: The assessment of many—if not most—arguments depends on the epistemic situation of the evaluator. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes Derrida’s last seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign with Heidegger’s The Event in order to question Derrida’s reading of the notion of Walten in Heidegger’s texts in relation to the themes of sov­ereignty and death. It draws out different senses of Walten depending on whether Heidegger thinks Greek φύσις or the other beginning and it points out the importance of constancy for the notion of Walten. In each case Walten shatters in relation to death or to the (...) notions of the “beingless” and “expropriation” that Heidegger introduces at the beginning of the 40s. At the same time, there emerges a strange proximity between an originary differencing Heidegger thinks in relation to the notions of “the beingless” and “expropriation” on the one hand, and Derrida’s notion of différance on the other hand as well as a strange proximity in the circular character of both Heidegger’s and Derrida’s writings that has to do with how death informs their writing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bergson and the Transformations of the Notion of Intuition NATHAN ROTENSTREICH THE CONCEPT "INTUITION",like many other concepts referring to the particular or the singular mode of philosophic cognition, is by no means a univocal concept. In different philosophical systems this concept was given different meanings and directions in accordance with the general trend of the system at stake. We are about to attempt to understand the meaning of the (...) concept of intuition in Bergson's system against the transformations that concept underwent in some major philosophical world-views. Let us observe in the first place: the term 'intuition' derives from the root intu~rL Like several other concepts in the philosophical vocabulary referring to modes of knowledge this term too denotes seeing, a mode of cognition brought about by a direct visual encounter with the world. It belongs to a family of concepts like theoria, speculatio, contemplatio. It is a conjecture that the first use of the term 'intuition' connoting a singular mode of knowledge appears in the mystical literature. The mystic conception stresses the mode of seeing whereby the light is seen; pursuing the Platonic notion, the light of vision makes the very seeing possible. From the mystical literature the concept intuition was absorbed into the philosophical vocabulary.1 Intuition is a mode of knowledge. Yet it conveys a particular ingredient in the sum-total of knowledge, making this mode of knowledge different from other modes. The ingredient conveyed is that of the certainty of the achievement reached by knowledge. From this point of view 'intuition' denotes the position of knowledge in terms of its ultimate consummation, taking consummation as being different from the procedure leading to the final outcome. This component characteristic of 'intuition' is present in Bergson's doctrine, though possibly does not occupy a central place in it. From here we can proceed to the discernment of an additional meaning of 'intuition', a meaning which to some extent seems to be the most common one. 1 Shlomo Pines, translator's Introduction to Maimonides' The Guide oJ the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963),p. Iv. [335] 336 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 'Intuition" is knowledge which takes place directly, without mediation. As such it does not stand in a need of a method, since every method is a way leading to knowledge as well as a wall between the step taken and the final objective of knowledge. A method is essentially a mediation, as a way is a mediation between the point of departure and the destination. Knowledge acquired through a method is thus different from knowledge acquired directly or immediately. We do not confine the notion of method to any particular method, whether experimental or analytic. Any method is reasoning, comparison, verification and a procedure for deriving conclusions. Against these aspects of method intuition is presented precisely as seeing. Seeing is that visual encounter with objects which does not take on a methodical character. It might be preceded by methodological knowledge, but the act of seeing per se is trans-methodical. A close reading of Bergson's text will show that this aspect of intuition again is present in his doctrine, but it is by far not the most prominent aspect of his own rendering of intuition. It can be said in a general way that in different philosophical systems we find a kind of a conjunction of the first meaning of 'intuition' in terms of certainty with the second meaning in terms of directness. Different philosophers in different contexts maintained the view that the unqualified certainty of knowledge can refer only to the ultimate stratum of reality or to God, and that this stratum or God can be known directly. Plato's view (to look to the absolute and eternal) could be a paradigm of this trend. 2 This view re-emerges in Spinoza. The mode of knowledge which is the highest and most certain achievement on the ladder of modes of knowledge, as Spinoza puts it, is true and necessary: "He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived." 3 This mode of knowledge is adequate to its... (shrink)

Given his influence on a broad cohort of prominent theorists in the latter half of the twentieth century – among them Gilles Deleuze, Bernard Stiegler, François Laruelle, Gilles Châtelet, Albert To...

Throughout his career, Hans Jonas has reflected on the notion of the human soul and on the concept of man being created in God’s image. A careful analysis of his writings reveals that (approximately) from 1968 he changed his perspective on these topics. Before this year, Jonas used some Gnostic myths to speak about the image of man in relation to God and was concerned that referring to the immortality of the human soul or to the notion of imago Dei (...) could lead to dualistic or pseudo-Gnostic interpretations of the natural world. From 1968 (when Jonas published an article for an American Jewish journal) he started to underline the importance of the Judeo-Christian notion of imago Dei (from the book of Genesis) for his ethical project. Subsequently, he used this concept (derived from the Bible rather than from Gnostic texts) in support of his ethical approach to show the special role that God assigned to humanity to act as a steward of His creation. This article presents the development of Jonas’s contributions on these issues over time, their importance in relation to his ethical project and how he was influenced in the development of his perspective on this subject. (shrink)

Given his influence on a broad cohort of prominent theorists in the latter half of the twentieth century – among them Gilles Deleuze, Bernard Stiegler, François Laruelle, Gilles Châtelet, Albert To...

The main idea animating the present paper is that the general aim of debates, such as the one involving the notorious case of the Master Argument, is the ponderation of logical principles by confronting them with some set of assertions and other endorsed principles on the meaning explanation of connectives, quantifiers and modality. As suggested by Seel (2017), the point of the specific case of the MA is about examining Aristotle’s notion of possibility – as implemented by the Possibility Principle (...) (i.e., If it is necessary that if A then B, then B is possible if A is) and the Possibility Rule (i.e., If A is possible, and if B follows from the assumption of A, then B is is possible) in the context of a dialectical debate where it has been asserted that a given proposition is possible, even it is neither true now nor it will ever be, and where at the same time the irrevocability of the past has been endorsed. This suggests to study the MA debate in a setting based on Marion’s (2020) reconstruction of Aristotle’s Dialectical Bouts, adapted to propositions affected by modalities. The setting of Dialectical Bouts for the MA proposed includes•Propositions affected by Reichenbach’s (1948, § 5) three-folded temporal reference, namely: the point of speech S, the point of reference R and the point of the event E. This constitutes our take on Vuillemin’s (1977, 1979, 1984, 1996) suggestion of a “double indexation”.•The dialogical meaning explanation for modalities understood as involving hypotheticals. •The dialogical rules that settle the commitments undertaken when endorsing Aristotle’s Possibility Principle. In fact, in relation to the notion of possibility at work in Vuillemin’s (1996) reconstruction we explored different formulations of the Possibility Rule. Still, there remains a dearth of researches confronting the different formulations of the Possibility Rule with the texts studied by Crubellier (2010) and Rosen and Malink (2012). More generally and coming back to my remarks above, one of the most fruitful insights that can be gained from Vuillemin’s writings on the MA, is that such kind of debates provide an instance of a general pattern for reasoning that I shall call Dialectical Bouts of Material Admissibility (BMA). The rationale behind such kind of argumentation-pattern is to examine the incorporation of new (epistemological, ontological or logical) principles against the background of the commitments undertaken by endorsing a specific set of assertions and meaning explanations. They display the kind of abductive procedure stressed by Crubellier’s (2014) study of syllogism. Under this perspective Ebbinghaus’s (1964) casting of the inferential moves that reduce imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones as implementing an admissibility procedure, represents a logical generalization of the material procedures at stake in the Dialectical Bouts of Material Admissibility. Furthermore if, as stressed by Duthil-Novaes (2005) Medieval Obligations represent a development of Aristotelian Bouts aimed at the ludic exercise of consistency maintenance, DMA should be rather linked to the Islamic tradition of dialectical theory [jadal, munāẓara, ādāb al-baḥth], aimed at the epistemological task of what Young (2017) calls the forging of principles, including legal and deontic ones. In a more contemporary setting, DMA can be related to Brandom’s (2000, pp. 66-77) considerations on Non-Conservative Extensions, where the point of dialectical procedures is put under public Socratic scrutiny the discovery and elucidation of concepts. This general point on Dialectical Bouts of Material Admissibility can be seen as underlying Vuillemin’s project of linking the study of the MA with the classification of philosophical systems.The present paper does not contain a fully developed study on such Dialectical Bouts, but it is rather is an invitation to pick up the gauntlet that Jules Vuillemin threw into the ring. (shrink)

The place of Glissant’s philosophy of decolonisation in relation to Fanon and Césaire has been theorised by some authors, but the emphasis has not been placed on the fact that Glissant refers to both his predecessors as examples of the absence of a link between the two tactics of resistance – un détour [a tactical diversion] and un retour [a return]. For Glissant, both Césaire and Fanon are still diverters and not properly producers of a new reality, of a real (...) Caribbean territory and history. Thus, following previous analyses by commentators, but departing from them (or adding a new layer, the layer of spatiality that should be combined with a traditional analysis of temporality), this chapter defends the idea that Glissant locates his decolonial thought between Césaire and Fanon: it neither advocates a reconstruction that points to a past located elsewhere (Africa), nor recommends the rejection and replacement of the here/now with a different, unknown spatiality and temporality. For Glissant, the locus of resistance is located in the present and in the possibilities of decolonisation already contained in the Caribbean, although concealed and understated. This chapter begins by showing what is, according to Glissant, the necessary conjunction between the different tactics of resistance, then focuses on some of Césaire’s and Fanon’s texts in order to show why they do not offer this necessary link. The final section comes back to Glissant to analyse the notion of l’antillanité as the possibility of truly focusing on a here/now as a multilayered strategy of resistance. (shrink)

This article considers the importance of a spatial dimension for witchcraft research, which has so far been largely neglected. In twentieth-century Europe people in certain regions still considered their world in terms of witchcraft; they attributed misfortune to bewitchments and usually blamed their neighbors. Here a part of Flemish-speaking Belgium is investigated with the help of legend texts collected in the 1960s. The witchcraft discourse that informed these texts did not just contain formulations of space; sometimes it also determined how (...) people negotiated space. In this part of Flanders, witchcraft was embedded in Roman Catholicism; monasteries were the favored destinations of all those who considered themselves or their family members bewitched. In order to find cures for bewitchments people undertook hazardous journeys of considerable distance and found their efforts hindered by the witch they sought to counteract. The measures against evil influences that they were given were meant to consolidate the boundaries between their own space and the space where witches roamed. Bewitchments were generally blamed on women. In the contemporary patriarchal social order, both public and domestic spaces were nearly always under men's control. This is why bewitchment was caused less by transgressions of male-defined boundaries than by infringements of bodily spaces such as by eying or touching somebody else's children. This suggests a different approach to female space based on notions of proximity. (shrink)

Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 355-280BCE) of Phalerum was a philosopher-statesman. He studied in the Peripatos under Theophrastus and subsequently used his political influence to help his teacher acquire property for the Peripatetic school. As overseer of Athens, his governance was characterized by a decade of domestic peace. Exiled to Alexandria in Egypt, he became the adviser of Ptolemy. He is said to have been in charge of legislation, and it is likely that he influenced the founding of the Museum and (...) the Library. This edition of the fragments of Demetrius of Phalerum reflects the growing interest in the Hellenistic period and the philosophical schools of that age. As a philosopher-statesman, Demetrius appears to have combined theory and practice. For example, in the work On Behalf of the Politeia, he almost certainly explained his own legislation and governance by appealing to the Aristotelian notion of politeia, that is, a constitution in which democratic and oligarchic elements are combined. In On Peace, he may have defended his subservience to Macedon by appealing to Aristotle, who repeatedly recognized the importance of peace over war; and in On Fortune, he will have followed Theophrastus, emphasizing the way fortune can determine the success or failure of sound policy. Whatever the case concerning any one title, we can well understand why Cicero regarded Demetrius as a unique individual: the educated statesman who was able to bring learning out of the shadows of erudition into the light of political conflict, and that despite an oratorical style more suited to the shadows of the Peripatos then to political combat. The new edition of secondary reports by Stork, van Ophuijsen, and Dorandi brings together the evidence for these and other judgments. The facing translation which accompanies the Greek and Latin texts opens up the material to readers who lack the ancient languages, and the accompanying essays introduce us to important issues. The volume will be of interest to those interested in Greek literature, Hellenistic philosophy, Hellenistic history, and generally to persons captivated by the notion of philosopher-statesman. (shrink)

The article conducts an analysis of everyday notions of witnessing as emerging from the marginal writings of a mid-twentieth century Belgian medievalist, François Louis Ganshof (1895-1980). The aim of the analysis is threefold: to explore a specific set of cultural conditions shaping the understanding of witnessing; to demonstrate the primacy, in witnessing, of an intricate notion of historicity as moulded by scholarly practice; and to indicate that, and in what manner, witnessing and historicity informed a notion of political experience (...) that appears foundational to Ganshof's understanding of, and attitude towards, matters political in general. The article also stipulates the legitimacy and the value, in a historical investigation of political thought, of focusing on minor figures, discursive patterns and events of seeming insignificance. It ultimately proposes that the small-scale cultural labour on the discursive formations centred on historicity may be deployed for rethinking our understanding of epochal concepts such as modernity. (shrink)

The notion of ‘electronic texts’ has gained universal currency. What, exactly, does this phrase refer to? Most authors answer by describing a set of surface characteristics resulting from the application of computer technology to traditional texts. Such depictions, I want to argue, can be seriously misleading. They presuppose a conventional understanding of ‘text’ in order to make sense of the phenomenon of digitised inscriptions. The simple choice of the phrase ‘electronic text’ suppresses the radical challenge raised by the new medium. (...) Its impact is supposedly captured by modification of an existing concept, so it is hardly surprising that most accounts end up with a typical ambivalence. Electronic texts, we are told, are quite different from—but, at the same time, comparable to—their traditional precursors. Some things that could not be done in the entire history of literacy have become possible nowadays. Yet, it is this very history that provides the background for the understanding of digital processes. Describing something previously unknown by means of well-known categories is bound to lead to these kinds of mildly schizophrenic pronouncements. This chapter discusses their initial plausibility and probes their underlying logic. (shrink)

Although Nicholas of Cusa occasionally discussed how the universe must be understood as the unfolding of the absolutely infinite in time, he left open questions about any distinction between natural time and historical time, how either notion of time might depend upon the nature of divine providence, and how his understanding of divine providence relates to other traditional philosophical views. From texts in which Cusanus discussed these questions, this paper will attempt to make explicit how Cusanus understood divine providence. The (...) paper will also discuss how Nicholas of Cusa’s view of the question of providence might shed light on Renaissance philosophy’s contribution in the historical transition in Western philosophy from an overtly theological or eschatological understanding of historical time to a secularized or naturalized philosophy of history. (shrink)

The main theme of this book is how newly excavated texts have provided new energy and perspectives to allow us to renew our understanding of ancient Chinese thought, especially that of Confucianism. Through an analysis of texts from the Guodian, Shanghai Museum, and other collections of excavated manuscripts, this book undertakes a wide-ranging analysis of Confucian thought in itself and also its influence on other trends of thought in ancient China. It focuses such topics as morality, virtue, and self-cultivation, political (...) philosophy, circumstance, and the relationship between human beings, others, and the natural world. It rethinks core Confucian concepts such as ren or "benevolence" and shendu or "maintaining one's moral nature" as well great Confucian notions on circumstance and political philosophy. This book also illustrates the influence that Confucian philosophy had during the Warring States period showing that elements of its moral philosophy informed the consciousness and behavior of state officials in such places as the state of Qin. Excavated texts are an inescapable part of Chinese philosophy, as such this book is invaluable to anyone wishing to understand ancient Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, and anyone interested in the interplay between material and intellectual culture. (shrink)

This text represents an exploration of the possible significance of Bernard S. Cohn's 1980 essay, `History and Anthropology: The State of Play', for understanding the present of historical anthropology and its futures. My discussion has two aims: (1) to reflect on both Bernard S. Cohn's pedagogy and mode of inquiry; and (2) to explore the complexity and nuance of citationality as a generative principle within the constitution of historical anthropology's subject. Toward this, I examine Cohn's notion of `the colonial (...) situation' and reflect on how the emergence of the human sciences is intertwined with the proliferation of colonialism's enduring legacy within postcoloniality. (shrink)

This essay introduces the notion of a digital concordance as a reading and research tool to explore intertextual passages online, and illustrates how a digital concordance of highly allusive texts can change how we read and research such texts. I take as example the digital concordance on Intertextual Dante, a project on Digital Dante developed in collaboration with the Center for Digital Research and Scholarship at Columbia University, which in the first phase highlights the Ovidian intertextuality in Dante’s Divina Commedia. (...) The essay traces the history of the scholarship on Dante’s Ovid, identifying its strengths and limitations, especially of the concordances in print. Since the intertextual passages in the Commedia require a reading not restricted to the obviously corresponding verses, but attentive to the broader textual contexts, I show how the digital concordance on Intertextual Dante greatly facilitates such a contextualized reading. The visualization of the corresponding passages and the search options help the study of intertextuality in the Commedia, as illustrated with examples from the site. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 145 Luther on Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer. By DENIS R. JANZ. Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fiir Europiiische Geschichte Mainz, Abt. Religionsgeschichte, Bd. 140. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989. Pp. ii + 124. DM 38 {cloth). As Denis Janz, specialist in the late medieval context of Luther's thought (Luther and Late Medieval Thomism, 1983), points out in the "Prospectus," a study of (...) Luther's understanding of Thomas has an inherent appeal, for, " rightly or wrongly, Thomas and Luther are inevitably regarded as the standard-bearers of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism" {p. 1). The recent completion of the necessary critical indices has made the task possible, and the result is a fine and necessary contribution to the work of all scholars interested in the thought of these two pivotal Christian thinkers. The method of Janz is straightforward: assemble the references to Thomas in Luther's works, organize them into appropriate categories, exegete their meanings, and discern important tendencies or perspectives common to these texts. Then "the accuracy of Luther's understanding and the cogency of his critique " can be evaluated from the perspective of twentieth cenrtury historical knowledge {p. 2). Janz recognizes that there are significant hermeneutical difficulties inherent in such a study and that any evaluation " may well imply a notion of history as progress, perhaps even a confidence in the intellectual superiority of modernity over the past " (p. 3). The result bears out the soundness of his approach. Chapter I examines "Luther on the Person of Thomas." Luther, sharing in and contributing to his time's distinctive theological polemic, had no shortage of epithets for Thomas, from " Sophist " to " beggarly paunch " {p. 4). The remarkable thing is the surprising number of complimentary things he has to say. At different times of his career Luther referred to Thomas as " this holy man " or " a man of ' great genius '... woefully misunderstood " {p. 5). A most interesting example is the different uses he makes of a story of Thomas's struggle with despair when near death, when Thomas faced his Anfechtung by holding the Bible and saying "I believe what is in this book" (p. 8). Sometimes Luther cites it as an example of the weakness of implicit faith; but other times he makes no critical comment on Thomas, and the story implies the victory of faith over despair. These different uses show the ambiguity of Luther's attitude toward Thomas as a person, and what in balance seems to be " grudging respect " for an " example of how great persons can at the same time be seriously mistaken " (p. 10). 146 BOOK REVIEWS Chapter U, which comprises the bulk of the hook, carefully examines the substantive issues on which Luther mentions and responds to Thomas: experience, the use of Aristotle, Scripture, penance and indulgences, the Lord's Supper, monasticism, justification, law, baptism, angels, papal authority, purgatory, and the veneration of images. On some of these issues Janz sees only a minor critique of Thomas by Luther and sometimes little real difference between their positions. Both Luther and Thomas give primacy to the literal sense of Scripture, and "both teach that the Church and theology stand under the authority of Scripture" (p. 30). On this question Luther's critique has more to do with the Thomists than Thomas. In regard to penance and indulgences Luther criticizes Thomas's view, though here again there is distortion of Thomas by the Thomists, which Luther correctly suspects (pp. 44-45). Though Luther disagrees with Thomas's understanding of the Lord's Supper, he feels Thomas was entitled to his opinion; what he cannot bear is how Thomas has been raised " to the level of an infallible teacher," with his opinions transformed "into articles of faith" (p. 48). Justification, the heart of Luther's thought, is "a relatively insignificant issue " in his critique of Thomas, as Luther eventually comes to understand better the key place Thomas gave grace (pp. 60, 61). Luther sees Christ as the " abrogation " of the law and criticizes Thomas for not seeing it this way; however, this is a linguistic misunderstanding of Thomas, probably based on Gabriel Bicl's teaching, so that Thomas and Luther are... (shrink)

Speculative realism has, over the course of its rapid and controversial emergence in the past decade, been frequently criticized from the perspective of historical materialism, for its putative reliance on abstraction and eschewal of a sufficiently rigorous ideological alignment. This paper takes such critiques as a starting point for an examination of the contributions recent thought in the area of speculative realism has to offer the study of the humanities – specifically, the study of literature and literary history. In (...) particular, contemporary realist thought has the potential to enable scholars of literature to move beyond the anthropocentric and specialized notions of history as an exclusively cultural entity, which have dominated the discipline since the twentieth century. Paying especially close attention to the work of Graham Harman and Manuel DeLanda, it is my argument that emergent realist philosophy offers literary scholars a set of powerful conceptual tools which can be put toward the work of accounting for the hitherto neglected ontological status of the literary text – illuminating the status of the text as a particular variety of real and physical object that participates in a system of real and physical history and memory. (shrink)

Through an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions concerning the practice of veiling, this article problematises the semiotics-architectural structure of article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion), questioning which representation of the human and the female subject is recognised and therefore protected by secular/liberal and Human Rights law. It argues that the semiotics-architectural structure of article 9, which is based on the distinction between faith and its manifestation, not only (...) relies on a particular ontological understanding of the religious subject as well as a specific notion of religion, but it also reveals a distinct relationship between the individual and sovereign power through the division between the public and the private spheres. In light of this, the western debate surrounding the women’s veiling overlooks how liberal secularism perceives and defines the religious and legal gendered subject in the modern world, and how this understanding is embedded in and reproduced through the law, which emerges as an instrument for regulating minority religious communities. (shrink)

The notion of ‘electronic texts’ has gained universal currency. What, exactly, does this phrase refer to? Most authors answer by describing a set of surface characteristics resulting from the application of computer technology to traditional texts. Such depictions, I want to argue, can be seriously misleading. They presuppose a conventional understanding of ‘text’ in order to make sense of the phenomenon of digitised inscriptions. The simple choice of the phrase ‘electronic text’ suppresses the radical challenge raised by the new medium. (...) Its impact is supposedly captured by modification of an existing concept, so it is hardly surprising that most accounts end up with a typical ambivalence. Electronic texts, we are told, are quite different from—but, at the same time, comparable to—their traditional precursors. Some things that could not be done in the entire history of literacy have become possible nowadays. Yet, it is this very history that provides the background for the understanding of digital processes. Describing something previously unknown by means of well-known categories is bound to lead to these kinds of mildly schizophrenic pronouncements. This chapter discusses their initial plausibility and probes their underlying logic. (shrink)

The History of Ideas is presently enjoying a certain renaissance after a long period of disrepute. Increasing quantities of digitally available historical texts and the availability of computational tools for the exploration of such masses of sources, it is suggested, can be of invaluable help to historians of ideas. The question is: how exactly? In this paper, we argue that a computational history of ideas is possible if the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Sound Method . A (...) computational history of ideas must be built upon a sound theoretical foundation for its methodology, and the only such foundation is given by the use of models , i.e., fully explicit and revisable interpretive frameworks or networks of concepts developed by the historians of ideas themselves. (ii) Data Organisation. Interpretive models in our sense must be seen as topic-specific knowledge organisation systems (KOS) implementable (i.e. formalisable) as e.g. computer science ontologies. We thus require historians of ideas to provide explicitly structured semantic framing of domain knowledge before investigating texts computationally, and to constantly re-input findings from the interpretive point of view. In this way, a computational history of ideas maximally profits from computer methods while also keeping humanities experts in the loop. We elucidate our proposal with reference to a model of the notion of axiomatic science in 18th -19th century Europe. (shrink)

In anthropology, works of art are used as sources of information rather than as expressive realities in their own right. In anthropology the work of art is treated more as a window than as a symbol; it is treated as a transparency rather than as a membrane having its own properties and qualities. For instance, it is usually in social science that art "reflects" life with more or less distortion. Yet no art can record anything it is not actually programmed (...) to register. This programming usually concerns very small sectors of all actuality, and it is limited by the figural traditions and by the technical resources of the artisans....Given my assumptions—that art does not "reflect" life; nor does it necessarily imitate nature; nor can it be explained away by texts or informants—given these assumptions, we are required to limit our notions about how much "information" the arts can convey. George Kubler is Robert Lehman Professor of the History of Art at Yale University. His publications include The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things, Studies in Classic Maya Iconography, Portuguese Plain Architecture, 1526-1706 and The Art and Architecture of Ancient America: The Mexican, Maya, and Andean Peoples. (shrink)

Written by a team of distinguished scholars, this is an authoritative and comprehensive history of Western philosophy from its earliest beginnings to the present day. Illustrated with over 150 color and black-and-white pictures, chosen to illuminate and complement the text, this lively and readable work is an ideal introduction to philosophy for anyone interested in the history of ideas. From Plato's Republic and St. Augustine's Confessions through Marx's Capital and Sartre's Being and Nothingness, the extraordinary philosophical dialogue between (...) great Western minds has flourished unabated through the ages. Dazzling in its genius and breadth, the long line of European and American intellectual discourse tells a remarkable story--a quest for truth and wisdom that continues to shape our most basic ideas about human nature and the world around us. That quest is brilliantly brought to life in The Oxford History of Western Philosophy. With spectacular illustrations--including sixteen pages of full-color plates--this splendidly written volume takes the reader on a magnificient chronological tour through the revolutions of thought that have forged the Western philosophical tradition from ancient times to the present. Throughout, the six contributors--an internationally renowned team of philosophers including Roger Scruton, Anthony Quinton, and Anthony Kenny--bring the astonishingly diverse, wide-ranging landscape of intellectual history into sharp focus, emphasizing how notions seen today as part of an inevitable march of ideas were in their own time often considered radical, if not revolutionary. Thus we are treated, for example, to lively accounts of how Plato's "theory of forms" and Aristotle's pioneering exercises in logic broke with the past to irrevocably alter the course of Western thought. The authors also reveal the relationships between landmark thinkers, and the ways they drew on their intellectual heritage. They show, for instance, how St. Augustine and Aquinas, though advancing the cause of Christian doctrine, picked up where their pagan Greek forebears had left off. We witness how, during the Renaissance, the profound empiricist ideas underlying Descarte's famous utterance--"I think, therefore I exist"--lived in a tense but complementary relationship with Locke's rationalist theories. Moving into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the book explores how Hume greatly influenced Kant's conception of the "transcendental aesthetic," and how Hegel drew upon the lesser known (but groundbreaking) work of Fichte and Schelling. The authors bring the story up to our own time, vividly recounting the existential trend from Nietzsche ("God is dead") to Sartre, along with other increasingly fractious schools of thought. Along the way, we not only encounter the vast intellectual riches of the Western mind, but we also meet the personalities behind the great thoughts, from the saintly Hume (described by Adam Smith as having "come as near to perfection as anybody could") to the ill-mannered outcast Fichte. And the hundreds of maps and striking illustrations (including full-color reproductions of art ranging from medieval manuscripts to the works of Raphael, Ingres, and Magritte) form an integral part of the book, revealing the interweaving of art and ideas through the ages, as artists have striven to give visual immediacy to philosophical concepts. The Oxford History of Western Philosophy is the most authoritative single-volume account ever written for the general reader. Engagingly written and astonishingly far-reaching, it provides the consummate introduction to the intellectual bedrock upon which Western civilization is built. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Report on the Tenth European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies Conference:History as a Challenge to Buddhism and ChristianityJohn O’Grady, Elizabeth J. Harris, and Jonathan A. SeitzThe Tenth Conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies (ENBCS) brought together between sixty and seventy people at the Oude Abdij, Drongen, Belgium, between 27 June and 1 July 2013, to examine the theme “History as a Challenge to Buddhism and Christianity.” (...) It was a collaborative effort between the ENBCS and the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The 2011 ENBCS conference had focused on whether hope was a relevant concept for Buddhists and Christians. The choice of history as a theme complemented this. It also resonated with a research concern of both KU Leuven and the Network.Five key themes were chosen for examination: the traditional Christian and Buddhist conceptions of history; Jesus and the Buddha: fact and fiction; Buddhist and Christian historiography; dangerous memory in Christianity and Buddhism; and permitting historical consciousness in Buddhism and Christianity. Each was approached from a Buddhist and a Christian perspective. An opening lecture addressed the theme “Modern Historical Consciousness and the Challenge to Religion.” In addition, eighteen research papers on Buddhist-Christian relations were given in parallel sessions on Friday evening and Saturday morning. These covered topics as various as the writings of Edmund Pezet (Pierre Gillet), Paul Knitter’s understanding of Buddhist-Christian double belonging (Achim Riggert), Keiji Nishitani and the death of God (Jonatan Navarro Estrada), the encounter of Zen Buddhism and Christianity in the works of D. T. Suzuki (Mariusz Rucki), Buddhist-Christian encounters by Han Yong Woon (Seung Chul Kim), and “Liberating the Conflict from ‘History’ in Sri Lanka” (Jude Lal Fernando).Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Münster, Germany), in the opening lecture, discussed [End Page 189] seven challenges that modern historical consciousness was posing to religion: the challenge of falsification (when historical evidence, for example, showed some doctrines cherished by believers were not taught by the founder), the challenge of uncertainty or methodological doubt, the challenge of methodological naturalism (should a natural explanation be considered more probable than a supernatural one?), the challenge of the distance between past and present, the challenge of change (religions are not static), the challenge of demystification, and the challenge of relativity (the writing of history is perspectival, conditioned by context). He stressed that it would be a blessing to religion if these challenges were faced and, throughout the conference, encouraged other speakers to face them.The first theme was tackled by Mark Blum (Berkeley, USA) from a Buddhist perspective and Jan-Olav Henriksen (Norwegian School of Theology) from a Christian perspective. In a magisterial historical and geographical survey of the Buddhist tradition, Blum first noted that no one had unearthed a traditional notion of Buddhist history in the early texts. The theme of decline and reformation had been taken from Indian cosmology, but with a Buddhist twist and the conviction that it was pointless to talk about beginnings. And in the growth of the Mahāyāna tradition, a dehistoricization of the Buddha had occurred in the belief that the Buddha’s dharma-body was his only “real” body.Henriksen argued that Christian salvation history had its origin in the narrative of the Fall, an event for which there was no historical evidence, and developed into a history of God’s call (election) to all people that they should be brought together in community. It was a history that was linked with the divine logos, a force that Christian theology has seen as deeply interwoven into creation from the beginning of time and that was made human in Jesus.Terrence Merrigan (KU Leuven, Belgium), giving a Christian perspective on the second theme, distinguished three quests or attempts to reach the historical Jesus. The first, from 1774 to 1906, sought to uncover the Jesus that had been obscured by dogma. It imploded with the realization that separating “core” from “myth” was impossible, and conditioned a reactive “no-quest” in the first half of the twentieth century. A “new quest” arose in the 1950s, initiated by Käsemann’s reaction to the theologies of Barth and Bultmann. A further quest that appealed to archaeology and the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:History of Philosophy and the Reflective Society by Riccardo PozzoRobert R. ClewisPOZZO, Riccardo. History of Philosophy and the Reflective Society. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2021. vi + 231 pp. Cloth, $94.99In a forward-looking proposal, Pozzo lays out his vision for a multidisciplinary history of philosophy "from a global perspective." This book is "a long position paper, an extended essay dedicated to twenty-first century policies of (...) philosophical research from a global perspective." The chosen format is a Denkschrift, that is, a memorandum in the sense of a document that experts lay out for their government to ponder. Perhaps, Pozzo suggests, the history of philosophy could even have an impact on economic authorities and policymakers. Indeed, the work seems driven by the laudable aim of promoting access and equality around the world. The author reveals a just concern for migrants in particular, since they bring [End Page 156] with them their intellectual traditions and philosophical texts, which can be translated and thereby foster intercultural dialogue.The book consists of an introduction (chapter 1) followed by nine chapters. It has a thirty-page references list as well as subject and name indexes. In part one, Pozzo argues for the need for new narratives in the history of philosophy (chapter 2), in order to establish its role in addressing migration (chapter 3). The second part concerns reflective society (chapter 4). It considers societal readiness (chapter 5) and cultural innovation (chapter 6). Part three explores the paradigm shift from a close reading of texts to a "distant" reading of corpora (chapter 7), a shift Pozzo endorses. It examines implications for the translation of languages (chapter 8) and the translation of studies (knowledge) and competencies (chapter 9). Chapter 10 concludes by briefly reflecting on the notions of the "fluidity" of peoples and their ideas, biodiversity (and food), and spiritual humanism based on dignity.Scholars in the history of philosophy "should be open to the idea of a pluriversum of a history of facts and places, whereby history of philosophy finds its grounding in spatial heterogeneity." Nowadays, when people migrate and transfer competencies at increasing velocity, the "history of philosophy can be usefully reinvented on the basis of its consideration of intercultural dialogue." Pozzo considers the World Digital Library to be "one of the most exciting examples of corpora that talk to each other"—an idea he uses not merely metaphorically. By "corpora" is meant not just the sum of separate books, but XML-accessible complete collections of traditions of texts, with corresponding dictionaries, thesauri, and reference works, which make it possible to analyze a number of original texts as well as transliterations into other alphabets or hanzi characters. The result would be a "data-driven" history of philosophy.Given that history of philosophy is a product of culture, it is influenced by migrating peoples, who bring philosophical ideas and religious traditions with them. Research on migration thus ought to also consider translations of texts and competencies from one to another context, be it linguistic, economic, political, or cultural. The humanities, and a reflective society more generally, might provide a partial basis for intercultural dialogue. The history of philosophy might even thereby improve the quality of life of citizens.Pozzo rightly emphasizes that we need multilingual philosophers and historians of philosophy. History of philosophy ought to also be based on robust lexical and historical considerations, and historians of philosophy should be trained in a number of the world's languages as well as face the challenge of dealing with multilingualism and with validating translations. Pozzo's proposed methodology, informed by computational techniques, relies on tools such as vocabularies, ontologies, concordances, frequencies, or the analysis of texts and corpora, which integrates quantitative and formal methods into the portfolio of the methods of history of philosophy and intellectual history. Since Pozzo has published [End Page 157] widely on Kant, it is fitting that he explores Kant on migration as well as the editorial contexts and translation projects concerning the philosopher's writings.As for aesthetics, Pozzo notes that the history of philosophy can reflect on migrants' cultural and artistic creations. Historians of philosophy should thus start observing and interpreting phenomena created by... (shrink)

Whatever its merits and difficulties, the concept of logic embedded in much of the "new philosophy" of the early modern period was then understood to supplant contemporary views of formal logic. The notion of compiling a natural history of the understanding constituted the basis of this new concept of logic. The following paper attempts to trace this view of logic through some of the major and numerous minor texts of the period, centering on the development and influence of John (...) Locke's understanding of the analysis of the cognitive faculties as the discipline of logic. (shrink)

The notions of individual and collective ethics were first explicitly defined in the biostatistical literature in 1971 to motivate a mathematical solution to a posed ethical dilemma. This paper reviews key antecedents to these concepts and traces explicit references to them over time, primarily in the biostatistical literature. Following a historical exposition of these texts, a critical thematic analysis shows the following: the normative force of these concepts has not been adequately argued. Individual and collective ethics do not solve (...) the problem of how to use accumulating data to inform ethical action. The notions of the "individual" and the "collective" are too vague to prompt clear moral imperatives, especially in difficult cases. These concepts have not been successfully linked to a standard ethical framework. Finally, the paper concludes with the observation that a systematic, comprehensive ethical framework must be identified to fulfill the intuitions behind individual and collective ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Aesthetics of Representation:Dramatic Texts and Dramatic EngagementKathleen Gallagher (bio)Staking the TerritoryThere are several ways in which aesthetic discourses might be positioned in the field of drama education. While some might locate "aesthetics" in the cognitive or interpretive realm of learning, and others the affective or philosophical realm, I have chosen to speak of the discourses of aesthetics as they relate to both cognitive and embodied responses to the (...) (extra)ordinary events of a drama classroom. I am already unsatisfied with the recognizable distinctions implied in this binary, but I persist in the hope that the relationship between these learning functions will become clear as I proceed with what I have termed the sociology of aesthetics in drama practice. In drama, we attempt—collectively—to represent our lives through art as we come to know the world and our sensuous responses to it.Fenner's brief history of aesthetic experience and aesthetic analysis will further help stake the territory about which we are speaking in a drama classroom.1 Calling aesthetic experiences the "raw data" that aesthetics is meant to explain, he helpfully distinguishes between Kantian understandings of the conditions of aesthetic judgment and the emergence of those thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who began to focus on the psychology of aesthetic experience. Following these thinkers and further developments in the early part of the twentieth century, the work of John Dewey explored the psychological nature of what he called "an experience" in the field of education more generally.2 This article will also privilege the notion of aesthetic experience but will, more specifically, focus on an exploration of ideas borne out of aesthetic experiences that cultivate sociological questions about representation and the nature of cognitive and embodied engagement in classroom drama. Key to my view of dramatic representation is the notion of a provoked imagination. [End Page 82]In the nineteenth century, Archibald Allison claimed that it was the imagination that was responsible for what we term "aesthetic experiences."3 Earlier philosophers of aesthetics had determined that the mere presence of beauty could create an aesthetic experience, but Allison insisted upon the "exercises of the imagination" in his understanding of aesthetic experiences. Contemporary writers in the field of arts education have also favored this more active conception of aesthetic responses, such as the formidable Madeleine Grumet and Maxine Greene. They and others will be cited here in support of a conception of "aesthetic experiences" in the drama classroom as active, selective, and highly framed experiences.Dramatic Texts and Aesthetic Knowing: Framing the ExperiencesOne can hardly discuss the idea of aesthetic exploration without first engaging with the rather unwieldy idea of "creativity." Radford, citing Margaret Boden, puts forward a very helpful notion of creativity as "conceptual space."4 This "conceptual space" is what I will refer to as "the frame" carefully placed around dramatic learning, usually by a highly skilled teacher. Frequently because of this frame, something entirely forgettable to students is shaped into something worth considering. The "frame," therefore, consists of both careful pedagogical planning and, in many cases, a piece of text that ignites the conceptual space and inspires a deliberate probing. This deliberate probing, or what Radford might call creative thought, invites co-creators to "play at the boundaries of sense."5 Bruner speaks about the "creative act" as bringing about a "shock of recognition,"6 or what Radford equally describes as something speaking to something "within us." This idea is particularly helpful in deconstructing what is often at work in a collaborative piece of improvised drama activity in a classroom of young people.To this end, I would like to offer three brief episodes as examples of textual and improvised drama engagement that speak to Bruner's and Radford's ideas of "recognition," or resonance with "something within us," and to my own understanding of how ideas of representation or mimesis are operating in moments of aesthetic knowing for young people. The other principle at work, seemingly at odds with these ideas, is the notion of distance or alienation from an event, in effect a dis-identification. What I would especially hope to demonstrate in the following brief, empirical... (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 19 The theory of possible worlds has been minimally employed in the field of theory and philosophy of history, even though it has found a place as a tool in other areas of philosophy. Discussion has mostly focused on arguments concerning counterfactual history’s status as either useful or harmful. The theory of possible worlds can, however be used also to analyze historical writing. The concept of textual possible worlds offers an interesting framework to work (...) with for analyzing a historical text’s characteristics and features. However, one of the challenges is that the literary theory’s notion of possible worlds is that they are metaphorical in nature. This in itself is not problematic but while discussing about history, which arguably deals with the real world, the terminology can become muddled. The latest attempt to combine the literary and philosophical notions of possible worlds and apply it to historiography came from Lubomír Doležel in his _Possible Worlds of Fiction and History: The Postmodern Stage_. I offer some criticism to his usage of possible worlds to separate history and fiction, and argue that when historiography is under discussion a more philosophical notion of possible worlds should be prioritized over the metaphorical interpretation of possible worlds. (shrink)

The paper argues that Sartre’s work as both a literary critic and social philosopher is deeply indebted to his early commitment to phenomenology. The first part of the paper examines the nature of reading and writing in the account of literary meaning that is presented in the transitional text, 'Qu’est-ce que la littérature?' While acknowledging the political turn that occurs in Sartre’s work, we then discuss how the theme of history emerges in the later essay, 'Questions de méthode,' as (...) one that opens up a “double reading” of human motivation. Our conclusion maintains that the Marxist phase of Sartre’s work is based on the hermeneutical notion of comprehension, which provides an anthropological grounding for his existential philosophy. (shrink)

There is a Balinese sense of history, albeit one different from most Western notions of history in that it stresses continuity with patterns from the past, not the past as a "foreign country." Balinese do not narrate events in chronological order for the purposes of writing history, as is the bent of Western scholars. Rather, they tell stories about other things that we would call "mythical" or "legendary" in order to refer to events. Balinese historical writing (...) serves to establish and reflect patterns of social and cultural organization, where things "happen" fortuitously, and truth becomes manifested in the well-performed or well-written text. The textual form of "commemorations" makes the coincidental connections between texts and events quite explicit; they show that most Balinese texts are written as part of a process of writing history. The commemorations intimate that an event is not just an event. It is a moment selected from a temporal continuum by an act of remembering. The texts of Bali were written into the historical moment, in a two-way process of contextualizing and historicizing. (shrink)

This article enquires into the origins of the historiographical notion of double truth, a prominent and controversial category in the modern study of medieval philosophy. I believe that these origins are to be found in a short text by Jacob Thomasius from 1663, entitled De duplici & contradictoria veritate, which stands as a very early and highly original example of a history of double truth. I propose a detailed analysis of this document in order to shed light on the (...) mechanisms that transformed duplex veritas from a keyword in Thomasius’s Protestant milieu into a historiographical category. As I show, the De duplici & contradictoria veritate provides a historical legitimation of Thomasius’s own brand of Lutheran Aristotelianism. It does so in a highly ambiguous fashion, namely by bringing together the Lutheran theologian and proponent of double truth Daniel Hofmann with anonymous medieval “Averroists”. I venture an explanation for Thomasius’s line of action by uncovering two of his implicit sources. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006) 149-179 [Access article in PDF] The Problem of "Misplaced Ideas" Revisited: Beyond the "History of Ideas" in Latin America Elías José Palti Universidad Nacional de Quilmes—CONICET The change that has come over this branch of historiography in the past two decades may be characterized as a movement away from emphasizing history of thought (and even more sharply, "of (...) ideas") toward emphasizing something rather different, for which "history of speech" or "history of discourse," if not unproblematic or irreproachable, may be the best terminology so far found J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History1In 1973, Roberto Schwarz published a paper that profoundly marked a generation of thinkers in Latin America: "As idéias fora do lugar" ("Misplaced Ideas").2 It was originally intended to provide a theoretical framework for "progressivist" authors to counter the influence of nationalistic tendencies that, in the 1960s and 1970s, were particularly noticeable among the leftist political organizations.3 Yet, the concept of "misplaced [End Page 149] ideas" soon proved especially productive for theorizing the problematic development of ideas in Latin American history. Schwarz's text thus became the fundamental point of reference for those in the field who intended to question the hitherto predominant paradigms in cultural and literary critique, which were mostly inspired by the Romantic-nationalistic tradition. Notwithstanding, a quarter of a century later, Schwarz's original contribution in this regard needs to be reassessed. In the course of the last twenty-five years, the apparent loss of the national states' centrality helped to reveal the inherent complexity of the processes of cultural exchange hidden behind a perspective that still tended to conceive of them exclusively in terms of inter-national relationships. Furthermore, a series of new developments in the disciplines specifically dedicated to analyzing those kinds of exchange processes compels us to reconsider some of the implicit assumptions in Schwarz's concept and reformulate it.The object of this paper is to explore, in the light of the new realities of the last fin-de-siècle, new perspectives regarding the dynamic of ideas and cultural exchange in peripheral areas (of which Latin American is only a particular case), utilizing the new conceptual tools provided by the recently developed disciplines and theories in the field. Ultimately, the present work intends to raise a broader, epistemological, issue, whose relevance exceeds the local context. As it shows, the shortcomings in Schwarz's theory spring from a crude linguistic view, which is inherent in the "history of ideas," that reduces language exclusively to its referential function. A more precise distinction of the different levels of language will thus help to reveal aspects and problems that Schwarz's perspective obliterates. Yet, as this paper also intends to demonstrate, Schwarz's original intellectual project may be disentangled from its linguistic premises and recovered for cultural critique. Applied in a new way, it can still provide a theoretical framework to comprehend the intricacies of the processes of cultural exchange, and, more specifically, the problematic dynamics of ideas in Latin America that Schwarz intended to analyze. On Places and Non-Places of Ideas In order to understand the sense of Schwarz's notion of "misplaced ideas" we must place it within the conceptual framework in which it emerged. With it, Schwarz aimed to translate into a cultural key the postulates of the so-called "dependency theory," the core of which took shape in the "Seminar [End Page 150] on Marx," organized in São Paulo in the early 1960s (and in which Schwarz participated). As is well known, that theory intended to refute the "dualistic" approaches that viewed the peripheral areas as vestiges of a precapitalistic world that tends historically to disappear. The nations in this area would thus replicate the same pattern of linear development of central countries. On the contrary, dependency theory postulated the existence of a complex dynamic between the center and the periphery, the two representing instances inherent in capitalist development, thus forming a single, interconnected system. According to... (shrink)

Norbert Elias’s project in The process of civilization involved reconstructing invisible movement—both the slow tempoof long-term historical change and the modification of psychic structures and embodied dispositions. To do this, he resorted to uncommon devices: treating historical texts as constituting a series amenable to a rudimentary discourse analysis, he constructed an imagined ‘curve of civilization’ serving as an approximation of the hidden process of change. Elias’s curve was not supposed to represent single past states, but movement itself, its direction and (...) pace. This novel concept of historical representation was related to the perception of cinema as a new medium making actual movement visible. But beyond making it possible to imagine how one could telescope long-term historical process, cinema also held the promise of serving as a microscope, making the minute movements of the human body, gestures and manners available for close inspection. While anthropologists were devising ways of using the new medium to document fleeting gestures and bodily postures, it was used by popular audiences as a source for remodelling behaviour and acquiring polite manners and body techniques, as noticed by such acute observers as Marcel Mauss and Joseph Roth. Hence, popular appropriation of the cinema gave rise to a heightened awareness of the historicity of gestures and the changing modalities of their transmission. Cinema was itself part of the accelerated motion of history, of a perceived change of pace in the process of civilization, which in its turn shed light on its historical antecedents and played an essential role in rethinking the notion of civilization and culture.Keywords: Norbert Elias; Marcel Mauss; Joseph Roth; Cinema; Gestures; Body; Discourse; Historiography; Sociology of culture. (shrink)

This book survives superficial but fails deeper scrutiny. A facile, undiscerning criticism of Lectures in the History of Political Thought (LHPT) is that on Oakeshott’s own account these are lectures on a non-subject: ‘I cannot detect anything which could properly correspond to the expression “the history of political thought”’ (p. 32). This is an entirely typical Oakeshottian swipe – elegant and oblique – at the title of the lecture course he inherited from Harold Laski. If title and quotation (...) sit awkwardly we should remember that Oakeshott never prepared the text for publication – a fortiori he did not prepare it for publication under this title. Moreover, for Oakeshott the compound notion of ‘political thought’ does not denote much either (pp. 33–4). A positive characterization can, however, be made for the notion of ‘political experience’ or ‘intellectual organization’ (p. 42), a particular context-bound agglomeration ‘of sentiments, beliefs, habits of thought, aspirations and ideas’ (pp. 43, 45, 391, 393). This notion, with its enumeration and specification into Greek, Roman, medieval and modern political experience, structures the 32 lectures that comprise the book. Oakeshott’s notion of political experience has deep affinities (at least) with the style of political analysis followed by the Cambridge classicist, F.E. Adcock, in Roman Political Ideas and Practice (1964), a text surely not fortuitously included in the course reading-list for the original lectures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006) 149-179 [Access article in PDF] The Problem of "Misplaced Ideas" Revisited: Beyond the "History of Ideas" in Latin America Elías José Palti Universidad Nacional de Quilmes—CONICET The change that has come over this branch of historiography in the past two decades may be characterized as a movement away from emphasizing history of thought (and even more sharply, "of (...) ideas") toward emphasizing something rather different, for which "history of speech" or "history of discourse," if not unproblematic or irreproachable, may be the best terminology so far found J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History1In 1973, Roberto Schwarz published a paper that profoundly marked a generation of thinkers in Latin America: "As idéias fora do lugar" ("Misplaced Ideas").2 It was originally intended to provide a theoretical framework for "progressivist" authors to counter the influence of nationalistic tendencies that, in the 1960s and 1970s, were particularly noticeable among the leftist political organizations.3 Yet, the concept of "misplaced [End Page 149] ideas" soon proved especially productive for theorizing the problematic development of ideas in Latin American history. Schwarz's text thus became the fundamental point of reference for those in the field who intended to question the hitherto predominant paradigms in cultural and literary critique, which were mostly inspired by the Romantic-nationalistic tradition. Notwithstanding, a quarter of a century later, Schwarz's original contribution in this regard needs to be reassessed. In the course of the last twenty-five years, the apparent loss of the national states' centrality helped to reveal the inherent complexity of the processes of cultural exchange hidden behind a perspective that still tended to conceive of them exclusively in terms of inter-national relationships. Furthermore, a series of new developments in the disciplines specifically dedicated to analyzing those kinds of exchange processes compels us to reconsider some of the implicit assumptions in Schwarz's concept and reformulate it.The object of this paper is to explore, in the light of the new realities of the last fin-de-siècle, new perspectives regarding the dynamic of ideas and cultural exchange in peripheral areas (of which Latin American is only a particular case), utilizing the new conceptual tools provided by the recently developed disciplines and theories in the field. Ultimately, the present work intends to raise a broader, epistemological, issue, whose relevance exceeds the local context. As it shows, the shortcomings in Schwarz's theory spring from a crude linguistic view, which is inherent in the "history of ideas," that reduces language exclusively to its referential function. A more precise distinction of the different levels of language will thus help to reveal aspects and problems that Schwarz's perspective obliterates. Yet, as this paper also intends to demonstrate, Schwarz's original intellectual project may be disentangled from its linguistic premises and recovered for cultural critique. Applied in a new way, it can still provide a theoretical framework to comprehend the intricacies of the processes of cultural exchange, and, more specifically, the problematic dynamics of ideas in Latin America that Schwarz intended to analyze. On Places and Non-Places of Ideas In order to understand the sense of Schwarz's notion of "misplaced ideas" we must place it within the conceptual framework in which it emerged. With it, Schwarz aimed to translate into a cultural key the postulates of the so-called "dependency theory," the core of which took shape in the "Seminar [End Page 150] on Marx," organized in São Paulo in the early 1960s (and in which Schwarz participated). As is well known, that theory intended to refute the "dualistic" approaches that viewed the peripheral areas as vestiges of a precapitalistic world that tends historically to disappear. The nations in this area would thus replicate the same pattern of linear development of central countries. On the contrary, dependency theory postulated the existence of a complex dynamic between the center and the periphery, the two representing instances inherent in capitalist development, thus forming a single, interconnected system. According to... (shrink)