Interpretation

Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that consciousness not only historically constrains experience but also allows strangeness to intelligibly speak to it. This historically effected and effective consciousness features in Gadamer’s idea that a common language is unearthed for the interpretive horizons of those involved in dialogue with each other through a logic of question and answer. I argue, however, that this reveals a conceptual uncertainty about evaluating progress in interpretive understanding. Gadamer’s failure to escape from this uncertainty risks the possibility of a (...) problematic relativism. Effectively, even if sufficient interpretation occurs when horizons are infinitely structured, this does not preclude incoherence between a horizon’s elements. (shrink)

For the Intentionalist, utterance content is wholly determined by a speaker’s meaning-intentions; the sentence uttered serves merely to facilitate the audience’s recovering these intentions. We argue that Intentionalists ought to be Particularists, holding that the only “principles” of meaning recovery needed are those governing inferences to the best explanation; “principles” that are both defeasible and, in a sense to be elaborated, variable. We discuss some ways in which some theorists have erred in trying to tame the “wild west” of pragmatics (...) and context-sensitivity -- including recent work that makes essential appeal to the information structure of a discourse -- and in so doing, offer a general recipe for defending the Particularist picture of utterance content and its recovery that we favor. (shrink)

In Strawson’s Entity and Identity, there are two essays (Chapters 11 and 12), which study the notion of context. In these essays, Strawson advances a threefold distinction regarding how context bears on the meaning of 'what is said' when a sentence is uttered. -/- In this paper, we'll (i) review the original scheme of Strawson and summarize his improvements to his own scheme, and (ii) add our own improvements to make it even more thoroughgoing. We'll also show that unless it (...) is elaborated with several considerations (mostly based on our work regarding context as a social construct and contextualizing as a form of social action) it cannot function as a realistic initiative towards building common sense models of how intended meaning is achieved. (shrink)

Wittgenstein seeks to throw light on our concept of understanding by looking at how misunderstandings arise and what kinds of failure they involve. He discerns a peculiar sort of misunderstanding in the writings of the social anthropologist James Frazer. In Frazer’s hands, the anthropological project of enabling us to understand human behavior seems to yield the result that there are certain forms of human behavior that simply cannot be understood. The source of Frazer’s misunderstanding, according to Wittgenstein, is that he (...) places narrow requirements on what could count as meaningful, prior to and independently of his encounter with the subjects of his interpretation. Frazer, like some of the philosophers Wittgenstein addresses in his other works, succumbs to nonsense in his very attempt to draw the limits of sense. My aim in this chapter is to clarify the connections between Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frazer and his criticism of his fellow philosophers, in particular of Frege. The materials I draw on stem from various periods in Wittgenstein’s career, and they reveal, in my mind, an important continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought: addressing misunderstanding, in Wittgenstein’s view, is fundamentally an ethical problem, not a theoretical one. (shrink)

This existential phenomenological exploration concerns how writing is not the mere tool for communication and commemoration, or the supplementary image of a memory, but is closely connected to the phenomenon of the grave. The exploration aims to show a transgenerational mode of human existence and moral life, by considering how the becoming of a historical, which is to say a transgenerational subject through the features that writing and the grave together lets us capture, is also importantly bound to the becoming (...) of a moral subject, or an “I,” in relation to the passed away other. (shrink)

This paper focuses on several morphosyntactic properties of qualitative binominal constructions (QBCs) in a Southern Italo-Romance language spoken in the Apulian town of San Marco in Lamis (Foggia). QBCs are complex noun phrases such as ‘a jewelN1 of a villageN2’. In this language, QBCs appear in two ways: prepositionally (using the preposition də, ‘of’, and allowing definites, indefinites, and demonstratives) and non-prepositionally (only allowing definite nouns with definite articles and not proper names). We propose that in the latter type, N1 (...) and N2 are related by a categorical match in their determiner layer, which we refer to as ‘match D’. N1, a property-denoting element, is embedded as a noun, which allows for two things: 1) the recursive DP strategy found in non-prepositional genitives, and 2) the extension of this mechanism to qualitative phrases, where N1 functions like an adjective. This leads to the impossibility of syntactic operations such as extraction, which we connect to the concept of phase. With non-denominal N1s, the article of N1 is treated as a head-agreeing adjectival linker, which forms a constituent with the modifier but agrees with the head. We argue that a phrase is interpreted as a qualitative binominal if N1 and N2 share the same number features and if the features of N1 do not allow it to be interpreted as the head/possessum of N2. We also discuss external agreement with either noun of the construction, and present data that support the relevance of the [+HUMAN] feature for agreement relations. (forthcoming, Italian Journal of Linguistics). (shrink)

In performing an act of assertion we are sometimes responsible for more than the content of the literal meaning of the words we have used, sometimes less. A recently popular research program seeks to explain certain of the commitments we make in speech in terms of responsiveness to the conversational subject matter (Hoek 2018, Stokke 2016, Yablo 2014). We raise some issues for this view with the aim of providing a more general account of linguistic commitment: one that is grounded (...) in a more general action-theoretic notion of responsibility. (shrink)

The notions of inference and default are used in pragmatics with different meanings, resulting in theoretical disputes that emphasize the differences between the various pragmatic approaches. This paper is aimed at showing how the terminological and theoretical differences concerning the two aforementioned terms result from taking into account inference and default from different points of view and levels of analysis. Such differences risk making a dialogue between the theories extremely difficult. However, at a functional level of analysis the different theories, (...) definitions, and approaches to interpretation can be compared and integrated. At this level, the standardization of pragmatic inferences can be regarded as the development of a specific type of presumptions, used to draw prima-facie interpretations. (shrink)

Metaphors are considered as instruments crucial for persuasion. However, while their emotive, communicative and persuasive effects are the focus of different studies and discussions, the core of their persuasive function, namely their argumentative dimension, is almost neglected. This paper addresses the problem of explaining how metaphors can communicate arguments, and how it is possible to reconstruct and justify them. To this purpose, a distinction is drawn between the arguments that are communicated metaphorically and reconstructed “top down,” namely based on relevance (...) considerations, and the ones that are triggered implicitly by the use of a metaphorical expression. In both cases, metaphorical arguments are reconstructed through different patterns of argument, called argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008). However, while the purpose of a metaphorical sequence of discourse (called metaphorical move) can guide and justify the reconstruction of the argument that can sufficiently support the intended conclusion in a persuasive move, a more complex analysis is needed for analyzing the inferences that a metaphorical move can trigger. These inferences are claimed to represent part of the connotation of the metaphorical expression and can be captured through its most frequent collocations, determinable using some tools of the corpus linguistics. (shrink)

The composition of a timeline depends on purpose, perspective, and scale – and of the very understanding of the word, the phenomenon referred to, and whether the focus is the idea or concept, an instance of an idea or a phenomenon, a process, or an event and so forth. The main function of timelines is to provide an overview over a long history, it is a kind of a mnemotechnic device or a particular kind of Knowledge Organization System (KOS).b The (...) entries in the timeline should be brief and indisputable. Therefore, timelines often identify the first occurrences rather than the most widespread or most qualified instances leaving the fuller and more complex, and possibly disputable story out. But even first occurrences are often difficult to establish. The first occurrence is most often only the first finding of an instance. Older instances may be found and competing definitions develop either within a field or in different fields. This is further complicated since the phenomena, their names, and their meanings may change over time. Former meanings may become redundant, or they must accommodate and coexist with new meanings. The time and place of the composition of the timeline are to be considered in interpreting the things listed. The following note will discuss these issues as they occur in the development of the notions of text, e-text and hypertext, and the origin of machine translation. (shrink)

This paper explores some ways how perceptual-cognitive accounts of anorexia can benefit from philosophy. The first section focuses on the three dimensions of anorexia most open to a contribution from philosophy: the dimensions of language, perception and cognition. In the second section, I offer a brief overview of what philosophy has to say regarding these dimensions, especially as they relate to two crucial issues: introspection and meaning. I draw from current philosophy of language, especially from the arguments against using internal (...) perception as a model for the way we express our own bodily states. I draw also from current philosophy of interpretation, especially from debates concerning the criteria for handling dialogical misunderstanding. I use these insights to expose some dangers in assuming and working with oversimplified accounts of introspection and meaning. I then suggest refined and updated accounts and examine their applicability and usefulness in the diagnosis and treatment of anorexia. (shrink)

Near the end of 'Naming the Colours', Lewis (1997) makes an interesting claim about the relationship between linguistic and mental content; we are typically unable to read the content of a belief off the content of a sentence used to express that belief or vice versa. I call this view autonomism. I motivate and defend autonomism and discuss its importance in the philosophy of mind and language. In a nutshell, I argue that the different theoretical roles that mental and linguistic (...) content play suggest these kinds of content should be understood as sensitive to different things. (shrink)

This paper explores the significance of intelligent social behavior among non-human animals for philosophical theories of communication. Using the alarm call system of vervet monkeys as a case study, I argue that interpersonal communication (or what I call “minded communication”) can and does take place in the absence of the production and recognition of communicative intentions. More generally, I argue that evolutionary theory provides good reasons for maintaining that minded communication is both temporally and explanatorily prior to the use of (...) communicative intentions. After developing these negative points about the place of communicative intentions in detail, I provide a novel alternative account according to which minded communication is characterized in terms of patterns of action and response that function to coordinate the representational mental states of agents. I show that an account which centers on patterns of representational coordination of this sort is well suited to capture the theoretical roles associated with minded communication and that it does so in away that provides a good fit with comparative facts about the presence of minded communication among non-human animals. (shrink)

Abstract is a noun. Abstract is, also, a verb. Thus, abstraction. Explaining nouns. And verbs.

We have to go all the way back to Euclid, and, actually, before, to figure out the basis for representation, and therefore, interpretation. Which is, pure and simple, the conservation of a circle. As articulated by Foucault, Deleuze, and Nietzsche. 'Pi' (in mathematics) is the background state for everything (a.k.a. 'mind').Providing the explanation for (and the current popularity, and, thus, the 'genius' behind) NFT (non fungible tokens). 'Reality' has, finally, caught up with the 'truth.'.

What modern physicists are 'discovering:' conservation of a circle is the basis for 'reality.'.

The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation The indeterminacy of translation is the thesis that translation, meaning, and reference are all indeterminate: there are always alternative translations of a sentence and a term, and nothing objective in the world can decide which translation is the right one. This is a skeptical conclusion because what it … Continue reading The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation →.

In this short paper, I am going to discuss an often neglected aspect of Davidson's philosophy, his metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy is traditionally defined as the philosophy of philosophy. This definition, however, is not illuminating. I think metaphilosophy aims at a disclosure of the nature of philosophical questions, what they are and how to approach them. ...

ACTION-THEORETICALLY EXPLANATORY INTERPRETATIONS AS A MEANS OF SEMANTIC MEANING ANALYSIS The article first develops a general procedure for semantic meaning analysis in difficult cases where the meaning is very uncertain. The procedure consists of searching for one or more possible hypothetical causal explanations of the text, these explanations containing, among other things, the semantic intention of the author, his subjective reasons for this meaning and for the writing down of the text, but also the path of transmission of the text (...) from the writing down to the respective present text version. These hypothetical explanations (interpretations) are deductive-nomological or probabilistic, therefore presuppose corresponding general law hypotheses. If there is only one possible (hypothetical) explanation of the text at hand, this hypothetical explanation is also true. Very often, however, there are several possible explanations. In this case, the probabilities of these possible explanations must be determined; these probabilities then carry over to the individual hypotheses in the explanation (according to Bayes' law). This general procedure of meaning analysis is used in the second part of the article to reconstruct two famous interpretations (by Wapnewski and Hahn) of a poem by Walther von der Vogelweide ("Nemt, frowe, disen kranz"). -/- GERMAN ABSTRACT In dem Artikel wird zunächst ein allgemeines Verfahren zur semantischen Bedeutungsanalyse in schwierigen Fällen entwickelt, in denen die Bedeutung sehr unsicher ist. Das Verfahren besteht darin, daß eine oder mehrere mögliche hypothetische kausale Erklärungen des Textes gesucht werden, wobei diese Erklärungen u.a. die semantische Intention des Autors enthalten, seine subjektiven Gründe für diese Bedeutung und für die Niederschrift des Textes, aber auch den Weg der Tradierung des Textes von der Niederschrift bis zur jeweils vorliegenden Textversion. Diese hypothetischen Erklärungen (Deutungen) sind deduktiv-nomologisch oder probabilistisch, setzen deshalb entsprechende allgemeine Gesetzeshypothesen voraus. Wenn es nur eine mögliche (hypothetische) Erklärung des vorliegenden Textes gibt, ist diese hypothetische Erklärung auch wahr. Sehr häufig gibt es aber mehrere mögliche Erklärungen. In diesem Fall müssen die Wahrscheinlichkeiten dieser möglichen Erklärungen bestimmt werden; diese Wahrscheinlichkeiten übertragen sich dann auch auf die einzelnen Hypothesen in der Erklärung (nach dem Bayesschen Gesetz). Dieses allgemeine Verfahren der Bedeutungsanalyse wird im zweiten Teil des Artikels zur Rekonstruktion zweier berühmter Interpretationen (von Wapnewski und Hahn) eines Gedichts von Walther von der Vogelweide („Nemt, frowe, disen kranz“) verwendet. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a dialectical approach to legal interpretation, consisting of three dimensions: a formalization of the canons of interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes; a dialectical classification of interpretive schemes; and a logical and computational model for comparing the arguments pro and contra an interpretation. The traditional interpretive maxims or canons used in both common and civil law are translated into defeasible patterns of arguments, which can be evaluated through sets of corresponding critical questions. These interpretive argumentation schemes are (...) classified in general categories and a distinction is drawn between schemes supporting and rebutting an interpretation. This framework allows conceiving statutory interpretation as a dialectical procedure consisting in weighing arguments pro and contra an interpretation. This procedure is formalized and represented computationally through tools from formal argumentation systems. (shrink)

Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement (...) must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view. (shrink)

I have argued for a kind of ‘counterfactual scepticism’: most counterfactuals ever uttered or thought in human history are false. I briefly rehearse my main arguments. Yet common sense recoils. Ordinary speakers judge most counterfactuals that they utter and think to be true. A common defence of such judgments regards counterfactuals as context-dependent: the proposition expressed by a given counterfactual can vary according to the context in which it is uttered. In normal contexts, the counterfactuals that we utter are typically (...) true, the defence insists, while granting that there may be more rarefied contexts in which they are false. I give a taxonomy of such contextualist replies. One could be a contextualist about the counterfactual connective, about its antecedent, or about its consequent. I offer some general concerns about all these varieties of contextualism. I then focus especially on antecedent-contextualism, as I call it. I firstly raise some high-level objections to it. Then, I look at such a contextualist account due to Sandgren and Steele. I think it has many virtues, but also some problems. I conclude with some avenues for future research. (shrink)

[WHAT IS POLITICAL STABILITY?] Artykuł traktuje o problemie definiowania pojęcia „stabilność polityczna” państwa. Głównym jego celem jest odpowiedź na pytanie, co znaczy stwierdzenie, że dane państwo jest stabilne politycznie. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. W pierwszej wyjaśniany jest leksykalny sens słów: „stabilny”, „stabilność” i „stabilizacja”. W drugiej części analizowane jest rozumienie znaczenia terminu „stabilność polityczna” w piśmiennictwie politologicznym. Trzecia część artykułu poświęcona jest omówieniu kwantytatywnych prób ujmowania sensu pojęcia stabilności politycznej. W zakończeniu podjęta została próba zdefiniowania przedmiotowego terminu polegająca (...) na syntezie elementów najczęściej spotykanych w propozycjach wyjaśniania istoty stabilności politycznej; oceniono związek między istnieniem stabilności politycznej a podstawowymi typami reżimu politycznego: demokracją i autorytaryzmem; oraz zidentyfikowano główne podejścia konceptualne w pojmowaniu przedmiotowego terminu. (shrink)

Statutory interpretation involves the reconstruction of the meaning of a legal statement when it cannot be considered as accepted or granted. This phenomenon needs to be considered not only from the legal and linguistic perspective, but also from the argumentative one - which focuses on the strategies for defending a controversial or doubtful viewpoint. This book draws upon linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics to present an argumentation-based approach to statutory interpretation. By translating and summarizing the existing legal interpretative canons (...) into eleven patterns of natural arguments - called argumentation schemes - the authors offer a system of argumentation strategies for developing, defending, assessing, and attacking an interpretation. Illustrated through major cases from both common and civil law, this methodology is summarized in diagrams and maps for application to computer sciences. These visuals help make the structures, strategies, and vulnerabilities of legal reasoning accessible to both legal professionals and laypeople. (shrink)

„O pełnej znajomości prawa można mówić tylko wówczas, gdy zna się prawo i wytworzone przez praktykę reguły posługiwania się nim” – pisał swego czasu Marek Zirk-Sadowski. Pogląd ten wiąże się z niezwykle istotnym sporem o kryterium poprawności dokonywanej przez sędziów wykładni prawa. Zlokalizowanie takiego kryterium wydaje się być szczególnie ważne choćby ze względu na zawartą w naszym systemie prawnym konieczność realizowania zasady trójpodziału władzy, zgodnie z którą w procesie stosowania prawa nie może dochodzić do tzw. kryptoprawotwórstwa. Celem niniejszego tekstu jest (...) zaprezentowanie wybranych koncepcji poprawności wykładni prawa oraz ich krytyka w świetle neopragmatyzmu Stanley'a Fisha, filozofa prawa oraz profesora literaturoznawstwa, którego głównym przedmiotem refleksji był problem interpretacji. Filozofia amerykańskiego neopragmatysty opiera się na dwóch koncepcjach: reader-response criticism i wspólnotach interpretacyjnych. Reader-response criticism polega na skupieniu się na afektywnym aspekcie procesu interpretacji, uznając czytelnika za kluczową instancję tego procesu; koncepcja wspólnot interpretacyjnych z kolei ma wytłumaczyć, dlaczego podmiot interpretuje w taki a nie inny sposób. Zaproponowana przez Fisha metoda pozwala uznać, że de facto jedynym możliwym kryterium poprawności wykładni są inne decyzje sędziowskie. W świetle powyższych uwag wydaje się zasadnym stwierdzenie, że podejście Fisha umożliwia pogłębienie refleksji na temat jednej z kluczowych kwestii zarówno dla praktyki jak i teorii prawniczej, tj. poprawności wykładni prawa. (shrink)

It causes many difficulties for jurisprudence to define the notion of judicial activism. At the very beginning it had rather a journalistic character, but but over time it has become a serious charge against these judges who act on the basis of their vision of what the law ought to be like rather than what it actually is like. On the ground of the polish legal theory the echoes of the dispute about judicial activism are reflected in the discussions about (...) the nature of legal interpretation. Transposing the problem of activism into the problem of interpretation allows the use of analysis tools that were previously unavailable. One of these tools are concepts emerged on the neopragmatist philosophy of Stanley Fish. Fish tries to describe the nature of the interpretation in the context of reader-response criticism and the concept of interpretive communities. Application of Fish's philosophy in the field of legal theory provides constructive conclusions about the concepts of judicial activism and judicial law-making. (shrink)

Communication and content presents a comprehensive and foundational account of meaning based on new versions of situation theory and game theory. The literal and implied meanings of an utterance are derived from first principles assuming little more than the partial rationality of interacting agents. New analyses of a number of diverse phenomena – a wide notion of ambiguity and content encompassing phonetics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and beyond, vagueness, convention and conventional meaning, indeterminacy, universality, the role of truth in communication, semantic (...) change, translation, Frege’s puzzle of informative identities – are developed. Communication, speaker meaning, and reference are defined. Frege’s context and compositional principles are generalized and reconciled in a fixed-point principle, and a detailed critique of Grice, several aspects of Lewis, and some aspects of the Romantic conception of meaning are offered. Connections with other branches of linguistics, especially psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, and natural language processing, are explored. -/- The book will be of interest to scholars in philosophy, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. It should also interest readers in related fields like literary and cultural theory and the social sciences. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic—his theory about signs, reference, interpretation, meaning, and communication—is applicable with illuminating results to innumerable processes of semeiosis or sign interpretation. Robert C. Neville is the first deep student of Peirce’s semeiotic to have systematically applied that theory to the analysis and theory of theological signs, interpretation, and truth—hereafter, theological semeiotic. The result is easily the deepest and richest theological semeiotic currently available. Being the best, it is also most worthy of critique. In this essay, I argue (...) that Neville misinterprets Peirce’s concept of an index, conceiving an index in terms of the interpreter-object rather than... (shrink)

This chapter outlines a new theoretical method, which I call “dancing-with,” emerging from the process of writing my dissertation and the book manuscript that followed it. Defined formally, a given theorist X can be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s historical communities, and also meaningful and actionable (i.e. facilitating social justice) for X and X’s historical communities. In this pursuit, the method of (...) dancing-with involves both (1) a creative “torsion” of Y’s thought (particularly in the direction of unconscious, embodied and political factors at work in Y’ texts), and (2) a resultant, sympathetic torsion of X’s thought toward Y. In other words, X and Y “meet in the middle,” like two dancers walking onto the dance floor, to explore the promise of a flourishing artistic partnership. In this partnership, each must attend to the way that political meanings are inscribed on the other’s raced/sexed/etc. body, both to react maximally justly, and to maximize the aesthetic movement options that can be brought into play. As the method of dancing-with is thus modeled on an ideal comportment for improvisational social dance (such as the contemporary Latin dance called “salsa”), I envision the end-goal of dancing-with as what I call “poetic social justice.” By this, I mean the “poetic justice” of two theorists’ mutually empowering each other for maximal social good. Though this process is admittedly more difficult between some theorists, in part as a function of their respective embodiments and sociohistorical positions, at least a move or two together is always possible. (shrink)

This paper written as a dialogue between two interlocutors, Julie and a Student, deals with Understanding and its role in the social sciences. The fictional dialogue takes place in Hannover, Germany, and the interlocutors are exchanging arguments about Verstehen and how it should be conceptualized in the philosophy of the social sciences. A range of different approaches is discussed and a naturalistic strategy emerges as a defensible alternative.

This article explores problems with several definitions of Originalism proposed by Justice Scalia in "Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts." It begins by looking at Justice Scalia's citation of a possible statement by Queen Anne that Justice Scalia claims in itself justifies Originalism. Queen Anne may have told Sir Christopher Wren that St. Paul's Cathedral was "awful, artificial, and amusing" at a time when those words meant "awe-inspiring, highly artistic, and thought-provoking." Conceding that one must understand how Queen Anne (...) meant these terms, this article shows how this example actually undermines Originalism when applied to on-going rules. It also explores inconsistencies and problems with several definitions of Originalism including Justice Scalia's arbitrary exclusion of technology from the constraints of "original meaning." It further disputes his claim that Originalism ". . .will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making and acceptable argumentation [and that it] will curb -- even reverse -- the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences." This article maintains that Originalism has the opposite effect. -/- Keywords: originalism, original meaning, Scalia, interpretation, meaning. (shrink)

Brief reflections in prose and verse on the vital importance of linguistic diversity.

This Article explores the interpretation and construction of executive orders using as examples President Trump’s two executive orders captioned “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States” (the “Two Executive Orders”). President Trump issued the Two Executive Orders in the context of (among other things) Candidate Trump’s statements such as: “Islam hates us,” and “[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred.” President Trump subsequently provided further context including his tweet about the second (...) of his Two Executive Orders: “People, the lawyers and the courts can call [the second of the Two Executive Orders] whatever they want, but I am calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” Although President Trump replaced the first of the Two Executive Orders with the second one and although the Supreme Court by orders dated October 10, 2017 and October 24, 2017, vacated and remanded litigation involving the second order on grounds of mootness, the Two Executive Orders remain highly instructive for those who would understand the interpretation and construction of executive orders. This article therefore examines in detail the original speaker's (i.e., President Trump's) intended meaning and effect of the Two Executive Orders. It performs such examination using insights from the semiotic subfield of pragmatics, a semiotic subfield which explores how real-world people actually use, interpret, and construe language in various real-world contexts (including contexts where the issuer of the Two Executive Orders himself has claimed that “Islam hates us” and has tweeted “TRAVEL BAN!”). Using such insights of pragmatics, this Article also explores why reasonable judges thoroughly versed in legal theory, legal practice, and pragmatics should conclude that President Trump unlawfully targeted Muslims in the Two Executive Orders. This Article, among other things, also questions the sensibility of such notions as “facial legitimacy” to the extent such notions suggest text has meaning apart from context. Keywords: executive orders, speaker meaning, interpretation, construction, semiotics, pragmatics, originalism, speech acts, context, facial legitimacy, Constitutionality, First Amendment,Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Scalia, immigration, semantics, original meaning, travel ban, Trump, textualism. (shrink)

Neil Gorsuch lauds judges who purport to “apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be . . . .” It’s hard to see how such a form of Originalism withstands scrutiny. -/- First, using “reasonable reader” understandings rather than speaker meaning turns language and law on their heads. Audiences effectively become (...) the speakers in ordinary speech (since reader or audience meaning prevails), and audiences (and thus the ruled) effectively become the rulers when interpreting law (since audiences’ meaning prevails). -/- Second, since laws look forward to govern conduct, how can best legal practices keep such a backward focus? -/- Third, words (however understood by others at the time “originally” uttered) may or may not (depending on speaker and not reader meaning) signify concepts whose meanings embrace change over time. For example, the word “planet” used by a speaker before the discovery of Uranus and Neptune may or may not include further planets depending upon what the speaker meant by “planet.” (The same applies to the inclusion or exclusion of Pluto had the speaker used the word “planet” after the discovery of Pluto but before its exclusion by current science.) Unlike the “reasonable” reader of Gorsuch’s Originalism as phrased above, speakers run the gamut from reasonable to unreasonable, from informed to uninformed, and from thoughtful to thoughtless. -/- Fourth, to the extent a judge is principally “constrained” by a text or texts (as he may determine), by dictionaries that he chooses, and by “history” as the judge understands it, isn’t judicial activism encouraged rather than restrained? Talk of a “reasonable” reader masks the fact that there can be multiple “reasonable” conclusions of what a reasonable or unreasonable speaker meant. Is a judge not therefore left to pick definitions and applications of terms that accord with the judge’s understandings of history, understandings that may well be colored by the judge’s politics and judicial philosophy? This applies to principles as well as labels for things. Principles are also subject to multiple frames, and their terms are subject to multiple definitions therefore raising the very same questions just raised above. -/- Finally, such Originalism doesn’t merely fail with legal texts. It also fails when applied to other texts (including sacred texts such as the Ten Commandments) and when used to interpret art (such as “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” often attributed to Bruegel and which inspired such great ekphrasis as Auden’s “Musée Des Beaux Arts”). These further failures underscore the dysfunction of Originalism in Gorsuch's form noted above. -/- Keywords: Originalism, Neil Gorsuch, Text, Textualism, Scalia, Interpretation, Pragmatics, Speaker Meaning, Art, Painting, Bruegel, Auden, Ekphrasis, Icarus, Bible, Ten Commandments, Herod, Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln. (shrink)

Davidson’s later philosophy of language has been inspired by Wittgenstein’s Investigations, but Davidson by no means sympathizes with the sceptical problem and solution Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. Davidson criticizes the sceptical argument for relying on the rule-following conception of meaning, which is, for him, a highly problematic view. He also casts doubt on the plausibility of the sceptical solution as unjustifiably bringing in shared practices of a speech community. According to Davidson, it is rather success in mutual interpretation that explains (...) success in the practice of meaning something by an utterance. I will argue that Davidson’s objections to the sceptical problem and solution are misplaced as they rely on a misconstrual of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view. I will also argue that Davidson’s alternative solution to the sceptical problem is implausible, since it fails to block the route to the sceptical problem. I will then offer a problematic trilemma for Davidson. (shrink)

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described (...) using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required. (shrink)

This article describes the recent reception of Giovanni Gentile and his doctrine of actualism, describing the philosopher's rehabilitation as a major Italian thinker and actualism as a provocative account of socially situated consciousness. The discussion then turns to the future of Gentile studies, focusing on ways in which the ahistorical methods of analytic philosophy might help restore actualism and its author to their proper place in the philosophical canon.

The sociopolitical and cultural evolution as a result of the Reform and Opening up in 1978, facilitated not least by the inexorable juggernaut of globalization and technological advancement, has revolutionized the way China engages domestically and interacts with the outside world. The need for more proactive diplomacy and open engagement witnessed the institutionalization of the interpreter-mediated premier's press conferences. Such a discursive event provides a vital platform for China to articulate its discourse and rebrand its image in tandem with the (...) profound changes signaled by the Dengist reform. This chapter investigates critically how political press conference interpreting and interpreters' agency in China are impacted in relation to such dramatic transformations. It is revealed that, while interpreters are confronted with seemingly conflicting expectations, in actual practice they are often able to negotiate a way as highly competent interpreting professionals with the additional missions of advancing China's global engagement and safeguarding China's national interests. (shrink)

The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject (...) to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation. (shrink)

This paper proposes an argumentation-based procedure for legal interpretation, by reinterpreting the traditional canons of textual interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes, which are then classified, formalized, and represented through argument visualization and evaluation tools. The problem of statutory interpretation is framed as one of weighing contested interpretations as pro and con arguments. The paper builds an interpretation procedure by formulating a set of argumentation schemes that can be used to comparatively evaluate the types of arguments used in cases of (...) contested statutory interpretation in law. A simplified version of the Carneades Argumentation System is applied in a case analysis showing how the procedure works. A logical model for statutory interpretation is finally presented, covering pro-tanto and all-things-considered interpretive conclusions. (shrink)

Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional (...) solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy. (shrink)

By describing the aim of triangulation as locating the objects of thoughts and utterances, Davidson has given in the double role of accounting for both the individuation of content and the sense in which content necessarily is public. The focus of this article is on how triangulation may contribute to the individuation of content. I maintain that triangulation, interpreted in terms of joint attention, may serve to break into the intentional circle of meaning and belief, yet without forcing us to (...) renounce the claims concerning the interdependence of meaning and belief and the irreducibility of meaning. (shrink)

Owing in part to Rorty’s energetic promotional efforts, Davidson’s philosophy of language has received much attention in recent decades from quarters most diverse, creating at times a sense of an almost protean versatility. Conspicuously missing from the rapidly growing literature on the subject is a sustained discussion of the relationship between Davidson’s interpretive theory and history: an omission all the more surprising since a comparison between Davidson and Gadamer has been pursued at some length and now, it seems,abandoned—all without as (...) much as a mention of history, which does, of course,play a prominent role in Gadamer’s thought. The issue, moreover, is hardly negligible. Davidson understood his work as an attempt to reconcile the demands of rigorous naturalism with the Kantian picture of human rationality,thereby salvaging what he considered to be important and interesting features of the human world from mechanistic reduction. For many thinkers of the 20th century, including Dewey and Gadamer, the irreducibly human had to do with the historical being of mankind, with historicity as the unique mark of our species. Yet, Davidson has virtually nothing to say about history and, in fact, a recent study by Giuseppina D’Oro (2004b), comparing Collingwood and Davidson, concludes that Davidson’s model of interpretation results in a distorted picture of understanding, as judged by the standards of a historically informed interpretive practice. Examining the causes of their disagreement, then,should help us make some headway towards a clearer sense of what it means to understand historically, by gleaning some additional constraints that the requirement of historicity imposes upon an interpretive theory. We start with D’Oro’s criticism of Davidson and discuss the alternative account of interpretation she proposes. Afterwards, we turn to Collingwood to see if either account does justice to his central insights, ending with some suggestions about the conceptual adjustments required to accommodate them. (shrink)

Interpretations of Nietzsche, particularly about politics, cover an exceptionally wide range. Additionally, Nietzsche is often said to commit “rhetorical excesses.” I argue and show that Nietzsche consciously crafted his published works to allow this range of interpretations, that he did this for critical purposes, and that his so-called rhetoric is there to serve this purpose.