Au viie s., l’extension des territoires d’Argos et de Sparte dans le Péloponnèse était telle que le mont Parnon est devenu la zone de contact entre les deux cités : après l’annexion de la Thyréatide par Sparte, au vie s., l’époque classique continue à être ponctuée de conflits entre les deux cités, Argos cherchant à en reprendre le contrôle. Les auteurs anciens sont de peu de secours pour démêler l’écheveau de l’histoire politique de cette région, sise aux confins des territoires (...) argien, arcadien et spartiate, aux ve et ive s. : ils la mentionnent rarement, celle‑ci étant demeurée hors des grands conflits. Aussi, les sources archéologiques prennent‑elles toute leur importance. Cette contribution s’efforce de prolonger les enquêtes topographiques conduites par nos aînés en recourant à l’étude des fortifications, source de choix pour appréhender l’histoire régionale. Ainsi, l’étude des ouvrages fortifiés de Thyréatide (enceintes urbaines, tours isolées) permet d’éclairer l’histoire de cette région si convoitée ainsi que certains points de l’histoire du Péloponnèse à l’époque classique. De la période archaïque à l’époque hellénistique, la Thyréatide a été à la fois un ensemble cohérent et une partie des confins (eschatiai) d’un ensemble politique plus vaste, une région frontalière, aux marges du territoire lacédémonien ou argien, qui a conduit à l’implantation d’un réseau de villes fortifiés et de tours de guet. Après avoir fait l’inventaire de ces fortifications, leur analyse architecturale comme celle de leur implantation topographique nous ont souvent permis, d’abord d’y distinguer plusieurs phases de construction, ensuite de replacer ces ouvrages dans le réseau fortifié auquel ils appartiennent. Enfin, on a pu proposer parfois qui, de Sparte ou d’Argos, était le commanditaire de ces ouvrages fortifiés et vers quels ennemis ceux‑ci étaient tournés. Nous avons ainsi pu montrer que plusieurs de ceux qui étaient attribués à Sparte sont en fait à considérer plutôt comme argiens. (shrink)

This paper situates Wittgenstein in what is known as the causalism/anti-causalism debate in the philosophy of mind and action and reconstructs his arguments to the effect that reasons are not a species of causes. On the one hand, the paper aims to reinvigorate the question of what these arguments are by offering a historical sketch of the debate showing that Wittgenstein's arguments were overshadowed by those of the people he influenced, and that he came to be seen as an anti-causalist (...) for reasons that are in large part extraneous to his thought. On the other hand, the paper aims to recover the arguments scattered in Wittgenstein's own writings by detailing and defending three lines of argument distinguishing reasons from causes. The paper concludes that Wittgenstein's arguments differ from those of his immediate successors; that he anticipates current anti-psychologistic trends; and that he is perhaps closer to Davidson than historical dialectics suggest. (shrink)

Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

The concept of value is often discredited for its ambivalence: value increases and decreases, and is valid for one person but not necessarily for the next. Philosophies of value are subjectivist or contaminated by economic rationality. I show, from Gilbert Simondon, that value can be conceived of as a variable quantity without falling into levelling or axiological relativism. This implies dismissing the neo-Kantian separation of ontology and axiology, rejecting the conception of culture as a set of values and the bipolarity (...) of value oppositions, and finally thinking of value from a physical-mathematical rather than an economic analogy. (shrink)

In hoeverre kan een literair werk bijdragen tot de ethische ontwikkeling van zijn lezers, of juist niet? Behalve een genuanceerd antwoord op deze vraag, wil dit boek premissen bieden voor een methode om de ethische inslag van een literair werk aan het licht te brengen. Dat de romans van de Nederlandse schrijver Frans Kellendonk (1951-1990) een goede casus vormen om dieper op deze problematiek in te gaan, ligt voor de hand. Kellendonk staat immers bekend als een van de meest controversiële (...) Nederlandse auteurs van het einde van de twintigste eeuw. Vandaag wordt hij vooral beschouwd als een soort profeet van het hedendaagse scepticisme omtrent de multiculturele samenleving. Zijn laatste roman, 'Mystiek lichaam' (1986), zorgde bijvoorbeeld voor een geruchtmakende ideologische rel, terwijl er volgens sommige critici geen vuiltje aan de lucht was. Kellendonks romans stellen de eenduidige lectuur ervan steevast op de proef. - [provided by publisher]. (shrink)

Ce texte dessine les contours de l’interprétation de l’œuvre de Nietzsche par Georg Simmel. On en tirera des éléments pour l’intelligence du projet philosophique de Simmel, comme effort pour articuler objectivité et relativité de la valeur. Mais on trouvera aussi des raisons de défendre un certain usage de Nietzsche, replacé par Simmel dans une lignée humaniste, mais sans la moindre naïveté anthropocentrique. Nous nous arrêterons particulièrement sur deux thèses de Simmel : (1) Nietzsche propose une « théorie de la valeur (...) » objective et systématique ; (2) Nietzsche est un « moraliste » qui défend une variété particulière de « personnalisme ». (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation challenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of picture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement? We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing control over (...) conceptual uptake, and there are contexts—such as professions that depend on coordinated conceptual innovation—in which there are good reasons to institutionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a liberal democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. (shrink)

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that to question the authority of concepts is to ask for reasons of a special kind: (...) reasons for concept use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing conceptions of things,—even things as contested as liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering. (shrink)

Bernard Williams thought that philosophy should address real human concerns felt beyond academic philosophy. But what wider concerns are addressed by Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, a book he introduces as being ‘principally about how things are in moral philosophy’? In this article, we argue that Williams responded to the concerns of his day indirectly, refraining from explicitly claiming wider cultural relevance, but hinting at it in the pair of epigraphs that opens the main text. This was Williams’s solution (...) to what he perceived as the stylistic problem of how to pursue philosophy as cultural critique. Taking the epigraphs as interpretative keys to the wider resonances of the book, we show how they reveal Williams’s philosophical concerns – with the primacy of character over method, the obligation to follow orders, and the possibility of combining truth, truthfulness, and a meaningful life in a disillusioned world – to be recognisably rooted in the cultural concerns of post-war Britain. In the light of its epigraphs, the book emerges as the critique of a philosophical tradition’s inadequacies to the special difficulties of its cultural moment. (shrink)

The quasi-interchangeability of the words »culture« and »world« in German philosophy of culture at the beginning of the 20th century has frequently been stressed. Can we infer from that the idea that this philosophy of culture could be described as a type of cosmology? This article argues for such an interpretation, reflecting on Georg Simmel's work, particularly his little known concept of »ideal world«. Following this path, Simmel's relation to Kant and the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism is analyzed.

In this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognise the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we anyway already aim to realise theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of (...) concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognised as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns. (shrink)

Cernée par la tentation autoritaire, la démocratie paraît fragilisée. Brandie comme un étendard, la promesse d'un? gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple - n'a, semble-t-il, pas été véritablement tenue. La classe politique paraît souvent plus soucieuse de sa propre survie que du bien commun, la démocratie représentative ne serait-elle qu'un leurre? Partout dans le monde, de nouveaux mouvements citoyens cherchent à mettre en oeuvre une démocratie horizontale. En déconstruisant les mécanismes et les croyances qui régissent notre vision (...) du pouvoir, ce texte propose de refonder rigoureusement le concept de démocratie réelle."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Bernard Williams articulated his later political philosophy notably in response to Ronald Dworkin, who, striving for coherence or integrity among our political concepts, sought to immunize the concepts of liberty and equality against conflict. Williams, doubtful that we either could or should eliminate the conflict, resisted the pursuit of conceptual integrity. Here, I reconstruct this Dworkin–Williams debate with an eye to drawing out ideas of ongoing philosophical and political importance. The debate not only exemplifies Williams's political realism and its connection (...) to his critique of the morality system. It also illustrates the virtues and hazards of contemporary efforts to ameliorate or engineer our concepts; it indicates what political philosophy might look to in appraising political concepts; it adverts to the different needs these concepts have to meet if they are to sustain a politics of pluralism, deal with polarization, and secure the consent of those who end up on the losing side of political decisions; and it presents us with two starkly contrasting conceptions of politics itself, of the place of political values within it, and of our prospects of reducing the uncomfortably conflictual character of those values through philosophy. (shrink)

Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have?? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is (...) a more perspicuous way of reaping the same explanatory pay-off as pragmatic genealogy while dispensing with its fictionalising and historicising. My aim is to determine when and why the reverse movement from paradigm-based explanation to pragmatic genealogy remains warranted. I argue that the fictionalising and historicising of pragmatic genealogy is well motivated, and I outline three ways in which the method earns its keep: by successfully handling historically inflected practices which paradigm-based explanation cannot handle; by revealing and arguing for connections to generic needs we might otherwise miss; and by providing comprehensive views of practices that place and relate the respects in which they serve both generic and local needs. (shrink)

In recent decades, many researchers set out to draw links between Western anarchism and ancient Chinese Daoism. The present work aims at adding to this ongoing debate by answering the question of whether the Guodian _Laozi_’s 郭店老子 sayings can be labelled as “anarchism.” It defends the claim that the text endorses a unique kind of anarchist theory based on a distinctive theory of political authority grounded in Daoist moral commitments. To do so, this essay first offers an overview of the (...) scholarly debate surrounding this topic. Second, it provides an account of the necessary and sufficient feature any theory must secure in order to be argued to be anarchist, as well as a framework that underlines potential differences between various anarchist theories. Third, a rigorous textual analysis of the Guodian Laozi is conducted to extrapolate its political advice, before analyzing it in light of the anarchist framework mentioned above. This essay concludes with an assessment of several objections that may be raised against its claims. (shrink)

1. Simmel précurseur de l’anthropologie philosophique? Deux principes fondamentaux peuvent caractériser le courant de pensée qui, à partir des travaux fondateurs de Max Scheler et de Helmuth Plessner, s’est nommé « anthropologie philosophique » et a voulu proposer, face à l’éclatement des sciences et de la culture, une nouvelle « image de l’homme ». Le premier principe est celui de la « réduction anthropologique » : l’ensemble des produits et domaines culturels doivent être considérés à l’au...

In Truth and Truthfulness, Bernard Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value. But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic? And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history? In this paper, I propose to resolve these puzzles by reading Williams as a type of pragmatist and his genealogy (...) as a pragmatic genealogy. On this basis, I show just in what sense Williams’s genealogy can by itself yield reasons to cultivate a sense of the value of truth. Using various criticisms of Williams’s genealogical method as a foil, I then develop an understanding of pragmatic genealogy which reveals it to be uniquely suited to dealing with practices exhibiting what I call self-effacing functionality—practices that are functional only insofar as and because we do not engage in them for their functionality. I conclude with an assessment of the wider significance of Williams’s genealogy for his own oeuvre and for further genealogical inquiry. (shrink)

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism (...) without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision. (shrink)

Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justifiable? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while finding a home for it in the public decision-making of modern societies, it also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and context-sensitive. This differentiates strong (...) forms of the demand calling for theory from weaker forms calling for less, and contexts where it has a place from contexts where it is out of place. In light of this, subjecting personal deliberation to the demand turns out to involve a trade-off. (shrink)

Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while those who think it a superficial idea that cannot coherently be deepened tend to neglect it as unimportant. Parting company with both camps, I argue that the idea of the voluntary is at once important and superficial—it is an essentially superficial notion that performs important functions, but can only perform them (...) if we refrain from deepening it. After elaborating the contrast between superficial and deepened ideas of the voluntary, I identify the important functions that the superficial idea performs in relation to demands for fairness and freedom. I then suggest that theories trying to deepen the idea exemplify a problematic moralization of psychology—they warp psychological ideas to ensure that moral demands can be met. I offer a three-tier model of the problematic dynamics this creates, and show why the pressure to deepen the idea should be resisted. On this basis, I take stock of what an idea of the voluntary worth having should look like, and what residual tensions with moral ideas this leaves us with. (shrink)

If ethical reflection on which concepts to use has an avatar, it must be Nietzsche, who took more seriously than most the question of what concepts one should live by, and regarded many of our inherited concepts as deeply problematic. Moreover, his eschewal of traditional attempts to derive the one right set of concepts from timeless rational foundations renders his conceptual ethics strikingly modern, raising the prospect of a Nietzschean alternative to Wittgensteinian non-foundationalism. Yet Nietzsche appears to engage in two (...) seemingly contrary modes of concept evaluation: one looks to concepts’ effects, the other to what concepts express. I offer an account of the expressive character of concepts which unifies these two modes and accounts for Nietzsche’s seemingly bifurcating interests. His fundamental concern is with the effects concepts are likely to have going forward, and it is precisely this concern that motivates his preoccupation with what concepts express. He evaluates concepts by asking for whom they have a point, working back from a concept via the need it fills to the conditions that engender that need and thereby render the concept pointful. For a concept to be pointful is for it to serve the concerns of its users through its effects. But even when it is not pointful, a concept expresses the presuppositions of its pointfulness, which we can work back to by asking who would have need of such a concept. What emerges is a powerful approach to conceptual ethics that looks beyond the formal virtues and vices of concepts at the presuppositions we buy into by using them. (shrink)

Why does a journal that intends to »bring out reason into culture« give so much space to the question of mysticism? The contemporary rise of extra-ecclesial reli- giosity is well known. A critique of culture that questions the significance of its given forms must problematize the enthusiasm for mysticism. But in its claim for immediacy, mystical experience constitutes a kind of impossible object for the phi- losophy of culture. I interpret the reflection on mysticism as a test for the capacity (...) of the philosophy of culture to account for cultural life and not only its objectified forms. This reflection reveals a structural tension of the Logos program as an effort to recover the link between life and its objectivations. (shrink)

Philosophe de la culture et non seulement essayiste et critique de la modernité, Georg Simmel a voulu proposer une idée de la culture en temps de crise, susceptible de servir d'horizon pour une " vie moderne " fragmentée et déchirée entre processus d'objectivation et dissolution des formes. Cette entreprise a un nom : " relativisme ", ou plutôt " relationnisme " – une " philosophie dans son concept cosmique ", mais sans l'artifice du système. Le relationnisme s'installe d'emblée dans le (...) concret de la vie socio-historique, il commence par le milieu : la relation. Après avoir interrogé la valeur et l'" esprit objectif " des produits de la culture, il analyse les conditions de leur appropriation par la vie individuelle et sociale. Si la discordance entre subjectivités et objectivités peut être surmontée, ce sera au moyen d'une nouvelle description, relationniste, des formes de l'individualité. En reconstruisant ce programme philosophique, ce livre redonne à Simmel sa place dans la tradition allemande et parmi les grands auteurs de son temps. (shrink)

Pragmatic genealogies seek to explain ideas by regarding them, primarily, not as answers to philosophical questions, but as practical solutions to practical problems. Here I argue that pragmatic genealogies can inform the formation of philosophical canons. But the rationale for resorting to genealogy in this connection is not the familiar one that genealogy renders the concepts of the present intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the past—the claim is rather the reverse one, that genealogy renders the concepts of (...) the past intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the present: past thinkers can be made to speak to us by revealing how their ideas tie in with our concerns, in the sense of helping us to remedy practical problems we still face in some form. (shrink)

Against those who identify genealogy with reductive genealogical debunking or deny it any evaluative and action-guiding significance, I argue for the following three claims: that although genealogies, true to their Enlightenment origins, tend to trace the higher to the lower, they need not reduce the higher to the lower, but can elucidate the relation between them and put us in a position to think more realistically about both relata; that if we think of genealogy’s normative significance in terms of a (...) triadic model that includes the genealogy’s addressee, we can see that in tracing the higher to the lower, a genealogy can facilitate an evaluation of the higher element, and where the lower element is some important practical need rather than some sinister motive, the genealogy can even be vindicatory; and finally, that vindicatory genealogies can offer positive guidance on how to engineer better concepts. (shrink)

Far from being indiscriminately critical of the ideas he associated with the morality system, Bernard Williams offered vindicatory explanations of its crucial building blocks, such as the moral/non-moral distinction, the idea of obligation, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, and the practice of blame. The rationale for these concessive moves, I argue, is that understanding what these ideas do for us when they are not in the service of the system is just as important to leading us out of the system as the (...) critique of that system. I then show how regarding the aspiration to shelter life from luck as the system’s organizing ambition explains why the system elaborates and combines these building blocks in the way it does. Finally, I argue that the ultimate problem with the resulting construction is its frictionless purity. It robs valuable concepts of their grip on the world we live in, and, by insisting on purity from contingency, threatens to issue in nihilism about value and scepticism about agency. (shrink)

« À la fin de son œuvre Les Aventures d’Alice aux pays des merveilles, Lewis Carroll dévoile en un bref paragraphe la nature onirique de l’histoire vécue par la fillette et y souligne le rôle spécifique joué par les bruits alentour ayant accompagné son assoupissement. Ainsi les sons du vent, de l’étendue d’eau voisine, des animaux et de la vie sociale alimentaient incidemment le récit hallucinatoire, œuvrant, dans le brouillard du signifiant propre au sommeil, à la reconfiguration du sens par (...) le non-sense. Ce que donne à lire la conclusion de l’œuvre est un cas typique de paréidolie noise, ce processus d’identification formelle chimérique, où les bruits devenus informes s’avèrent enfin disponibles pour y projeter d’autres formes. Un tel phénomène se retrouve sans doute dans la traque des EVP ( electronic voice phenomena ) qui hante l’histoire des médias et des technologies de reproduction sonore, soit ces voix fantomatiques supposément entendues dans la friture hertzienne d’un poste de radio ou tapies dans le bruit de fond d’un enregistrement. Qu’entendons-nous alors dans ces bruits? Et plus particulièrement, que nous disent ces voix du processus même de la pensée philosophique, lorsque la clarté censée la définir s’abandonne aux lignes de fuite de son brouillage? ». (shrink)

This chapter argues that several aspects of Bernard Williams’s style, methodology, and metaphilosophy can be read as evolving dialectically out of Wittgenstein’s own. After considering Wittgenstein as a stylistic influence on Williams, especially as regards ideals of clarity, precision, and depth, Williams’s methodological debt to Wittgenstein is examined, in particular his anthropological interest in thick concepts and their point. The chapter then turns to Williams’s explicit association, in the 1990s, with a certain form of Wittgensteinianism, which he called ‘Left Wittgensteinianism’. (...) It is shown how this is not a sudden conversion, but the direct product of Williams’s longstanding critical engagement with Wittgenstein’s methodology and metaphilosophy: Williams arrives at this position by envisaging a Wittgensteinianism that thinks in concrete sociohistorical terms, embraces genuine explanation, and relinquishes its insistence on the purity of philosophy. When properly understood, moreover, this critique turns out to be continuous with Williams’s advocacy of a conception of philosophy as a humanistic discipline. Finally, it is shown that Williams inherits from Wittgenstein a certain understanding of how philosophy can help us to live, in particular the therapeutic ambition to liberate us from distortions in our self-understanding by assembling reminders. (shrink)

Some fictionalist approaches to the notion of scientific model are based on the concept of game of make-believe developed by Kendall Walton, without proposing a similar interpretation of it. The distinction between authorized and unauthorized games can be one of the sources of those divergences. In relation to the distinction made by Walton, the de dicto and de re modalities of the fiction-operator reflect different epistemological engagements concerning objects which satisfy properties. This paper aims at following up on the proposals (...) formulated by Roman Frigg and Adam Toon by using some modal logic concepts, notably by defining the identities of properties in modal contexts in terms of world-lines. Applying a model to a target-system consists in transposing fictional truths into actual situations, through an extrapolation that goes beyond the games of make-believe. (shrink)

While Lee and Schwarz propose grounded procedures of separation as an explanation for physical cleansing in various domains (e.g., washing one's hands), we suggest that separation can also account for behavioral cleansing aimed at washing consciences and polishing reputations. We discuss this extension in terms of degrees of behavioral cleansing, motivations, and intentions behind cleansing, and social settings.