Traditions in Philosophy

Pragmatic genealogies seek to explain ideas by regarding them, primarily, not as answers to philosophical questions, but as practical solutions to practical problems. Here I argue that pragmatic genealogies can inform the formation of philosophical canons. But the rationale for resorting to genealogy in this connection is not the familiar one that genealogy renders the concepts of the present intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the past—the claim is rather the reverse one, that genealogy renders the concepts of (...) the past intelligible by relating them to the concerns of the present: past thinkers can be made to speak to us by revealing how their ideas tie in with our concerns, in the sense of helping us to remedy practical problems we still face in some form. (shrink)

In recent years, the "science of science" has combined computational methods with novel data sources in order to understand the dynamics of research communities. As the name suggests, science of science is primarily focused on science and technology, with less attention to the humanities. However, many of the questions investigated by science of science are also relevant to academic philosophy: To what extent can the discipline be divided into subfields with different methods and topics? How are prestige and credit distributed (...) across the discipline? And how do these factors interact with other factors, such as gender, to shape job market outcomes? In this paper, we provide some empirically-informed answers to these questions by applying computational methods to job market data for Anglophone academic philosophy. We find, first, evidence that is consistent with the analytic-continental divide, but is also consistent with other, more complex ways of organizing academic philosophy into distinct intellectual traditions; second, a clear prestige hierarchy, dividing PhD programs into two distinct prestige categories; and third, evidence that gender, prestige, and country have notable effects on academic job market outcomes for recent philosophy PhDs. (shrink)

What is it to be clear? And will that question have the same answer in science, poetry, and philosophy? This paper offers a taxonomy of clarity, before focusing on two notions that are pertinent to the notions of clarity in science, poetry, and, in particular, philosophy. It argues that “scientific clarity,” which is marked by its reliance on technical terms, is, though often appropriate, not the only way in which something can be clear. In particular, poetry entirely eschews technical terms—but (...) can nonetheless be crystal clear. Poetry achieves this clarity by sensitivity to the richness of language: rhythm, ambiguity, and so on. The paper argues that some philosophy uses language in this same way to achieve its philosophical ends. Accordingly, we should allow that this is a legitimate philosophical method and should not judge the clarity of such philosophy by the standards of scientific clarity. (shrink)

I criticize Brian Earp's ‘Some Writing Tips for Philosophy’. Earp's article is useful for someone who wishes to do well in analytic philosophy as currently practised but it also casts doubt on why such analytic philosophy would be of interest to someone who wants to learn something new. In addition to its good tips, Earp's article contains two bad tips which, if followed, will tend to produce a paper that says next to nothing. I list the two faulty tips, show (...) how the practices of great philosophers and scientists contradict them, then set out some contrary good tips for philosophers who aim to write a paper that makes a contribution to our knowledge. (shrink)

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic-continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical (...) texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions. (shrink)

A collection of essays dedicated to Pier Luigi Lecis' retirement. Contributors include: Mariano Bianca, Silvana Borutti, Vinicio Busacchi, Massimo Dell'Utri, Rosaria Egidi, Roberta Lanfredini, Giuseppe Lorini, Diego Marconi, Francesco Orilia, Paolo Parrini, Alberto Peruzzi, Simonluca Pinna, Pietro Salis, Paolo Spinicci.

Collating, for the first time, the key writings of Leonard Harris, this volume introduces readers to a leading figure in African-American and liberatory thought. -/- Harris' writings on honor, insurrectionist ethics, tradition, and his work on Alain Locke have established him as a leading figure in critical philosophy. His timely and urgent responses to structural racism and structural violence mark him out as a bold cultural commentator and a deft theoretician. -/- The wealth and depth of Harris' writings are brought (...) to the fore in this collection and the incisive introduction by Lee McBride serves to orient, contextualize, and frame an oeuvre that spans four decades. In his prolegomenon, Harris eschews the classical meaning of “philosophy,” supplanting it with an idiosyncratic conception of philosophy--philosophia nata ex conatu--that features an avowedly value-laden dimension. As well as serving as an introduction to Harris' philosophy, A Philosophy of Struggle provides new insights into how we ought conceptualize philosophy, race, tradition, and insurrection in the 21st century. (shrink)

The tendency to idealise artificial intelligence as independent from human manipulators, combined with the growing ontological entanglement of humans and digital machines, has created an “anthrobotic” horizon, in which data analytics, statistics and probabilities throw our agential power into question. How can we avoid the consequences of a reified definition of intelligence as universal operation becoming imposed upon our destinies? It is here argued that the fantasised autonomy of automated intelligence presents a contradistinctive opportunity for philosophical consciousness to understand itself (...) anew as holistic and co-creative, beyond the recent “analytic” moment of the history of philosophy. Here we introduce the concept of “crealectic intelligence”, a meta-analytic and meta-dialectic aspect of consciousness. Intelligent behaviour may consist in distinguishing discrete familiar parts or reproducible functions in the midst of noise via an analytic process of segmentation; intelligence may also manifest itself in the constitution of larger wholes and dynamic unities through a dialectic process of association or assemblage. But, by contrast, crealectic intelligence co-creates realities in the image of an ideal or truth, taking into account the desiring agent imbued with a sense of possibility, in a relationship not only with the Real but also with the creative sublime or “Creal”. (shrink)

Investigation on the ethical implications of the principle of identity and of the principle of reason. The logical principle of identity (A=A), along with the principle of non­contradiction and the principle of the third middle costitute the basis of ocidental logic. However, its dominance is not restricted to logic. As the dominance of the principle of reason is not restricted to epistemology and ontology. This principles constitute a whole worldvew with serious ethical implications. We’ll try, at the end of the (...) article, to indicate contemporary alternatives to this principles – alternatives which bring with themselves different ethical implications. (shrink)

The normative and metanormative pluralism that figures among core self-descriptions of democratic theory, which seems incompatible with democratic theorists’ practical ambitions, may stem from the internal logic of research traditions in the social sciences and humanities and in the conceptual structure of political theory itself. One way to deal productively with intradisciplinary diversity is to appeal to the idea of a meta-consensus; another is to appeal to the argument from cognitive diversity that fuels recent debates on epistemic democracy. For different (...) reasons, both strategies fail, such that a metatheoretical step aside may be desirable, one that entails modeling democratic theory after the public justification approach. (shrink)

The article discusses Nicholas Rescher’s metaphilosophical view of orientational pluralism. In his essay "Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy" Rescher explains a substantial difference between philosophy and science—namely, that philosophers—differently than scientists—continuously propose and undermine various solutions to the same old problems. In philosophy it is difficult to find any consensus or convergence of theories. According to Rescher, this pluralism of theoretical positions is caused by holding by philosophers different sets and hierarchies of cognitive values, i.e. methodological (...) orientations. These orientations are chosen in virtue of some practical postulates, they are of axiological, normative, but not strictly theoretical character. Different methodological orientations yield different evaluations of philosophical theses and arguments. This article shows that Rescher’s account does not determine clearly acceptable cognitive values. If there are no clear criteria of evaluation of methodological orientations, then the described view seems to be identical to relativism adopting the 'everything goes' rule. In addition, accepting orientational pluralism it is hard to avoid the conclusion that discussions between various philosophical schools are futile or can be reduced to non-rational persuasion. (shrink)

Review of the book "Brandom", by Ronald Loeffler.

भारतीय चिन्तन परम्परा में पंच-महाभूत का बहुत महत्वपूर्ण स्थान है. भारतीय प्राचीन ग्रन्थों से लेकर अब तक विश्व की सरंचना सम्बन्धी सिद्धांतों में पंच-महाभूत सबसे स्वीकार्य सिद्धांत माना जाता रहा है. ये पांच तत्व हैं: पृथ्वी, जल, वायु, अग्नि और आकाश. परन्तु चार्वाक जैसे दार्शनिक और आर्यभट्ट (पांचवीं शताब्दी) जैसे विज्ञानी यह कहते आ रहे हैं की तत्व पांच नहीं, चार हैं. इन लोगों ने आकाश को स्वतंत्र तत्व के रूप में स्वीकर नहीं किया. चार्वाक का यह भी विचार रहा (...) है की सारा भौतिक व प्राक्रतिक परिदृश्य न किसी ने रचा है, न इसका कोई उद्देश्य है, प्रक्रति में परिवर्तन, विकास, रुपनान्तरण आदि इसकी अपनी प्रकिया है जो तब भी लाखों करोड़ों वर्षों से हो रहा था और आज भी विभिन्न रूपों में हो रहा है. पंच-तत्व के सिद्धांत को मानने वालों का विचार है की इन पांच तत्वों से जब शारीर बनता है तब आत्मा बाहर से प्रविष्ट होती है जबकि चार तत्व को मानने वाले चार्वाक का कथन है की इन चरों तत्वों के विशेष रूप में परस्पर मेल से ही चैतन्य (चेतना ) की उत्पत्ति होती है, आत्मा कहीं बाहर से नहीं आती- भूतेभ्य: चैतन्यम.आज विज्ञानं बहुत आगे बढ़ गया है और चार्वाक उसके अनुसार नये तत्वों की बात करते हैं. वास्तविकता तो यह है की जिन्हें हम तत्व कह रहे हैं वे तत्व न होकर यौगिक या मिश्रण हैं. तत्व वह होता है जिसमें एक तरह कर परमाणु रहते हैं और जिसे सरलतम पदार्थ के रूप में विभाजित नहीं किया जा सकता. चार्वाक प्रकृति के जड़ रूप से ही, भौतिक तत्वों से चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति को मानता है. जैसे किनव, मधु और शर्करा आदि के मिलने से मादकता उत्पन्न होती है उसी प्रकार शरीर में चैतन्य की उत्त्पति होती है. जब भौतिक तत्वों का तालमेल बिगड़ जाता है तो चैतन्य भी खत्म हो जाता है- सदा के लिए, सर्वदा के लिए – भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमन कुत:.चार्वाक का कहना है की चैतन्य आत्मा काआकस्मिक गुण नहीं बल्कि मौलिक गुण है और चैतन्ययुक्त शरीर ही आत्मा है . यद्यपि आज चार्वाक के चार तत्व भी आदर्शवादियों के पांच तत्वों की तरह ही रद्द हो चुके हैं तथापि उनकी स्थिति दूसरी है. उन्होंने चार तत्वों को प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि कह कर इन से चेतना की उत्पत्ति मानी है, प्रकृति एकतत्ववाद का उनका सिद्धांत आज विज्ञानसम्मत सिद्धांत है, भले ही उन की तत्वों की बात तकनीकी रूप में सही न हो. उनके लिए चार तत्वों को मानना न अनिवार्य है और न ही उसे मानने के लिए कोई ईश्वरीय आदेश है क्योंकि तत्व उनके लिए प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि मात्र हैं, जो तब यदि चार थे तो आज 118 हैं. इससे उन्हें कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ता जबकि अन्य दर्शनों के लिए के लिए स्वीकार करना दुरूह है. अत: हम कह सकते हैं की चार्वाक का दर्शन अनात्मवादी, प्रत्यक्षवादी और भौतिकवादी है. अत: इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य विष्ण पंच-महाभूतों की अवधारणा की चार्वाक के सन्दर्भ में समीक्षा करना है और चार्वाक दर्शन की आज की प्रासंगिकता को देखना है. (shrink)

Defining posthumanism as a single, well-oriented philosophy is a difficult if not impossible endeavour. Part of the reason for this difficulty is accounted by posthumanism’s illusive origins and its perpetually changing hermeneutics. This short paper gives a brief account of the ecological trend in contemporary posthumanism and provides a short prescription for the future of posthumanist literature and potential research avenues.

I intended to deal with the different sections or chapters in one volume,‭ ‬but as certain sections or chapters are very long,‭ ‬like chapter‭ ‬1,‭ ‬THEORIZING AND PHILOSOPHIZING‭ (‬VOLUME‭ ‬1‭)‬,‭ ‬I divided some of them into separate volumes,‭ ‬chapter‭ ‬2‭ ‬HEURISTICS AND PROBLEMSOLVING‭ (‬Volume‭ ‬2‭) ‬and‭ ‬chapter‭ ‬3‭ ‬IMAGINARY EXPERIMENTS AND METAPHORS‭ (‬Vol‭ ‬3‭)‬. -/- In Volume‭ ‬1‭ ‬THEORIZING AND PHILOSOPHIZING‭ (‬VOLUME‭ ‬1‭) ‬I show that and how‭ (‬the different features,‭ ‬steps and stages of‭) ‬philosophizing resemble the processes of theorizing. (...) -/- I deal with a number of basic approaches that philosophers employ to do philosophy.‭ ‬These approaches form part of the traditional methodologies of all Philosophy. -/- The processes and techniques of doing philosophy resemble the techniques and methods one finds in different steps,‭ ‬stages and features of the processes of theorizing,‭ ‬theory development and construction.‭ ‬As many philosophers lack meta-cognitive awareness of what they are doing‭ (‬namely theorizing‭) ‬and how they are doing it‭ (‬the techniques of the different steps and stages of theorizing‭) ‬they do not complete the entire process of theorizing and theory development,‭ ‬but instead concentrate on only certain features of it. -/- The different features,‭ ‬steps and stages of theorizing are explained and the doing of philosophy is compared with them. (shrink)

Passare da Wittgenstein per arrivare a san Tommaso non è un percorso a ritroso, filosoficamente parlando. Lo sostengono importanti pensatori britannici della tradizione post-analitica come Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe e Anthony Kenny, i quali propongono una lettura molto originale del Dottor Angelico e dell’autore delle Ricerche filosofiche. Roger Pouivet ricostruisce in Dopo Wittgenstein, san Tommaso i percorsi di una nuova e provocatoria corrente filosofica che ha preso il nome di “tomismo analitico” ed è una delle più coraggiose frontiere filosofiche di (...) oggi. (shrink)

In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco searches for the conception of knowledge that best justifies the judgment that one can learn from non-local traditions of philosophy. Jenco considers four conceptions of knowledge, namely, in catchwords, the esoteric, Enlightenment, hermeneutic, and self- transformative conceptions of knowledge, and she defends the latter as more plausible than the former three. In this critical discussion of Jenco’s article, I provide reason to doubt the self-transformative conception, and also advance (...) a fifth, pluralist conception of knowledge that I contend best explains the prospect of learning from traditions other than one’s own. (shrink)

In “Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy? A Qualified Yes,” Leigh Jenco responds to an article in which I had argued for a similar conclusion. I had contended roughly that the positing of objective truth combined with a fallibilist epistemology best explains why a philosopher from one culture could learn something substantial from another culture. In her response, Jenco contends that this knowledge framework does not account adequately for the intuition that various philosophical traditions (...) have an equal standing and that traditions other than one’s own are not to be considered inferior. In addition, according to Jenco, an appeal to objective truth on the part of one epistemic culture is unavoidably oppressive, or overly risks being so, with regard to another one. In this brief reply, I argue that an appeal to objective truth in the realms of epistemology and morality in fact makes the most sense of Jenco’s concerns about inegalitarianism and oppression. (shrink)

Статтю присвячено розглядові назв українських футбольних команд у діаспорі, починаючи з другої половини 40-х ХХ ст. Проаналізовано мотивованість цих номінацій та продемонстровано, як під впливом національних чинників, що були визначальними у виборі найменувань футбольних команд, збережено тяглість національних культурних традицій у назовництві футбольних клубів поза межами України.

The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of /truth/, the concept of TRUTH, and the word *truth*. The property of /truth/ is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of /truth/; and *truth*· is the word we (...) use to express that understanding. Almost all human beings over the age of 2 have the concept of TRUTH, and therefore, the question whether some tradition has the concept of TRUTH is moot, but that doesn't imply that every language has a (single) word for *truth*. Furthermore, recognizing *truth* is complicated by the conceptual neighbors of TRUTH. What distinguishes *truth* from its neighbors is disquotationality. Theories of /truth/ similarly need to be distinguished from theories about adjacent notions. If a theory is more plausibly interpreted as a theory of /justification/, then it is not a theory of /truth/. (shrink)

What today divides analytical from Continental philosophy? This paper argues that the present divide is not what it once was. Today, the divide concerns the styles in which philosophers deal with intellectual problems: solving them, pressing them, resolving them, or dissolving them. Using ‘the boundary problem’, or ‘the democratic paradox’, as an example, we argue for two theses. First, the difference between most analytical and most Continental philosophers today is that Continental philosophers find intelligible two styles of dealing with problems (...) that most analytical philosophers find unintelligible: pressing them and resolving them. Second, when it comes to a genuine divide in which not understanding the other side’s basic philosophical purposes combines with disagreement on fundamental questions of doctrine, the only such divide today is that between those analytical philosophers who tend to solve problems and those Continental philosophers who tend to press problems. It is among these subgroups that there is a real philosophical divide today. So the analytical–Continental divide is more a matter of style than of substance; but as we try to show, differences in style shape differences over substance. (shrink)

In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail (...) commitment to such a view, and I propose to consider a form of realism that dissolves the measurement problem. It is simply a stripped down version of realism. I derive the methodological questions in this form of realism, speculating that within it a novel realist interpretation of quantum mechanics could be conceived. (shrink)

Estudio sobre el alcance de la concepción del pensamiento hispanoamericano en José Gaos, en su obra de los años 40. A History of Latin American Philosophy (s. XVI- XIX): / José Gaos (1900-1969).

ABSTRACT of The Flying Termite by L.L. Katona -/- In this book I would like to show the term “intelligence“ has a universal, non-anthropomorphic meaning. We can perceive intelligence in dogs, dolphins or gorillas without understanding of it, but intelligence can be also seen in many other things from insects and the Solar System to elementary particles or the rules of a triangle. But that doesn’t mean intelligence comes from Intelligent Design, yet alone a Designer, they seems to be the (...) “state of things” in the Universe. One of the most known law of the triangle is “the measures of the interior angles of a triangle in Euclidean space always add up to 180 degrees.” The question is this law exists without any existing triangle, or not? If there is an encrypted program in DNA, what determines which living being will be a chameleon or a cat, where this program lies? Whether in the DNA itself? But DNA also programmed. Where is the program of a computer? You may say in the hard drive or in the head of the programmer. But the hard drive or the head of the programmer is just the vehicle of the program; when you dissect a computer or a programmer’s head you will not find the program, just the diodes or cells connected by pack of orders. And you won’t see the orders in them. In my book I want to show the works of this elusive intelligence with some interesting contradictions between causality, determinism, teleology, and dependent formation through biology, mathematics and logic. If I need to summarize my idea I can use the following parable. A priest and an atheist are playing with a beach ball in a pool, in a two-dimensioned plane. They are rod-people with a circle. What they can’t perceive is this plane is a part of a three-dimensioned world, where the wind is blowing, so they can’t understand why the ball disappearing continuously, and why it comes back at another point randomly. Both of them have a hint, the ball is a sphere, and the space is three-dimensioned, but instead of trying to work in team to understand this curious phenomena of the Beach Ball, they’re using the old method: insulting each other. (shrink)

This Special Issue of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies originates from ‘A Dangerous Liaison? The Analytic Engagement with Continental Philosophy’, a conference held at the University of York on 9th December 2011 courtesy of the support of The Mind Association, the Aristotelian Society, and the Humanities Research Centre. There were four invited speakers, each with a respondent, and two graduate speakers, with papers presented by four of the six article authors in this volume. The aim of the conference was (...) to promote cross-pollination between the two traditions of philosophy, with the emphasis on what analytic philosophers could gain from engaging with phenomenology and hermeneutics. The conference was bookended by two excellent broadcasts on the relationship under scrutiny: Stephen Mulhall, Béatrice Han-Pile, and Hans-Johann Glock were interviewed on BBC Radio 4 in a programme of In Our Time entitled ‘The Continental-Analytic Split’ on 10th November; and the Philosophy Bites podcast for 18th December was ‘Brian Leiter on The Analytic/Continental Distinction’. (shrink)

Philosophizing and the True Knowledge of Human Being -/- The article presents the principles and method of classical philosophy. This kind of philosophy, developed mainly in ancient and medieval times, is still viable and interesting today. What is more important, it can be used as grounds for academic philosophy. Doing so provides a philosopher with resources for autonomy in her philosophical inquiry as well as the usefulness and application of its results for various cultural, social, and political tasks. The last (...) part of the article explains the manner in which the principles of philosophy may be connected with different ways of classical philosopher’s concern the with knowledge of the human being understood as a special, unique being, with her transcendence behind her biological nature and human society. In the conclusion, several tasks for philosophical reflection are given. In all its parts, the article emphasizes the importance of the concept of philosophizing person for the understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

There are two aspects to Wittgenstein’s method of deconstructing pseudo-philosophical problems that need to be distinguished: (1) describing actual linguistic practice, and (2) constructing hypothetical ‘language-games’. Both methods were, for Wittgenstein, indispensable means of clarifying the ‘grammar’ of expressions of our language -- i.e., the appropriate contexts for using those expressions – and thereby dissolving pseudo-philosophical problems. Though (2) is often conflated with (1), it is important to recognize that it differs from it in important respects. (1) can be seen (...) as functioning as a direct method of ‘proof’ (i.e., attempt to convince the reader of some thesis), and (2) as an indirect method of ‘proof’ -- proof by reductio ad absurdum. This essay will be devoted to clarifying (2) by forging an analogy with surrealism in art. (shrink)

We describe an ontology of philosophy that is designed to aid navigation through philosophical literature, including literature in the form of encyclopedia articles and textbooks and in both printed and digital forms. The ontology is designed also to serve integration and structuring of data pertaining to the philosophical literature, and in the long term also to support reasoning about the provenance and contents of such literature, by providing a representation of the philosophical domain that is oriented around what philosophical literature (...) is about. (shrink)

Traditional representations of philosophy have tended to prize the role of reason in the discipline. These accounts focus exclusively on ideas and arguments as animating forces in the field. But anecdotal evidence and more rigorous sociological studies suggest there is more going on in philosophy. In this article, we present two hypotheses about social factors in the field: that social factors influence the development of philosophy, and that status and reputation—and thus social influence—will tend to be awarded to philosophers who (...) offer rationally compelling arguments for their views. In order to test these hypotheses, we need a more comprehensive grasp on the field than traditional representations afford. In particular, we need more substantial data about various social connections between philosophers. This investigation belongs to a naturalized metaphilosophy, an empirical study of the discipline itself, and it offers prospects for a fuller and more reliable understanding of philosophy. (shrink)

What are ideas? How have new ideas emerged? How have ideas been preserved or altered? Whoever ‘has got an idea’ may believe it fell from the skies. Yet in so far as they become intelligible, ideas must have grown out of some tradition, and in so far as they are significant, new ideas grow from them. In a nutshell: Ideas are always connected historically. How such connections are to be explored constitutes the subject matter of this book, focussing on method.

Is Descartes the most misunderstood philosopher in the history of philosophy? To many of us in the business of Descartes scholarship, it certainly seems so. Time and time again, we find ourselves faced with pronouncements about one or another of Descartes's 'errors' — whether the shortcomings of the theater model of consciousness, or the pernicious after-effects of a foundationalism devoted to the transparency of the mental, or the shocking vilification of the body and emotions. Typically these pronouncements are paired with (...) exhortations to overcome the Cartesian X, where 'X' stands for whatever item crucial to enlightenment is currently most misunderstood. That X is some term rarely used and drastically .. (shrink)

It is possible to pursue philosophy with a clarificatory end in mind. Doing philosophy in this mode neither reduces to simply engaging in therapy or theorizing. This paper defends the possibility of this distinctive kind of philosophical activity and gives an account of its product—non-theoretical insights—in an attempt to show that there exists a third, ‘live’ option for understanding what philosophy has to offer. It responds to criticisms leveled at elucidatory philosophy by defenders of extreme therapeutic readings and clearly demonstrates (...) that in rejecting the latter one cannot assume Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy was theoretically based by default. (shrink)

Williams Syndrome provides a striking test case for discourses on disability, because the characteristics associated with Williams Syndrome involve a combination of “abilities” and “disabilities”. For example, Williams Syndrome is associated with disabilities in mathematics and spatial cognition. However, Williams Syndrome individuals also tend to have a unique strength in their expressive language skills, and are socially outgoing and unselfconscious when meeting new people. Children with Williams are said to be typically unafraid of strangers and show a greater interest in (...) contact with adults than with their peers. This apparently keen social knowledge is a counterexample to the discussion of disability among academic philosophers, especially philosophers of the early modern period. Locke infamously used the example of disability to claim that Descartes’ arguments in favor of innate ideas were incorrect. On the contrary, Williams Syndrome may stand as an example of innate social knowledge; something that could benefit current discourse in philosophy, disability theory, and medical ethics. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is the object of metaphilosophical investigations. Metaphilosophy is the philosophy of philosophy. Philosophy is an archetypical thinking of being or an experience-of-being. History of Greek-European tradition of philosophy has three archetypes of thinking: objectivity, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity. They are three archetypical contexts of interpretations of the concept of a philosophy of science too. Is philosophy of science part of philosophy? Is philosophy ofscience part of epistemology? What are methods of philosophy of science? These questions are the topics (...) of metaphilosophy. The topic of a scientific fact is a focal point of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Is a scientific fact a fallible knowledge? The nature of a scientific fact is discussed in keeping with to the opposition of fallibilism and infallibilism. If fallibilism is universal quality of knowledge then there is a problem: is a scientific fact a fallible knowledge too? We are understanding and make clear the nature of a scientific fact by correlation of facts with: (1) data and evidence; (2) languages and theories; (3) methods of empirical investigations; (4) values, norms, and conventions of scientific investigations. Philosophy of science communicates with philosophy ofeconomics as the contemporary branch of philosophy. Its problems arise from the relationship of philosophy and philosophy of science with economics and practice. (shrink)

Wittgenstein wrote: 'Working in philosophy … is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's own way of seeing things.' In what sense, for Wittgenstein, is work in philosophy 'work on oneself'? This paper will be devoted to answering this question, and to delineating the moral aspects of this work.

John Dewey and Alasdair MacIntyre are seldom considered philosophically compatible. Yet, both critique contemporary liberalism by focusing on the pervasiveness of atomistic, pecuniary, laissez-faire individualism. I argue that Dewey and MacIntyre have not abandoned individualism as much as reconstructed the concept. Dewey's and MacIntyre's conceptions of human flourishing rely on a nuanced conception of individualism, which I term "collectivistic individualism.".

In one accessible, beautifully designed and illustrated volume, scholars have gathered the major theories and key ideas of world's greatest thinkers. The presentation of material sets this reference apart from other philosophy books by providing both the historical and cultural context of the ideas being explored, and by giving visual expression to the arguments and insights themselves through the artwork of the time. Immerse yourself in both Eastern and Western philosophy, spending time with Plato on knowledge, Aquinas on ethics, Marx (...) on religion, and Confucius on human destiny. Designed for maximum flexibility of use, all thinkers and issues are cross-referenced, enabling you to move within or across branches of philosophy and historical periods, to get either a broad overview of the whole world of philosophy, or a more detailed exploration of a particular thinker or approach. (shrink)

Terry Horgan defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy. I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions.

The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify (...) to the intellectual value of feminism as a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry. This volume will be essential reading for any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about the place of feminism in their subject. (shrink)

Close analysis of the work of fifty major thinkers in the field of Eastern philosophy make this an excellent introduction to a fascinating area of study. The authors have drawn together thinkers from all the major Eastern philosophical traditions from the earliest times to the present day. The philosophers covered range from founder figures such as Zoroaster and Confucius to modern thinkers such as Fung Youlan and the present Dalai Lama. Introductions to major traditions and a glossary of key philosophical (...) terms make this a comprehensive and accessible reference resource. (shrink)

● Sergio Cremaschi, The non-existing Island. I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the (self-)images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counter-instance to both the familiar self-images and to the fashionable ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. My conclusions are: (i) the only place where Continental philosophy exists (as Euro-Communism one decade ago) is America; (...) (ii) less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does no more exist as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; (iii) the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; (iv) what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenism; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag (not a difference) in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of 'Continental' philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best 'analytic' philosophers have produced. ● Michael Strauss, Language and sense-perception: an aspect of analytic philosophy. To test an assertion about one fact by comparing it with perceived reality seems quite unproblematic. But the very possibility of such a procedure is incompatible with the intellectualistic basis of logical positivism and atomism (as it is for example to be found in Russell's Analysis of Mind). According to the intellectualistic approach pure sensation is meaningless. Sensation receives its meaning and order from the intellect through interpretation, which is performed with the help of linguistic tools, i.e. words and sentences. Before being interpreted, sensation is not a picture or a representation, it is neither true nor false, neither an illusion nor knowledge; it does not tell us anything; it is a lifeless and order-less matter. But how can a thought (or a proposition) be compared with such a lifeless matter? This difficulty confronts the intellectualist, if on the one hand he admits the necessity of comparing thought with sense-perception, and on the other hand presupposes that we possess only intellectual and no immediate perceptual understanding of what we see and hear. In this paper I give a critical exposition of three attempts, made by Russell, Neurath and Wittgenstein, to solve this problem. The first attempt adheres to strict conventionalism, the second tends to naturalism and the third leads to an amended, very moderate version of conventionalism. This amended conventionalism looks at sense impressions as being a peculiar language, which includes primary symbols, i.e. symbols not founded on convention and not being in need of interpretation. ● Ernst Tugendhat, Phenomenology and language analysis. The paper, first published in German in 1970, by which Tugendhat gave a start to the German rediscovery of analytic philosophy. The author stages a confrontation between phenomenology and language analysis. He argues that language analysis does not differ from phenomenology as far as the topics dealt with are concerned; instead, both currents are quite different in method. The author argues that language-analytic philosophy does not simply lay out of the mainstream of transcendental philosophy, but that instead it challenges this tradition on the very level of foundations. The author criticizes the linguistic-analytic approach centred on the subject as well as any object-centred approach, while proposing inter-subjective understanding through language as the new universal framework. This is, when construed in so general terms, the same program of hermeneutics, though in a more basic version. ● Jürgen Habermas, Language game, intention and meaning. On a few suggestions by Sellars and Wittgenstein. The paper, first published in German in 1975, in which Habermas announces his own linguistic turn through a discovery of speech acts. In this essay the author wants to work out a categorical framework for a communicative theory of society; he takes Wittgenstein's concept of language game as a Leitfade and, besides, he takes advantage also of Wilfried Sellars's quasi-transcendental account of the genesis of intentionality. His goal is to single out the problems connected with a theory of consciousness oriented in a logical-linguistic sense. ● Zvie Bar-On, Isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. This essay presents the problem of the formal relationship between speech acts and intentional states as an essential part of the perennial philosophical question of the relation between language and thought. I attempt to show how this problem had been dealt with by two prominent philosophers of different camps in our century, Edmund Husserl and John Searle. Both of them wrote extensively about the theory of intentionality. I point out an interesting, as it were unintended, continuity of their work on that theory. Searle started where Husserl left off 80 years earlier. Their meeting point could be used as the first clue in our search. They both adopted in effect the same distinction between two basic aspects of the intentional experience: its content or matter, and its quality or mode. Husserl did not yet have the concept of a speech act as contradistinguished from an intentional state. The working hypothesis, however, which he suggested, could be used as a second clue for the further elaboration of the theory. The relationship of the two levels, the mental and the linguistic, which remained for Husserl in the background only, became the cornerstone of Searle' s inquiry. He employed the speech act as the model and analysed the intentional experience by means of the conceptual apparatus of his own theory of speech acts. This procedure enabled him to mark out a number of parallelisms and correlations between the two levels. This procedure explains the phenomenon of the partial isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. ● Roberta de Monticelli, Ontology. A dialogue among the linguistic philosopher, the naturalist, and the phenomenological philosopher. This paper proposes a comparison between two main ways of conceiving the role and scope of that fundamental part of philosophy (or of "first" philosophy) which is traditionally called "ontology". One way, originated within the analytic tradition, consists of two main streams, namely philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind, the former yielding "reduced ontology" and the latter "neo-Aristotelian ontology". The other way of conceiving ontology is exemplified by "phenomenological ontology" (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version). Ontology as a theory of reference ("reduced" ontology, or ontology as depending on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege to Quine). "Reduced ontology" is shown to be identifiable with one level of a traditional, Aristotelian ontology, namely the one which corresponds to one of the four "senses of being" listed in Aristotle's Metaphysics: "being" as "being true". This identification is justified on the basis of Franz Brentano's "rules for translation" of the Aristotelian table of judgements in terms of (positive and negative) existential judgments such as are easily translatable into sentences of first order predicate logic. The second part of the paper is concerned with "neo-Aristotelian ontology", i.e. with naturalism and physicalism as the main ontological options underlying most of contemporary discussion in the philosophy of mind. The qualification of such options as "neo-Aristotelian" is justified; the relationships between "neo-Aristotelian ontology" and "reduced ontology" are discussed. In the third part the fundamental tenet of "phenomenological ontology" is identified by the thesis that a logical theory of existence and being does capture a sense of "existing" and "being" which, even though not the basic one, is grounded in the basic one. An attempt is done of further clarifying this "more basic" sense of "being". An argument making use of this supposedly "more basic" sense is advanced in favour of a "phenomenological ontology". ● Kuno Lorenz, Analytic Roots in Dialogic Constructivism. Both in the Vienna Circle ad in Russell's early philosophy the division of knowledge into two kinds (or two levels), perceptual and conceptual, plays a vital role. Constructivism in philosophy, in trying to provide a pragmatic foundation - a knowing-how - to perceptual as well as conceptual competences, discovered that this is dependent on semiotic tools. Therefore, the "principle of method" had to be amended by the "principle of dialogue". Analytic philosophy being an heir of classical empiricism, conceptually grasping the "given", and constructive philosophy being an heir of classical rationalism, perceptually providing the "constructed", merge into dialogical constructivism, a contemporary development of ideas derived especially from the works of Charles S. Peirce (his pragmatic maxim as a means of giving meaning to signs) and of Ludwig Wittgenstein (his language games as tools of comparison for understanding ways of life). 7. Albrecht Wellmer, "Autonomy of meaning" and "principle of charity" from the viewpoint of the pragmatics of language. In this essay I present an interpretation of the principle of the autonomy of meaning and of the principle of charity, the two main principles of Davidson's semantic view of truth, showing how both principles may fit in a perspective dictated by the pragmatics of language. I argue that (I) the principle of the autonomy of meaning may be thoroughly reformulated in terms of the pragmatics of language, (ii) the principle of charity needs a supplement in terms of pragmatics of language in order to become really enlightening as a principle of interpretation. Besides, I argue that: (i) on the one hand, the fundamental thesis of Habermas on the pragmatic theory of meaning ("we understand a speech act when we know what makes it admissible") is correlated with the seemingly intentionalist thesis according to which we understand a speech act when we know what a speaker means; (ii) on the other hand, to say that the meaning competence of a competent speaker is basically a competence about a potential of reasons (or also of possible justifications) which is inherently connected with the meaning of statements, or with their use in utterances. ● Rüdiger Bubner, The convergence of analytic and hermeneutic philosophy This paper argues that the analytic philosophy does not exist, at least as understood by its original programs. Differences in the analytic camp have always been bigger than they were believed to be. Now these differences are coming to the fore thanks to a process of dissolution of dogmatism. Philosophical analysis is led by its own inner logic towards questions that may be fairly qualified as hermeneutic. Recent developments in analytic philosophy, e.g. Davidson, seem to indicate a growing convergence of themes between philosophical analysis and hermeneutics; thus, the familiar opposition of Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy might soon belong to history. The fact of an ongoing appropriation of analytical techniques by present-day German philosophers may provide a basis for a powerful argument for the unity of philosophizing, beyond its strained images privileging one technique of thinking and rejecting the remainder. Actual philosophical practice should take the dialogue between the two camps more seriously; in fact, the processes described so far are no danger to philosophical work. They may be a danger for parochial approaches to philosophizing; indeed, contrary to what happens in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" developing within the framework of one fixed paradigm is not typical for philosophical thinking. And in philosophy innovating revolutions are symptoms more of vitality than of crisis. ● Karl-Otto Apel, The impact of analytic philosophy on my intellectual biography. In my paper I try to reconstruct the history of my Auseinandersetzung mit - as I called it - "language-analytical" philosophy (including even Peircean semiotics) since the late Fifties. The heuristics of my study was predetermined by two main motives of my beginnings: the hermeneutic turn of phenomenology and the transformation of "transcendental philosophy" in the light of the "language a priori". Thus, I took issue with the early and the later Wittgenstein, logical positivism, and post-Wittgensteinian and post-empiricist philosophy of science (i.e. G.H. von Wright and the renewal of the "explanation vs understanding controversy" as well as the debate between Th. Kuhn and Popper/Lakatos); besides, with speech act theory and the debate about "transcendental arguments" since Strawson. The "pragmatic turn", started already by C.L. Morris and the later Carnap, led me to study also the relationship between Wittgensteinian "use" theory of meaning and of truth. This resulted on my side in something like a program of "transcendental semiotics", i.e. "transcendental pragmatics" and "transcendental hermeneutics". ● Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A doubt on both their houses: the blindness to non-western philosophies. The burden of my criticism is that contemporary European philosophers of all kinds have continued to think as if there were no true philosophy but that of the West. For the most part, the existentialists have been oblivious of their Eastern congeners; the hermeneuticians have yet to stretch their horizons beyond the most familiar ones; and the analysts remain unaware of the analyses and linguistic sensitivities of the ancient non-European philosophers. Briefly, ignorance still blinds almost all contemporary Western philosophers to the rich, variegated philosophical traditions outside of their familiar orbit. Both Continental and Anglo-Americans have lost the breadth of view that once characterized such thinkers as Herder and the Humboldts. The blindness that has resulted is not simply that of individual Western philosophers but of our whole, still parochial philosophical culture. (shrink)