Excerpt from Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue This book is the product of a dialogue, a dialogue first with the works of Martin Buber and later with Martin Buber himself. The influence of Buber's thought has steadily spread throughout the last fifty years until today Buber is recognized throughout the world as occupying a position in the foremost ranks of contemporary philosophers, theologians, and scholars. What has made such men as Hermann Hesse and Reinhold Niebuhr speak (...) of Martin Buber as one of the few wise men living on the earth today, however, is not only his eminence as a thinker but also his concern with the 'lived concrete, ' the everyday reality which he takes up into his imagining and bears as his responsibility. Buber's eightieth birthday, on February 8, 1958, was celebrated all over the world, for Martin Buber is one of the truly universal men of our time. 'More than any other person in the modern world, ' said the Protestant theologian H. Richard Niebuhr at one such celebration, 'more even than Kierkegaard, Martin Buber has been for me, and for many of my companions, the prophet of the soul and the witness to that truth which is required of the soul not as solitary, but as companionable being.' In a time in which we are in danger of losing our birthright as human beings, Martin Buber has shown us what it means to live as men. When in 1944 Dr. Simon Greenberg gave me the first book of Buber's that I ever read - The Legend of the Baal-Shem - Buber himself was practically unknown in America and only two of his books were in English, both published in England. Even when I wrote my doctoral dissertation on Buber in 1950, few had heard of him and few of his books were published here. Today more than twenty of Buber's books have been published in English, most of them in both England and America, several more translations are underway, five of his books have been reissued in paperback editions, four anthologies of his writings have appeared, and several books in English have been written on his thought, including the forthcoming Philosophy of Martin Buber volume of The Library of Living Philosophers, which I have had the honor of editing. In 1951-1952 Buber spent almost a year in America under the auspices of the Jewish Theological Seminary; in 1957 he was brought here by the Washington School of Psychiatry to deliver the fourth William Alanson White Memorial Lectures; and in 1958 he was brought to this country by Princeton University. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue , the first study in any language to provide a complete overview of Buber's thought, remains the definitive guide to the full range of his work and the starting point for all modern Buber scholarship. As well as summarizing Buber's early intellectual development and attitudes - his mysticism, his youthful existentialism, his philosophy of Judaism and religious socialism - it focuses on the two crucial issues of his mature thought: his dialogic or I-Thou (...) philosophy, and his probing of the nature and redemption of evil. As a sensitive, intuitive and perennially fascinating account of one of the twentieth century's great spiritual teachers, and as an influential classic in its own right, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue reveals the implications of Buber's thought for theory of knowledge, education, philosophy, myth, history and Judaic and Christian belief. This fully revised and expanded 4th edition includes a new preface from the author, an expanded bibliography incorporating new Buber scholarship, and two new appendices in the form of essays on Buber's influence on Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin. (shrink)

In this note we show that Friedman's syntactic translation for intuitionistic logical systems can be carried over to Martin-Löf's type theory, inlcuding universes provided some restrictions are made. Using this translation we show that the theory is closed under a higher type version of Markov's rule.

Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, the first study in any language to provide a complete overview of Buber's thought, remains the definitive guide to the full range of his work and the starting point for all modern Buber scholarship. Maurice S. Friedman reveals the implications of Buber's thought for theory of knowledge, education, philosophy, myth, history and Judaic and Christian belief. This fully revised and expanded fourth edition includes a new preface by the author, an expanded bibliography (...) incorporating new Buber scholarship, and two new appendices in the form of essays on Buber's influence on Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin. (shrink)

This article shows buber's dialogue with taoism, Hinduism, And buddhism, How they influenced him, And how this dialogue entered into the progressive stages of his thought. Neither hinduism nor buddhism remains a central part of buber's later thought as do taoism, Hasidism, And zen, But they do play an important part in his early developmental thinking. When he reached his mature philosophy of dialogue, He transcended his early partiality for non-Dualistic vedanta. But taoism, And especially wu-Wei, Action of the whole (...) being, Remained central to the i-Thou relationship, As did buber's affinity for the other "mysticisms of the particular," zen buddhism and hasidism. (shrink)

A study of the religious philosophy of one of the century's foremost Jewish thinkers. The author, a Buber scholar, summarizes the philosopher's views on ethics and on the history of religion, and his dialog with oriental religions. An existentialist philosopher, Buber sees "salvation" as relatedness to others and to divine revelation in day-to-day events.

Traces the development of the famous theologian's philosophy as he faced the challenges of the Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and prewar Palestine.

This is the first book on Buber to address the full scope of his seminal influence for any number of thinkers and fields from philosophy to psychotherapy to literary theory.

A biography of the noted philosopher and Jewish theologian focuses on the years in which Buber became internationally acclaimed for his work as an author, philosopher, and peacemaker.

Beginning with the similarities between Buber and Levinas-both twentieth-century Jewish philosophers, each in his own way dialogica-this essay proceeds to their differences. From there the essay discusses Levinas's critiques of Buber's philosophy, the extent to which they were based on misunderstanding, and Buber's own replies to Levinas. This foundation provides a springboard for discussion of the source of the moral ought in both Buber and Levinas-Buber's emphasis on the "between" and Levinas's emphasis on the "face"-and raises a serious ethical question (...) concerning Levinas's argument against Buber's discussion of "Samuel and Aging" from the Hebrew Bible. (shrink)

[1] The early years, 1878-1923 -- [2] The middle years, 1923-1945 -- [3] The later years, 1945-1965.

For sentences $\phi$ of $L_{\omega_{1},\omega}$, we investigate the question of absoluteness of $\phi$ having models in uncountable cardinalities. We first observe that having a model in $\aleph_{1}$ is an absolute property, but having a model in $\aleph_{2}$ is not as it may depend on the validity of the continuum hypothesis. We then consider the generalized continuum hypothesis context and provide sentences for any $\alpha\in\omega_{1}\setminus\{0,1,\omega\}$ for which the existence of a model in $\aleph_{\alpha}$ is nonabsolute . Finally, we present a complete (...) sentence for which model existence in $\aleph_{3}$ is nonabsolute. (shrink)

In its traditional form epistemology has always rested on the exclusive reality of the subject-object relationship. If one asks how the subject knows the object, one has in brief form the essence of theory of knowledge from Plato to Bergson; the differences between the many schools of philosophy can all be understood as variations on this theme. There are, first of all, differences in emphasis as to whether the subject or the object is the more real--as in rationalism and empiricism, (...) idealism and materialism, personalism and logical positivism. There are differences, secondly, as to the nature of the subject, which is variously regarded as pure consciousness, will to life, will to power, the scientific observer, or the intuitive knower. There are differences, thirdly, as to the nature of the object--whether it is material reality, thought in the mind of God or man, pantheistic spiritual substance, absolute and eternal mystical Being, or simply something which we cannot know in itself but upon which we project our ordered thought-categories of space, time, and causation. There are differences, finally, as to the relation between subject and object: whether the object is known through dialectical or analytical reasoning, scientific method, phenomenological insight into essence, or some form of direct intuition. (shrink)

Shelah has shown that $\aleph_1$-categoricity for Abstract Elementary Classes (AECs) is not absolute in the following sense: There is an example $K$ of an AEC (which is actually axiomatizable in the logic $L(Q)$) such that if $2^{\aleph_0}.

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, (...) we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it. (shrink)

My friendship with Martin Buber begins -- The cost of my commitment -- On the suspension of the ethical -- Martin Buber's first visit to America -- Sartre, Heidegger, Jung, and Scholem -- The life of dialogue: letters following Buber's first visit -- Personal direction: letters, 1954-1957 -- The Washington School of Psychiatry and the Buber-Rogers dialogue -- Postscript to I and thou: letters following Buber's second visit -- Buber's last visit to America -- Interrogations and responses: letters (...) following Buber's last visit -- Our stay in Jerusalem and Buber's last years -- Epilogue: memorial address. (shrink)

Traces the life of the renowned Jewish religious philosopher, discussing his youth, his education in turn-of-the-century Vienna, his Zionism, and the impact of world politics on his life and thought.

Martin Buber was close to sociology and sociologists from his university years on and in 1938 was head of the new Department of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Although influenced by Ferdinand Toennies, and George Simmel, he went beyond them in his philosophy of the “interhuman” from which standpoint he also criticized Max Scheler. Focal social concepts of Buber's are “the interhuman”_the dialogical relationship between persons that entails “inclusion,” or “imagining the real,” making present, and confirmation ; (...) the “essential We” or common cosmos that each helps to build by speech-with-meaning from his or her unique stance; the distinction between the “political principle” of government and the “social principle” of fellowship and social spontaneity; and the philosophy of community that led Buber to a federalistic socialism and the vision of restructuring society into a “community of communities”. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

In this insightful study of the common origins of analytic and continental philosophy, Friedman looks at how social and political events intertwined and influenced philosophy during the early twentieth century, ultimately giving rise to the two very different schools of thought. He shows how these two approaches, now practiced largely in isolation from one another, were once opposing tendencies within a common discussion. Already polarized by their philosophical disagreements, these approaches were further split apart by the rise of Naziism (...) and the resulting emigration of all influential German-speaking philosophers except for Heidegger. Although the book gives a general overview of the philosophical issues of the period, the author pays special attention to the relationships among three key twentieth-century philosophers: Rudolf Carnap, Ernst Cassirer, and Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

Friedman continues an old and longstanding love: a poetics of dialogue with modern literature. Such a poetics sees literature and its interpretation in terms of what philosopher Martin Buber calls "meeting" or "the between." Friedman's powerful study boldly asserts that meaning can be reached through an engagement with classic works of world literature to arrive at a more powerful and purposeful affirmation while holding the tension with what is negative.

In "A proof of Vaught's conjecture for ω-stable theories," the notions of ENI-NDOP and eni-depth have been introduced, which are variants of the notions of NDOP and depth known from Shelah's classification theory. First, we show that for an ω-stable first-order complete theory, ENI-NDOP allows tree decompositions of countable models. Then we discuss the relationship between eni-depth and the complexity of the isomorphism relation for countable models of such a theory in terms of Borel reducibility as introduced by Friedman (...) and Stanley and construct, in particular, a sequence of complete first-order ω-stable theories $(T_\alpha)_{\alpha < \omega_1}$ with increasing and cofinal eni-depth and isomorphism relations which are strictly increasing with respect to Borel reducibility. (shrink)

In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to (...) recent studies by Turri and Friedman. (shrink)

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...) theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne’s epistemic rule (BEL): If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers’s theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)? (shrink)