Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and (...) Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

This indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science contains fifty-five specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences. The _Companion_ covers everything students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including: a section on the individual (...) sciences, including chapters on the philosophy of biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter. (shrink)

This indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science contains fifty-five specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers: historical and philosophical context debates concepts the individual sciences. The _Companion_ covers everything students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including: a section on the individual (...) sciences, including chapters on the philosophy of biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter. (shrink)

Some philosophers have argued that miracles cannot occur because it is impossible for an event to violate a law of nature. This paper examines three attempts (by W.L. Rowe, N. Smart, and R. Swinburne) to refute this argument. It concludes that none of them is successful if one wants to use the law-violating character of alleged miracles as evidence for God’s existence and nature.

The claim that even in 1543 the Copernican theory was objectively superior to the Ptolemaic theory is explained and defended. The question is then raised concerning the relevance of this insight for our understanding of the rationality of the Copernican revolution. It is proposed that (a) the decision to reject the Ptolemaic theory first became clearly rational early in the 17th century as a result of Galileo's observations of the phases of Venus, and (b) the decision to accept the Copernican (...) theory only became clearly rational when Newtonian gravitational theory provided reasonable physical grounds for rejecting the Tychonic theory towards the end of the 17th century. (shrink)

This is an excellent book on a limited topic, displaying meticulous scholarship in its use of primary sources and shrewd judgment in its interpretation of facts. It makes a small but valuable contribution to our understanding of the relationships between Calvinist theology, Cartesian philosophy and the "new science"' in the 17th century, and the mechanisms by which science became an established part of Enlightenment society and education.

The book is divided into two parts. Each part is about eighty pages, followed by nearly fifty pages of notes and a comprehensive bibliography. Morality is reappraised in Part 1 and reaffirmed in Part 2. The aim of Part 1 is to articulate a conception of morality and moral theory that combines elements from act-based and virtue-based approaches, with the latter taking the lead. Part 2 defends moral theory against the criticisms of "antitheorists," a diverse group that includes Annette Baier, (...) Stanley Fish, Cheryl Noble, Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum, and Michael Walzer. In both parts most of the historical attention is devoted to Aristotle and Kant. Louden contends that neither Aristotle nor Kant were as exclusive in their approaches to morality as they are usually portrayed. Aristotle, it is argued, had a use for a specifically moral ought; Kant had a keen interest in the cultivation of virtue. Both are largely innocent of the crimes of which they stand accused by the antitheorists. What are those crimes? They are the errors of thinking that correct moral judgments are deducible from universal principles; that moral values are commensurable; that all moral conflicts are rationally resolvable; that the role of moral theory is to enable one to deduce the correct answer to moral questions; that moral theory is purely normative, not descriptive or explanatory; and that moral problems are solved best by moral experts. Louden agrees with the antitheorists that all of these are false, but he maintains that few moral theories entail them. Thus, he charges that the antitheorists are attacking a straw man. It is of some interest here that Louden dismisses utilitarianism--one of the main targets of the antitheorists--in a few paragraphs for committing the sin of reductionism. There is no significant discussion of more sophisticated consequentialists such as Sedgwick, Moore, and Brandt. In many ways Aristotle is an easy case for Louden to defend, and indeed some of the authors in the antitheory group, such as Nussbaum, approve of Aristotle. The case for Kant is much harder and involves stressing Kant's appreciation of the role of non-rule-governed judgments in making moral choices. Louden says little about the categorical imperative in his treatment of Kant, though he does argue that there are genuine moral dilemmas in which neither "Do A" nor "Do not do A" can be willed to be universal law. (shrink)

In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.

In, “Some Conclusive Reasons Against ‘Conclusive Reasons’”, Pappas and Swain have criticized Dretske’s theory that conclusive reasons are necessary for knowledge. In their view this condition is too strong. They attempt to show this by means of two purported counterexamples: the cup-hologram case and the generator case. This paper defends Dretske’s analysis against these challenges.

The aim of this book is to defend compatibilism against incompatibilism by exploring the metaphysical issues that lie at the heart of the debate between them. Berofsky defines incompatibilism as the doctrine that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that particular action is not determined. Thus, regardless of the truth of determinism, that is, regardless of whether or not all events and actions are determined, the key question is: Can an agent be morally responsible for an (...) action that is determined? Berofsky thinks the correct answer is yes, and that all arguments for incompatibilism are unsound. (shrink)