From dogs to gods, the science of understanding mysterious minds--including your own. Nothing seems more real than the minds of other people. When you consider what your boss is thinking or whether your spouse is happy, you are admitting them into the "mind club." It's easy to assume other humans can think and feel, but what about a cow, a computer, a corporation? What kinds of mind do they have? Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray are award-winning psychologists who (...) have discovered that minds--while incredibly important--are a matter of perception. Their research opens a trove of new findings, with insights into human behavior that are fascinating, frightening and funny. The Mind Club explains why we love some animals and eat others, why people debate the existence of God so intensely, how good people can be so cruel, and why robots make such poor lovers. By investigating the mind perception of extraordinary targets--animals, machines, comatose people, god--Wegner and Gray explain what it means to have a mind, and why it matters so much. Fusing cutting-edge research and personal anecdotes, The Mind Club explores the moral dimensions of mind perception with wit and compassion, revealing the surprisingly simple basis for what compels us to love and hate, to harm and to protect. (shrink)

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reasonis an outstanding reference source to this exciting and distinctive subject area. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the field covering questions such as: What is the nature of the reasons for which we act and what is the nature of the faculty of practical reason? What are normative reasons for action? What is practical irrationality and what are the requirements, permissions, and powers that (...) explain what it is to be practically rational and irrational? What is the relationship between ethics and the philosophy of practical reason? This handbook will be essential reading for philosophy students and researchers in metaethics, philosophy of action, action theory, ethics and history of philosophy. (shrink)

The question of the moral status of human nature is today being posed above all under the influence of medical and biotechnological aspects. These facilitate not only an increasing number of, but also increasingly far-reaching interventions and manipulations in humans, so that the perspective of a gradual "technologization" of his physical constitution can no longer be regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that this disturbing development can only be halted when an inherent value is (once again) ascribed to (...) human nature. After a short description of this situation (I), the following paper first examines the difficulties that arise as regards an adequately precise descriptive definition of human nature (II) and, in a second step, the problems posed by the necessity to define the normative status of human nature (III). It hereby comes to the conclusion that a precise definition of "human nature" is not possible for fundamental reasons, and that only a weak normativity can be warranted. (shrink)

In its first part, this paper seeks to make plausible (a) that molecular genetic diagnostics differs in ethically relevant ways from traditional types of medical diagnostics and (b) that the consequences of introducing this technology in broad screening-programs to detect widespread genetic diseases in a population which is not at high risk may change our understanding of health and disease in a problematic way. In its second part, the paper discusses some aspects of public control of scientific and technological innovations (...) in the field of molecular genetic diagnostics. (shrink)

Our recent review demonstrates that “purity” is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify some of these understandings, but much messiness remains. The harm-centric theory of dyadic morality suggests that purity violations can be comprehensively understood as abstract harms, acts perceived by some people (and not others) to indirectly cause suffering.

Aqua an ignis utilior - De sollertia animalium - Bruta ratione uti - De esu carnium I - De esu carnium II - Platonicae quaestiones - De animae procreatione in Timaeo - Epitome libri de animae procreatione in Timaeo.

1. It seems that the description and explanation of what is going on in inanimate nature differ in important respects from the description and explanation of what is going on when that involves human beings or certain animals. The difference is sometimes expressed by saying that whereas in the former case what we describe and explain is always events, in the latter it is sometimes events and sometimes actions. Material objects, one might say, do not do anything, do not perform (...) actions, are not agents. The question arises whether the differences between material objects and agents, and consequently between events and actions, are such as to render inapplicable to actions the categories of explanation employed in the natural sciences. This question is sometimes answered in the affirmative. In particular, it is argued that actions do not admit of causal explanations, or of explanations in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or in terms which imply that the occurrence of an action is wholly determined. Or it is argued more cautiously, that, even if some kinds of action are so explicable, the most important kinds, those which are voluntary, intentional, deliberate, cannot be. In this essay, I argue for a third theory. It shares with the first two the view that in the narration and description of events and actions we do not employ exactly the same categories and that, therefore, in the explanation of one, reference may have to be made to types of fact not mentioned in the explanation of the other. Thus, in the explanation of why I raised my arm, I may have to refer to my purpose, intention or aim, whereas in the explanation of my arm’s going up, this may be irrelevant. Nevertheless, the theory here defended maintains that all kinds of action, including intentional ones, admit of causal or deterministic explanations. (shrink)

Gauthier's magnificent book erects a conception of morality, “morals by agreement,” on the foundation of his own theory of practical rationality. This is as it should be if, as he claims, following Hobbes and others, there is an initial “presumption against morality” and no theory of morals “can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are also truly endorsed in each individual's reason”, indeed, that it is a requirement of rationality that one (...) always satisfy the requirements of morality. This means, however, that the initial assumption against morality is inherited by his theory of practical rationality. His theory of morals therefore can serve a useful purpose only if his theory of rationality is sound. In this paper, I want to explore some of the more dubious aspects of that theory to see whether it can bear the heavy load of justification that “morals by agreement” places on it. (shrink)

Das Thema "menschliche Natur" hat eine lange Tradition in der Geschichte des philosophischen Denkens. Vor allem in Krisenzeiten und an Epochenschwellen stellte sich immer wieder Frage, was der Mensch "eigentlich" ist. Es sollte daher auch nicht überraschen, daß diese Frage auch in der Gegenwart wieder eine zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit findet. Nach langen Jahren eines nur zurückhaltenden Interesses findet die philosophische Anthropologie wieder stärkere Aufmerksamkeit. - Und doch handelt es dabei nicht nur um die Wiederaufnahme eines alten Themas. Die philosophische Beschäftigung mit (...) der menschlichen Natur hat im Zusammenhang mit den Fortschritten der modernen Bio- und Informationstechnologie eine unmittelbar praktische Relevanz bekommen, die sie in dieser Weise niemals zuvor hatte. Durch diese Fortschritte haben nämlich die Möglichkeiten technischer Eingriffe am Menschen eine Dimension erreicht, die nicht mehr nur einzelne seiner Merkmale manipulierbar macht, sondern seine "Natur" selbst. Dies gilt insbesondere im Hinblick auf die nicht mehr vollkommen utopische Idee eines genetischen Umbaus der gesamten Menschheit. Die Frage, die sich vor diesem Hintergrund stellt, ist die nach dem normativen Status der menschlichen Natur. Ist die psycho-physische Gestalt, in der wir den Menschen seit jeder kennen, ein Produkt zufälliger evolutionärer Prozesse und als solche moralisch neutral; oder ist sie intrinsisch wertvoll und daher schützenswert? Die in der Literatur geäußerten Meinungen zu dieser Frage gehen auseinander. Auf der einen Seite stehen diejenigen, die in der menschlichen Natur lediglich eine Tatsache sehen und keinen Grund erkennen können, weshalb diese Tatsache sakrosankt ein sollte. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen, so behaupten die Vertreter dieser Partei, kann es nicht nur legitim sein, die menschliche Natur zu verbessern, es kann sogar moralisch geboten sein. Auf der anderen Seite stößt genau diese Vorstellung einer technischen Rekonstruktion des Menschen auf Empörung und Abscheu. Abgesehen von allen Risiken, die mit einem solchen Herumbasteln verbunden sind, werde der Mensch auf diese Weise auf ein beliebiges "Stück Natur" reduziert; er werde zum totalen Objekt technischen Handelns und seiner Würde beraubt. Der menschlichen Natur müsse daher ein inhärenter Wert zugeschrieben werden, um den unverantwortlichen Plänen der Menschheitsverbesserer eine kategorische Grenze zu setzen. Doch was ist die "menschliche Natur"? Worin besteht sie und wie kann sie angesichts der unübersehbaren individuellen und kulturellen Vielfalt definiert werden? Dies ist die erste Frage, der die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gewidmet sind. Und an sie schließt sich sogleich eine zweite an: Wenn es denn eine menschliche Natur gibt und wenn diese hinlänglich genau umrissen werden kann: Kann oder muß ihr dann ein moralischer Status zugeschrieben werden? Und welcher Art ist dieser Status: Ist er der menschlichen Natur inhärent oder leitet er sich von etwas anderem ab? -. (shrink)

'The Battle of the Gods and Giants Redux' is a collection of 14 original essays in early modern philosophy by leading scholars in the field presented in honour of Thomas M. Lennon.

Probably no one has done more than Frankena to bring about the recent shift in philosophical interest from the primarily linguistic concerns of metaethics to what he calls “meta-morals,” that is, to questions about morality as a whole. Instead of investigating what so-called ethical terms stood for, or whether ethical utterances employed propositions or proposals or imperatives or whether they expressed feelings, beliefs, descriptions or prescriptions, or whether they conformed to ordinary propositional logic or to an imperatival or some other (...) logic of their own, Frankena set out to investigate the moral enterprise itself. Quite recently he put together the results of these reflections in two series of lectures, “Three Questions About Morality” and Thinking About Morality. My own views had always been very close to his, but these recent lectures, which for the first time put his thoughts on this topic together in a systematic way, have made clear to me that, while the starting point of our investigations is indeed the same, our conclusions diverge on a number of important points. I want to take up some of the problems to which we offer different solutions. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to discuss two types of moral judgment, the ascription of moral value and of moral worth. Such judgments attribute evaluative properties to persons. There can be little doubt that such judgments are frequently passed and that, though many people find them distasteful, they are indispensable to the effective operation of a morality. To take seriously the slogan ‘Judge not lest ye be judged’ is to treat morality as a private, personal matter, which is solely a (...) person’s own concern. But so taken, the slogan invites indiscriminate mutual condonation of, and so connivance at, immorality. I therefore ignore possible objections to such judgments on the grounds of their supposed illegitimacy. (shrink)

Building upon a recent call to renew actor-network theory (ANT) for educational research, this article reconsiders relations between technology and educational theory. Taking cues from actor-network theorists, this discussion considers the technologically-mediated networks in which learning actors are situated, acted upon, and acting, and traces the novel positions of creative capacity and participation that emerging media may enable. Whereas traditional theories of educational technology tend to focus on the harmonization of new technologies with extant curricular goals and educational practices, an (...) educational theory of technology looks to novel forms of technologically-mediated learning experience—from production pedagogies to role play in the virtual—to make visible the surprising relations, techniques, and opportunities that emerging media, and their attendant social contexts, may offer educational research. (shrink)

Dieser Band ist der erste Teil einer Lekture von Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes, in dem die ersten drei Hauptkapitel - d.h. -Bewusstsein-, -Selbstbewusstsein- und -Vernunft- - von Hegels erstem Hauptwerk umfassend kommentiert werden. Der Text entstand dabei wahrend eines uber viele Jahre laufenden Seminars, welches am Institut fur Philosophie der Universitat Wien unter Leitung von Professor Dr. Friedrich Grimmlinger abgehalten wurde und in dem der Hegelsche Text gemeinsam Satz fur Satz gelesen und ausgelegt wurde.".

Revised habilitation - Universitèat, Wien.

This article was prepared for the International Demographic History Congress on ‘Malthus Yesterday and Today’ which took place in Paris, 27–29 May 1980.