It is often claimed that humans are rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral creatures. What these characterizations may all have in common is the more fundamental claim that humans are normative animals, in the sense that they are creatures whose lives are structured at a fundamental level by their relationships to norms. The various capacities singled out by discussion of rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral animals might then all essentially involve an orientation to obligations, permissions and prohibitions. And, if this is (...) so, then perhaps it is a basic susceptibility, or proclivity to normative or deontic regulation of thought and behavior that enables humans to develop the various specific features of their life form. This volume of new essays investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals in this sense. The contributors do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms-social, moral, and linguistic-and asking whether they might all be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind. These questions are posed by philosophers, primatologists, behavioral biologists, psychologists, linguists, and cultural anthropologists, who have collaborated on this topic for many years. The contributors are committed to the idea that understanding normativity is a two-way process, involving a close interaction between conceptual clarification and empirical research. (shrink)

The question of the moral status of human nature is today being posed above all under the influence of medical and biotechnological aspects. These facilitate not only an increasing number of, but also increasingly far-reaching interventions and manipulations in humans, so that the perspective of a gradual "technologization" of his physical constitution can no longer be regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that this disturbing development can only be halted when an inherent value is (once again) ascribed to (...) human nature. After a short description of this situation (I), the following paper first examines the difficulties that arise as regards an adequately precise descriptive definition of human nature (II) and, in a second step, the problems posed by the necessity to define the normative status of human nature (III). It hereby comes to the conclusion that a precise definition of "human nature" is not possible for fundamental reasons, and that only a weak normativity can be warranted. (shrink)

In its first part, this paper seeks to make plausible (a) that molecular genetic diagnostics differs in ethically relevant ways from traditional types of medical diagnostics and (b) that the consequences of introducing this technology in broad screening-programs to detect widespread genetic diseases in a population which is not at high risk may change our understanding of health and disease in a problematic way. In its second part, the paper discusses some aspects of public control of scientific and technological innovations (...) in the field of molecular genetic diagnostics. (shrink)

Das Thema "menschliche Natur" hat eine lange Tradition in der Geschichte des philosophischen Denkens. Vor allem in Krisenzeiten und an Epochenschwellen stellte sich immer wieder Frage, was der Mensch "eigentlich" ist. Es sollte daher auch nicht überraschen, daß diese Frage auch in der Gegenwart wieder eine zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit findet. Nach langen Jahren eines nur zurückhaltenden Interesses findet die philosophische Anthropologie wieder stärkere Aufmerksamkeit. - Und doch handelt es dabei nicht nur um die Wiederaufnahme eines alten Themas. Die philosophische Beschäftigung mit (...) der menschlichen Natur hat im Zusammenhang mit den Fortschritten der modernen Bio- und Informationstechnologie eine unmittelbar praktische Relevanz bekommen, die sie in dieser Weise niemals zuvor hatte. Durch diese Fortschritte haben nämlich die Möglichkeiten technischer Eingriffe am Menschen eine Dimension erreicht, die nicht mehr nur einzelne seiner Merkmale manipulierbar macht, sondern seine "Natur" selbst. Dies gilt insbesondere im Hinblick auf die nicht mehr vollkommen utopische Idee eines genetischen Umbaus der gesamten Menschheit. Die Frage, die sich vor diesem Hintergrund stellt, ist die nach dem normativen Status der menschlichen Natur. Ist die psycho-physische Gestalt, in der wir den Menschen seit jeder kennen, ein Produkt zufälliger evolutionärer Prozesse und als solche moralisch neutral; oder ist sie intrinsisch wertvoll und daher schützenswert? Die in der Literatur geäußerten Meinungen zu dieser Frage gehen auseinander. Auf der einen Seite stehen diejenigen, die in der menschlichen Natur lediglich eine Tatsache sehen und keinen Grund erkennen können, weshalb diese Tatsache sakrosankt ein sollte. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen, so behaupten die Vertreter dieser Partei, kann es nicht nur legitim sein, die menschliche Natur zu verbessern, es kann sogar moralisch geboten sein. Auf der anderen Seite stößt genau diese Vorstellung einer technischen Rekonstruktion des Menschen auf Empörung und Abscheu. Abgesehen von allen Risiken, die mit einem solchen Herumbasteln verbunden sind, werde der Mensch auf diese Weise auf ein beliebiges "Stück Natur" reduziert; er werde zum totalen Objekt technischen Handelns und seiner Würde beraubt. Der menschlichen Natur müsse daher ein inhärenter Wert zugeschrieben werden, um den unverantwortlichen Plänen der Menschheitsverbesserer eine kategorische Grenze zu setzen. Doch was ist die "menschliche Natur"? Worin besteht sie und wie kann sie angesichts der unübersehbaren individuellen und kulturellen Vielfalt definiert werden? Dies ist die erste Frage, der die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gewidmet sind. Und an sie schließt sich sogleich eine zweite an: Wenn es denn eine menschliche Natur gibt und wenn diese hinlänglich genau umrissen werden kann: Kann oder muß ihr dann ein moralischer Status zugeschrieben werden? Und welcher Art ist dieser Status: Ist er der menschlichen Natur inhärent oder leitet er sich von etwas anderem ab? -. (shrink)

The principle of scientific freedom is usually taken forgranted; few attempts have been made to justify it systematically. The present paper discusses three “classic” arguments, which are used to justify this principle. However, it will become clear that (a) each argument refers to a different understanding of science and therefore justifies a different type of science, and that (b) each of them is based on assumptions which are not always consistent with the social reality of scientific research; the profound changes (...) science has undergone since its inception are not sufficiently taken into account. (shrink)

Das theoretische Interesse von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels sowie der meisten ihrer Nachfolger galt den Strukturen der Gesellschaft sowie ihrer historischen Entwicklung; ihr praktisches Interesse galt der politischen Überwindung des Kapitalismus. In diesem Kontext widmeten Marx und Engels dem Phänomen ›Technik‹ beginnend mit den Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripten bis zum Kapital und darüber hinaus erhebliche Aufmerksamkeit. Eine selbständige Technikphilosophie gehörte allerdings nicht zu ihrem Programm und erst recht keine Technikethik. Das zeigt sich schon daran, dass von ›Technik‹ oder ›Technologie‹ bei ihnen (...) eher selten die Rede ist; stattdessen aber von ›Werkzeug‹, ›Maschine‹, ›Produktivkraft‹ oder ›Kapital‹. (shrink)

In a philosophical tradition extending back to antiquity, walking erect has consistently been seen as a symbol of the special position the human being occupies in the natural order. Since the Renaissance, this ability has supported the argument that human claims to happiness and power in this world are justified. Anthropology of the Enlightenment continued with this line of reasoning and attempted to strengthen it with the then contemporary natural scientific tools of discovery. An unanticipated backlash, however, resulted. Empirical discoveries (...) remained unsatisfying in light of the effort to verify human supremacy. Indeed many of them even refuted the anthropocentric bias. A trend within the Enlightenment movement reacted by polemizing human self-elevation to the lord of nature and by presenting civilization with an account of the ‘costs’ it had incurred. Athropocentrism appeared likely to fall prey to physiocentrism under the pressure of empirical research. As a consequence, the metaphysical foundations of modern ethical thought began to weaken. If the human being is simply a beast of nature, what is the basis for morality?Der aufrechte Gang ist in einer bis in die Antike zurückreichenden Tradition des philosophischen Denkens stets als ein Symbol für die besondere Stellung des Menschen in der Natur gedeutet worden. Seit der Renaissance wird er als legitimierendes Argument für den innerweltlichen Glücks- und Herschaftsanspruch des Menschen benutzt. Das anthropologische Denken der Aufklärung setzt diese Denktradition fort und versucht, sie durch den Einsatz der Erkenntnismittel der zeitgenössischen Naturwissenschaften zu stärken. Dabei ergibt sich aber eine unerwartete gegenläufige Tendenz. Die empirische Befunde bleiben unbefriedigend im Hinblick auf die angezielte Fundierung der menschlichen Sonderstellung, etliche von ihnen sprechen sogar gegen das anthropozentrische Vorurteil. In Reaktion darauf bildet sich eine Strömung innerhalb der Aufklärungsbewegung, die gegen die Selbsterhebung des Menschen zum Herrn über die Natur polemisiert; die der Zivilisation eine Rechnung über die von ihr verursachten 'Kosten' vorlegt. Der Anthropozentrismus droht unter dem Druck der empirischen Forschung in einen Physiozentrismus umzuschlagen. Damit geraten auch die metaphysischen Grundlagen des ethischen Denkens der Moderne ins Wanken. Wenn der Mensch bloß Natur ist, wo sollte dann die Moral ihr Fundament haben? (shrink)

Research Programme and Development of Science. For Imre Lakatos his methodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of a research programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies (...) of science if it is not detached from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. The methodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term "research programme" may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysis sui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too. (shrink)

Summary For Imre Lakatos hismethodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of aresearch programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies of science if it is not detached (...) from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. Themethodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term research programme may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysissui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 1 Seiten: 99-112.

This paper is based on the hypothesis that the effort to establish new criteria for diagnosing human death, which has been taking place over the past twenty years or more, can be viewed as a paradigm case for the impact of scientific and technological progress on morality. This impact takes the form of three tendencies within the change in morality, which may be characterized as ‘denaturalization’, ‘functionalization’ and ‘homogenization’. The paper concludes with the view that these tendencies do not indicate (...) a decline of morality, as feared by some authors, but rather a structural change. Keywords: bioethics (Institutionalization and Professionalization of), brain death, brain life, moral reflexivity, organ transplantation CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

From its very beginnings Darwinian theory of Evolution has had a strong appeal for philosophers; attempts have been made, among others, to base a philosophical understanding of the nature of scientific change on the Darwinian principle of natural selection. In its first section the present paper gives a sketch of the conceptions of Ernst Mach, Karl Popper and Stephen Toulmin, which converge on the claim that scientific change not only can be seen in analogy to organismic evolution, but has to (...) be conceived of as evolutionary in a strict sense of the term. In the second section this claim is analyzed critically; it is asked, whether these conceptions are based on a correct understanding of Darwinian theory and whether they succesfully translate its basic assumptions to philosophy of science. In the final section some of the main philosophical implications of the evolutionary perspective on scientific change are discussed, especially its tendency to interpret this change as a natural process. (shrink)

“Victories of Freedom which Humans Achieved by Research in the Foundation of Things”. - This article analyzes the political self-conception of leading representatives of the natural sciences in 19th century Germany. It is argued that the main feature of this self-conception which remained constant over the time consisted in a strong “rationalization-imperative”, i.e. the postulate that state and society have to be reshaped on the basis of natural science. On the other hand, this imperative was put forward in very different (...) forms and with different political content: it shifted from revolutionary aspirations in the period of 1848 to moderate and sometimes even reactionary positions in the last decades of the century. (shrink)