The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man’s evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version offered by Thomas (...) Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God’s action and a creature’s action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand’s series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism. (shrink)

Contrary to what many interpretations claim, according to Bayle faith does not completely eliminate reason. It intervenes to reveal factual truths that can only be known through revelation (for example, that God allowed Adam and Eve to sin). To these factual truths can be applied a rational principle (an axiomatic and evident one, according to Bayle, which he calls a "common notion"), namely, that "what God does is well done." God allowed sin, so we must think it was justified, even (...) if we don't understand why. This approach is what I call, cum grano salis, Pierre Bayle's theodicy. (shrink)

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute (...) to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation ex nihilo and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre was one of the most important philosophical and political thinkers of the twentieth century. His writings had a potency that was irresistible to the intellectual scene that swept post-war Europe, and have left a vital inheritance to contemporary thought. The central tenet of the Existentialist movement which he helped to found, whereby God is replaced by an ethical self, proved hugely attractive to a generation that had seen the horrors of Nazism, and provoked a revolution in post-war (...) thought and literature. In _What is Literature?_ Sartre the novelist and Sartre the philosopher combine to address the phenomenon of literature, exploring why we read, and why we write. (shrink)

Jean-Pierre Dupuy, prophet of what he calls "enlightened doomsaying," has long warned that modern society is on a path to self-destruction. In this book, he pleads for a subversion of this crisis from within, arguing that it is our lopsided view of religion and reason that has set us on this course. In denial of our sacred origins and hubristically convinced of the powers of human reason, we cease to know our own limits: our disenchanted world leaves us defenseless (...) against a headlong rush into the abyss of global warming, nuclear holocaust, and the other catastrophes that loom on our horizon. Reviving the religious anthropology of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Marcel Mauss and in dialogue with the work of René Girard, Dupuy shows that we must remember the world's sacredness in order to keep human violence in check. A metaphysical and theological detective, he tracks the sacred in the very fields where human reason considers itself most free from everything it judges irrational: science, technology, economics, political and strategic thought. In making such claims, The Mark of the Sacred takes on religion bashers, secularists, and fundamentalists at once. Written by one of the deepest and most versatile thinkers of our time, it militates for a world where reason is no longer an enemy of faith. (shrink)

I examine Bayle's infamous statement that Christian mysteries are not only "above" human reason, but are "against" it. I put it back in the context of 16th-17th century Reformed thought. I then discuss the relation between reason and faith according to Bayle.

Michèle Stanton-Jean | : Le bien commun est un concept fréquemment utilisé pour aborder la question du vivre ensemble. Rarement défini, on l’utilise pour le critiquer comme le fruit d’une vision occidentale et chrétienne non applicable sur le plan universel ou encore pour en proposer une vision moderne affranchie de sa rigidité traditionnelle. Le texte qui suit se base sur une thèse qui a examiné les principes et les valeurs qui pourraient fonder une vision renouvelée du bien commun, susceptible (...) d’être utilisée dans tous les contextes culturels et historiques, en prenant comme exemple l’élaboration de la Déclaration universelle sur la bioéthique et les droits de l’homme adoptée à la conférence générale de l’UNESCO en 2005. | : Common good is frequently mentioned to discuss how we can live together. Rarely defined, it is often described as a concept based on a Western and Christian vision that cannot be applied universally, or as a concept that could be revisited to develop a modern and non-rigid vision of it. The following text is based on a PhD thesis that studied what principles and values could contribute to the development of a renewed vision of common good that could be used in every cultural and historical context, taking as an example the elaboration of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted at the General Conference of UNESCO in 2005. (shrink)

That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I (...) begin by evaluating a pair of morally releventcounterfactuals in a case via David Lewis's account. I then turnto a slight modification of the case, arguing that Lewis'ssemantics fails to generate the correct truth values of thesubjunctive conditionals in the modified case. Finally, I presenta modified version of Lewis's semantics that generates the correctresults in all of the cases. (shrink)

This paper explores the origins of the term "causa sine qua non" used by Durand de Saint-Pourçain to describe the role of material things in knowledge. I show that its technical meaning comes from the Stoics and was transmitted to the Middle Ages by Boethius' commentary on Cicero's Topics. The expression "sine qua non" here does not have the ordinary and restricted meaning of "indispensable", "necessary condition", which can also apply to direct, per se causes of an effect. In the (...) present context, sine qua non causes do not act on the effect in question, either as concomitant, secondary, or instrumental causes, or as remote causes. They act only on that which hinders the actualization of a potentiality, in order to remove that obstacle. For example, the removal of a support that prevented something from falling does not act on that thing, nor does it add anything to its tendency to fall; it simply enables that thing to exercise its own actualization. Similarly, in cognitive processes, external things do not impose anything on the soul, but simply give it the opportunity to actualize its faculties of its own accord. I situate Durand's use of this form of causality in the context of late 13th/early 14th century theories of cognition, among several other attempts to find an alternative theory to the standard Aristotelian model and to maintain the pure activity of the soul with respect to the body. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, (...) without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the problem of Bayle's skepticism. I show that he is not a wholesale skeptic. Rather, he thinks that reason is plagued by internal conflicts. But its principles, which clash with each other, can be adopted separately from each other. It is often what we have to do when dealing with metaphysical problems. This also entails that reason is not to be rejected as a whole when it happens to be contradicted by faith; only some of (...) its principles have to be denied, and solely in that case. Further, Bayle believes that we possess absolute certainly in our knowledge of ethical principles. I show how this is compatible with his relativism in other domains by putting back his contention in the context of Reformed thought. (shrink)

I first explain the scholastic (Scotist) thesis on the independence of essences Bayle alludes to in the passage of the Continuation des Pensée Diverses where he presents the Stratonicians' and the Chinese philosophers' retorsion. Then, I show that this retorsion applies to the argument of the existence of God based on "aseity", but not to the occasionalist argument based on the "quod nescis" principle. I conclude that materialism (the "Stratonician hypothesis") cannot be, for Bayle, a satisfying system.

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute (...) to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation ex nihilo and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general. (shrink)

Le silence observé par John Rawls à propos des thèses de Friedrich Hayek sur la question de la justice sociale est à la fois remarquable et irritant. À défaut de pouvoir s’appuyer sur des textes où Rawls se démarquerait explicitement de ces thèses, il est cependant possible de tenter de tracer la ligne de clivage essentielle entre les deux auteurs : Hayek demeure convaincu que la question de la justice ne peut se poser qu’à propos des actions individuelles, c’est-à-dire dans (...) le domaine du droit privé ou de ce que l’on a appelé la justice corrective et sa démonstration s’appuie sur l’impossibilité de définir une répartition quelconque des ressources comme juste. Rawls affirme, en revanche, qu’il est impossible de définir une transaction interpersonnelle comme juste de manière isolée, et qu’il faut au contraire pour cela que cette transaction prenne place dans une structure sociale juste. Mais loin de concevoir cette justice contextuelle en termes d’allocation de ressources – position que Hayek lui attribue à tort –, il la conçoit en termes de règles de coopération sur lesquelles les partenaires pourraient raisonnablement s’accorder. Le silence de Rawls pourrait donc s’expliquer par le fait qu’il concevait comme une impasse évidente toute tentative pour déterminer les éléments d’une justice commutative ou corrective indépendamment d’une théorie de la justice distributive et que, à ses yeux, il est tout simplement absurde de s’interroger sur la justice d’une transaction – d’un contrat, d’un échange, d’une appropriation – indépendamment du contexte structurel dans lequel elle prend place. Mais il pourrait s’expliquer aussi par le fait que Hayek prend à partie une conception de la justice distributive en termes d’allocation de biens et non en termes de règles de coopération que Rawls lui-même n’a jamais songé à soutenir et qu’il rejette explicitement. (shrink)

Alors qu’il était précepteur en Suisse, le jeune Hegel traduisit minutieusement un libelle révolutionnaire dénonçant l’oppression que les autorités bernoises exerçaient sur le Pays de Vaud. Il publia ces Lettres de Jean-Jacques Cart à son retour en Allemagne, en 1798, sous le couvert d’un anonymat qu’il ne leva jamais. Derrière le caractère anecdotique de cette première publication, on peut déceler des enjeux qui conduisirent à l’instauration de l’idéalisme spéculatif. Le motif de la lutte pour la reconnaissance, en particulier, semble (...) y trouver sa première apparition. Plus fondamentalement cette première publication éclaire le travail d’élaboration stylistique conduisant progressivement au système, avec, à l’horizon, la question de la portée pratique de la philosophie. (shrink)

Un temps, Michel Foucault a été lu comme un archéologue du savoir et un homme d'archives, abandonnant par instants sa réserve pour répondre à l'urgence des luttes. La lecture des cours au Collège de France suggère pourtant que sa politique ne peut être réduite au désordre des circonstances. Elle appartient de plein droit à l'histoire de la vérité quand elle rencontre celle du gouvernement de soi-même et des autres. Comment sommes-nous gouvernés? Quel est en nous le ressort caché de la (...) servitude? Pouvons-nous être gouvernés et nous gouverner autrement? Rechercher et dire la vérité peut-il nous altérer et, avec nous, le monde auquel nous appartenons? Pour répondre à ces questions, Foucault se déplace de l'époque moderne à l'Antiquité et privilégie tour à tour les rapports de pouvoir disséminés dans toute la société, les stratégies politiques qui les organisent et le travail éthique qui permet l'" inservitude " volontaire. Au terme de ce voyage que la mort a interrompu, la volonté de vérité devient le courage de se transformer et de transformer le monde, le principe d'une expérience spirituelle dont la politique est la pierre de touche. Ces déplacements dessinent un nouveau paysage politique dont ce livre établit la cartographie, pour que d'autres, après Foucault, puissent reprendre le voyage. (shrink)

Foucault débute le cours de 1983, l’avant-dernier de son enseignement au Collège de France, par la lecture de Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?, texte auquel il confère le statut que Kant attribue à l’ Aufklärung, celui de Wahlspruch, à la fois blason, précepte et marque distinctive. On se demande comment le lecteur est engagé par la lecture qu’il expose aux auditeurs du cours. S’agit-il de se reconnaître l’obligé de ce que Kant envisage en termes de sortie, une redistribution du rapport du (...) gouvernement de soi et du gouvernement des autres? S’agit-il de s’approprier d’une manière inédite le mode kantien de l’attention à ce rapport en s’appliquant à un examen théorico-pratique qui sera à la hauteur de ce que l’actualité exige de nous? (shrink)

Quaestio, Volume 20, Issue, Page 217-238, January 2020.

La distinction que Descartes opère entre infini et indéfini est bien connue et a été abondamment commentée. On se trompe souvent, pourtant, sur la véritable nature de cet indéfini. La plupart des interprètes, du XVIIe siècle à nos jours, le réduisent à un infini en son genre, dont le genre serait l’étendue, qualifié notamment d’infini « en extension », « spatial », « négatif », « potentiel », ou « quantitatif ». Allant à l’encontre d’une telle interprétation, cet article montre (...) que l’indéfini cartésien n’est à proprement parler ni infini, pas même en son genre, ni fini, et que sa véritable nature est l’indétermination. (shrink)

La conception malebranchiste de la liberté est originale. Malebranche ne croit pas en une liberté d’indifférence absolue, c'est-à-dire en une capacité d’opérer un choix indépendamment de toute motivation. Il ne croit pas non plus que nous puissions indifféremment choisir entre deux motivations de force inégale : au moment où on se détermine, le bien le plus grand (du moins selon l’apparence) l’emporte. La liberté réside seulement dans le fait que l’on n’est pas obligé de se déterminer : nous pouvons toujours (...) suspendre notre consentement. Cette conception est exposée à des objections que Pierre Bayle a formulées et qui tentent de la mettre en contradiction avec d’autres thèses de Malebranche : son occasionalisme, sa théorie de la création continuée, l’obscurité de l’âme à elle-même, sa théologie des voies de l’action divine. Nous discuterons ces objections et verrons si Malebranche est en mesure de leur résister. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende investigar as veredas da estética da crueldade construídas no romance Venenos de Deus, remédios do Diabo, de Mia Couto, a partir da hibridização, desterriorização e dos percursos das identidades diaspóricas criadas e fragmentadas nos discursos existentes na Vila Cacimba, cenário que documenta a história de Bartolomeu Sozinho, sua esposa Dona Munda, o médico Sidónio Rosa e a mulher que este ama e busca reencontrar em Vila Cacimba, Deolinda. Nesse cenário é que os textos acerca da língua (...) enquanto colonização, da suposta epidemia enquanto multietnicidade, da diáspora, das miscigenações vistas com muita resistência, e certas inversões de significados tidos como maniqueísmos e tabus, como sugere o próprio título Venenos de Deus, remédios do Diabo, desvelam estéticas da crueldade nos cruzamentos de fronteiras e nas fronteiras que se cruzam em discursos identitários. (shrink)

O diálogo Fedro apresenta um difícil problema de interpretação para os leitores de Platão: como unificar as duas principais temáticas discutidas no texto – a do amor e a da arte dos discursos. Em trabalho recente, o comentador italiano Franco Trabattoni propõe como chave de leitura a ideia de que Platão vincula os temas do amor e da arte dos discursos por meio de uma tese acerca da natureza do pensamento e do discurso filosófico. Segundo Trabattoni, a tese em questão (...) implica um reconhecimento das limitações do conhecimento filosófico em sua pretensão de acesso à verdade. Ao longo deste artigo será argumentado que a leitura de Trabattoni, ao omitir aspectos importantes do texto de Platão, é inadequada. (shrink)

The relationship between the imaginary and the political has many aspects and it is not possible to address them all in this paper. We will choose to focus on the relationship between myth and national idea, on the one hand, and myth and political ideologies on the other. Before considering these questions, we will first present the work of Gilbert Durand from his articles “Le social et le mythique” and “La cité et les divisions du royaume” ; then we will (...) focus on the study of the two axes announced. This paper thus emphasizes the importance of the imaginary in politics and society. We will conclude with the current development, particularly in Western Europe, where myth no longer plays its unifying role for society. (shrink)