Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 319-342, Spring 2022.

Institutional investors control almost 60% of all assets under management worldwide and encompass a wide variety of organizations. Despite this reach, however, institutional investors have not received the normative scrutiny they merit beyond general discussions around their legally grounded fiduciary obligations to their beneficiaries. This paper offers a discussion of institutional investor ethical obligations in light of their specific attributes. We propose that the different characteristics of institutional investors and the diverse roles they play in the marketplace inform the scope (...) of their activities, and, in turn, the different ways in which their basic ethical obligations can be fulfilled. (shrink)

Markets, corporations, shareholding, management, law, and ethics are all human constructs. A human element seems essential to their existence. Yet, the predominant conception of shareholders as used in academia as well as the business world is thin, generic, and inanimate. This article argues that a thick conception of shareholders as human beings is needed to legitimize and improve managerial decision making under value pluralism, accurately reflect empirical reality of capital markets, and meet moral demands to respect the dignity of the (...) human person. Drawing on the philosophical idea of thick evaluative concepts, the article explores how this idea can be applied to shareholders and begins to examine some of the implications of considering shareholders’ humanity for the responsibilities of and relationships between managers and shareholders. (shrink)

“Libertarian paternalism” aims to harness cognitive biases in order to improve prudential decision-making. Some critics have objected that libertarian paternalism is wrongly manipulative. I argue that this objection is mostly unsuccessful. First, I point out that some strategies endorsed by libertarian paternalists can help people to better appreciate reasons. Second, I develop an account of manipulation according to which an agent manipulates her target by worsening the target’s deliberative position. The means of influence defended by libertarian paternalists—for instance, the judicious (...) use of default rules—are not manipulative in this way. (shrink)

Our decision-making is often subject to framing effects: alternative but equally informative descriptions of the same options elicit different choices. When a decision-maker is vulnerable to framing, she may consent under one description of the act, which suggests that she has waived her right, yet be disposed to dissent under an equally informative description of the act, which suggests that she has not waived her right. I argue that in such a case the decision-maker’s consent is simply irrelevant to the (...) permissibility of proceeding. I then consider two alternative views. According to the first, people susceptible to framing are able to give valid consent so long as they are sufficiently informed. This suggestion, I argue, maintains an overly narrow focus on mere quantity of information to the exclusion of other choice-affecting factors. A second response, which appeals to hypothetical consent, is likewise of little use in resolving the moral problem posed by framing effects. I conclude that if susceptibility to framing undermines the validity of consent, we may have good reason to reconsider whether consent has the rights-waiving function commonly attributed to it. (shrink)

Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant because it (...) parallels and corroborates well-known worries about natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and religion is genuine or superficial. (shrink)

Most anti-paternalists claim that informed and competent self-regarding choices are protected by autonomy, while ill-informed or impaired self-regarding choices are not. Joel Feinberg, among many others, argues that we can in this way distinguish impermissible “hard” paternalism from permissible “soft” paternalism. I argue that this view confronts two related problems in its treatment of ill-informed decision-makers. First, it faces a dilemma when applied to decision-makers who are responsible for their ignorance: it either permits too much, or else too little, intervention (...) to satisfy its proponents. Second, the most promising rationales in favor of the view ignore the distinction between an agent’s voluntarily bringing about some state of affairs, on the one hand, and an agent’s voluntarily assuming a risk, on the other. I conclude that a decision-maker’s ignorance is irrelevant to the permissibility of intervention on her behalf. If it is permissible to intervene in a given ill-informed choice, it would be permissible to intervene in an otherwise similar but informed choice, at least provided that intervention would produce similar benefits in both cases. This shows that we should sometimes accept straightforwardly paternalistic rationales. (shrink)

Research into the roots of ideological extremism has traditionally focused on the social, economic, and demographic factors that make people vulnerable to adopting hostile attitudes toward outgroups. However, there is insufficient empirical work on individual differences in implicit cognition and information processing styles that amplify an individual’s susceptibility to endorsing violence to protect an ideological cause or group. Here we present original evidence that objectively assessed cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes, including a willingness to harm others, and sacrifice one’s life (...) for the group. Across two samples (N = 1,047) from the United Kingdom and United States, structural equation models demonstrated that cognitive inflexibility predicted endorsement of violence to protect the national ingroup, which in turn predicted a willingness to die for the group. These statistical models accounted for an average of 31.4% of the variance in willingness to die for the group, after accounting for demographic variables. Furthermore, cognitive inflexibility was related to greater confidence in the decision to sacrifice one’s life in an ingroup trolley problem scenario. Analysis of participants’ performance on the cognitive tasks revealed that cognitive rigidity – distinctly from other aspects of cognition – was specifically implicated as a cognitive antecedent of extremist attitudes. Implications for the study of radicalization and identity fusion throug... (shrink)

Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering (...) whether a version of the reason-giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty. (shrink)

Philosophers disagree about the moral status of harm-enabling, or behavior by which an agent removes an obstacle to the completion of a threatening sequence. I argue that enabling harm is equivalent to doing harm, at least when an agent withdraws a resource to which neither she nor the victim has any prior moral claim. This conclusion reinforces the common objection that deontological appeals to the doing/allowing distinction cannot easily handle cases involving the withdrawal of aid. I argue that the existing (...) literature on this issue overlooks a more fundamental problem concerning the moral relevance of an agent’s past behavior. (shrink)

Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be (...) confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work. (shrink)

Whistle blowing programs have been central to numerous government, legislative, and regulatory reform efforts in recent years. To protect investors, corporate boards have instituted numerous measures to promote whistle blowing. Despite significant whistle blowing incentives, few individuals blow the whistle when presented with the opportunity. Instead, individuals often remain fallaciously silent and, in essence, become passive fraudsters themselves. Using the fraud triangle and models of moral behavior, we model and analyze fallacious silence and identify factors that may motivate an individual (...) to rationalize fallacious silence. We use a survey of graduate accounting students to test hypothesized factors that contribute to fallacious silence rationalizations in an academic setting. We find evidence that the ability to rationalize fallacious silence is related to community influences and personal traits such as awareness and moral competence. (shrink)

Many philosophers distinguish between "hard" paternalism, which supposedly violates autonomy, and "soft" paternalism, which does not. This chapter begins by critically assessing Joel Feinberg's account of the distinction, according to which hard paternalism interferes with voluntary self-regarding choices while soft paternalism interferes with substantially nonvoluntary self-regarding choices. It then considers several other ways to draw the hard/soft distinction. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that although the hard/soft distinction is a crucially important component of most antipaternalist views, it is surprisingly difficult to (...) draw in a satisfying way. (shrink)

This article examines the thought of two prominent political theorists: John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Both Rawls and Habermas take deliberation to be central to the theory of justice. In their view, deliberation provides a necessary alternative to paternalistic models of power and authority. The deliberative turn has been celebrated as one of the great frontiers of political theory. But what are its limitations? What are its blind spots? This article argues that the deliberative turn has reinforced the anthropocentrism of (...) modern political theory by categorically excluding the moral claims of animals from the sphere of justice. The article then proposes an evolutionary conception of justice as a way out of our anthropocentric social imaginary. (shrink)

The process of engaging in historical empathy holds the potential for significant curricular and dispositional benefits for students in history classrooms. In order to realize these benefits, classroom teachers must be able to integrate historical empathy into their existing planning and teaching; a process that would benefit from empirical examination. This single subject case study examined the pedagogical reasoning process of an experienced classroom teacher who integrated historical empathy into an existing instructional unit designed to foster student knowledge of social (...) control as an enduring historical understanding. The findings of this study suggest that experienced teachers may only be able to partially anticipate the unique pedagogical needs integrating historical empathy requires, and that a holistic examination of pedagogical reasoning during all phases of planning and teaching may be most suitable for the task. (shrink)

In this century a number of events could extinguish humanity. The probability of these events may be very low, but the expected value of preventing them could be high, as it represents the value of all future human lives. We review the challenges to studying human extinction risks and, by way of example, estimate the cost effectiveness of preventing extinction-level asteroid impacts.

A clear and concise introduction to the political philosophy of Alain Badiou, centred in a political context.

This article challenges a particular form of Eliminative Materialism as presented in the work, "Quining Qualia" where Dr. Daniel Dennett argues that qualia, as he defines it, does not exist. The paper underscores the contradictory nature of Dennett's "Intuition Pumps" and shows how he assumes the very notion he proports to defeat namely, that first-person (or subjective) conscious experience, commonly termed "qualia," exists.

The challenge from religious diversity is widely thought to be one of the most important challenges facing religious belief. Despite this consensus, however, many epistemologists think that standard versions of the challenge fail because they threaten to implicate many seemingly reasonable yet highly controversial non-religious beliefs. In light of this we develop an alternative, less discussed, diversity challenge that does not generalize. This challenge concerns why so much religious diversity exists in the first place given common religious, and in particular (...) theistic, views. Although there are some interesting scientific explanations of such diversity, satisfying theistic explanations of its existence are still required. (shrink)

Many people think that the amount of evil and suffering we observe provides important and perhaps decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world. Yet almost nobody worries about the ethics of human procreation. Can these attitudes be consistently maintained? This chapter argues that the most obvious attempts to justify a positive answer fail. The upshot is not that procreation is impermissible, but rather that we should either revise our beliefs about the severity of global arguments (...) from evil or develop new and better defenses of human procreation. Although both possibilities are worthy of pursuit, this chapter focuses on the latter possibility. (shrink)

In his article entitled 'Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism' ("Religious Studies", 42 (2006), 177–191), Stephen Maitzen draws our attention to an important feature that is often overlooked in discussion about the argument from divine hiddenness (ADH). His claim is that an uneven distribution of theistic belief (and not just the mere existence of non-belief) provides an atheological challenge that cannot likely be overcome. After describing what I take to be the most pressing feature of the problem, I argue (...) that a hidden premise causes Maitzen to overlook a Molinist solution. The upshot is a softening of the atheological import of the demographic data. (shrink)

Many philosophers maintain that an adequate metaphysical theory of social groups (e.g., baseball teams, rock bands, committees, and courts) will be one that is capable of accommodating social groups that may exist despite having no members. In this paper, I examine cases that motivate this position, cases where a social group seems to persist at some time despite having no members at that time. My aim here is twofold. First, I aim to show that we may accept that these motivating (...) cases are indeed possible without accepting that some social groups may exist despite having no members; second, I aim to show that the acceptance of the possibility of memberless social groups comes at a steep, theoretical cost. In particular, I will argue that the acceptance of memberless social groups comes at the cost of effectively preventing them from being the kinds of things that may interact with the material world. (shrink)

Balthasar Hubmaier is often called ‘the theologian of the Anabaptists’ for he was the only early Anabaptist leader with an earned doctorate. The former Catholic priest embraced the reforming thought of Erasmus, Zwingli, and eventually Zwingli’s former pupils and led the Moravian city of Nikolsburg to become a bastion of Anabaptist thought and practice. The multi-dimensional religious landscape both afforded Hubmaier the opportunity and compelled him to author the first Anabaptist catechism. Through the work, Hubmaier articulated a clear and succinct (...) portrayal of Anabaptist theology and ecclesiology summed up in the Erasmian tenet of the love of God and neighbor. (shrink)

This paper develops the outlines of a pragmatic, adaptive management-based approach toward the control of invasive nonnative species (INS) through a case study of Kings Bay/crystal River, a large artesian springs ecosystem that is one of Florida’s most important habitats for endangered West Indian manatees (Trichechus manatus). Building upon recent critiques of invasion biology, principles of adaptive management, and our own interview and participant–observer research, we argue that this case study represents an example in which rigid application of invasion biology’s (...) a␣priori imperative to minimize INS has produced counterproductive results from both an ecological and social standpoint. As such, we recommend that INS control in Kings Bay should be relaxed in conjunction with an overall program of adaptive ecosystem management that includes meaningful participation and input from non-institutional stakeholders. However, we also note that adaptive management and INS control are by no means mutually exclusive, in Kings Bay or elsewhere. Instead, we suggest that adaptive management offers a means by which INS control efforts can emerge from—and be evaluated through—ongoing scientific research and participatory dialogue about the condition of specific places, rather than non-contextual assumptions about the harmfulness of INS as a general class. (shrink)

Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent's actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others' beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another's false belief critically depends on representing the agent's potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed (...) agent's action capacities. We therefore used a `mummification' technique to manipulate whether the agent in a visual ball-detection task was free to act or whether he was visibly constrained from acting. Adults' reaction times reliably reflected the agent's beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball and not when the agent was visibly constrained from acting. Furthermore, it was the agent's constrained action capabilities, rather than any perceptual novelty, that determined whether adult observers' reaction times reliably reflected the agent's beliefs. These findings signal that our motor system may underpin more of social cognition than previously imagined, and, in particular, that motor representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking. (shrink)

This chapter considers various arguments purporting to show that respect for animal rights is consistent with "therapeutic hunting"--that is, hunting undertaken as part of a plan to control wild animal populations. It concludes that these arguments fail. It also suggests that the implications of Regan's rights view may be more sweeping than are generally recognizes: the rights view seems to rule out not only therapeutic hunting, but also subsistence hunting.

According to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry, there are weighty reasons not to create miserable people and only weaker reasons to create happy people. This view has several advantages over the Strong Procreation Asymmetry, which holds that there are no reasons to create happy people. Nonetheless, it faces a serious problem: according to some critics, it suggests that our reasons to create lives are as strong as our reasons to save lives. In response, this essay draws on the intuition that we (...) have reason to maximize the number of lives saved, even when doing so would not secure a greater benefit. Numbers are not comparably relevant, however, to choices involving the creation of people. Taken together, these judgments show that there is typically an “extra” consideration that favors saving lives over creating lives. They thereby help to defuse a common objection to the Weak Procreation Asymmetry. (shrink)

We show that the exterior algebra bundle over a curved spacetime can be used as framework in which both the Dirac and the Einstein equations can be obtained. These equations and their coupling follow from the variational principle applied to a Lagrangian constructed from natural geometric invariants. We also briefly indicate how other forces can potentially be incorporated within this geometric framework.

People with disabilities often report enjoying a much higher quality of life than people without disabilities would expect. For instance, many people believe that their lives would be much worse if they were to become paraplegic. Indeed, some people believe that life with paraplegia would be barely worth living. Yet many paraplegics report being roughly as happy as able-bodied people. This conflict in attitudes has come to be known as “the disability paradox.” Many psychologists claim that the disability paradox is (...) at least partly explained by affective forecasting errors. Someone makes an affective forecasting error when she makes a mistaken prediction about the effect of some event on her experiential quality of life. Such affective forecasting errors raise moral problems that are especially pressing in the context of medical decision-making. For instance, when a recommended treatment would leave someone disabled, she may refuse on the grounds that she would rather live a shorter life without the disability than a longer life with the disability. Yet it may be that she would feel very differently after adapting to the condition in question. What should we say about such cases? On the one hand, some ethicists have argued that affective forecasting errors compromise autonomy, so that decision-makers should take account of the likelihood that they will adapt. On the other, it may appear that decision-makers should have no regard for adaptive preferences they may form in the future. My central goal in this paper is to argue that both of these views are mistaken. If sound, my arguments suggest that legitimate moral concerns about a subject’s well-being are sometimes misrepresented as concerns about her autonomy. (shrink)

The sunk cost fallacy is a well-established phenomenon where decision makers continue to commit resources, or escalate commitment, because of previously committed efforts, even when they have knowledge that their returns will not outweigh their investment. Most research on the sunk cost fallacy is done using hypothetical scenarios where participants make a single decision to continue with a project or to abandon it. This paradigm has several limitations and has resulted in a relatively limited understanding sunk cost behavior. To address (...) some of these limitations, we created a dynamic repeated choice paradigm where sunk costs are learned over time and opportunity costs are explicit. Over three experiments we show that the sunk cost fallacy depends on the relative a priori importance of the goal being invested in. We observed escalation of commitment only when the sunk cost domain is more important than alternatives, and participants showed de-escalation of commitment to the sunk costs domain otherwise. (shrink)

Discourse, Figure signifies an event. I mean this in a variety of ways. There has been a recent event: the publication of an English translation of Jean-François Lyotard’s first major book. Its translation is an event forty years delayed and signifies the closing of a major gap in the translation of Lyotard’s work. Of course, both “signify” and “event” are important words for Lyotard. Discourse, Figure’s goal is to “signify the other of signification” (2011, 13, emphasis his). The question of (...) the representability of events that concerns Lyotard throughout his career originates in Discourse, Figure. I use these two words to guide my review. First I outline the events of the book: its context and its argument. .. (shrink)

From many Aboriginal elders, such as Tjangika Napaltjani, Bob Williams and Djiniyini Gondarra, to painters, such as Arthur Boyd, Pro Hart and John Forrester-Clack, from historians, such as Manning Clark, and poets, such as Maureen Watson, Francis Webb and Henry Lawson, to celebrated novelists, such as Joseph Furphy, Patrick White and Tim Winton, the figure of Jesus has occupied an endearing and idiosyncratic place in the Australian imagination. It is evidence enough that 'Australians have been anticlerical and antichurch, but rarely (...) antiJesus'. But which Jesus? In what follows, I seek to listen to what some Australians make of Jesus, and to consider some theological implications of their contributions for the enduring quest for an Australian Jesus. (shrink)

This essay begins by offering some observations about how holiness was comprehended and expressed in Victorian and Edwardian England. In addition to the 'sensibility' and 'sentiment' that characterised society, notions of holiness were shaped by, and developed in reaction to, dominant philosophical movements; notably, the Enlightenment and Romanticism. It then considers how these notions found varying religious expression in four Protestant traditions - the Oxford Movement, Calvinism, Wesleyanism, and the Early Keswick movement. In juxtaposition to what was most often considered (...) to be a negative expression of holiness associated primarily with anthropocentric and anthroposocial behaviour as evidenced in these traditions, the essay concludes by examining one - namely, P.T. Forsyth - whose voice called from within the ecclesial community for a radical requisition of holiness language as a fundamentally positive reality describing the divine life and divine activity. The relevance of a study of the Church's understanding of holiness and how it sought to develop its doctrine while engaging with larger social and philosophical shifts endure with us still. (shrink)

This article focuses on Daisaku Ikeda's (1928– ) philosophy and practice of intercultural dialogue—what I call ‘value‐creative dialogue’—as a new current in interculturalism and educational philosophy and theory. I use excerpts from Ikeda's writings to consider two aspects of his approach to dialogue. First, I locate his approach philosophically in Buddhism; in the examples of dialogue modeled by Ikeda's mentor, Josei Toda (1900–1958), and by Toda's mentor, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871–1944); and in Makiguchi's theory of value creation (soka) and value‐creating pedagogy. (...) Second, I consider the multiple and value‐creative levels Ikeda's dialogues play. I conclude with implications of value‐creative dialogue in education in general and bilingual‐bicultural education in particular. (shrink)