The notion of being a burden to others is mostly discussed in the context of care‐intensive diseases or end‐of‐life decisions. But the notion is also crucial in decision‐making at the beginning of life, namely regarding prenatal testing. Ever more sophisticated testing methods, especially non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), allow the detection of genetic traits in the unborn child that may cause disabilities. A positive result often influences the decision of the pregnant women towards a termination of the pregnancy. Thus, critics claim (...) that these testing methods send a negative message to people with disabilities. At the core of this is what we call the burden assumption. This assumption claims that children with disabilities are necessarily a burden to others, especially to their parents and other family members. In this paper, we discuss what being a burden to others means in this context and how such an attitude can be avoided without restraining reproductive autonomy. A closer examination shows that the burden assumption is mostly based on misinformation and a false model of disability. Empirical studies as well as narrative evidence from parents who raise a child with disabilities show that the burden assumption is wrong. Raising a child with disabilities does not necessarily mean a decrease in the quality of life. We show how the burden assumption can be challenged through an advanced genetic counselling that combines empirical evidence with narratives from a first‐person perspective. (shrink)

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the human mind (1764), whose axioms are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. Interpreters of Reid seem to be divided in evaluating the significance of his geometry of visibles in the history of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. (...) The question will be reexamined with particular attention given to his unpublished manuscripts. These include comments on Saccheri’s work and Reid’s repeated attempts to derive Euclid’s parallel postulate from the axioms of incidence. (shrink)

Richard Owen has been condemned by Darwinians as an anti-evolutionist and an essentialist. In recent years he has been the object of a revisionist analysis intended to uncover evolutionary elements in his scientific enterprise. In this paper I will examine Owen's evolutionary hypothesis and its connections with von Baer's idea of divergent development. To give appropriate importance to Owen's evolutionism is the first condition to develop an up-to-date understanding of his scientific enterprise, that is to disentagle Owen's contribution to the (...) modernization of typology and morphology. I will argue that Owen's Platonic essentialism is rhetorical and incongruous. On the contrary, an interpretation of the archetype based on Aristotle's biological works makes possible a new conception of type, based on a homeostatic mechanism of stability. The renewal of morphology hinges on homological correspondences and a homeostatic process is also the origin of serial and special homology. I will argue that special homology shows an evolutionary orientation insofar as it is a typically inter-specific character while serial homology is determined through an elementary usage of the categories of developmental morphology. (shrink)

Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...) abandoning his direct realist theory of perception, and reintroducing sense-data. The question will be reexamined by considering two aspects of Reid’s theory of vision: the claim that we do not directly perceive distance by sight and Reid’s characterization of visible figure as a partial notion of an external object. (shrink)

A radical reform of the agri-food biotech regulation in the EU is considered in many quarters as a pressing necessity. Indeed, two important decisions on the legal status of the so-called New Breeding Techniques are expected shortly. In order to clarify some basic aspects of the complex scenario, after a brief introduction regarding the “GMO” fallacy, we offer our point of view on the following facets: A faulty approach is frequent in the discussion of the agri-food regulation; NBTs, genome editing (...) may lead to the disappearance of the “GMO” meme; Beyond health and safety issues: socio-economic considerations; Sustainability: the comprehensive, meaningful starting point of a positive reform; The theoretical and legal basis for the reform are already contained in the EU’s general guidelines to legislation. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Digital technologies have become a crucial factor in nursing. Given the fact that many tasks could also be done by robots or AI systems, the place for the nurse in this scenario is unclear. In what way and to what extent will the implementation of ever more sophisticated technology affect nursing practice? It is the aim of this paper to analyse the potential challenges of nursing practice in the digital age. The analysis is conducted through the lens of new materialism, (...) a set of theoretical models that understand the relationship between humans and technology as dynamic and performative. According to this view, there is no prefixed essence of technology. Rather, the meaning of technology is enacted in concrete practice. The analysis shows that in past debates on technology use in nursing, the nurses’ role has been defined as guardians of humanity, defending the patient against the dehumanizing effects of technology. This role has been transferred to the digital age, where it is the duty of nurses to cushion the negative effects of digital technology. As an alternative to this outdated role, nurses should be included in processes of technology design and policymaking. Enabling nursing professionals to shape the circumstances of a digitally enhanced holistic practice may empower their status within the healthcare system and also benefit the patient by contributing to a more person‐centred care. (shrink)

Based on Pritchard's distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness. This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call (...) embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. (shrink)

In this commentary, I focus on Jones' suggestion of a close connection between the domain of space and that of kinship. I expand on that suggestion by introducing the concept of frame of reference and show how it can possibly participate to the generation of kinship systems.

AgeTech involves the use of emerging technologies to support the health, well-being and independent living of older adults. In this paper we focus on how AgeTech based on artificial intelligence (AI) may better support older adults to remain in their own living environment for longer, provide social connectedness, support wellbeing and mental health, and enable social participation. In order to assess and better understand the positive as well as negative outcomes of AI-based AgeTech, a critical analysis of ethical design, digital (...) equity, and policy pathways is required. A crucial question is how AI-based AgeTech may drive practical, equitable, and inclusive multilevel solutions to support healthy, active ageing. In our paper, we aim to show that a focus on equity is key for AI-based AgeTech if it is to realize its full potential. We propose that equity should not just be an extra benefit or minimum requirement, but the explicit aim of designing AI-based health tech. This means that social determinants that affect the use of or access to these technologies have to be addressed. We will explore how complexity management as a crucial element of AI-based AgeTech may potentially create and exacerbate social inequities by marginalising or ignoring social determinants. We identify bias, standardization, and access as main ethical issues in this context and subsequently, make recommendations as to how inequities that stem form AI-based AgeTech can be addressed. (shrink)

In March 2019, the German Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss (G‑BA; Federal Joint Committee) presented the result of the method assessment process on non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT). The aim of this method assessment process was to decide whether NIPT should become a publicly funded procedure of routine prenatal care. The G‑BA decided in favor of NIPT, making the implementation of NIPT very likely, provided that other healthcare and political institutions also agree. This development could be interpreted as empowering from the perspective of reproductive (...) autonomy, since NIPT allows pregnant women to obtain valuable information on the health of the fetus in a fast and easy manner and without the risks of invasive methods. However, the routinization of NIPT also implies ethical challenges. Will the routinization lead to a normalization of prenatal quality control? Will it lead to an expansion to women outside the high-risk group? What would be the ethical implications of such a development? How should physicians, geneticists, and patients deal with the increased amount of obtainable information? What are the implications for choice and decision-making in the prenatal care context? In this paper, we analyze the ethical aspects of the routinization of NIPT, focusing on information and the counseling process, the burden of choice, and the threats to reproductive autonomy by societal interests linked to NIPT. (shrink)

This paper considers the nature of schizophrenic autism and urges its importance for understanding the phenomenological core of schizophrenia. Different clinical manifestations of schizophrenic autism are demonstrated, and it is asked whether these might reflect different aspects of one underlying phenomenologically intelligible phenomenon. Four phenomenological hypotheses are put forward: that autism is a function of semantic drifting, emotional drifting, ontological incompleteness, or a particular ethic rejecting common sense. By way of conclusion an integrative hypothesis is considered: that autism is intelligible (...) in terms of the experience of disembodiment. (shrink)

As correctly noticed by Vincent Colapietro, one of the few authors who have approached the topic, pragmatism and psychoanalysis followed parallel paths. The most obvious comparison between James and Freud did not seem to cast new light neither on the understanding of psyche nor on the two movements of thought. However, a different and less obvious comparison between Peirce and Jung might be more fruitful, notwithstanding the progressive antipsychologism of Peirce’s approach to logic. As we are going to see, this (...) unusual comparison is due to the strong epistemic and philosophical import of Jung’s mature theories as well as to Peirce’s tendency to provide a general theory of the mind, both conscious and unconscious. Therefore, this paper will try to understand the attitude that Peirce had towards psychology (I), to recall the part of Jung’s theory that has to do with Peirce’s pragmatism (II), to assess the relationship between the two authors and the reciprocal advantage in mutually integrating their theories (III). (shrink)

The duality between general frames and modal algebras allows to transfer a problem about the relational (Kripke) semantics into algebraic terms, and conversely. We here deal with the conjecture: the modal algebra A is subdirectly irreducible (s.i.) if and only if the dual frame A* is generated. We show that it is false in general, and that it becomes true under some mild assumptions, which include the finite case and the case of K4. We also prove that a Kripke frame (...) F is generated if and only if the dual algebra F* is s.i. The technical result is that A is s.i. when the set of points which generate the dual frame A* is not of zero measure. (shrink)

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart tried to show that ‘a variety of colour (...) sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn, two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul. (shrink)

Gli antichi Greci la chiamavano métis. Parola comune e anche nome mitologico di divinità. Se consultiamo il vocabolario, ne troviamo due significati: "saggezza" ispirata a "prudenza" e "disegno", nel senso di "piano" concepito da qualcuno. La flessibilità ha a che fare soprattutto con il secondo significato, perché è razionalità strategica e agonistica, in cui la duttilità è insieme ragion d'essere, modo di operare e scopo. Giovanni Bottiroli sostiene da tempo la necessità di elaborare una filosofia di tipo modale, che (...) apra le categorie della logica classica alla coppia rigido/flessibile. In questo saggio porta a compimento una teoria estremamente articolata degli stili di pensiero, la sola che giudica in grado di comprendere l'eterogeneità della mente, il pluralismo logico e semantico, l'identità come polisemia. Se definiamo "rigido" ogni soggetto il cui modo d'essere è la coincidenza con se stesso, la flessibilità non può ridursi infatti a una rigidità indebolita: è inclusiva e avvolgente e le spetta il primato sul piano logico, etico ed estetico. Perché è la flessibilità a renderci liberi. (shrink)

In order to illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, Reid imagines a blind man that by ‘some strange distemper’ has lost all his notions of external objects, but has retained the power of sensation and reasoning. Reid argues that since sensations do not resemble external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer from them any notion of primary qualities. Condillac proposed a similar thought experiment in the Treatise on Sensations. I argue that Condillac can reach a conclusion opposite (...) to that of Reid only by assuming that some particular collections of sensations do indeed resemble the qualities of external objects. Reid had considered a similar case in a manuscript, but he again notices that such complex collections sensations do not resemble the qualities of external objects. (shrink)

The paper defends the theoretical strength and consistency of Rawls's constructivism, showing its ability to articulate and convincingly weave together several key ethical ideas; yet it questions the political relevance of this admirable normative architecture. After having illustrated Rawls's conception of moral agency and practical reason, the paper tackles two criticisms raised by Scheffler. First the allegation of naturalism based on Rawls's disdain of common sense ideas on desert is rebutted. It is then shown that, contrary to Scheffler's contention, Rawls (...) takes proper account of our moral sentiments in the process of constructing his normative theory. Finally, the second criticism is assessed, namely the inability of Rawls's theory to increase consent around liberal policies. Despite disagreement with details of Scheffler's argument, it is suggested that the failure of recent normative liberal theories to have a political impact belies their inability to take into proper consideration the reality of politics. A more realistic appraisal of political life and of historical events and developments are called for if political philosophy wants to be something more than an academic exercise. (shrink)

Reid’s rejection of the “theory of ideas” implies that sensations are not copies of external qualities such as extension and figure. Reid also says that not even the order of sensations is spatial. However, in his early manuscripts Reid did not deny that sensations are arranged spatially. He simply denied that our ideas of extension and figure are copied from any single atomic sensation. Only subsequently did Reid explicitly reject the view that sensations are arranged spatially. The question of the (...) spatiality of color sensation was a central concern of early interpreters of Reid, like Dugald Stewart, John Fearn, and William Hamilton. In particular, John Fearn thought that the denial of the spatiality of color sensations is the result of Reid’s commitment to the immateriality of the soul. Against Reid’s view, Fearn argued that the perception of visible figure necessarily implies the spatiality of color sensations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Schizophrenic Delusions, Embodiment, and the BackgroundGiovanni Stanghellini (bio)Keywordsschizophrenia, delusion, embodiment, common sense, phenomenologyIn their article Delusions, Certainty, and the Background, Rhodes and Gipps (2008) argue for a Background theory of delusions. Their central argument may be summed up as follows:• The formation and maintenance of delusions becomes intelligible once they are seen to reflect a basic disturbance. When studying delusions, the focus should be on providing an adequate framework (...) for understanding, rather than providing empirical hypotheses to be tested.• The basic disturbance in delusions, and insanity in general, is not a deficiency in reasoning or a defect in the content of experience, but rather something more fundamental.• Delusions––this is their central claim––are caused by a failure of the Bedrock of beliefs (Wittgenstein) or the Background (Searle) to adequately inform or constrain the process of belief formation.• Our Bedrock certainties are defined––following Wittgenstein––as ultimately constituted by our ability to act in the world and demonstrate our primary engagement with the world. They are born out of our everyday experience of the world, conveying our direct, pre-reflective, and practical grasp of the world, rather than expressing judgments we make about it.• Similarly, the Background is defined as those abilities and dispositions that are neither representations nor rules, that function before we can make sense of our experiences.• Wittgenstein’s Bedrock and Searle’s Background in great part overlap with Blankenburg’s pre-reflective natural self-evidence and Stanghellini’s common sense, namely, our own unreflecting know-how, a set of nonpropositional skills, capacities, and dispositions that attune us with the world.• Without a fully functioning Background, the distinctions between imaginary and real (mind and world), self and non-self, and cause and coincidence fail to be adequately drawn within experience. Also, grasping the meaning of others’ behaviors and a weakening of contextual influences are entailed by an erosion of Background sensibilities.I feel extremely sympathetic to this account and, as Rhodes and Gipps report, there are remarkable points of overlap between their and my own ideas about the formation of schizophrenic delusions. I would like to add some comments on the main theories on the basic disorders entailed in the pathogenesis of delusions and conclude with some suggestions to integrate the Background theory of delusions. [End Page 311]Syntagmatic Versus Paradigmatic Models of DelusionsLet me raise first an epistemological point: paradigmatic models of delusions––defining what a delusion is in itself and what are its borders with similar phenomena––proved to be unsatisfactory in psychopathology. As Schneider and Huber (1975) put it more that 40 years ago, “[w]hat counts in delusions is not the delusion itself... but snagging the course of the lived experience, rather than its product” (p. 2042). What we do need, to understand what delusions really are, are syntagmatic models how––delusions (in this case, delusions in persons with schizophrenia) are connected to other phenomena within a structure or a process. What we should look for, then, are the phenomena that contribute as motivationally (or causally) necessary vulnerability, that is, the basic disturbance for the development of delusions. This logically implies that we need studying delusions in fieri, or the pathways that lead to delusions themselves. I subscribe to the principle that studying delusion by merely concentrating exclusively on its crystallized forms would be like studying stroke victims to know more about hypertension (Parnas and Sass 2001). This methodological move from crystallized delusions to delusions in-the-making is quintessential to define the subtle, basic, phenomenal invariant core that characterizes a given psychopathological phenomenon and that emerges across the manifold facets of the phenomenon itself and shapes them and keeps them meaningfully interconnected.A syntagmatic model should account for (at least) the following features of schizophrenic delusions:• abnormalities in symbolization (loss of commonsense meaning of a given thing or fact),• formal aspects (e.g., revelation character, experience of centrality), and• specificity of content (e.g., metaphysical tinge).It should also be compatible with those phenomena like self-disorders (loss of sense of ownership and of agency) that are entailed in most schizophrenic symptoms (e.g., verbal–acoustic hallucinations and experiences of alien control). Finally, it should keep meaningfully... (shrink)

According to Reid, opinions that contradict the principles of common sense are not only false but also absurd. Nature has given us an emotion that reveals the absurdity of an opinion: the emotion of ridicule. An appeal to ridicule in philosophical arguments may easily be discounted as a logical fallacy in the same manner as an appeal to the common consent of people. This essay traces the origins of Reid's defense of ridicule in the works of Addison, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and (...) Campbell. Reid rejected a non-epistemic view of the sense of ridicule. According to Reid, ridicule includes both a feeling and a particular act of judgment based on the principles of common sense. (shrink)

An overview of current scholarship in ontology places one before two parallel lines that never meet: on the one hand there are essays in so-called “analytic ontology”, on the other hand, there are studies developed within so-called Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology. However, even though it is frequently ignored, there is an interesting philosophical current of thought within so-called “analytical Thomism”, which joins contemporary debates of “analytic ontology” from the perspective of an Aristotelian-Thomistic ontology. The main contributors to this current are P. Geach (...) and B. Miller, who have proposed a new theory about existence, called “two sense theory”. It is a view intermediate between the well known Fregean and Meinongian views, arguing for the possibility of two senses of “exists”: as first- and as second-order predicate. The object of this paper is to present this current of thought, and to evaluate it from the point of view of the history of ontology and of “continental” Thomism. (shrink)

While Hume had a favorable opinion of the new commercial society, Reid envisioned a utopian system that would eliminate private property and substitute the profit incentive with a system of state-conferred honors. Reid’s predilection for a centralized command economy cannot be explained by his alleged discovery of market failures, and has to be considered in the context of his moral psychology. Hume tried to explain how the desire for gain that motivates the merchant leads to industry and frugality. These, in (...) their turn, benefit all society. Reid still saw the desire for money as a degenerate form of the desire for power. The contrast between Hume and Reid, however, has not to be taken too far. On some particular matters of economic policy, such as paper credit, Hume and Reid eventually came to similar views. (shrink)

Die Möglichkeiten der Reproduktionsmedizin erweitern sich ständig. Bei einigen Maßnahmen assistierter Reproduktion ist es oft unklar, ob eine Indikation vorliegt oder ob diese Maßnahmen als wunscherfüllend anzusehen sind. Die Unterscheidung zwischen medizinisch indizierter Maßnahme und wunscherfüllender Behandlung hängt von dem hier verwendeten Konzept der Indikation ab. Daher kommt dem Konzept der Indikation auf dem Gebiet der Reproduktionsmedizin ein besonderer Stellenwert zu. Dabei fällt auf, dass die Abgrenzung zwischen medizinisch indizierter Behandlung und Wunschbehandlung nicht allein klinisch begründet ist, sondern implizit oder (...) explizit normative Urteile enthält. Der sprachlich-kommunikative Aspekt spielt hierbei eine zentrale Rolle. Der übliche Sprachgebrauch von „indiziert“ suggeriert ein Urteil, das allein auf empirisch-klinischen Fakten basiert, und verdeckt die normativen Urteile, die in das Konzept der Indikation einfließen. Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, den normativen Gehalt der Indikation in der Reproduktionsmedizin zu analysieren. Grundlage ist die eingehende Betrachtung des Konzepts der Indikation und der besonderen Stellung der Indikation in der Reproduktionsmedizin. Aus dieser Betrachtung ergibt sich, dass der normative Gehalt der Indikation von einem soziokulturellen Skript bezüglich Elternschaft geprägt ist, das sich v. a. im Leistungsrecht niederschlägt. Dieses Skript enthält gesellschaftliche Anschauungen, Normen und Rollenbilder und kann als „gute Elternschaft“ bezeichnet werden. Das Skript der guten Elternschaft wirkt als Regulativ, das durch leistungsrechtliche Vorgaben über den Zugang zu reproduktionsmedizinischen Maßnahmen bestimmt. Es basiert auf traditionellen heteronormativen Ehe- und Familienkonzepten und sieht Elternschaft für heterosexuelle, verheiratete Paare vor. Somit ergibt sich der Widerspruch, dass Verfahren der Reproduktionsmedizin, die den Raum für die Fortpflanzung jenseits traditionell-heteronormativer Konzepte öffnen, von ebenjenen Konzepten legitimiert und limitiert werden. (shrink)

In his writings about hypergeometric functions Gauss succeeded in moving beyond the restricted domain of eighteenth-century functions by changing several basic notions of analysis. He rejected formal methodology and the traditional notions of functions, complex numbers, infinite numbers, integration, and the sum of a series. Indeed, he thought that analysis derived from a few, intuitively given notions by means of other well-defined concepts which were reducible to intuitive ones. Gauss considered functions to be relations between continuous variable quantities while he (...) regarded integration and summation as appropriate operations with limits. He also regarded infinite and infinitesimal numbers as a façon de parler and used inequalities in order to prove the existence of certain limits. He took complex numbers to have the same legitimacy as real quantities. However, Gauss’s continuum was linked to a revised form of the eighteenth-century notion of continuous quantity: it was not reducible to a set of numbers but was immediately given. (shrink)

Fr. Sala attempts in this article to provide readers and students of Lonergan with a clear, precise, and condensed presentation of his conception of method in theology in today’s context. He does this by sketching the most important stages in the evolution of Lonergan’s thought. The core of this presentation is the analysis of the “human subject in its subjectivity.” Lonergan deals primarily not with the content of theological science but with the operations theologians perform in constructing theology. He endeavors (...) to clarify this subjectivity in all its dimensions. Having given us an analysis of Lonergan’s Verbum articles, Sala goes on to present Lonergan’s Insight under three headings: knowledge, objectivity, and reality. This done, he proceeds to summarize Method in Theology under these headings: the religious dimension of the subject, the structure of theological method, the specific theological principle of a method in theology, and the authentic subject as the foundation for theological reflection.The article is a masterly presentation of a vast area of research and a good introduction to Lonergan’s works.This article appeared in Theologie und Philosophie 63 (1988) 34-59 and was titled: “B. Lonergans Methode der Theologie: Ein Theologe hinterfugt seinen eigenen Verstand.” Von Giovanni B. Sala, S.J. (shrink)

This highly influential anti-Machiavellian text is an important primary source for the understanding of early modern political thought.

Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – (...) what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. (shrink)

In a recent article on Reid’s theory of single and double vision, James Van Cleve considers an argument against direct realism presented by Hume. Hume argues for the mind-dependent nature of the objects of our perception from the phenomenon of double vision. Reid does not address this particular argument, but Van Cleve considers possible answers Reid might have given to Hume. He finds fault with all these answers. Against Van Cleve, I argue that both appearances in double vision could be (...) considered visible figures of the object, and show how this solution might preserve Reid’s direct realism. However, this solution is not compatible with the single appearance of an object predicted by Reid’s theory of single and double vision. This consequence will appear evident once we consider the critique of Reid’s theory of single and double vision formulated by William Charles Wells (1757-1817). Wells argues that Reid’s theory is either incomplete or incompatible with other claims made by Reid. It is incomplete since it fails to specify the unique direction in which we the object in single vision; if it not incomplete and is compatible with the law of monocular direction given by Reid, then it is incompatible with Reid’s claim that we do not perceive immediately distance by sight. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We characterize, for every subvariety V of the variety of all MV- algebras, the free objects in V. We use our results to compute coproducts in V and to provide simple single-axiom axiomatizations of all many-valued logics extending the Lukasiewicz one.

Acknowledgements -- Intimation -- Dressed to communicate, or not -- Storytelling as intimation: the model presented -- Storytelling as intimation, the model defended and refined -- Situational irony, the world made intimative -- Bibliography -- Index.

Euler developed a program which aimed to transform analysis into an autonomous discipline and reorganize the whole of mathematics around it. The implementation of this program presented many difficulties, and the result was not entirely satisfactory. Many of these difficulties concerned the integral calculus. In this paper, we deal with some topics relevant to understand Euler’s conception of analysis and how he developed and implemented his program. In particular, we examine Euler’s contribution to the construction of differential equations and his (...) notion of indefinite integrals and general integrals. We also deal with two remarkable difficulties of Euler’s program. The first concerns singular integrals, which were considered as paradoxical by Euler since they seemed to violate the generality of certain results. The second regards the explicitly use of the geometric representation and meaning of definite integrals, which was gone against his program. We clarify the nature of these difficulties and show that Euler never thought that they undermined his conception of mathematics and that a different foundation was necessary for analysis. (shrink)

O presente ensaio, aqui publicado em tradução original para Português, constitui uma secção muito significativa da conhecida obra de Giovanni B. Sala sobre Lonergan e a sua relação com Kant. Trata-se de um estudo comparativo das teorias do conhecimento de Immanuel Kant e de Bernard Lonergan, tomando-se como ponto de partida uma análise do estatuto do a priori no conhecimento humano tal como no-lo apresenta a Crítica da Razão Pura, de Kant, para depois se apresentarem as respectivas lacunas, insuficiências (...) e contradições mediante o recurso a Insight, a obra mestra de Bernard Lonergan. Para o filósofo jesuíta, com efeito, o interesse primordial consiste em realçar a possibilidade do conhecimento do ser, possibilidade essa fundamentada na natureza do juízo e na natureza do questionamento humano. Para além disso, mostra-se também como em ordem a ultrapassar a impossibilidade do conhecimento numénico, a reflexão lonerganiana sublinha o conhecimento como estrutura empírica, inteligente, racional e responsável, capaz de captar a realidade, uma vez que esta é, segundo Lonergan, intrinsecamente inteligível. /// The present text is a translation into Portuguese of a section of a work by Giovanni Sala on Lonergan and his relation with Kant. It amounts to a comparative study of the gnoseologies of Kand and Lonergan, whereby the starting point is an analysis of the statute of the a priori in human knowledge such as we find it in the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant, so that in the process the author also shows the corresponding insufficiencies and contradictions by means of a reading of the work Insight by Bernard Lonergan. For the Jesuit philosopher, the main interest of his gnoseology consists in an affirmation of the possibility of knowing being, possibility that is grounded in the nature of judgment itself and in the nature of human interro- gation. Moreover, the article also shows how in order to overcome the impossibility of noumenal knowledge, the lonerganian reflexion underlines knowledge as an empirical structure, intelligent, rational and responsible, able to capture reality. In the end, this is possible due to the fact that, for Lonergan, the real is intrinsically intelligible. (shrink)

In a transcendental argument, a judgement ≫S is P≪ is unpacked into the two reflective claims: ≫I say that S is P≪, and ≫What I say is indeed the case≪; and the truth of the second is made to rest on the authority of the ≫I say≪ of the first. The argument has all the features of a testimony, where the reliability of the testimony depends on the extent to which, in being rendered, it conforms to stipulated canons of objectivity. (...) As presented in 1804, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre can be interpreted as a protracted argument of this kind, inasmuch as, since its avowed subject-matter, the One, is ex hypothesi ineffable, its validity as a narrative about it depends solely on its internal logic as narrative. Such a narrative can only be one which, in constructing any schema about its transcendent subject-matter, at the same time de-constructs it: in the course of this process it methodically and exhaustively uncovers the genesis of otherwise merely accepted facts of experience, manifesting them for what they truly are, and also allowing the necessarily unspoken evidence of the One to shine through. The Wissenschaftslehre 1804 is a type of apophantic theology. It is a Spinozism, but one developed from the standpoint of a finite subject who knows that he exists in a universe where, in truth, there is no explainable room for finitude. (shrink)

Up to equivalence, a substitution in propositional logic is an endomorphism of its free algebra. On the dual space, this results in a continuous function, and whenever the space carries a natural measure one may ask about the stochastic properties of the action. In classical logic there is a strong dichotomy: while over finitely many propositional variables everything is trivial, the study of the continuous transformations of the Cantor space is the subject of an extensive literature, and is far from (...) being a completed task. In many-valued logic this dichotomy disappears: already in the finite-variable case many interesting phenomena occur, and the present paper aims at displaying some of these. (shrink)

It is a curious feature of Hegelian studies in English that its practitioners seem incapable of tackling their subject without first disclaiming any adherence to the more metaphysical side of Hegel's thought, be it called “speculative metaphysics,” “dialectical logic” or whatever. I say “curious” because I doubt that the same scholars would feel obliged to enter an equivalent disclaimer at the head of a study on, say, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza or even Newton—even though all of these classics have a metaphysical (...) side at least as abstruse as any of Hegel's worse romantic excesses. Hegel himself, if he could witness the practice, would be flattered by it. He would not see it as an indication that “the problems of [his] logic remain alien and artificial to us in ways that the problems of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy do not” but, on the contrary, as a hidden acknowledgement that, whether for good or bad, his philosophy is still alive, still so close to our culture that we instinctively feel the need of exorcizing it ritually, like a demon capable of frightening us. (shrink)

It is a curious feature of Hegelian studies in English that its practitioners seem incapable of tackling their subject without first disclaiming any adherence to the more metaphysical side of Hegel's thought, be it called “speculative metaphysics,” “dialectical logic” or whatever. I say “curious” because I doubt that the same scholars would feel obliged to enter an equivalent disclaimer at the head of a study on, say, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza or even Newton—even though all of these classics have a metaphysical (...) side at least as abstruse as any of Hegel's worse romantic excesses. Hegel himself, if he could witness the practice, would be flattered by it. He would not see it as an indication that “the problems of [his] logic remain alien and artificial to us in ways that the problems of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy do not” but, on the contrary, as a hidden acknowledgement that, whether for good or bad, his philosophy is still alive, still so close to our culture that we instinctively feel the need of exorcizing it ritually, like a demon capable of frightening us. (shrink)