History of Mathematics

The reception of Newton's Principia in 1687 led to the attempt of many European scholars to ‘mathematicise' their field of expertise. An important example of this ‘mathematicisation' lies in the work of Irish-Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. This essay aims to discuss the mathematical aspects of Hutcheson's work and its impact on British thought in the following centuries, providing a case in point for the importance of the interactions between mathematics and philosophy throughout time.

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part-whole principle, according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano's mature theory of the infinite and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano's infinite sums can be equipped (...) with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring, and that Bolzano's views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent. (shrink)

The paper explores Hermann Weyl’s turn to intuitionism through a philosophical prism of normative framework transitions. It focuses on three central themes that occupied Weyl’s thought: the notion of the continuum, logical existence, and the necessity of intuitionism, constructivism, and formalism to adequately address the foundational crisis of mathematics. The analysis of these themes reveals Weyl’s continuous endeavor to deal with such fundamental problems and suggests a view that provides a different perspective concerning Weyl’s wavering foundational positions. Building on a (...) philosophical model of scientific framework transitions and the special role that normative indecision or ambivalence plays in the process, the paper examines Weyl’s motives for considering such a radical shift in the first place. It concludes by showing that Weyl’s shifting stances should be regarded as symptoms of a deep, convoluted intrapersonal process of self-deliberation induced by exposure to external criticism. (shrink)

The paper discusses Peano's defense and application of permanence as a principle of practice, and Hahn's further point that, even if it were a principle of logic, permanence would not eliminate all logical ambiguity. Dedicated to the memory of Mic Detlefsen.

The purpose of this work is to address the relation existing between ancient Greek practical geometry and ancient Greek pure geometry. In the first part of the work, we will consider practical and pure geometry and how pure geometry can be seen, in some respects, as arising from an idealization of practical geometry. From an analysis of relevant extant texts, we will make explicit the idealizations at play in pure geometry in relation to practical geometry, some of which are basically (...) explicit in definitions, like that of segments in Euclid’s Elements. Then, we will address how in pure geometry we, so to speak, “refer back” to practical geometry. This occurs in two ways. One, in the propositions of pure geometry. The other, when applying pure geometry. In this case, geometrical objects can represent practical figures like, e.g., a practical segment. (shrink)

Archimedes’ statics is considered as an example of ancient Greek applied mathematics; it is even seen as the beginning of mechanics. Wilbur Knorr made the case regarding this work, as other works by him or other mathematicians from ancient Greece, that it lacks references to the physical phenomena it is supposed to address. According to Knorr, this is understandable if we consider the propositions of the treatise in terms of purely mathematical elaborations suggested by quantitative aspects of the phenomena. In (...) this paper, we challenge Knorr’s view, and address propositions of Archimedes’ statics in their relation to physical phenomena. (shrink)

It has been argued in relation to Old Babylonian mathematical procedure texts that their validity or correctness is self-evident. One “sees” that the procedure is correct without it having, or being accompanied by, any explicit arguments for the correctness of the procedure. Even when agreeing with this view, one might still ask about how is the correctness of a procedure articulated? In this work, we present an articulation of the correctness of ancient Egyptian and Old Babylonian mathematical procedure texts – (...) mathematical texts presenting the solution of problems. We endeavor to make explicit and explain how and why the procedures are reliable over and above the fact that their correctness is intuitive. (shrink)

Hendrick Uwens was a Flemish-educated Jesuit who became a missionary to the Mughal Empire. Prior to embarking on his missionary work, he taught mixed mathematics in Lisbon in the early 1640s. Both in Europe and India, Uwens often insisted on portraying himself as a mathematician. Mathematics allowed him to be amongst the first teachers of certain aspects of Galileo’s physics and to promote a mechanical worldview – unusual ideas in early Jesuit circles. He also used mathematics to negotiate his missionary (...) appointments in Asia. This paper analyzes the manuscript writings produced by Uwens throughout his life: the letters he wrote in Flanders to the Superior General requesting to be made a missionary, his Portuguese textbook on mechanics, and his correspondence from India to his Jesuit Superiors in Flanders and Rome. (shrink)

Gauss’s quadratic reciprocity theorem is among the most important results in the history of number theory. It’s also among the most mysterious: since its discovery in the late 18th century, mathematicians have regarded reciprocity as a deeply surprising fact in need of explanation. Intriguingly, though, there’s little agreement on how the theorem is best explained. Two quite different kinds of proof are most often praised as explanatory: an elementary argument that gives the theorem an intuitive geometric interpretation, due to Gauss (...) and Eisenstein, and a sophisticated proof using algebraic number theory, due to Hilbert. Philosophers have yet to look carefully at such explanatory disagreements in mathematics. I do so here. According to the view I defend, there are two important explanatory virtues—depth and transparency—which different proofs (and other potential explanations) possess to different degrees. Although not mutually exclusive in principle, the packages of features associated with the two stand in some tension with one another, so that very deep explanations are rarely transparent, and vice versa. After developing the theory of depth and transparency and applying it to the case of quadratic reciprocity, I draw some morals about the nature of mathematical explanation. (shrink)

In Bertrand Russell's 1903 Principles of Mathematics, he offers an apparently devastating criticism of the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen's Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History (PIM). Russell's criticism is motivated by his concern that Cohen's account of the foundations of calculus saddles mathematics with the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum, and thus threatens the very idea of mathematical truth. This paper defends Cohen against that objection of Russell's, and argues that properly understood, Cohen's views of limits and infinitesimals (...) do not entail the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum. Essential to that defense is an interpretation, developed in the paper, of Cohen's positions in the PIM as deeply rationalist. The interest in developing this interpretation is not just that it reveals how Cohen's views in the PIM avoid the paradoxes of the infinitesimal and continuum. It also reveals some of what is at stake, both historically and philosophically, in Russell's criticism of Cohen. (shrink)

The “four-color” theorem seems to be generalizable as follows. The four-letter alphabet is sufficient to encode unambiguously any set of well-orderings including a geographical map or the “map” of any logic and thus that of all logics or the DNA plan of any alive being. Then the corresponding maximally generalizing conjecture would state: anything in the universe or mind can be encoded unambiguously by four letters. That admits to be formulated as a “four-letter theorem”, and thus one can search for (...) a properly mathematical proof of the statement. It would imply the “four colour theorem”, the proof of which many philosophers and mathematicians believe not to be entirely satisfactory for it is not a “human proof”, but intermediated by computers unavoidably since the necessary calculations exceed the human capabilities fundamentally. It is furthermore rather unsatisfactory because it consists in enumerating and proving all cases one by one. Sometimes, a more general theorem turns out to be much easier for proving including a general “human” method, and the particular and too difficult for proving theorem to be implied as a corollary in certain simple conditions. The same approach will be followed as to the four colour theorem, i.e. to be deduced more or less trivially from the “four-letter theorem” if the latter is proved. References are only classical and thus very well-known papers: their complete bibliographic description is omitted. (shrink)

David Lindsay Roberts. Republic of Numbers: Unexpected Stories of Mathematical Americans through History. ix + 244 pp., bibl., index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. $29.95 (cloth); ISBN 9781421433080. E-book available. Julian Havil. Curves for the Mathematically Curious: An Anthology of the Unpredictable, Historical, Beautiful, and Romantic. xx + 259 pp., apps., refs., index. Princeton, N.J./Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019. $29.95 (cloth); ISBN 9780691180052. E-book available. David S. Richeson. Tales of Impossibility: The Two-Thousand-Year Quest to Solve the Mathematical Problems of (...) Antiquity. xii + 436 pp., notes, refs., index. Princeton, N.J./Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019. $29.95 (cloth); ISBN 9780691192963. E-book availabl. (shrink)

This book offers insights relevant to modern history and epistemology of physics, mathematics and, indeed, to all the sciences and engineering disciplines emerging of 19th century. This research volume is the first of a set of three Springer books on Lazare Nicolas Marguérite Carnot’s (1753–1823) remarkable work: Essay on Machines in General (Essai sur les machines en général [1783] 1786). The other two forthcoming volumes are: Principes fondamentaux de l’équilibre et du mouvement (1803) and Géométrie de position (1803). Lazare Carnot (...) – l'organisateur de la victoire – in Essai sur le machine en général (1786) assumed that the generalization of machines was a necessity for society and its economic development. Subsequently, his new coming science applied to machines attracted considerable interest for technician, as well, already in the 1780’s. With no lack in rigour, Carnot used geometric and trigonometric rather than algebraic arguments, and usually went on to explain in words what the formulae contained. His main physical– mathematical concepts were the Geometric motion and Moment of activity–concept of Work . In particular, he found the invariants of the transmission of motion (by stating the principle of the moment of the quantity of motion) and theorized the condition of the maximum efficiency of mechanical machines (i.e., principle of continuity in the transmission of power). While the core theme remains the theories and historical studies of the text, the book contains an extensive Introduction and an accurate critical English Translation – including the parallel text edition and substantive critical/explicative notes – of Essai sur les machines en général (1786). The authors offer much-needed insight into the relation between mechanics, mathematics and engineering from a conceptual, empirical and methodological, and universalis point of view. As a cutting–edge writing by leading authorities on the history of physics and mathematics, and epistemological aspects, it appeals to historians, epistemologist–philosophers and scientists (physicists, mathematicians and applied sciences and technology). (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to address what notion of geometrical object and geometrical figure we have in different kinds of geometry: practical, pure, and applied. Also, we address the relation between geometrical objects and figures when this is possible, which is the case of pure and applied geometry. In practical geometry it turns out that there is no conception of geometrical object.

Relying upon a very close reading of all of the definitions given in Euclid’s Elements, I argue that this mathematical treatise contains a philosophical treatment of mathematical objects. Specifically, I show that Euclid draws elaborate metaphysical distinctions between substances and non-substantial attributes of substances, different kinds of substance, and different kinds of non-substance. While the general metaphysical theory adopted in the Elements resembles that of Aristotle in many respects, Euclid does not employ Aristotle’s terminology, or indeed, any philosophical terminology at (...) all. Instead, Euclid systematically uses different types of definition to distinguish between metaphysically different kinds of mathematical object. (shrink)

The concept of ‘ideas’ plays central role in philosophy. The genesis of the idea of continuity and its essential role in intellectual history have been analyzed in this research. The main question of this research is how the idea of continuity came to the human cognitive system. In this context, we analyzed the epistemological function of this idea. In intellectual history, the idea of continuity was first introduced by Leibniz. After him, this idea, as a paradigm, formed the base of (...) several fundamental scientific conceptions. This idea also allowed mathematicians to justify the nature of real numbers, which was one of central questions and intellectual discussions in the history of mathematics. For this reason, we analyzed how Dedekind’s continuity idea was used to this justification. As a result, it can be said that several fundamental conceptions in intellectual history, philosophy and mathematics cannot arise without existence of the idea of continuity. However, this idea is neither a purely philosophical nor a mathematical idea. This is an interdisciplinary concept. For this reason, we call and classify it as mathematical and philosophical invariance. (shrink)

in this paper we return to Marshall Clagett’s view about the existence of an ancient Greek geometry of motion. It can be read in two ways. As a basic presentation of ancient Greek geometry of motion, followed by some aspects of its further development in landmark works by Galileo and Newton. Conversely, it can be read as a basic presentation of aspects of Galileo’s and Newton’s mathematics that can be considered as developments of a geometry of motion that was first (...) conceived by ancient Greek mathematicians. (shrink)

While classical sources including Aristotle, Cicero and Boëthius addressed different notions of probability, medieval contributions to probability seem rather scarce. The situation changes during the Second Scholasticism with the post-Tridentine debates on “probable opinion” in moral theology and the introduction of “moral necessity” and “moral implication” in the debates on compatibilism and theological optimism. The eighteenth-century transformation of scholastic philosophy was marked, among other characteristics, by a gravitation towards the early modern scientific revolution. In his Philosophia Pollingana ad normam Burgundicae, (...) the renowned moral theologian Eusebius Amort addressed the basic issues of probabilistic logic from the philosophical, logical, and mathematical points of view in an attempt to synthesise earlier scholastic conceptual analyses of probability and probabilistic epistemic logic with the cutting-edge mathematical calculus introduced by Jacob Bernoulli. (shrink)

Prominent constructive theories of sets as Martin-Löf type theory and Aczel and Myhill constructive set theory, feature a distinctive form of constructivity: predicativity. This may be phrased as a constructibility requirement for sets, which ought to be finitely specifiable in terms of some uncontroversial initial “objects” and simple operations over them. Predicativity emerged at the beginning of the 20th century as a fundamental component of an influential analysis of the paradoxes by Poincaré and Russell. According to this analysis the paradoxes (...) are caused by a vicious circularity in definitions; adherence to predicativity was therefore proposed as a systematic method for preventing such problematic circularity. In the following, I sketch the origins of predicativity, review the fundamental contributions by Russell and Weyl and look at modern incarnations of this notion. (shrink)

Albert Lautman (b. 1908–1944) was a philosopher of mathematics whose views on mathematical reality and on the philosophy of mathematics parted with the dominant tendencies of mathematical epistemology of the time. Lautman considered the role of philosophy, and of the philosopher, in relation to mathematics to be quite specific. He writes that: ‘in the development of mathematics, a reality is asserted that mathematical philosophy has as a function to recognize and describe’ (Lautman 2011, 87). He goes on to characterize this (...) reality as an ‘ideal reality’ that ‘governs’ the development of mathematics. The relation between mathematical problems as they arise in the historical development of mathematics and the solutions that are provided to these problems by mathematicians, in the form of new mathematical theories, definitions or axioms, are governed by a what Lautman characterises as a dialectics of mathematics. The aim of this paper is to give an account of this Lautmanian dialectic and of how it can be understood to govern the development of solutions to mathematical problems. (shrink)

Mathematics has always been a core part of western education, from the medieval quadrivium to the large amount of arithmetic and algebra still compulsory in high schools. It is an essential part. Its commitment to exactitude and to rigid demonstration balances humanist subjects devoted to appreciation and rhetoric as well as giving the lie to postmodernist insinuations that all “truths” are subject to political negotiation. In recent decades, the character of mathematics has changed – or rather broadened: it has become (...) the enabling science behind the complexity of contemporary knowledge, from gene interpretation to bank risk. Mathematical understanding is all the more necessary for future jobs, as well as remaining, as ever, a prophylactic against the more corrosive philosophical views emanating from the humanities. (shrink)

The influence of religious beliefs to several leading mathematicians in early Soviet years, especially among members of the Moscow Mathematical Society, had drawn the attention of militant Soviet marxists, as well as Soviet authorities. The issue has also drawn significant attention from scholars in the post-Soviet period. According to the currently prevailing interpretation, reported purges against Moscow mathematicians due to their religious inclination are the focal point of the relevant history. However, I maintain that historical data arguably offer reasons to (...) cast reasonable doubts on this interpretation. In this paper, by reviewing the relevant literature, I raise some methodological and philosophical concerns, in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the issue. I maintain that an efficient line of reasoning is to discuss issues in the context of their making, taking into consideration the specific features of each era’s culture. Thus, by focusing on P.A. Nekrasov’s case, I attempt to point to an alternative interpretation, in which the different treatment of religious inclined mathematicians by Soviet authorities is explained in the context of the ideological confrontation between two contrasting worldviews, as part of the ongoing class war in the several phases of Soviet history. (shrink)

Richard Dedekind’s theorem 66 states that there exists an infinite set. Its proof invokes such apparently nonmathematical notions as the thought-world and the self. This article discusses the content and context of Dedekind’s proof. It is suggested that Dedekind took the notion of the thought-world from Hermann Lotze. The influence of Kant and Bernard Bolzano on the proof is also discussed, and the reception of the proof in the mathematical and philosophical literature is covered in detail.

In mathematics textbooks and special mathematical treatises, themes and theses of Arthur Schopenhauer's elementary geometry appear again and again. Since Schopenhauer's geometry or philosophy of geometry was considered exemplary in the 19th and early 20th centuries in its relation to figures and thus to the intuition, the two-hundred-year reception history sketched in this paper also follows the evaluation of intuition-related geometries, which depends on the mathematical paradigms.

The main goal of part 1 is to challenge the widely held view that Poincaré orders the sciences in a hierarchy of dependence, such that all others presuppose arithmetic. Commentators have suggested that the intuition that grounds the use of induction in arithmetic also underlies the conception of a continuum, that the consistency of geometrical axioms must be proved through arithmetical induction, and that arithmetical induction licenses the supposition that certain operations form a group. I criticize each of these readings. (...) More fully, I argue that the justification Poincaré offers for the use of the group notion in geometry appears to extend to set-theoretic notions that would suffice to put arithmetic on a logical foundation, thus undermining his own case for the necessity of intuition in arithmetic. In part 2, I offer an interpretation of intuition’s role on which it justifies the use of group-theoretic, but not set-theoretic, notions. (shrink)

The incorporation of paper instruments, also known as volvelles, into astronomical and cosmographical texts is a well-known facet of sixteenth-century printing. However, the impact that these instruments had on the reading public has yet to be determined. This paper argues that the inclusion of paper instruments in Peter Apian’s Cosmographia transforms the text into a book-instrument hybrid. The instruments and accompanying text in Cosmographia enabled readers to make their own measurements and calculations of both the heavens and the earth. Through (...) the experience of manipulating the instruments, the readers became participants in sixteenth century mathematical culture, and thus mathematical amateurs. I conclude that the presence of these mathematical amateurs contributed to a much broader social base for the cultural shift towards an empirical understanding of nature from 1500 to 1700. (shrink)

The current literature on history of science reports that Levi-Civita’s parallel transport was motivated by his attempt to provide the covariant derivative of the absolute differential calculus with a geometrical interpretation (For instance, see Scholz in ''The intersection of history and mathematics'', Birkhäuser, Basel, pp 203-230, 1994, Sect. 4). Levi-Civita’s memoir on the subject was explicitly aimed at simplifying the geometrical computation of the curvature of a Riemannian manifold. In the present paper, we wish to point out the possible role (...) implicitly played by the principle of virtual work in Levi-Civita’s conceptual reasoning to formulate parallel transport. (shrink)

‘‘What Is Algebra?-Why This Book?’’ This is the amazing prelude to Taming the Unknown by Victor J. Katz, emeritus professor of mathematics at the University of the District of Columbia and Karen Hunger Parshall, professor of history of mathematics at the University of Virginia. This is an excellent book; its accurate historical and pedagogical purpose offers an accessible read for historians and mathematicians. [continue...].

Based on our research regarding the relationship between physics and mathematics in HPS, and recently on Geneva Edition of Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1739–42) by Thomas Le Seur (1703–70) and François Jacquier (1711–88), in this paper we present some aspects of such Edition: a combination of editorial features and scientific aims. The proof of Proposition XLIII is presented and commented as a case study.