Frédéric Leclercq, Jean-Baptiste Biot (1774-1862) et la théorie corpusculaire de la lumière.Thèse soutenue le 14 février 2008 à l’Université de Lille 1. Composition du jury Michel Blay, Directeur de recherche au CNRalaaS (ENS Paris) Jean Eisenstaedt, Directeur de recherche au CNRS (Observatoire de Paris) Robert Locqueneux, Professeur émérite à l'Université de Lille 1 Bernard Maitte, Professeur à l'Université de Lille 1, Directeur de thèse. RésuméA la fin du XVIIIe siècle, l’application des pr..

The goal of this paper is to investigate the ethical implications of emerging forms of control that have developed along with the use of ubiquitous information technology. Because it can be exerted at a distance, almost anytime and anywhere, IT-based control has become more subtle, indirect, and almost invisible, with many negative side effects. Yet the issues raised by this new form of control have rarely been interpreted, treated, and framed as ethical issues in business ethics literature. Thus, a more (...) comprehensive inquiry rooted in ethical concerns is necessary to improve understanding of this more subtle form of control, its ethical consequences, and the way ethical considerations can be taken into consideration and acted on by management. This article addresses this goal with a qualitative, exploratory case study of a telecommunications company, in which salespeople have been equipped with ubiquitous technology. The findings specify the characteristics and consequences of ubiquitous IT-based control, thereby inviting a rethinking of the ethical issues related to the privacy, autonomy, human dignity, and health of salespeople. In particular, this article highlights four ethical issues raised by the use of ubiquitous IT at work: the ambivalence of this use of ubiquitous IT at work, the subtlety of the control exerted by ubiquitous IT, the invasiveness of ubiquitous IT, and the self-reinforcement of ubiquitous IT-based control. Such issues are not often taken into account, suggesting that ethical considerations fail to enter into managerial decision making. This study directly raises questions about the intentions, responsibilities, and divisions across different categories of organizational members who participate in such control systems. It also provides useful insights into employees’ perceptions and offers guidance to managers who want to apply a professional code of ethics to the uses of ubiquitous IT. (shrink)

The ethical issues introduced by excessive uses of ubiquitous information technology at work have received little attention, from either practitioners or ethics scholars. This article suggests the concept of technological ill-being and explores the ethical issues arising from such ill-being, according to the individual and collective responsibilities associated with their negative effects. This article turns to the philosopher Michel Foucault and proposes a renewed approach of the relationship among IT, ethics, and responsibility, based on the concepts of practical rationality, awareness, (...) and self-engagement. This article reports a case study of an international automotive company actively engaged in both corporate social responsibility and ubiquitous IT deployment. Technological ill-being is an expression of the tension between an individual’s social attributes and aspirations when using modern IT and a system of norms, rules, and values imposing constraints on him or her. We identify the reasons for the lack of consideration of technological ill-being in CSR through identification of the inclusion–exclusion principle. The resulting critical, comprehensive approach to corporate responsibilities and IT uses incorporates the ethical implications of the latter, highlights the practical rationality of their relationship, and demands both individual and collective responses, through a call for collective ethical awareness and self-engagement. The findings prompt a Foucauldian ethics of IT use in organizations, which emerges in a mutually constitutive relationship between the self, as a moral subject of own actions, and broader organizational principles, in which CSR appears as a techne. (shrink)

The philosophical assumptions that organize moral sociology as practical philosophy are the outcome of a secular quest to investigate the principles, norms and values behind the constitution of society. As a protracted response to the whole utilitarian-atomistic-individualistic tradition that systematically deemphasizes the constitutive role that morality plays in the structuration of self and society, the sociological tradition has continued, by its own means, the tradition of moral and practical philosophy in theoretically informed empirical research of social practices. Going back to (...) classic moral philosophy, I want to show in this article how social theory is involved in the quest for ‘the good life with and for the others in just institutions’ (Ricoeur). (shrink)

Some habits are vital to who we are in that they shape both our self-perception and how we are seen by others. This is so, I argue, because there is a constitutive link between what I shall call ‘identity-shaping habits’ and narrative agency. Identity-shaping habits are paradigmatically acquired and performed by persons. The ontology of personhood involves both synchronic and diachronic dimensions which are structurally analogous to the synchronic acquisition and the diachronic performance of habits, and makes persons distinctly suitable (...) to being shaped by habits. Since habits differ vastly in their scope, I develop a conceptualization that carves out defining features of identity-shaping habits. Such habits, I venture, fundamentally alter a person’s embodiment such that the alterations to their psychological and physiological make-up vitally inform their persistence—if not metaphysically, then at least practically by crucially shaping one’s narrative agency. (shrink)

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents—but also critics—of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and (...) Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky’s key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson’s, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. (shrink)

The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I examine (...) the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of "value", i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophy enjoyed a Russian fandom that endured from the eighteenth century to the death of the last exiled Russian philosophers in the twentieth century. There was, to begin with, Leibniz’s direct impact on Peter the Great and on the scientific development of Saint Petersburg. Then there was, still in the eighteenth century, Mikhail Lomonosov, who was sent to study with Christian Wolff in Marburg, and who came back to Saint Petersburg with a watered-down Leibnizian worldview, which he applied to (...) the study of chemistry and physics. Another eighteenth century philosopher, Alexander Radishchev, who studied in Leipzig, displayed acquiescence with a number of key elements from Leibniz’s philosophy. Russian Lebnizianism as a continuous philosophical movement was considerably reinvigorated in the 1870s when the Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller took a position at the University of Dorpat (nowadays Tartu, Estonia), which was then located within the Russian Empire. Teichmüller influenced a number of Russian philosophers into adopting a “Teichmüllerian” version of Leibnizianism. Among these philosophers were Evgeny Bobrov and Alexei Kozlov. In Saint Petersburg, Kozlov influenced his own son, Askoldov, and the latter’s friend — Nikolai Lossky. In the meanwhile, in Moscow Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Bugaev, and Petr Astafiev developed their own Leibnizianism in seemingly relative independence from Teichmüller’s influence and presumably, in some cases, under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov. Despite this relative independence, however, the fact remains that there was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia a network of more or less loosely interconnected Leibnizian philosophers who read each other and wrote about each other, who exchanged ideas, and who constituted a movement that we might characterize as “Russian Leibnizianism” or “Russian Neo-Leibnizianism.” In this chapter, I tell the story of the intellectual lineage of Russian Leibnizianism. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky adhered to an evolutionary metaphysics of reincarnation according to which the world is constituted of immortal souls or monads, which he calls ‘substantival agents.’ These substantival agents can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher or of a lower level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a substantival agent can evolve (...) by being gradually reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. In ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic evolutionary doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis and he attempts to reconstitute this doctrine. The present article is intended as an historical introduction to the translation of Lossky’s ‘Leibniz’s Doctrine of Reincarnation as Metamorphosis.’. (shrink)

In his article “The Megarian and Aristotelian Concept of Possibility”, Nicolai Hartmann attempts to revive an interpretation of the conception of possibility of the Megarians that stood in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of possibility and thus in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of modality in general. In this introduction, I undertake to situate Hartmann’s article in its historical context. Did Hartmann come to adopt this thesis through his study of ancient Greek philosophy? Or did he already have a predilection (...) for the Megarian conception of possibility prior to this? If so, how did this predilection come about? Was there an influence from his friend Vasily Sesemann, who published an article discussing the Megarians the previous year? Or were both Hartmann and Sesemann influenced early on by their mutual Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky, or even by a general tendency pervading Russian thought—itself grounded in the fatalism typical of the Russian collective unconscious—as we find it expressed in the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, Lev Tolstoy, and other Russian thinkers? (shrink)

Introduction La question de l’érôs est d’une extrême importance philosophique, et singulièrement dans le cadre de la pensée de M. Henry, mais elle est aussi d’une terrible et redoutable difficulté, parce qu’elle ne laisse pas indifférent et nous touche précisément sur le plan des affects, des concepts et du langage comme possibilité du dire, c’est-à-dire ces ressources que nous allons tenter de mobiliser pour évoquer un objet sensible et complexe, au regard duquel M. Henry pense, en plus et p...

From the point of view of political liberalism, one of the main features of “reasonable” people consists in accepting that the firm adhesion to a comprehensive conception of good, the certainty of dealing with a true conception , does not offer a sufficient justification to the intention of promoting it by means of the power of the State. Now, how is this liberal position founded? My aim in this paper is to offer an argument for it. To do so, I (...) will start analysing some aspects of Rawls´conception of “reasonable person” and the difficulties derived from this conception, particularly enlightened by the objections formulated to it by Leif Wenar and Eduardo Rivera López. I will propose an alternative argument to the presented ones, departing from two premises: 1) a political principle of equality and free consensus and 2) a practical interpretation of the burdens of judgement. (shrink)

What’s worth a philosophy which achieves a phenomenological reduction in an opposite direction of Husserl’s one? This contribution, disputing Rudolf Bernet’s accurate critiques, intends to demonstrate that Michel Henry doesn’t take a “theological turn” by investigating the Christian Logos, but chooses it as a philosophical proof of his previous researches about affectivity as rationality, which were stemming from a rigorous analysis of everyday life. According to Henry and his New Testament interpretation, truth is affectivity and life, and because there’s an (...) “ipséité” in life, truth is a self. Yet, the Greek Logos just can’t consider the profoundness of life but the bodies, whereas the fleshy living Self generates and feels it in the fi rst and pathetic immanence. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette contribution n’est pas de parvenir à un exposé définitif, qui pourrait prétendre à une résolution circonstanciée des questions qui nous retiennent ; il se limite à une approche analytique faisant droit aux textes et à la complexité de leur agencement, en interrogeant à nouveaux frais le travail de Michel Henry. Ce préalable étant avancé, commençons par trois citations extrêmes qui devraient permettre de trouver un espace et une tonalité pour notre propos : A la raison, je...

Marquée par l’oeuvre de Michel Henry, cette contribution cherche à répondre à la question de la Vérité, dans l’intertexte d’une tradition surchargée de sens. Cette tentative d’élucidation ne peut se faire, sur le plan d’une intelligibilité spécifique du christianisme, qu’en recourant à ses propres paroles, dont méthodologiquement il convient de comprendre qu’elles sont – mais sans être les seules – des Paroles de la Vie, qui confèrent à l’homme une vocation singulière et authentique. C’est dans ce cadre que la vérité (...) en christianisme transporte vers la Vie et ce qu’elle ne cesse de dire au gré des vivants et du Premier de ses vivants, qui dans son antériorité absolue peut précisément dire «C’est moi la vérité». (shrink)

In A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke argues in favor of religious toleration positing that the state cannot make a person's life better by forcing that person to live according to beliefs he refuses. More recently, Ronald Dworkin and Will Kymlicka have developed similar arguments. In the first case, against some paternalistic policies; in the second, in support of the liberal ideal of state neutrality. My aim in the present paper is to analyze the plausibility of these arguments conceived as (...) a defense of liberal neutrality. I will prove that both versions of the argument fail. In section II, I will object the argument's capability to support the conclusions it attempts to establish, without raising doubts about the reliability of its premises. In section III, I will submit three objections against the conception of critical well-being that constitutes the core of both versions of the argument. (shrink)

Reading the Communist Manifesto against the contemporary background of massive unemployment, the author argues that Marx's theory of work is no longer adequate to tackle the problem of `workers without work' and suggests that it has to be reformulated in such a way that its normative intuitions and its critical impulses can be maintained. In the first part, he presents a philosophical critique of Marxism that is inspired by Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt. In the second part, he presents a (...) sociological critique of Marxism and argues that the theory of the alienation of work implies a justification of work and the work society. Finally, in the last part, the author presents an ideological critique of Marxism that is inspired by Marcel Mauss' sociology of the gift. Criticising the contractualist assumptions of workfare solutions, he proposes a package solution for a radical decommodification of the labour market by means of a disjunction of income and work. (shrink)

The question of whether Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), as open-loop, closed-loop or adaptative technology, induces unwanted effects on patients’ personality is still an ongoing multidisciplinary deb...

When translated into concrete policy, any allocation of emissions leads to the attribution of emissions rights based on distributive justice. Consequently, the distributive justice approach legitimizes the corresponding amount of emissions. If a certain level of emissions can receive emissions rights, provided they are compatible with a certain emissions budget, to allocate emissions rights when the dangerous concentration level has been overshot could understate the need to preserve the functioning of a “balanced” climate system. From the perspective of Foucault’s archaeology (...) of knowledge, and with the purpose of assessing the epistemology of climate justice, it will be possible to question the possible importation of the mode of production of norms of social law into climate mitigation justice. Additionally, it will be questioned whether the amount of anthropogenic emissions rights can be provided by “the laws of nature” and whether and how the no‑harm principle can contribute to the epistemological relevance of the narrative of climate justice. (shrink)

La guerre, pour reprendre l'expression du général Le Borgne, serait "morte à Hiroshima" il y a plus d'un demi-siècle. Et pourtant elle n'a jamais cessé. Actes terroristes, conflits israélo-palestiniens et moyen-orientaux, implosion de la Yougoslavie, pays déchirés par les factions, sans même parler des autres guerres : économiques, psychologiques, informatiques, guerres des sexes ou des générations... L'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie a pourtant rebattu les cartes. Cette fois, dit-on, c'est le retour de la vraie guerre, avec ses exactions, ses (...) horreurs, sa violence. Mais qu'est-ce qu'une vraie guerre? En convoquant de grands philosophes politiques, de Platon à Marx, en passant par Machiavel et Hobbes, ce livre tente de répondre à cette question, qu'elle accompagne d'une série d'autres : qu'est-ce qu'une guerre juste? Quelles sont les forces morales engagées dans un conflit? Est-ce l'Etat qui fait la guerre ou la guerre qui fait l'Etat? Enfin, après avoir exploré les significations et les enjeux du spectre de la guerre "totale", il affronte l'ultime question : pourquoi la guerre? -- payot. (shrink)

L'expérience esthétique est la voie de la phénoménologie ; c'est du moins ce qu'établit Dufrenne avec une profondeur inégalée. Cette expérience est décrite de façon novatrice selon une phénoménologie du sentiment, qui est le fil conducteur de cette philosophie. La réduction - devenue dès lors réduction esthétique - conduit à l'essence de la manifestation et se prolonge en une réduction cosmologique : le monde se trouve conquis en sa figure originaire, la Nature, qui est pensée comme source ou matrice universelle. (...) L'esthétique enveloppe en outre une réflexion sur l'imagination, l'image et l'imaginaire, comme sur la beauté, marquant l'une des originalités de la perspective dufrennienne. Les percées ontologiques réalisées débouchent alors sur une cosmo-esthétique qui se prolonge en une cosmopoétique. Il s'agit à la fois de concevoir l'appartenance de l'homme au monde, qui le précède et l'excède, ainsi que la différence subjective, puisqu'il est capable de le percevoir. Cette philosophie définit la Nature comme Infini expressif - esthétique et poétique -, et montre que l'homme est appelé à vivre poétiquement, les exigences éthiques et politiques étant nouées à l'esthétique, où le sens de l'humain s'atteste."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

La naissance est la source vive de notre existence, elle ne fut pourtant jamais mise au centre de la philosophie. Au contraire, il s'agit de montrer que la philosophie doit se constituer comme philosophie de la naissance, articulant phénoménologie, métaphysique et anthropologie. Considérer la naissance ouvre une compréhension neuve de l'épochè -- devenue épochè natale --, la réflexion suivant alors la voie d'une heuristique de la naissance. Cette heuristique archéologique décèle à la fois la Natalité-Infinie du monde et l'événement de (...) la naissance métaphysique de la vie. Il devient alors possible d'élaborer une anthropologie-selon-la-naissance qui décrit l'événement de la naissance d'un homme -- en tant que naissance existentiale, aperturale ou épochale --, ainsi que sa naissance continuée -- sa natalité existentielle. Cette dynamique existentielle est en outre susceptible de dénatalisation comme d'un procès de renatalisation examinés pour eux-mêmes, et cette anthropologie, nourrissant par ailleurs une conception inédite de la mort, enveloppe aussi les prolégomènes d'une esthétique, d'une érotique, d'une éthique et d'une herméneutique de l'existence sans jamais que le sens qui en émane ne résorbe l'étonnement qui l'a fait naître. (shrink)

Ce livre propose de relire la philosophie de Walter Benjamin à partir de sa cosmologie. Le cosmos de Benjamin n'est pas un univers ordonné, composé de corps célestes identifiables, mais l'occasion d'une expérience fulgurante: dans l'univers post-copernicien de Benjamin, l'intériorité du désir et l'extériorité des étoiles, le politique et le théologique, le présent et le distant passé se rencontrent sans fusionner. Situant Benjamin dans la tradition philosophique (G. W. Leibniz, K. Marx, F. Hegel) tout en s'appuyant sur des pensées contemporaines (...) (J. Butler, S. Hartmann, M. Löwy), ce livre crée une 'correspondance' entre Benjamin et notre actualité. Dans un monde soumis aux replis nationalistes, aux virus destructeurs d'altérité et à l'intrusion technologique, le lointain semble s'évanouir. En prise avec l'histoire la plus récente, celle du New Space et de la Sixième Extinction, de Black Lives Matter et des Communes éphémères, ce livre soutient qu'aucune transformation politique radicale, aucune émancipation, aucun communisme n'est possible, et souhaitable, sans relation avec un lointain telle l'Étoile du Nord que les esclaves en fuite suivaient dans le ciel nocturne pour les guider vers la liberté."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This is a translation of the obituary that Nicolai Hartmann wrote for his colleague and friend, Max Scheler, after the latter's premature death in 1928. In this eulogy, after emphasizing the unfortunate incompleteness of Scheler's lifework, his keeping abreast with the development of the various sciences, his power of intuition, and the fact that he was a philosopher of life without for that matter having a Lebensphilosophie, Hartmann chronologically recapitulates Scheler's life achievements, beginning with his career in Jena, his interest (...) for ethical principles, his relation to the phenomenological movement in Munich, his theory of values, wartime in Berlin, his work on the sociology of knowledge, he gives us glimpses into Scheler's unwritten and still fluctuating metaphysical views, his ever-growing interest in ontological questions, which was guided by his continued interest in the problem of man, his power of relearning, and the apparent contradictions in his thought, which, Hartmann says, was primarily the thought of a "problemthinker." The original German text was first published in Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft, vol. 33, n. 1/2, 1928, pp. ix‒xvi. The original pagination is indicated in angle brackets. (shrink)

Utilisant de nouveaux outils d'analyse, les études platoniciennes contemporaines cherchent dans tout ce qui accompagne le contenu explicite d'une œuvre - tout ce qui est suggéré de façon oblique, les situations, l'atmosphère, les digressions, les réticences... - des indications sur ce que l'auteur, soit veut communiquer, soit communique réellement. Ce fait si simple et en même temps énigmatique, connu de tout temps, à savoir que la philosophie de Platon ne nous est accessible que par ses dialogues, constitue l'un de ces (...) traits par lesquels tout énoncé philosophique émis par Platon se trouve inévitablement modalisé. L'attention à la forme dialogue, telle qu'elle est thématisée ici, c'est donc la prise en compte, pour mieux entendre Platon, de tous les aspects " para-énonciatifs " de ses dialogues ; de tout ce qui fait le sens, non seulement des énoncés théoriques prêtés à tel ou tel personnage, mais de leur ensemble, de l'échange en tant que tel (entre les personnages, entre l'auteur et le lecteur), et de la stratégie platonicienne pour faire de la réception de son œuvre une expérience (y compris émotive) pour son lecteur. (shrink)