In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 48-76 [Access article in PDF] Dialogic Characteristics of Philosophical Discourse:The Case of Plato's Dialogues 1 Frédéric Cossutta The dialogic is increasingly acknowledged as a fundamental factor in the study of human language, a factor that transcends its explicit presence in dialogue. Habermas and Apel are examples of philosophers who do not think of the dialogic as subordinate to the monologic, an approach to reflexive (...) consciousness inherited from Cartesianism; they also invest it with a constitutive dimension when they demonstrate its foundational role in knowledge and ethics. In their eyes, dialogue does not so much constitute ordinary human activity as create the conditions of its possibility. Thus with Apel this pragmatic dimension becomes transcendental, a dimension logically independent of the social or historical circumstances within which it is brought to bear, and one that is capable of playing the role of ideal regulator in the establishment of any community that is authentically human.My aim in this paper is to investigate the role that this dialogic dimension plays in philosophical discourse. If it is constitutive, and not derived, as Habermas and Apel claim, then it should be found at work in the history of philosophy. Indeed a number of philosophers and historians of philosophy have recently claimed an implicit dialogicity at the core of Descartes's Meditations, although these are actually presented in the form of a soliloquy (cf. Jacques 1979; Beyssade and Marion 1994; Bouvier 1996). But while it is true that every philosophy exhibits interdiscursive and intertextual dimensions even at the moment that it attempts to efface all traces of this interplay to present itself as a closed system, may we not question this dialogical property as constitutive of philosophical discourse as such? Philosophers who present their doctrines in the form of dialogues often use this form merely for the purposes of polemic, refutation, or instruction. There is, however, one famous exception: Plato, whose philosophy [End Page 48] is developed for the most part through a series of fictional dialogues, to which his talent gives an intrinsic "literary" quality. We thus have a case in which we can justifiably examine the philosophical value of the dialogue form. Historians of philosophy usually claim that the elements of his dialogues are no more than expressions of an underlying and constitutive dialectical dimension, though there is some dissent. 2 But I shall show that all of the elements of the dialogues, even the prologues and the settings, play a role that is intrinsically philosophical. Studying these elements will enable us to reveal the philosophical status of the dialogical dimension.I shall consider three hypotheses: (1) Though Plato's dialogues are literary rather than actual, their form cannot be reduced to the empty shell for an otherwise purely monological thought; there is an effective dialogism at work in both the early and the later Dialogues. This statement can be more easily accepted if it is recalled that philosophical activity for Plato consists of dialegsthai (Dixsaut 1985). 3 (2) In Plato, in effect, dialogue constitutes philosophical speech itself. The link between dialogue as a way of embodying doctrine and dialectics as an expression of the process of thought is intrinsic and necessary. Insofar as this link is necessary, dialogic activity cannot be characterized as an empirical practice of conversation, nor can it be reconstructed as a literary genre; rather, it is informed throughout by a philosophical theory whose explanation it makes generally available. (3) As a consequence, dialogic interplay at work in the Dialogues follows pragmatic rules that are not empirical in nature but possess a transcendental dimension and require ethical presuppositions. A parallel may thus be drawn between the Platonist conception of dialogue and the theory developed by Karl Otto Apel as "transcendental pragmatics" (1987 and 1994). This last point I shall dwell upon at length. Plato's Dialogues: Dialogism or hidden monologism? Paradoxically, the very thinkers who regard language as constitutively dialogic refuse to see this dialogism in Plato. It is true that at first sight the Platonic dialogues seem to turn the... (shrink)

Utilisant de nouveaux outils d'analyse, les études platoniciennes contemporaines cherchent dans tout ce qui accompagne le contenu explicite d'une œuvre - tout ce qui est suggéré de façon oblique, les situations, l'atmosphère, les digressions, les réticences... - des indications sur ce que l'auteur, soit veut communiquer, soit communique réellement. Ce fait si simple et en même temps énigmatique, connu de tout temps, à savoir que la philosophie de Platon ne nous est accessible que par ses dialogues, constitue l'un de ces (...) traits par lesquels tout énoncé philosophique émis par Platon se trouve inévitablement modalisé. L'attention à la forme dialogue, telle qu'elle est thématisée ici, c'est donc la prise en compte, pour mieux entendre Platon, de tous les aspects " para-énonciatifs " de ses dialogues ; de tout ce qui fait le sens, non seulement des énoncés théoriques prêtés à tel ou tel personnage, mais de leur ensemble, de l'échange en tant que tel (entre les personnages, entre l'auteur et le lecteur), et de la stratégie platonicienne pour faire de la réception de son œuvre une expérience (y compris émotive) pour son lecteur. (shrink)

Parmi les philosophies qui tentent de faire face à la crise de la rationalité, certaines, plus radicales que d’autres, en proposent une fondation reposant sur des principes qui se veulent exempts de toute présupposition. Ainsi K. O. Apel entend opérer une refondation de la rationalité éthique et cognitive en considérant les activités communicationnelles et argumentatives. Il s’agit d’élaborer une «pragmatique transcendantale» dont le processus d’étayage auto-réflexif s’appuie sur la «contradiction pragmatique» dans laquelle tombent ses éventuels contradicteurs. Une telle prétention n’est-elle (...) pas exorbitante ? Les sceptiques grecs ont élaboré une approche pragmatique du sens qui leur permet d’éviter la disqualification de leur énonciation, ce qui permet, en transposant leurs conceptions à la lumière des théories contemporaines du langage, d’échapper à la critique de Apel. On peut dès lors reconnaître le caractère constitutif de l’activité communicationnelle, sans prétendre en proposer une fondation ultime de type transcendantal, ni préjuger de son orientation éthique. Resterait à se demander s’il est possible de reconstruire une rationalité minimale compatible avec la posture sceptique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.4 (2003) 301-329 [Access article in PDF] Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics Frédéric Cossutta CNRS, UMR "Savoirs et Textes" University of Lille III 1. How skeptical objections play a part in transcendental foundation The grounding task of a transcendental pragmatics according to K. O. Apel My subject is the contemporary attempts, and more precisely K. O. Apel's, that aim at the refoundation of rationality (...) within a communicational framework. 1 I want to show that this task, insofar as it aims at being radical, insofar as it is "transcendental pragmatics," is the target of criticisms that a skepticism always raises against the doctrines purporting to be built upon a foundation wholly devoid of presupposition. 2 It so happens that Apel's doctrine—in a manner more systematic than that of F. Jacques or Habermas—makes explicit the conditions of its own constitution. It does so through the overthrow of skeptical objections that aim at a refutation of its radical attempt at a transcendental foundation: in Apel's eyes, the objection of the relativist or of the skeptic, because it contains an inner contradiction (a "performative self-contradiction") a contrario ensures the absolute validity of his universal pragmatic principle. If this use of skepticism constitutes the spring of the argumentation and the cornerstone of the systematic edifice Apel built, a skeptical overthrow of his overthrow will demonstrate the fragile and unsteady nature of its transcendental ambitions. It will then become impossible to associate the communicative activity with a horizon of ethical presuppositions that guarantee the success of discussion and of negotiation. It is the legitimacy of this foundationalism that we propose to contest in order to undermine transcendental theories of discourse ethics.And yet, without reverting to a sociological empiricism or having recourse to a philosophy of intersubjectivity, by showing that philosophical skepticism is not as naive as its critiques would have it, the ethical [End Page 301] orientation of communicative activity can be suspended without giving up the quest for consensus. The latter is not originary; it is not presupposed by a speech act that is ethically neutral at its structural level, but it can at best be derived as can its contrary, disagreement. Thus, against the inflation of transcendental pragmatics, I shall oppose an ethical minimalism. The grounding device of transcendental pragmatics On the one hand, how is one to undertake a founding task without anchoring it in a philosophy of consciousness? On the other hand, how is one to protect oneself from the relativistic consequences of an empirical approach of intersubjectivity? Apel's aim is to show that communicative activity presupposes an a priori that is neither a social nor a linguistic fact but factum rationis in the sense that freedom is the condition of the possibility of moral experience in Kant. Thus, according to K. O. Apel, "it appears that even purely semantic-referential discourse presupposes a pragmatic-transcendental reflection on the communicative speech-acts' claim to validity" (Apel 1994, 54). In the same book, the author relies on the model that makes language into a mere tool of communication and of representation, the Aristotelian view of language as propositional understanding: "Among the historical effects of the Aristotelian understanding there is, to some extent, the Western concept of the common sense of language as a tool for communication and representation" (54). In the initial historical treatment (12-13), it is true that a reference to Plato occurs: "in Plato, it is true that the logos, with the aid of 'language' or 'discourse' is an organon making it possible to communicate something to the other; its realm is thus that of conversation (dialogos), and thought itself is conceived of as 'a silent conversation of the soul with itself' " (Theaetetus, 180e-190a).However, this concession is immediately withdrawn: "but, on the other hand, the significance of the logos is made precise at the very moment that it is expressed as an utterance or proposition that can be true or false; this is the import of definition, argument or rational deduction" (Apel 1994, 14). In this sense... (shrink)

A collection of essays in French or English on the reception of Cartesian philosphy.