No final do Lísis. Sócrates emprega o termo “demônios” (daímones), no momento em que se constata a aporia a que chega a investigação sobre a amizade. A propósito de uma recente tradução brasileira do diálogo, que, alinhando-se a uma interpretação tradicional, entende o termo no sentido negativo de “divindades maléficas”, este estudo procura defender tese bem diferente: apesar das aparências, lembremo-nos do célebre “demônio socrático” e veremos aqui o anúncio do fim da discussão sem qualquer coação externa à própria investigação, (...) e sim em virtude de necessidades que são internas a esta. Daí se seguirá que, apesar do final aporético, esse diálogo apresenta certo ensinamento positivo que o distingue dos outros diálogos platônicos de juventude. (shrink)

La revue publie des numéros thématiques, mais telle n'est pas son unique destination. Son ambition est en effet d'être l'écho des recherches en cours, aussi bien de celles de chercheurs confirmés que de jeunes chercheurs.

This paper consists in three case studies of modern French philosophers who drew their inspiration from Plato : Emile Chartier, known under his nom de plume Alain, famous as a teacher in the twenties of the last century, and two of his pupils, Simone Petrement and Simone Weil. Great admirer of Plato, Alain taught the survival of his main thoughts through all the philosophical tradition and their agreement with the rationalistic mood of 19th‑20th century philosophy. This implied that these thoughts (...) were stripped of the allegorical or mythological way in which Plato often expresses them. In particular, Plato’s allegory of the cave, one of his core images, turned out in Alain’s interpretation to be a metaphoric description of the difficult ascent of the mind up to scientific or at least rational knowledge. Consequently in this interpretation it was no longer question of any transcendency of the idea of the Good.Petrement and Weil remained faithful to their teacher and therefore to Platonic inspiration. Nevertheless, both of them, although in different ways, have reacted against this exhaustion of transcendence and come into conflict with modern interpretation of Plato. Petrement, even before specialising in the history of Gnosticism, worked out a dualistic system in which truth is absolutely transcendent because, as universal, it is unattainable for any particular mind inasmuch it is a subject’s mind. Truth, therefore, is unattainable throughout this life. On Weil’s part, the interest in Plato took place after a period of left wing militancy, following her discovery of Christianity and some personal experiences of mysticism. Platonism was for her a means of combining her new faith with a properly philosophical, i.e. rationalistic, way of thinking. Of course in this view transcendency was crucial to the idea of Good as much as to that of God. Whether this transcendency is more a matter of faith than of reason is at least uncertain. (shrink)

L’hypothèse développée ici est que la « meilleure amie » évoquée par Socrate à la fin du chapitre n’est autre que son âme. L’exemple ainsi donné par Socrate de sa maîtrise de soi face à l’attrait exercé par une femme à la beauté « plus forte que les paroles » s’adresse non à cette dernière, mais aux assistants. On comprend ainsi pourquoi ce chapitre prend place dans une série d’entretiens où Socrate prodigue ses conseils à ceux qui « désirent les (...) belles choses » . Cette interprétation plaide en faveur de l’unité du livre III des Mémorables.The hypothesis exposed here is that the « better friend » called up by Socrates in the last sentence of the chapter is just his own soul. By giving a such example of self-control in face of an appealing woman whose beauty was « stronger than words », Socrates is not addressing this woman but his audience. We thus understand why this chapter is located in a series of conversations in which Socrates is giving advices to people who « desire beautiful things » . The thesis of the unity of Book III of Memorabilia is supported by this interpretation. (shrink)

’Socratic irony’ is often understood in modern scholarship, for instance by Gregory Vlastos, as having a rather favourable sense. It is understood as implying something different from what one says and doing so part of a programme of moral education that consisted in challenging the intellectual powers of his interlocutors. However, this sense of eironeia is not found in Plato or in Aristotle in the texts where he discusses Socratic irony. The term ’irony’ occurs in those texts in a consistently (...) negative sense, associated with contemptuous or arrogant treatment of others . In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ’Socratic irony’ may appear to have a more favourable sense; but close attention to the relevant passages, taken in the context of Aristotle’s ethical framework, shows that it signifies a kind of wilful disdain of convention, and is no more favourably understood than the other extreme of alazoneia. If we go back to the Platonic uses of the term, for instance, Thrasymachus in Republic 337a or Callicles in Gorgias 489e, we find again a negative connotation. Here, the relevant sense is that of evading one’s share in the discussion by pretending to have no answer to the questions one poses. In fact, ’evasion’ is, probably, what eironeia, means, understood as a deliberate tactic to get the better of one’s opponents. The more favourable sense of ’Socratic irony’ is, thus, a modern invention, partly based on the more positive usage of the term in Latin, in Cicero and Quintilian. (shrink)