Reducing health disparities and improving health outcomes are fundamental principles in global health. Environmental justice remains underrecognized and undervalued as a key driver of health dispar...

We propose a descriptive version of the classical multi-attribute utility model; to that end, we add a new parameter, momentary salience, to the customary formulation. The addition of this parameter allows the theory to accommodate changes in the decision maker’s mood and circumstances, as the saliencies of anticipated consequences are driven by concerns of the moment. By allowing for the number of consequences given attention at the moment of decision to vary, the new model mutes the criticism that SEU models (...) call for an omniscient decision maker. Use of the model is illustrated with a large-scale longitudinal study showing that adolescent smokers have higher utility for smoking than nonsmokers. We also propose to use the model hierarchically to describe everyday decisions that people deal with repeatedly. Big decisions, which set policy, guide a host of nested little decisions, which in turn lead to action. For a little decision, one of the options will be consistent with the policy, and will inherit its high utility. Accordingly, most little decisions will be made quickly and will follow the policy. However, people do sometimes decide to violate their own policies, and we describe how these lapses can lead to collapse of the policy. (shrink)

: This review offers a critical analysis of Shannon Sullivan's "feminist pragmatist standpoint theory" as a framework for thinking about issues of identity and truth. Sullivan claims that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on an anonymous or pre-personal quality to bodily experience commits him to a false universality and that his understanding of bodily intentionality traps him in a subjectivist philosophy that is incapable of doing justice to difference. She suggests that phenomenology in general is theoretically limited because of its alleged subjectivism (...) and universalism, and she turns to Dewey's pragmatism to develop a "transactional model" of identity and truth. In response, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of anonymity and intentionality do not entail either subjectivism or a false universality. I also challenge Sullivan's conception of truth as transactional flourishing by appealing to the "terrible truths" of violence and oppression. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a similarity between an ancient and a modern theory of living nature. There is no need to present the Aristotelian doctrine in full detail. I must rather apologize for repeating much that is well known. My endeavour is to offer it for comparison, and, incidentally, to clear it from misrepresentation. Uexküll's theory, on the other hand, is little known, and what is given here is an insufficient outline of it. I (...) do not maintain that either doctrine is right. I am fully aware that the problem of the essence of living nature by no means admits of an éasy solution. In offering for consideration the comparison contained in this paper I would go no farther than owning my belief that the two authors here discussed, both thinkers who combine an intensely philosophical outlook with a wide biological experience, are worth the attention not only of the historian of science and philosophy, but also of the student of philosophical biology. (shrink)

v. 1. 1955-1960.--v. 2. 1960-1964.--v. 3. March-November 1964.--v. 4. November 26, 1964-September 2, 1965.--v. 5. September 3, 1965-August 27, 1968.--v. 6. August 28, 1968-May 22, 1971.--v. 7. April 13, 1975-June 21, 1976.--v. 7, pt. 2. September 17, 1977-February 26, 1978.--v. 8. April 28, 1978-July 28, 1980 -- v. 9. August 16, 1980-March 15, 1984 -- v. 11. January 19, 1986-May 27, 1987.

The most extreme form of sacrifice is that in which a man gives up his life or its meaning for the sake of another. It is perhaps the most praiseworthy of all the acts of which he is capable. But how can an act be praiseworthy if it involves the loss of something as precious as a human life? Can an act be at all praiseworthy which precludes the making of further efforts to bring about what is good? Can that (...) act be good which makes impossible further goods? (shrink)

In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any (...) perspectivalist, which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. (shrink)

The 14th International Congress of Philosophy, held late last summer in Vienna, had an entire subsection devoted to Hegel. Several papers were presented by philosophers from America, including: "Hegel In Light of His First American Followers", by Professor Loyd D. Easton of Ohio Wesleyan University; "Hegel and Husserl", by Professor W.H. Werkmeister of The Florida State University; "Hegel's Theory of Signification & The Origin of Dialectic", by Professor Daniel Cook of Herbert H. Lehman College ; "Beginning the System: Kierkegaard and (...) Hegel", by Professor Robert Perkins, University of South Alabama. These papers and others will be published in the Congress Proceedings. Inquiries should be directed to the University of Vienna Department of Philosophy. * * * Professor H.S. Harris of Glendon College, York University, Toronto, will shortly have published in a volume titled Essays in Honour of Max Fisch "The Fragment on Faith and Being in Hegel's Early Theological Writings". The essay contains the text translation and a full commentary on the fragment Glauben und Sein in Nohl. * * * The Fall issue of Philosophy Today contain an article by Professor Howard P. Kainz of Marquette University titled "Hegel's Characterization of Truth in the Phenomenology". * * * James F. Donaldson of Texas Technological College has an article titled "The Origin of Hegel's Dialectic" in the current issue of Lavel Theologique et Philosophique. A brief abstract of the paper may be found in the Fall, 1969 Philosopher's Index. (shrink)

An instrument is any object which makes possible the attainment of desired ends. It is not essential to the being of the instrument that it be inanimate, worked over, or its mode of operation understood. A pigeon can carry a message; a stone as well as a hammer can be employed to break a glass; a child can start an automobile. The instrument need not function in the interests of men, be set into operation by living beings, or even be (...) used at all. Leaves serve some insects as umbrellas do men; the rays of the sun may turn a screw; a new knife has not yet had a chance to cut. A cow is an instrument for the production of milk, a hen for the production of eggs, though neither is inanimate, worked over, nor its operation understood; they can serve the interests of other animals, are able to initiate their own movements, and may not yet have had occasion to produce the desired results. But they are instruments because they are acknowledged means for the production of the desired milk and eggs. (shrink)

In this conversation with one of the witnesses from Auschwitz, deported when she was sixteen and become a Muselmann in the concentration camp, we can realize the discredit and even the contempt that surrounded the victims when they came back to the “planet of the living”, as well as the tardy interest for their stories that followed the trial against Eichmann. But how to witness? How to find the words to make other people understand what hunger or coldness are, when (...) their experience dates back so far in time? «There is no answer to the question: how did it happen? Knowing, not abstractly but through the images that one brings within oneself, that humans are capable of this, is really hard to stand with». (shrink)

1. Almost from the beginning of its history, it has tried to provide intelligible, systematic accounts of the world of actualities--the spatio-temporal objects which ground our daily experiences. Because of the great success of science in formulating cosmic schemes which are sustained by many widespread observations, multiple, daring predictions, and a host of desirable practical productions, many thinkers have been tempted to turn the entire task over to the sciences. Others have supposed that the philosopher has nothing more to do (...) than to occupy himself with historical studies, logical investigations, and perhaps some asides on ethics, aesthetics, and politics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Rejoinder to Professors Gosling and Taylor Hedonism is for Socrates the radical view that pleasure is the standard according to which one ought to steer one's life, the view that pleasure represents the proper end of human existence. Hedonism is not for Socrates the weaker view that the good life is also the most pleasant. Were it not for the Protagoras, all would agree, I think, that Socrates (...) does not regard pleasure as the highest goal of human life. Perhaps even Gosling and Taylor would concede that but for the Protagoras no reader of Plato would assign to pleasure a pivotal role in Socratic ethics:/ffdon~ as a standard of rightness or goodness is absent from the Apologyand Crito, and is railed against in the Phaedoand the Gorgias.The Gosling-Taylor project of reading all these dialogues in light of the Protagoras's presumed Socratic endorsement of hedonism, and interpreting them so that they are not incompatible with the Protagoras, drains the hedonism in the Protagoras of its radicality and substitutes--without warrant--the weaker, non-Socratic understanding of hedonism. Gosling and Taylor's accusation that I commit an ignoratioelenchiis one example of this sort of softening of the issue. I argue that Socrates (in the Apology) decides what to fear by appealing to the standard of what is right rather than determining what is right by appealing to the standard of fearfulness, and that it is therefore inaccurate to describe him as courageous through fear. Were the question here the weak one of whether the courageous man in fact chooses what is truly least fearful I could agree with Gosling and Taylor that it is irrelevant to consider the standard to which Socrates appeals in making his choice. Yet both in the Protagorasand in the Phaedo--as well as, I believe, in the Apology---what is at stake ~ the standard, the motivation behind the choice. In the Apology Socrates is not, as Gosling and Taylor claim, "motivated by" fear, even though he specifies what he fears. In order to explain what motivates him to fear and then to avoid what he fears, Socrates turns to the notions of duty and honor. Socrates declares (Apology 29b) that it is not because of fear of death or any other danger that he remains steadfast at his post and refuses to relinquish his duty of examining himelf and others; rather, he will obey his superior, whether God or man, becauseto do otherwise is wrong, wicked, and dishonorable. Indeed, it is since disobedience is wrong, wicked, and dishonorable that Socrates fears it more than death. Socrates thus can hardly be said to "leave inexplicit" the criteria that determine for him what is kak0n, nor does he allow any room for pleasure and pain to emerge as those criteria. As I sought to demonstrate in my paper, the philosopher in the Phaedo is characteristically indifferent to pleasure, pain, and fear. Although no human life can be devoid of intercourse with these, the way in which a philosopher negotiates his dealing with pleasures, pains, and fears is by choosing among them through reference to a higher standard. Regarding Gosling and Taylor's claim that I misrepresent their view on the Phaedo I shall of course defer to them. I direct the reader to pp. 522-23 and n. 18 of my paper, however, to explain what aspects of Gosling and Taylor's discussion prompted my interpretation. [117] 118 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 98:1 JANUARY 199 o Professors Gosling and Taylor insist that the Phaedo, in denouncing pleasure, concentrates specifically on bodily pleasure. I maintain that at Phaedo 68-69 what is deplored as spurious aret~ is the very goal of maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain and fear. As in the Protagoras, the calculus in the Phaedo has its eye on the bottom line; the type or quality of the pleasure is not a factor. The hedonism in the Protagoras, I firmly contend, is of the very crudest sort. I do not concede that it is enlightened in any sense--not even in Gosling and Taylor's limited sense in which its criterion of goodness is not immediate pleasure... (shrink)

What we experience is somewhat of a melange, something at once perceptual, mediated by the sense organs; scientific, reflecting our use of mathematical and other formal devices to make clear and systematic the causes of what is now taking place, and pointing us towards what might be expected; eventful, stretches of vital movement in which beginning and ending are, though separate, inescapably interlocked; and important, reflecting both our sense of value and the presence of an objective standard outside us and (...) unaffected by our interests. Initially these strands are inchoately together, constituting commonsense objects, artifactual or natural, the occupants of the world of which we unreflectively take account. On some occasions one of these facets may be to the fore, on other occasions it may be so recessive that its presence is overlooked. (shrink)

Anamnesis (Swiatlo Dnia) was written as an aftermath of a six-day performative installation at the twelfth-century castle in Trancoso, Portugal with the participation of local women and men, mainly farmers. It was written concurrently while working on the editing of the video and the sound, which I filmed and recorded on site (or, as I think of it, layering of images, sounds and different time paths). The text addresses the act of drawing as related to speech, mark, trace, scripture, presence (...) and absence as it elaborates on the notion of gesture across the media and time. The vital connections between the performative act of drawing and the desire to mark since time immemorial and the contemporary virtual and cinematic mediums are crucial to the notion of anamnesis in both the physical installation in real time with performative inhabitation of space and in the virtual and altered memory of that occurrence in the resulting video piece. (shrink)

Review of Sternberg’s Are Yout a Machine? an introduction to philosophy of mind which was begin as a high school project.

Definition: An essence is a meaning, a structure, the character, the nature of an entity, "what" it is.

Students of Hegel will soon have at their disposal a complete translation of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, "the only complete, matured, and authentic statement of Hegel's philosophical system", and the last of the four major works published by Hegel in his lifetime to be fully translated into English. Early next year, the Clarendon Press at Oxford will issue a translation of the second part of the Encyclopaedia, The Philosophy of Nature, by A.V. Miller, recent translator of Hegel's Science (...) of Logic. The translation includes the valuable Zusätze, and was supervised throughout by Professor J.N. Findlay of Yale, who has also written an Introduction for it. With it will also be published a new edition of the Philosophy of Mind, the third part of the Encyclopaedia. The text of the paragraphs is the familiar Wallace translation, but added to this volume are the Zusätze newly translated by Mr. Millet, and a new Introduction by Professor Findlay. When the present edition of the first part of the Encyclopaedia, usually referred to as "the Lesser Logic" has been exhausted, if will also be republished with some revisions and additions. Professor Findlay adds that all the proofs were done last June, and that if will appear "at a price that students will not find prohibitive". (shrink)