Bergson argues in his Creative Evolution that life has to be defined as an élan vital, that is, as a driving force that presses forward incessantly, overcoming obstacles to its progress and exploding in a variety of directions at once. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud elaborates a critique of such a vitalistic notion of the drives. For him, the drives are not only sources of excitation, but also forces that resist change and that cause the body's movements and activities (...) to stagnate. Freud ascribes a remarkable name to these conservative and stubborn tendencies at work in the body, viz. the death drive. I argue that this drive is to be understood as a force in life that resists life and that, instead of following a course of progression and development, consists in a production of antiproductivity. I show how Freud is led to reconsider a vitalistic conception of the drives by means of a study of phenomena of repetition. One suggestion that Freud makes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which I examine in detail, is that the ego-drives are the “myrmidons of death.” To clarify this claim, I consider a remark that he makes on the viscosity of the drives and melancholia in his short essay On Transience. (shrink)

Over the last 102 years, a lot of discussion was being held about the psychoanalytic conception of the “death drive,” but still with inconclusive results. In this paper, we start with a brief review of Freud’s conception, followed by a comprised overview of its subsequent support or criticisms. The core of our argument is a systematic review of current biochemical research about two proposed manifestations of the “death drive,” which could hopefully move the discussion to the (...) realm of science. It was already established that drive satisfaction leads to the secretion of beta-endorphins, and research evidence also shows that the same biochemical mechanisms get activated in the case of masochism and the gambling disorder but only if they are preceded by chronic frustration of the essential drives. We conclude that the actual situation is more complex than Freud hypothesized, and that a fundamental revision of the psychoanalytic drive theory is necessary. (shrink)

Freud introduces his dualistic theory of the life and death drives in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Much of that essay is devoted to the justification of the death drive, while little is said in defense of the introduction of “life drives” and “Eros,” which he claims are simply an extension of his libido theory from the psychological into the biological realm. In this essay, I argue that Eros is, on the contrary, fundamentally incompatible with Freud’s metapsychology. I (...) first show that Freud’s theory of society permits the production and preservation of social bonds only through the restraint of sexual aims rather than, as the theory of Eros would require, through the satisfaction of sexual drives. I then demonstrate that Eros is incompatible with three key elements of Freud’s metapsychology: the theories of the drives, the pleasure principle, and the principle of constancy. Finally, I argue that the death drive is indistinguishable from the early and late theories of the principle of constancy. Consequently, it is the death drive, and not Eros, that is merely an extension of the original libido theory. Because Eros is incompatible with the very foundations of Freud’s metapsychology, his drive theory can only consistently be interpreted as a monism of the death drive. (shrink)

Freud's biological notion of a death drive is not well founded but a number of closely associated notions (including those of a drive, and of aggression turned against the self) are.

This paper deals with Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of the death drive from the perspective of speculative philosophy. For this purpose, three philosophers have been chosen: Nick Land, Ray Brassier, and Reza Negarestani. I claim that they gradually radicalised the Freudian thought: Land expanded it to capitalist economy and terrestrial geotrauma; Brassier shifted it towards a solar catastrophe and the prospect of extinction; Negarestani incorporated it into the exteriority of cosmic contingency. This way, Freud’s legacy emerges as a transcendental, (...) epistemological and speculative instrument to tackle Meillassoux’s problem of correlation. I consider why this trajectory has ceased: I suggest a hypothesis that Bataille’s influence has not been overcome, especially in the case of Negarestani. I offer several vectors, according to which, Bataille could serve as an opportunity for openness to the Outside and a chance to continue the trajectory of the speculative death drive. I suggest that it is possible to reconsider Bataille as one of the precursors to the contemporary speculative thought. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the question of the hybridity of the religious and the secular through the example of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek and his psychoanalytically inspired notion of the undead. The undead is Žižek's rendering of the Freudian death drive, and as the undead is instantiated in the popular culture cliché of the zombies, we need to look no further than to George A. Romero's classic zombie movie Night of the Living Dead from 1968. Thus, (...) this article proceeds in three steps: first, I trace the concept of the death drive from Freud to Žižek, supplemented, for their theological importance, by two contemporary philosophers, Jonathan Lear and Eric Santner. Second, I discuss the zombie in contemporary popular culture, with a focus on Romero's movies, and whether such cinematic representations can function as a kind of cultural critique. In conclusion, I return to the question of theology by showing what Žižek means by theology and contrasting as well as comparing his philosophy to Augustine's anthropology. Despite Žižek's atheistic confession and his dismissal of all pre‐modern philosophy and theology, I show that Augustine's anthropology is structurally similar to Žižek's, thus suggesting that the relationship is more complex than Žižek allows. Both are united in rejecting any superficial and transparent understanding of self, and become, consequently, an example of the ambiguous relationship between religion and secularity in contemporary times. (shrink)

This article examines Harold Ramis’s 2005 noir comedy _The Ice Harvest_ as the critically dystopian counter-panel to his beloved 1993 film _Groundhog Day_, a film frequently discussed within the paradigm of utopia. While starkly different in genre, tone, and reception, the two films comprise a dialectical dyad that registers the historical transition from the utopian cultural effervescence of the early 1990s to the tragic foreclosure of imaginative horizons and the dystopian transformation of economic, political, and social landscapes in the new (...) millennium. In _The Ice Harvest_, the author argues, this is achieved through a strategic reactivation of film noir as a variant of the critical dystopia. (shrink)

Psychoanalysis and Christianity hold forth the promise of genuinely radical change, transforming a person so substantially such that ‘nothing remains the same’; even if the objective conditions of one’s existence stay fixed, the very lens with which the ‘born again’ subject views the world would have undergone so traumatic an upheaval that values, priorities and everything previously deemed essential would have been reimagined. It is, quite truly, a new beginning. This paper aims to insinuate a close proximity between Žižekian concepts (...) of the traumatically emergent and new vis-à-vis Biblical ideas of salvation, vocation and agape love. I also wish to demonstrate how even the Christian sacraments of baptism and the eucharist point to death and dying as their constitutive elements, with the result that sacrifice for the world becomes the main political role the Church must play. (shrink)

This paper addresses the emergence of the ‘death drive’ in Sigmund Freud’s later work, and thesignificance of this development for his psychoanalytic theory as a whole. In particular, the paper arguesthat the ‘death drive’ is a pivotal concept, articulating a connection between what are commonlyunderstood as the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ functions of the psyche. Moreover, the death drive is pivotal in asecond sense, in that it articulates a turn away from the strictly empirical realm (...) of science, to a dark andobscure field indicated , but not comprehended, by observable phenomena. Finally, thepaper suggests that as Freud’s departure from his scientific methodology into the wilderness of speculation,the death drive represents his most valuable contribution to psychoanalysis. With the death drive, Freud isable to engender a new perspective of human being: one that is not already encompassed by themechanistic neurological viewpoint from which his researches first issued. (shrink)

This paper addresses the emergence of the ‘death drive’ in Sigmund Freud’s later work, and the significance of this development for his psychoanalytic theory as a whole. In particular, the paper argues that the ‘death drive’ is a pivotal concept, articulating a connection between what are commonly understood as the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ functions of the psyche. Moreover, the death drive is pivotal in a second sense, in that it articulates a turn away from (...) the strictly empirical realm of science, to a dark and obscure field indicated, but not comprehended, by observable phenomena. Finally, the paper suggests that as Freud’s departure from his scientific methodology into the wilderness of speculation, the death drive represents his most valuable contribution to psychoanalysis. With the death drive, Freud is able to engender a new perspective of human being: one that is not already encompassed by the mechanistic neurological viewpoint from which his researches first issued. (shrink)

: This article examines Slavoj Žižek’s reading of F.W.J. Schelling’s Ages of the World from the standpoint of the ontological status of nothingness in Schelling’s idealism as contrasted with Žižek’s methodology of dialectical materialism. Although Schelling’s theosophical theism differs from Žižek’s materialist hermeneutic, Schelling’s thought nevertheless enacts an important breakthrough in Western philosophy that anticipates the dynamics of the Marxist interpretation of the dialectic. In particular, his positing of opposed unconscious drives within the ante-cosmic Godhead prefigures Sigmund Freud’s theory of (...) the death drive. (shrink)

The future is kid stuff -- Sinthom-osexuality -- Compassion's compulsion -- No future.

As a drive to the inorganic, the death drive is fundamentally opposed to sensuality and, specifically, to pleasure and pain. This is why Gilles Deleuze understands Freud’s account of the death drive as the “beyond of the pleasure principle” not in terms of the transgression of a boundary or limit (going beyond pleasure into something painful or traumatic), but rather as a foray into speculative philosophy, an attempt to identify the transcendent principle or higher law (...) of the pleasure principle, the supersensual law of its sensual manifestations. This paper explores the construction of the supersensual reality of the death drive in masochistic fantasy and in fetishistic disavowal, exploring their affinity not only with art and aesthetics but with mathematical and formal constructions. Both help to elucidate Freud’s early insight that the death drive is more mathematical than physical, a purely immanent energy with no sensual manifestation. (shrink)

필자의 논의는 우리 인간에게 있어서의 “모든 충동은 죽음의 충동”이라는 라캉의 주장에 대한 동의에서 출발한다. ｢쾌락 원칙을 넘어서｣에서 프로이트가 죽음 충동 개념을 도입한 이래로 죽음 충동에 관한 많은 유의미한 논의들이 있어왔다. 그러한 논의 중에는 엄밀성에 있어서 가치 있는 연구들도 있었고 삶의 가치를 풍요롭게 해 줄 연구들도 있었다. 개념 자체에 관한 논의들은 프로이트의 기획의 본 의도를 더욱 명확하게 해 준 것들도 있었고, 그의 논의가 가진 맹점을 날카롭게 비판한 것들도 있었다. 개념의 엄밀성을 보다 정교하게 해 줄 연구들은 지금도 여전히 풍부하게 진행 중일 것이다. (...) 그래서 필자의 연구는 그와는 다소 다른 관점에서 기획됐다. 필자는 오늘날 우리에게 가장 절실한 것으로서 삶에 대한 보다 건강하고 건전한 이해를 도울 수 있는 설명을 꼽는다. 그리고 그러한 설명이 다름 아닌 철학함이고, 철학 실천이라고 이해하고 있다. 본 연구는 철학에 관한 필자의 그와 같은 기본적 이해 혹은 신념의 바탕에서 출발한 것으로 필자는 본고에서 죽음 충동 개념을 통해 새로운 철학적 전망을 제시하고자 한다. 필자는 “말하는 주체”로서 우리가 처한 구조적 현실에서의 여러 고통들은 상징과 실재를 등가화하려는 시도 속에서 발생한다고 본다. 결코 등가화될 수 없는 불가능한 것들 사이에서 끊임없이 시도되는 실재의 상징화는 또 다른 불가능으로 치달을 수밖에 없지만, 그러한 충동들은 그 과정에서 우리에게 ‘너머의 쾌’를 제공해주기도 한다. 또한 충동하는 주체에게는 상징의 무한 부정을 통해 자유롭게 삶을 새롭게 해석해낼 수 있는 자유가 허락된다. 필자는 그런 종류의 충동들을 다름 아닌 “호모 루덴스”의 “죽음 충동”으로 해석하고 있으며, 이것이 고통을 넘어서는 고양된 삶에 이바지 한다고 주장하고자 한다. (shrink)

We argue that the gap between an authentically ethical conviction of sustainability and a behaviour that avoids confronting the terrifying reality of its ethical point of reference is characteristic of the field of business sustainability. We do not accuse the field of business sustainability of ethical shortcomings on the account of this attitude–behaviour gap. If anything, we claim the opposite, namely that there resides an ethical sincerity in the convictions of business scholars to entrust capitalism and capitalists with the mammoth (...) task of reversing, the terrifying reality of ecological devastation. Yet, the very illusory nature of this belief in capitalism’s captains to save us from the environmentally devastating effects of capitalism gives this ethical stance a tragic beauty. While sincere and authentic, it nevertheless is an ethical stance that relies on an “exclusionary gesture of refusing to see”, what in psychoanalysis is referred to as a fetishist disavowal of reality. We submit that this disavowal is fetishistic because the act is not simply one of repressing the real. If it was, we would rightly expect that we could all see the truth if we only provide more or better information to fill the subject’s lack of knowledge. The problem is that the fetishist transfers a fantasy of the real as the real. In the case of destructive capitalism, the fetishist disavows that particular reality by believing in another, thus subjectively negating the lack. Therefore, from the perspective of psychoanalytic theory, we submit that the gap between attitude and behaviour is best understood not only as an ethical flaw, but also as an essential component of an ethics that makes possible the field of business sustainability. (shrink)

Paul Moyaert proposes to resolve persistent difficulties in Freud's theory of drive by appealing to a metaphysics of mutually irreducible forces. His argument is persuasive on many points, but raises questions about others. Three of them are mentioned here: one each pertaining to the implications of his position for the body and sexuality, the analytic relation, and ethics.

The first philosophers of the Frankfurt School famously turned to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud to supplement their Marxist analyses of ideological subjectification. Since the collapse of their proposed "marriage of Marx and Freud," psychology and social theory have grown apart to the impoverishment of both. Returning to this union, Benjamin Y. Fong reconstructs the psychoanalytic "foundation stone" of critical theory in an effort to once again think together the possibility of psychic and social transformation. Drawing on the work (...) of Hans Loewald and Jacques Lacan, Fong complicates the famous antagonism between Eros and the death drive in reference to a third term: the woefully undertheorized drive to mastery. Rejuvenating Freudian metapsychology through the lens of this pivotal concept, he then provides fresh perspective on Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse's critiques of psychic life under the influence of modern cultural and technological change. The result is a novel vision of critical theory that rearticulates the nature of subjection in late capitalism and renews an old project of resistance. (shrink)

This book offers a radical alternative to the positive orientation of popular psychology. This positive orientation has been criticized numerous times. However, there has yet to be a coherent alternative proposed. We all know today that life hurts and that there is no ultimate remedy to this pain. The positive approach feels to us as dishonest and irrelevant. We require a new, more negative, perspective and practice, one that is honest and does not pretend to offer an escape from the (...) agonies of the world. This book offers in three main chapters a ‘depressive realist’ perspective that explores the structural role of negativity and tragedy in relation to the individual psyche, society, and nature. It explores the possibility of ‘negative psychoanalysis’ which takes into account the tragedy of human existence instead of adopting escapist positions. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To determine the epidemiology and the underlying pathological conditions of natural deaths among motor vehicle drivers. Sudden death while driving may cause damage to properties, other vehicles or road users. Although the Medical Commission on Accident Prevention recommended restrictions to drivers at risk of sudden death due to their medical conditions, these restrictions are useless if they do not result in greater safety to the public. DESIGN: A retrospective study of natural deaths of motor vehicle drivers. SETTING: (...) Natural deaths of motor vehicle drivers reported to the coroner for Birmingham and Solihull. SUBJECTS: 86 consecutive natural deaths of motor vehicle drivers in a five-year period between 1984 and 1988. RESULTS: Of the 86 fatalities reviewed, 80 (93%) sudden deaths were caused by ischaemic heart disease. Fifty vehicles were involved in collision with 32 properties, 20 other vehicles and six pedestrians. Fifty-one out of 80 cardiac deaths had past cardiac history and three had reported chest pain prior to the sudden death. CONCLUSION: An applied normative ethical assessment based on the basic moral principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence and non-maleficence are discussed. We conclude that medical screening of drivers has little benefit for the drivers or other persons. (shrink)

Postmodern critical assessments of Freud’s theory of mourning disavow the idea of grief’s conclusiveness, insisting that mourning is an interminable process or even a transcendental structure of experience. However, such assessments presuppose an ontological orientation toward finitude that avoids the profound speculative implications of the non-finite status of death in the unconscious. In consequence, mourning comes to assume an indefinite, generic status as a condition of experience instead of a resolutely speculative confrontation with the impossible real of infinitude. Freud’s (...) writings evidence his difficulties with this unconscious disjunction of mourning from finitude, but can be elucidated by turning to Hegel’s critical discussion of “infinite grief,” the melancholy apprehension of finitude as a spurious infinity. Hegel’s analysis in turn anticipates Lacan’s elaboration of the death drive as a concept of unconscious transmission. Here, what begins to emerge is a theory of mourning that concerns the speculative inheritance of an immortal object. (shrink)

This paper proposes that autonomous vehicles should be designed to reduce light pollution. In support of this specific proposal, a moral assessment of autonomous vehicles more comprehensive than the dilemmatic life-and-death questions of trolley problem-style situations is presented. The paper therefore consists of two interrelated arguments. The first is that autonomous vehicles are currently still a technology in development, and not one that has acquired its definitive shape, meaning the design of both the vehicles and the surrounding infrastructure is (...) open-ended. Design for values is utilized to articulate a path forward, by which engineering ethics should strive to incorporate values into a technology during its development phase. Second, it is argued that nighttime lighting—a critical supporting infrastructure—should be a prima facie consideration for autonomous vehicles during their development phase. It is shown that a reduction in light pollution, and more boldly a better balance of lighting and darkness, can be achieved via the design of future autonomous vehicles. Two case studies are examined through which autonomous vehicles may be designed for “driving in the dark.” Nighttime lighting issues are thus inserted into a broader ethics of autonomous vehicles, while simultaneously introducing questions of autonomous vehicles into debates about light pollution. (shrink)

In this response essay, Peter Taubman considers the relationship between melancholia and Freud's notion of a death drive. Taubman explores how audit culture sustains melancholia and intensifies the death drive, ultimately deadening our psyches by erasing memory, disparaging feelings, shutting down thought, and ignoring history. Taubman concludes with a suggestion that educators once again integrate discussions of Eros, or love, in their approaches to curriculum and teaching.

This essay examines how Black Mirror presents mortality as a moral dilemma, asking if we should use technology to rewrite the rules of existence. Through the exploration of philosophical perspectives from Martin Heidegger, Albert Camus, Jacques Derrida, and Sigmund Freud, the essay illustrates the choices Black Mirror presents regarding how we should deal with the death of others and the death of ourselves, as well as the meaning of death and whether we should defer it or embrace (...) it. (shrink)

Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger argues that mortality is a fundamental structuring element in human life. The ordinary view of life and death regards them as dichotomous and separate. This book explains why this view is unsatisfactory and presents a new model of the relationship between life and death that sees them as interlinked. Using Heidegger's concept of being towards death and Freud's notion of the death drive, it demonstrates the extensive influence (...) death has on everyday life and gives an account of its structural and existential significance. By bringing the two perspectives together, this book presents a reading of death that establishes its significance for life, creates a meeting point for philosophical and psychoanalytical perspectives, and examines the problems and strengths of each. It then puts forth a unified view, based on the strengths of each position and overcoming the problems of each. Finally, it works out the ethical consequences of this view. This volume is of interest for philosophers, mental health practitioners and those working in the field of death studies. (shrink)

In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by (...) the public. I this paper, I defend brain death as a biological concept. I challenge two assumptions in the brain death literature that have shaped the debate and have stood in the way of an argument for brain death as biological. First, I challenge the dualism established in the debate between the body and the brain. Second, I contest the emphasis on consciousness, which prevents the inclusion of psychological phenomena into a biological criterion of death. I propose that the term organism should apply both to the functioning of the body and the brain. I argue that the cessation of the organism as a whole should take into account three elements of integrated function. Those three elements are: 1) the loss of integrated bodily function; 2) the loss of psychophysical integration required for processing of external stimuli and those required for behavior; and, 3) the loss of integrated psychological function, such as memory, learning, attention, and so forth. The loss of those three elements of integrated function is death. (shrink)

Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially (...) distinct from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects. (shrink)

What is viral law? In order to being my discussion, I note that the last two years have been extremely difficult to understand and that we, meaning those who have lived through the pandemic, have struggled to make sense. Thus, I make the argument that the virus has impacted upon not only the individual’s ability to make sense in a world where every day routines have been upended, but also social and political structures that similarly rely on repetition to continue (...) to function. According to this thesis, Covid-19 is more than simply a biological organism, but also a cultural virus that undermines the organisation of social, political, and economic systems and requires new ways of thinking about how we might move forward into a post-Covid world. In the name of beginning this project of making sense of Covid-19, I track back in history to the comparable reference point of the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918–1920 and, in particular, a reading of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which the founder of psychoanalysis wrote in the shadow of the virus. In reading Freud’s attempt to write a psychology of death in the context of this funereal period of history, I argue that he set out first, a mythological theory of viral law concerned with the death drive, before turning to second, a techno-scientific, biological theory of the same law characterised by microbial immortality. Beyond this exploration of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in the third part of the article I turn to a reading of Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s work, where viral law becomes a story of cybernetics and nihilistic mechanisation. Here, perfect mechanisation, and the endless oscillation between message and noise, looks a lot like living death. Finally, I take up Derrida’s critique of Jacob’s molecular biology and, by extension, Freud’s theory of microbial immorality, that he thinks privileges an idea of repetitive sameness and opens up a space for cultural politics concerned with immunity against otherness. Derrida’s key point here is that this biological fantasy ignores the reality of viral sex that enables evolution to happen. What this means is that the other, even in its microbial form, is ever present, and that we must recognise the importance of difference to the possibility of social, political, and economic change. (shrink)

Is there a distinction between “art” and “craft,” where the former is motivated by something like “genuine” or “authentic” creativity and the latter by, at best, skill and skill alone, and at a worst, a fumbling attempt to fit in with popular modes of expression? In this paper, I suggest that there does seem to be such a distinction. In particular, I attempt to show that genuine creativity, and so, genuine art—in varying respects—is motivated by a certain recognition of what (...) we might understand as the most universal, and perhaps the most important property of all human beings: the brutal fact that our lives are limited; in the end, we all die. To show why I think this is the case, I have divided my paper into three parts. In the first, I briefly explain why we might view mortality as our most pressing issue and concomitantly, why we might understand it to be the driving force behind not only our desire to procreate, but also, to create. In the second part of the paper, I do something that is not strictly “philosophical”—I canvas a number of remarks by poets and writers who, like myself, are convinced that death is our primary muse, but not necessarily in a morbid, or despairing respect—in fact, we see that this is quite the opposite in some cases (c.f. Nabokov, 1966). Why do I do this? Because it seems obvious to me that we should ask the actual artists about what motivates them, rather than putting words into their mouths. In the third and final part of the paper, I offer a brief philosophical explanation of why and how—in light of sections one and two—we might begin to distinguish between genuine art and craft. -/- . (shrink)