Continental Psychoanalysis

This editorial explores the overlooked, yet compelling, intersection of sport and psychoanalysis. While sport is often viewed as a realm of physicality, competition, and entertainment, psychoanalysis reveals its deeper psychological significance. Sport functions as a site where unconscious desires, fantasies, and social tensions are enacted, challenging the notion that it exists beyond critical thought. This piece introduces several key themes, including the paradox of sport’s (in)significance—its simultaneous frivolity and profound cultural weight—along with the emotional and symbolic investments that shape fan (...) devotion and identity. Sport is presented as a microcosm of broader societal contradictions, where issues like failure, transgression, and unending desire take on heightened meaning. Furthermore, the editorial argues that sport does not merely invite psychoanalytic critique but also poses challenges to psychoanalytic thought itself, particularly regarding embodiment, rule-breaking, and fandom. By recognizing sport as a concentrated form of life, this introduction calls for further scholarly inquiry into its unconscious dynamics. The Sport and Psychoanalysis section welcomes original research and critical reviews on these intersections, emphasizing the necessity of taking sport seriously—not despite its absurdities, but because of them. (shrink)

In a world of suffering, alienation, materialism and hedonism (pleasure as the aim of life), the struggle to avoid the pull toward egoism and worldly desires becomes challenging. It is also difficult to recognise the existence of eudaimonia ('ultimate happiness'): or can there possibly be a eudaimonic life? The debate regarding how to live a meaningful life and attain 'ultimate happiness' is ongoing since happiness is constantly being constructed and is hence, not established. Although some believe otherwise, the Islamic framework (...) argues that suffering and struggling against one’s ‘self’ can lead to serenity and a meaningful life. Interestingly, one would envisage that psychoanalysis draws away from 'ultimate happiness', as the self is always conflicted. However, Freud (1856-1939 CE.) seems to portray a similar but failed paradigm to the Islamic self and suffering; it can be questioned whether Freud attributes a ‘final stage’ of human fulfilment beyond the superego stage. Using conceptual, applied and comparative analysis through a psychosocial approach, this theoretical dissertation uses primary and secondary sources to critically compare and analyse Freud’s personality and drive theories with the Islamic philosophical conceptions of the self, illustrating whether both frameworks contribute isomorphic theoretical implications. Secondly, I rethink and reconstruct the idea of happiness and a meaningful eudaimonic life, and whether overcoming the self and suffering can guide towards it. Finally, after critically comparing the 'final stages' of the self, that is, jihād al-nafs (the struggle against oneself) and Freud’s superego stage, the dissertation is among the first to propose whether the serene self leads towards eudaimonia and whether Freud’s idea of unhappiness and pleasure principles lead towards hedonism and the possibility of eudaimonia. Throughout this analysis, the question of whether philosophy and psychoanalysis can account for the possibility of an 'ultimate happiness', or 'final human fulfilment' beyond the post-superego stage is promising; therefore, it would be significant to contribute and propose this theory to enhance the study’s academic originality for philosophy and psychosocial studies. -/- . (shrink)

A possibilidade de transicionar, de mutação e transformação, se defronta com a possibilidade de transitar entre fronteiras, territórios, limiares. No campo das psicopatologias, a elaboração do diagnóstico de ‘transexualidade’ explicita fronteiras institucionais, componentes do que Foucault compreende como um regime de verdade moderno – no caso, aquele em que uma verdade sobre os sexos, assim como sobre a legitimidade dos estados, seria inquestionável. Em crítica a esse regime, argumento que o constrangimento das normatividades modernas, tanto sobre sexo/gênero como sobre relações (...) de dominação política e econômica, possui como um de seus modos de atuação as contra-nomeações, ou seja, a atribuição de categorias, nomes, designações às normas que pretendem aparentar universais. Em psicanálise, penso nessa atribuição como decorrente de outras perspectivas – libertárias – sobre a prática clínica. Se a psicanálise, por um lado, constrangeu os saberes médicos/psiquiátricos de sua época, por outro lado, como aponta Paul B. Preciado, não escapou das normativas do regime de verdade no qual se encontrava. Assim, pensar em uma psicanálise hibridizada, com Ayouch, ou emancipada, com Laufer, demanda que desafiemos não somente o regime da diferença sexual, mas o cânone acadêmico, a legitimidade da ‘lei’, as relações de governança e de opressão de classe, ou, como expõe Jourdan, o paradigma representacional; demanda, em síntese, que desconfiemos de todo e qualquer regime de verdade. Para desenvolver essas questões, uso as noções de injúria diagnóstica, de Ayouch; ofensa da nomeação, de Pfeil e Pfeil; pós-anarquismo, de Newman; desidentificação, de Muñoz; e outremização, de Morrison, entrecruzando psicanálise e política em direção a uma psicanálise libertária. Tomo como elemento analisador a injúria diagnóstica atribuída à transexualidade e a contra-nomeação que a sucede, no ímpeto de ofender o cânone moderno imiscuído nos saberes psicanalíticos. (shrink)

A Rejoinder to the Least Charitable Interpretation of Meursault's Narrative Self-Portrait as Anti-Social Passive-Aggressive Reactive Self-Destructive. Not worth your time. Perhaps the worst thing I have written yet.

The critical intention of this article does not focus on a comprehensive socio-cultural evaluation of gambling. Rather, its perspective is guided towards ways of picturing gambling and the subject of the gambler in different theoretical contexts. It is argued that one might expand philosophical conceptions of practical self-determination by taking an interdisciplinary look at gambling. However, such an attempt runs into the danger of painting an overly simplistic picture of self-control as self-continence, which can be found in theoretical approaches pathologizing (...) the gambler. In order to avoid such an outcome, an interdisciplinary analogy combining psychoanalytical and philosophical thought is presented. This analogy brings together the perspectives of the analysand and the gambler. By confronting these scenarios of human agency, it is shown that practical self-determination depends on instances of daring that can be related to certain gambling practices, too. The interdisciplinary view on gambling highlights its potentials for self-exploration, without neglecting the fact that an appropriate realization of such a self-exploration requires experiential and interpersonal conditions that often collide with the harsh reality of gambling practices. (shrink)

This article aims to discuss psychoanalytic cure as a particular kind of health dispositive. I argue that, when psychoanalysts leave the critique of concepts such as healthiness, normality and cure behind, our praxis could perpetuate violent social values. Initially, I explore how our expectations of healthiness and normality are socially mediated through a return to the Freudian notion of “love and work”. Two sections are specifically dedicated to analyzing each of these figures, respectively. Such demonstration sustain itself in an approximation (...) to the liberal concepts of work and love. My argument concludes with a critical appropriation of the Lacanian concepts of analytical act and sinthome, which I suggest could help us build a clinical praxis engaged with social emancipation. That opens room for a new, critically oriented reading of healthiness and cure. (shrink)

Hegel insists that the category ‘nature’, expressed in relation to the ideal of aesthetic beauty, is not nature as such but a supplementary deviation coloured by the subjective position from which this ‘nature’ is posited. We cannot distinguish nature ‘in itself’ from the ideological-artistic conditions of the distorted ‘use’ of nature. Nature exists to us only by reference to what is subjectively treated as non-natural. A similar relation is posited by Lacan in his famous assertion that ‘there is no sexual (...) relation’. For Freud and Lacan, the ‘all too human’ sexual drive derives from a deviated/distorted enjoyment of the initial failure to enjoy a purely natural sexual relation: an inevitably castrated enjoyment, where ‘natural’ sexuality is revealed as impossible. In other words, sexuality is for Lacan and Freud its own distortion of the category of ‘natural’. Sexuality is a perpetually distorted and abnormal form of enjoyment, for which the alternative is not ‘normal/natural enjoyment’, but rather the negative state of a fundamental lack of any relation. Through Hegel and sexuality, this paper argues that the unavoidable misuse of nature is not caused by improper application/categorisation, but instead reflects an internal incompleteness or indeterminacy in nature as a category. (shrink)

The paper proposes a parallel reading of Albrecht Dürer’s engraving ›Melencolia I‹ (1514) and Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s notion of real abstraction. It argues for a constitutive link between the abstractions operative in ›Melencolia I‹, in commodity exchange, and in certain formations of psychological suffering, most notably described in the psychoanalytic conception of melancholia theorized by Sigmund Freud and the subsequent Lacanian tradition. With and against the iconographic analysis put forward by Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl in ›Saturn and Melancholy‹ (...) (1964), this paper understands the engraving’s polyhedron as a pivot point in Dürer’s artwork and in art history in general – namely, as a stumbling block that indicates the negativity of abstraction through its very positive existence. Abstraction, understood in this specific sense, and contrary to classical ontology and epistemology can in fact constitute a world of real material social relations instantiated through acts (and failures) of exchange. (shrink)

Western philosophical orthodoxy places many aspects of other people's lives outside the scope of our knowledge. Demonstrating an alternative to this view, however, this book argues that Jean-Paul Sartre's application of his unique psychoanalytic method to Gustave Flaubert is the culmination of his project to show that it is possible to know everything there is to know about another person. It examines how Sartre aims to revolutionize our way of thinking about others by presenting his existential psychoanalysis as the means (...) to knowledge of both ourselves and others. By so doing, it highlights how his determination to solve the longstanding philosophical conundrum about other minds drives him not only to incorporate insights from Descartes, Hegel, Husserl, Freud, Marx, and Beauvoir into his philosophy, but also to supplement and enhance his philosophy through the development and application of a new form of psychoanalysis. -/- Sartre's Existential Psychoanalysis integrates, for the first time, Sartre's psychoanalysis into his overarching philosophical project. By offering a critical interrogation of the role his psychoanalytical studies played in the development of his existentialism, Mary Edwards uncovers the overlooked philosophical significance of his existential psychoanalysis and brings it into a new and productive dialogue with current research in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and psychotherapy. (shrink)

Die Abschaffung der Sklaverei, die Einführung sozialer Sicherungssysteme, die Sanktionierung von Vergewaltigung in der Ehe gelten gemeinhin als gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt – als ein Wandel zum Besseren. Dennoch hat die Idee einer generellen Fortschrittsbewegung ihren alten Glanz verloren, ja, sie ruft sogar Skepsis hervor. In aller Munde ist hingegen die Diagnose der Regression. Sie wird diversen Zeiterscheinungen gestellt, vom rechtsautoritären Populismus bis zur Demokratiemüdigkeit. -/- Rahel Jaeggi verteidigt in ihrem Buch das Begriffspaar Fortschritt und Regression als unverzichtbares sozialphilosophisches Werkzeug für die (...) Kritik unserer Zeit. Als fortschrittlich oder regressiv versteht sie nicht nur das Resultat, sondern vor allem die Gestalt gesellschaftlicher Transformationen selbst. Indem sie nach den Erfahrungsblockaden fragt, die regressiven Tendenzen Vorschub leisten, entwickelt sie einen Begriff des Fortschritts, der eurozentrische Verzerrungen ebenso vermeidet wie die Vorstellung einer zwangsläufigen Entwicklungstendenz. Fortschritt, so zeigt sie, ist nicht der Vorlauf zu einem bereits bekannten Ziel, sondern der nie abgeschlossene Prozess der Emanzipation. (shrink)

Ezra Pound got many things wrong. He was a poor judge of character and a supporter of causes and individuals that have done and continue to do much harm to people around the world. This book addresses the matters (literary and philosophical) that Pound got right, while still pointing out the flaws; it highlights the impact such evidence may yield for the student of art. -/- The result of my research in the pages that follow may be described as a (...) study in aesthetic affinities between Ezra Pound’s thought and the guiding notions found in the Confucian lore. The question it attempts to exemplify is that long-standing one about the nature of knowledge. -/- The analysis that follows seeks to provide a variety of perspectives (both in terms of disciplines and interpretations) about how Pound created with his writings a metaphor of knowledge to understand, assimilate, and put to use his discovery of the East as represented by the Confucian mind. (shrink)

Gender Without Identity offers an innovative and at times unsettling theory of gender formation. Rooted in the metapsychology of Jean Laplanche and in conversation with bold work in queer and trans studies, Avgi Saketopoulou and Ann Pellegrini jettison “core gender identity” to propose, instead, that gender is something all subjects acquire -- and that trauma sometimes has a share in that acquisition. Conceptualizing trauma alongside diverse genders and sexualities is thus not about invalidating transness and queerness, but about illuminating their (...) textures to enable their flourishing. -/- Written for readers both in and outside psychoanalysis, Gender Without Identity argues for the ethical urgency of recognizing that wounding experiences and traumatic legacies may be spun into gender. Such “spinning” involves self-theorizations that do not proceed from a centered self, but are nevertheless critical to psychic autonomy. Saketopoulou and Pellegrini draw on these ideas to offer clinical resources for working with gender complexity and for complexifying (what is seen as) gender normativity. (shrink)

Whereas traditional abolitionist arguments call for putting an end to capital punishment, French-Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida emphasizes its survival, writing that “even when it will have been abolished, the death penalty will survive.” My dissertation interprets this perplexing claim by attending to the specificity of Derrida’s discourse on survival or survivance, contending that the death penalty serves an irreducible role in the constitution of the (individual or collective) subject, such that, even in the event of its abolition, some form of (...) the death penalty must continue. Through close readings of Heidegger, Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Michel de Montagne, and Victor Hugo, as well as Shakespeare, linguist Émile Benveniste, Hungarian psychoanalysts Abraham and Torok, and the nineteenth-century political theorist Juan Donoso Cortés, the dissertation provides an account of the function of the death penalty as a specific institution within the modern penal system of a collective political body and as the legacy of ancient political economies based on sacrificial rites. This analysis interprets the death penalty both structurally and specifically, accounting for the indissociable relationship between the institution and its conceptual structure more broadly. Survivance, I argue, only ever occurs through an other, leaving open the question of the survival of the death penalty to the dissemination of indefinite and unpredictable forms that could consist in its abolition. (shrink)

In this article, the notion of entropology introduced by Claude Lévi-Strauss is applied and developed in the context of Georges Bataille’s anthropological philosophy: Bataille’s project is defined as entropological. Four philosophical vectors are chosen for this: the theory of general economy, the concept of decay, the idea of extinction and the notion of inhumanism. The theory of general economy allows us to understand the immanent terrestrial nature of humanity and the negative – entropic – side of the capitalist economy. The (...) concept of decay gives access to the thought of bodily disintegration and decomposition, which is temporality and mortality that split the subject. The idea of extinction speculates on the consequences of humanity’s destructiveness, libidinally charged inertia, and the extreme perspective of entropy’s impact on the planet. The notion of inhumanism suggests a radical rethinking of the human relationship with alienation and exteriority: Bataille’s philosophy is reinterpreted as inhumanist. I conclude that the Lévi-Strauss’s neologism – entropology – can be productively articulated and actualised within the framework of Bataille’s philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper the author discusses the meaning of akēdia in late antiquity. Although the term had a wide range of connotations, boredom with the ascetic life was one of its principal senses. The relevance this has for psychoanalysis lies in an understanding of the tradition of ‘spiritual exercises’ (askēsis), as a manifestation of the epimeleia heautou (care of oneself), as it was described, respectively, by Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault. In this context, psychoanalysis—particularly as it is expounded in the (...) oeuvre of Lacan—is seen as a continuation of a certain intensity in the relationship one has with oneself, which first developed in antiquity in pagan philosophy, and later flourished among the desert fathers. Here, akēdia signifies boredom with the cultivation of subjectivity. This condition is situated at the milder end of the more generic spectrum of anxietas and led to an abandonment of concern for the self, and of the spiritual exercises (askēsis tēs psuchēs) that characterised it. Specifically, a neglect for attentiveness and vigilance over one’s thoughts and dreams (prosochē), an abandonment of reading, and a disregard for enunciating who one is, through the practice of saying everything about oneself to another (parrhēsia). (shrink)

Psychoanalysis declares itself an anti-philosophy. For Freud and Lacan and their followers, philosophy does not take into account the role of the unconscious, and depends on the self-certainty of conscious thought. These are false assertions. Aristotle, the Peripatetics, Plato and Plotinus all acknowledged the role of unconscious thought: knowledge of which we are unaware (Meno 80d, Phaedo 68b–d), intellectual activity that we do no apprehend in conscious thought (Enn. IV.3.30), thoughts that we do not consciously grasp (V.1.12), or thoughts prior (...) to conscious awareness in perception (V.1.12). Psychoanalysis, like phenomenology, is based on discursive reason (dianoia) and perceived phenomena, and neglects the role of noetic thought, thought not connected to sense perception. For Lacan, influenced by structural linguistics, the signifier must precede the signified, as the perception must precede the idea. Freud and Husserl abandoned the teachings of their professor Brentano. According to Brentano in The Psychology of Aristotle, it is only when the activity of the active intellect (of Averroes) ‘has made the images intelligible in unconscious thought’ that the material intellect ‘receives from the images the concepts of sensible things’ (1977: 10). For Plotinus, it is only when the activities of intellect are shared with perception that ‘conscious awareness takes place’ (Enn. V.1.2). Freud saw the images of the unconscious becoming conscious through language (An Outline of Psycho-Analysis), while Lacan saw the language of the unconscious becoming conscious through images (Écrits). Neither presented a complete picture of how the mind works. Psychoanalysis needs to reclaim the philosophical unconscious in order to present a complete picture of the mind. (shrink)

"...T S Eliot was unimpressed by Freud. Eliot preferred the more approachable Roger Vittoz. It was only Scofield Thayer, who in his prolonged therapy with Sigmund Freud can be said to have brought anything Freudian in the classically psychoanalytic sense to Modernism." This is from the review. The review of the book is contrarian as the book under review is. The salient points of the book are interrogated in this review.

Freud’s discussion of uncanny [unheimlich] experiences focuses on their peculiar ambivalence. On his view, the uncanny is a paradoxical feeling of both familiarity and alienation. While Freud’s analysis of this paradoxical feeling does succeed in explaining it away, it does little to explain it. One might expect a psychoanalytical demystification of the real experience that is hidden behind the superstitious overtones of uncanny experiences. Instead, the uncanny is attributed rather anti- climactically to the combination of a previous superstition (maintained unconsciously) (...) and an entirely coincidental verification of that superstition. The implication is that there is no uncanny per se. There is no distinctive category of experience, the unique character of which tends to cause or encourage superstitious beliefs; rather, such beliefs are prerequisite to having the experience. In other words, the experience suits the belief, and not vice-versa. The uncanny is the fantasized verification of a repressed fantasy. It involves a breakdown of the reality principle and the projection of beliefs into the external world, rather than a peculiarity of feeling that can be linked intrinsically to a specific category of experience. I do not intend to reject this analysis in its entirety. The basic structure, repression and return, is sound. However, Freud’s analysis of the uncanny, which resolves uncanny ambivalence into the separate categories of consciousness and unconsciousness, merely reinstates the problematical opposition of das heimliche and das unheimliche, familiar and unfamiliar, within the mind rather than in the external world. The coincidence of the two feelings in uncanny experience cannot be explained without an intervening stage between repression and return. I will suggest that Freud’s characterization of uncanniness as the return, in superstition, of the repressed is a misplacement of the experience of uncanniness. The aesthetical feeling is the cause of, but not identical to, the projected superstitions and ideas which surround it. An explanation of the feeling of uncanniness must fall not on the side of the repressed, but on the side of consciousness. The import of my position is that the feeling of uncanniness refers, in a manner of speaking, to something “real,” rather than merely to infantile ideas projected upon the external world. Freud’s explanation makes the unconscious a kind of scapegoat to be blamed for imposing fundamentally irrational beliefs into our interpretation of present experience, in that way preserving a model of the conscious ego as autonomous, fundamentally attuned to reality and ultimately independent of the unconscious. I will argue, on the contrary, that the experience of the uncanny is not merely a falling back into irrational or infantile beliefs, but an experience of a deep disunity in personhood that rightly causes us to question our everyday confidence in the unity, independence, and rationality of our conscious sense of self. The ambivalence of the feeling has its source in an irresolvable ambivalence that can exist in consciousness, and not simply in an analytically resolvable psychical ambivalence between consciousness and the unconscious. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization is a revision of his early hedonism presented in his early papers from the 1930’s, a revision necessitated by the challenge Freud’s psychoanalysis posited to the possibility of hedonism. In the first section of the paper, I present Marcuse’s critical hedonist position, mainly in “On Hedonism” (1938), where he develops a social and objective hedonism that should be set as a main political goal of a society. Accordingly, the key to (...) a transformation of society is located at the social-political level. However, Freud’s metapsychology shows that the barriers that prevent a transformation of society are located at a much deeper level and are found in the relation between the psychological structure of individuals and social pressure, between the dynamics of the instincts and society’s material welfare. Thus, the possibility of a society that asserts happiness as its principle depends on the possibility of a transformation of human metapsychology and its social manifestation. This challenge, and the manner in which Marcuse dealt with it is the subject of the second section in which I analyze Eros and Civilization as Marcuse’s rethinking of his hedonism in light of Freud. (shrink)

The problem of affect and affectivity plays a significant role in psychoanalysis, both at a theoretical and therapeutic level. In Freud’s first interpretation of hysterical symptoms affect is considered as a certain amount of energy, and this already mirrors its aporetic intertwining with the ‘reality’ of the unconscious. On the one side, it is true that, in his Metapsychology, Freud identifies the charge of affect with instinct and explains that only ideational representation, not the affection, is found at the unconscious (...) level. This means that affectivity is something concerning the preconscious and conscious psychic life. However, on the other side, the existence of a ‘representative’ dimension within the unconscious opens the way of a dual or bifacial re-reading of it, beyond the biological-organic constitution Freud assigned to the Unbewusst. For Paul Ricœur, Freud’s psychoanalysis has a double, irreducible theoretical-procedural register, energetistic and hermeneutical; and his research about the unconscious reality reveals the significance and consequences of this double/dualistic approach. A combination of Husserl’s phenomenological and Ricœur’s hermeneutical approaches helps to find a “third, mediative way”, in which the unconscious can be reinterpreted as a “affective matter”, that is a mid-way reality placed between corporality and non-corporality, body and mind, natural causality and experiential/existential meaning. (shrink)

Philosophie und Psychoanalyse unterhalten seit Sigmund Freuds Lebzeiten ein spannungsvolles Verhältnis. Die damit einhergehenden Diskussionen tendieren dazu, die Disziplinen gegeneinander auszuspielen oder sie aneinander anzugleichen. Das vorliegende Buch stellt sich der Herausforderung, einen disziplinenübergreifenden Standpunkt jenseits solcher Einseitigkeiten zu identifizieren. Philosophische wie psychoanalytische Perspektiven können in Hinblick auf ihr ethisches Denken und ihr kritisches Selbstverständnis hiervon profitieren. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet ein Unbehagen gegenüber philosophischen Ansätzen, die ein Ideal praktischer Vernünftigkeit und Selbstbestimmung propagieren, das sich primär auf die reflexive Distanznahme beruft. (...) Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass dieses Ideal der Vielfalt des Handelns nicht gerecht wird, was auch mit dem Fehlen methodologischer Selbstreflexion zusammenhängt. Der erste Punkt wird anhand praktischer Irrationalität diskutiert, deren Bedeutung von dem Ideal nicht angemessen erfasst wird. Der zweite Punkt führt zu einer Konfrontation des philosophischen Standpunkts mit psychoanalytischer Theorie und Praxis. Dies impliziert eine Perspektive, deren Erkenntnisgewinn sich gerade in der Kritik ihrer Rationalitätsansprüche entfaltet. So legt eine philosophisch-ästhetische Erkundung psychoanalytischer Erzählungen schließlich das Potential von Irrationalität frei, Selbstbestimmungen als Wagnis zu bereichern. (shrink)

Davanger reviews Arne Johan Vetlesen's book "Pain in our Time" [Smerte i vår tid] (title translated from Norwegian for the purpose of this abstract).

This paper investigates the significance of filmic analysis in the contemporary theoretical paradigm inspired by Slavoj Žižek, which we term ‘Transcendental Materialism’. After characterising its distinct peculiarities within the history of psychoanalysis and film theory, we demonstrate the limitations of previous (possible) answers, arguing they are partly formulated in response to confrontations with other paradigms. Our own approach is then informed by a study of another popular object of analysis in Transcendental Materialism – the joke. We show how Freud’s understanding (...) of the joke was adapted by the paradigm and supported further by certain philosophical insights by (among others) G.W.F. Hegel. Finally, we demonstrate how parallels can be drawn between this adaptation and the significance of the filmic form within Transcendental Materialism, inspired in part by Alain Badiou’s reading of Hegel. (shrink)

The tension between the sense-content of the idea and its scientifically proven objectivity reaches its climax in the plainly expressed claim. However, science is free neither from metaphors nor from rhetorical figures that provide a framework for interpretation, such as paradigm, model, analogy, and so on. In other words, the findings need to be accommodated in order to be received and are not otherwise communicated. [...] The hope of the editors is to offer the reader, thanks to all the contributors, (...) a textbook of quality and relevance, and perhaps a particular input to challenge and find what is given by revealing itself and/or oneself. (shrink)

A crucial philosophical problem of social robots is how much they perform a kind of sociality in interacting with humans. Scholarship diverges between those who sustain that humans and social robots cannot by default have social interactions and those who argue for the possibility of an asymmetric sociality. Against this dichotomy, we argue in this paper for a holistic approach called “Δ phenomenology” of HSRI. In the first part of the paper, we will analyse the semantics of an HSRI. This (...) is what leads a human being to assign or receive a meaning of sociality by interacting with a social robot. Hence, we will question the ontological structure underlying HSRIs, suggesting that HSRIs may lead to a peculiar kind of user alienation. By combining all these variables, we will formulate some final recommendations for an ethics of social robots. (shrink)

Art, for Hegel, is not only distinct but self-distinguishing of and from nature – it happens in and through the latter. It liberates us from being merely natural creatures, and it does so by a dynamic of a cut or break - even though this liberation is achieved only through natural sensuousness, and hence, keeps us tethered to nature in some particular way. Inspired by Todd McGowan’s emphasis on the central role of contradiction in Hegel’s philosophy, this paper considers the (...) possibility to applying the dialectic between art and nature as it is unfolded in Hegel’s Aesthetic to a more insidious constellation — namely, what Marxists came to refer to as second nature: the world of commodities, in which man-made things appear to those who produce them as a naturalised and repressive opposite, a pseudo nature, an alienated solidified history. (shrink)

Beginning with Freud’s treatment of identification as an ambivalent process, we explore identification’s polarization between narcissistic idealization and melancholic division. While narcissistic identification can be seen as a strategy adopted by the ego to avoid the educational development of its drives and to maintain itself either in whole or in part in an infantile state, melancholic identification activates a tension between the ego-ideal and the real ego at the expense of the latter. After discussing the ambivalence of identification, we review (...) Freud’s discussion of mass formations as group identifications, arguing that the work of facilitating a productive sublimation of the drives cannot be reduced to a strengthening of the artificial masses represented by social institutions such as the church and the educational system. Instead, the difference between mass formations allowing for collective sublimation and those suffering from narcissistic or melancholic blockages must be found in the productive qualities of the mass itself. In closing, we outline a few ways in which we might begin to understand the political contribution of masses to the maturation of human drives. (shrink)

This paper briefly describes the life of Otte Gross and his thoughts on sexuality, society, and repression. This provides the basis to interpret the #MeToo movement as functioning in the same way as a repressed memory that breaks through to consciousness. Gross' suggestion that society "rapes" individuals and his assertion of a primordial matriarchal society are useful insights in understanding the #Metoo movement.

Når politikere truer kontanthjælpsmodtagere, flygtninge forvises til teltlejre, og vi skal assimileres til bestemt dansk kultur, er det den samme voldelige struktur, der reproduceres, når forældre begår vold mod børn. Psykoanalysen forklarer sammenhængen mellem institutionel vold og vold i relationer.

Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and gen- uinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can’t. I begin by explicating Husserl’s theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a (...) subject to re-inhabit a world of others from out of this sphere. In querying Husserl’s theory, I consider a series of problems, raised by Zhida Luo, concerning the apparent centrality of bod- ily similarity in empathy. I sketch Luo’s solution, which involves a shift to tactile similarity. While it makes for a better theory of empathy, this solution isn’t sufficient to make room for the givenness of another person not originally predicated on simi- larity. To clarify what’s at issue here, I turn to the Husserlian pictures of empathy presented by Heinz Kohut and Edith Stein. I conclude with a remark about what might be required, given the inability of Husserlian empathy to make room for the experience of others as singular and other, for a picture of our phenomenal life to have a shape that accounts for the coexistence of empathy to others who are like oneself and hospitality to others as genuine others. (shrink)

This chapter combines the insights of Sigmund Freud and Theodor W. Adorno to explain some of the psychoanalytic mechanisms that contributed to a scenario where people voted for a leader who undermines their very existence. Trump successfully exploited feelings of failure of the millions of Americans who have not been able to live up to the liberal capitalist ideology of success. By replacing their ego ideal with that of their leader, Trump voters could get rid of the frustration and discontent (...) that are generated by such an ideology. The people “fell in love” with Trump, because he provided them with the illusion that they “can become great again”. Moreover, by lifting moral restrictions to being openly classist, racist and sexist, Trump generated a permanent festival where the American people can feel themselves as being better than classed, raced and gendered Others, and thus satisfied with themselves again. (shrink)

This book is concerned with the continuing viability of both Freud and Hegel to the reading of modern literature. The book begins with Julia Kristeva’s attempts to relate Hegelian thought to a psychoanalytically informed conception of semiotics that was first explored in her influential study, The Revolution of Poetic Language, and then modified in later books that develop semiotics in new directions. Kristeva’s agreements and disagreement with Hegel are important to the book’s argument, which ultimately defends Hegel against familiar, poststructuralist (...) detractions. However, the book’s conceptual argument requires a historical exposition, with chapters devoted to literary figures ranging from Spenser to Ishiguro. One of the purposes of the book is to demonstrate that Hegel’s contribution to modern thought is at least partially exhibited in the history of literature, which also corroborates some of the deeper insights of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

A Touch of Doubt traces the theme of touch in the evolution of skepticism through Platonism, German idealism, Continental philosophy and psychoanalysis. Haptic Scepticism, the field of ethics emerging from this study, explores the grasp-ability of contradiction. Contradiction is a haptic marvel. We can cup it in our palms, press it against our lips, dip our toes into its coolness, and, if we are not careful, we may even burn ourselves on its surface.

Antithetical desires displayed throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship indicate the disjunctive assumption that the individual exists either in a state of increasing autonomy, expressed negatively as striving for freedom from divine constraint, or in a state of self-annihilating submission, expressed positively in terms of kenotic unification. Proximity to the divine thereby entails forfeiture of individuality, contrary to the explicit aim of Kierkegaard’s authorial project, and aversion to materiality. This essay enunciates the conflict (I), traces the crescendo of loss that births the pseudonymous (...) authorship and ends in realized longing for death (II), and approaches a more holistic vision of psycho-spiritual development (III). (shrink)

The critical theory tradition has, since its inception, sought to distinguish its perspective on society from more purely descriptive or normative approaches by maintaining that persons have a deep-seated interest in the free development of their personality—an interest that can only be realized in and through the rational organization of society, but which is systematically stymied by existing society. Yet it has struggled to specify this emancipatory interest in a way that avoids being either excessively utopian or overly accommodating to (...) existing society. Despite the fact that Hegel’s concept of reconciliation is normally thought to run aground on the latter horn of this dilemma, this book argues that reconciliation is the best available conceptualization of this emancipatory interest. It presents Hegel’s idea of freedom as something actualized in individuals’ lives through their becoming reconciled to how society shapes their roles, prospects, and sense of self; it presents reconciliation as being less a matter of philosophical cognition, and more of inclusion in a responsive, transparent political process. It then introduces the concept of reification, which—through its development in Marx and Lukács, through Horkheimer and Adorno—substantiates an increasingly cogent critique of reconciliation as something unachievable within the framework of modern society. Giving equal attention to psychoanalysis and legal theory, the second half critically appraises the writings of Rawls, Honneth, and Habermas as efforts to spell out what a concept of reconciliation more democratic and inclusive than Hegel, yet sensitive to the reifying effects of legal systems, might mean. (shrink)