A recent report by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in cooperation with the Swedish Security Service shows that the Internet has been extensively used to spread propaganda by proponents of violent political extremism, characterized by a worldview painted in black and white, an anti-democratic viewpoint, and intolerance towards persons with opposing ideas. We provide five arguments suggesting that philosophical dialogue with young persons would be beneficial to their acquisition of insights, attitudes and thinking tools for encountering such propaganda. (...) The arguments are based on stated requirements for problem solutions given by experts in violent political extremism, recent research about the effects of philosophical dialogue in young persons’ thinking skills, and parts of the basic theoretical framework of Philosophy for Children. Philosophical dialogues seem a promising way for young people to achieve a stronger democratic awareness and a more tenacious resistance against extremist views online. (shrink)

Was David Hume radically sceptical about our attempts to understand the world or was he merely approaching philosophical problems from a scientific perspective? Most philosophers today believe that Hume's outlook was more scientific than radically sceptical and that his scepticism was more limited than previously supposed. If these philosophers are correct, then Hume's approach to philosophy mirrors the approach of many contemporary philosophers. This similarity between Hume and many aspects of contemporary philosophy suggests that we should try to understand Hume (...) not as an historical relic but as a partner in a continuing philosophical dialogue. When we look closely at Hume's thoughts about human understanding, we find that Hume's scepticism emerges very insistently in the context of Hume's scientific approach. This book tries to come to terms with Hume's scepticism in a way that sheds light on contemporary philosophy and its relationship to science. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions on individuals holding Certified Public Accountant accreditation. While prior research has investigated both the characteristics of companies that have been investigated by the SEC and litigation against audit firms, it has not addressed the ways in which SEC investigations impact CPAs. Using a sample of 262 CPAs, we find that the most common CPA breach was associated with overstating revenues/income or earnings. The study finds serious consequences for CPAs (...) in terms of employment restrictions and SEC actions, incorporating suspension, which is often permanent. We find that the primary factors relating to the severity of actions by the SEC is whether the CPA intentionally breached the professional code of conduct, the age of the CPA, whether the CPA is still a member of the AICPA with CPA status and whether the CPA was operating as an external auditor or in a corporate accounting role. Our findings have implications for accounting practitioners, the AICPA and boards of directors. (shrink)

This paper explores Victoria Welby's fundamental assumption of meaning process (“semiosis” sensu Peirce) as translation, and some implications for the development of a general model of intersemiotic translation.

Freezing of gait can cause reduced independence and quality of life for many with Parkinson’s disease. Episodes frequently occur at points of transition such as navigating a doorway. Therapeutic interventions, i.e., drugs and exercise, do not always successfully mitigate episodes. There are several different, but not exclusive causes for freezing of gait. People with freezing of gait are able to navigate dynamic situations like stairways by utilizing a different attentional strategy to over-ground walking, but may freeze when passing through a (...) doorway. The question is, is it possible to employ a special attentional strategy to prevent freezing at this point? Motor imagery allows for learning motor skills in absolute safety and has been widely employed in a variety of populations, including other neuro-compromised groups. Motor imagery is not studied in a homologous manner in people with Parkinson’s Disease, leading to conflicting results, but may have the potential to establish a different attentional strategy which allows a subject to mitigate freezing of gait episodes. This paper will identify and discuss the questions that still need to be answered in order to consider this approach i.e., can this population access motor imagery, can motor imagery alter the attentional strategy employed when moving through doorways, what is the best motor imagery approach for people with Parkinson’s Disease and freezing of gait, and what dosage is most effective, while briefly outlining future research considerations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument has (...) been basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behaviour is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual vices. (...) Considering that these vices often block or subvert the acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth, it is important for epistemologists to understand how these kinds of traits can be most effectively mitigated. One currently unexplored way in which we might go about doing so is by employing epistemically paternalistic strategies, particularly the strategy of “epistemic nudging” (here on EN)—the practice of altering an agent’s decision-making capacities toward a desired outcome (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). -/- By bringing together two underexplored areas of epistemology yet to be discussed in connection to one another, this chapter will examine whether epistemic nudging can be employed as a successful practice to combat our epistemic vices. Despite prima facie appeal, I will argue that epistemic nudging at the very best amounts to a superficial and short-lived way of addressing epistemic vices. Additionally, I argue that the practice of EN can often lead to the creation of further vices, specifically the vice of epistemic laziness, as identified by Ian Kidd (2017). (shrink)

This paper examines moral dilemmas faced by family caregivers of older adults who employ live-in migrant care workers. Being both a family caregiver as well as an employer of a live-in migrant care worker often puts family members at a crossroad, where moral decisions must be made. Lacking a formal role, family members do not have a professional code of ethics or other clear rules that can guide their actions, and their choices are rooted in cultural, community, familial, and personal (...) values. This paper discusses moral dilemmas that result from family caregivers’ dual commitment, to the wellbeing of their older sick relative who is the recipient of care, and to the wellbeing of the live-in care worker whom they employ. The paper uses relational ethics as a theoretical framework to discuss three cases that involve complex moral decision making in real life. (shrink)

The article considers the question of the study of satire in philosophy. The study found that satire is an underdeveloped topic in the field of Ukrainian philosophy and the philosophy of Englishspeaking countries. For instance, the works of the last five to six years by such philosophers as D. Ab rahams and D. Declercq, who echoed the opinion of C. W. Mendell concerning the close connection of satire with philosophy. In the work “Satire as Popular Philosophy” created at the be (...) ginning of the 20th century Mendell proved that ancient satire was a type of philosophy. Ne vertheless, the issue of the first place of appearance of the genre of satire in the period of Antiquity, whether in ancient Roman or ancient Greek art, needs to be clarified. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to solve a number of related questions, namely: where previously appeared satire as a genre — in Ancient Rome or in Ancient Greece, why it got such a name, and what metamorphoses took place with it over time Antiquities. One of the primary sources about the history of satire was Aristotle’s work “Poetics”, which describes iambic (humorous) and satirical poetry. According to Aristotle, the nature of satiric poetry undergo metamorphosis from the “dance” tetra meter to the iambic meter characteristic of mocking poetry. In this regard, the main part of the work is devoted to proving that satiric poetry got its name from mythological goat-like satyrs and if the performers of iambic (derisive lyrics) could be ordinary people, then the performers of satirical poems — only mythological goat-like satyrs. As a result of the research, it was found that initially the genre called satire had a poetic form and was borrowed by ancient Roman poets from ancient Greek artists. The adopted type of satire received the name “satura”, in Latin meaning “miscellany or medley” of prose and verse form of presentation of the creation. (shrink)

96 Normal 0 false false false PT-BR JA X-NONE : Recorre-se aqui à história, aos construtos teóricos e às políticas curriculares com vistas a apreender como o que é historicizado, almejado e prescrito impacta a materialização desse conjunto na elaboração da dimensão do planejamento de ensino do Componente Curricular Língua Estrangeira-Inglês do Ensino Médio Integrado ao Técnico. Para tanto, o presente trabalho caracteriza-se como exploratório e descritivo e faz uso das pesquisas bibliográfica e documental. No total, são analisados, qualitativa e (...) quantitavamente, vinte e dois planos de cursos e quatorze ementários, os quais foram catalogados nos sítios eletrônicos de IFs. Os resultados da análise evidenciam que o EMIT 1) singulariza-se pelos fundamentos oriundos da concepção de educação onilateral e politécnica e de escola unitária, pelos fundamentos de currículo integrado e mostra-se inclinada a superar a dualidade histórica entre formação geral e formação profissional; 2) tem seus fundamentos hibridizados no âmbito das recentes políticas curriculares de modo que o horizonte da politecnia acaba ficando a cargo das próprias instituições que o adotarem e 3) e o CCLEI podem sincronizar-se caso os objetivos linguísticos e instrumentais se conjuguem com os objetivos educacionais o que pode ser feito à luz abordagem de letramento crítico integrada às outras abordagens de ensino hegemônicas no Brasil. Palavras-chave: Ensino Médio. Educação profissional técnica. Educação politécnica. Língua estrangeira. (shrink)

This article utilises the concept of ‘race trouble’ as an overarching framework for examining an interview between Ms Vanessa Nakate and a South African news broadcaster. The interview describes an incident involving Ms Nakate’s attendance at a global climate change conference and her exclusion from a media report about a press briefing that she held along with four other youth activists at the conference. The analysis focuses on the collaborative and interactional production of Ms Nakate’s claim that her exclusion was (...) racially motivated and the discursive mechanisms by which race is mobilised as a common-sense explanation for the incident that occurred. My analysis demonstrates the sanctionability of producing an accusation of racism and identifies the rhetorical functions of stake and facticity in its production, and concludes with a discussion of the relevance of these findings in the context of studies on race and racism in interaction. (shrink)

In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in “Reducing Responsibility.” This paper will object to Dougherty’s position (...) by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position. (shrink)

This unique volume collects some of the best recent work on the philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief. Featuring contributors from philosophy, religious studies, and theology, it is unified by the way in which many of the authors engage in sustained critical examination of one another's positions. John Hick's pluralism provides one focal point of the collection. Hick argues that all the major religious traditions make contact with the same ultimate reality, each encountering it through a variety (...) of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience but all offering equally effective paths to salvation or liberation. Another central position is William P. Alston's defense of the Christian practice of forming beliefs about manifestations of God in response to experiences of divine presence or activity. Articles by Hick and Alston develop their arguments and other selections respond, criticizing or defending various aspects of one or both positions. Religious skepticism, religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism, and other perspectives are also represented. In the introduction, the editors suggest connections among the articles and report on additional exchanges between the contributors. The only anthology that provides comprehensive coverage of the current philosophical debate about religious diversity, The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity is ideal for courses and seminars on the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and world religions. (shrink)

Within the rough ground that is the field of education there is a complex web of ethical obligations: to prepare our students for their future work; to be ethical as educators in our conduct and teaching; to the ethical principles embedded in the contexts in which we work; and given the Southern context of this work, the ethical obligations we have to this land and its First Peoples. We put out a call to colleagues whose work has been concerned with (...) the pedagogies of professional ethics, the ethical burdens of institutional injustice, and the application of ethical theory to education’s applied fields. In the responses we received it can be seen that ethical concerns in education are broad ranging, covering terrain varying from the preparation of preservice teachers, ethics in higher education, early childhood and care, educational leadership, relational and communicative ethics. Perhaps it could also be argued that this paper demonstrates Gibbon’s observation that ‘Assumptions about the particularity of this time as new and ripe with opportunity to make a difference through philosophy of education are not new and there’s much to learn from the persistence of wanting to imagine that they are’. However, while the field of ethics is perennially concerned with human relations and pedagogical interventions to improve these, the responses collected here show that educational ethics is far from static. Educational ethics is a field that continues to develop in response to changing contexts. (shrink)

This essay investigates an underappreciated way in which trust and testimonial injustice are closely connected. Credibility deficit and credibility excess cases both (in their own distinctive ways) contribute to a speaker’s being harmed in her capacity a knower. But moreover, as we will show—by using the tools of a performance-theoretic framework—both credibility deficit and credibility excess cases also feature incompetent trusting on the part of the hearer. That is, credibility deficit and excess cases are shown to manifest qualities of thinkers (...) that are inconducive to trust’s being reliably fulfilled. What this implies is an interesting result about testimonial injustice: to the extent that we want to mitigate against testimonial injustice—one promising way to do so will be to target incompetent trusting of the sort that underlies it. We conclude by outlining and defending what we take to be a promising substantive version of such a mitigation strategy, one which is centred around the cultivation of higher-order trusting competences. (shrink)

In her comprehensive and ambitious book, The Mismeasure of the Self: A Study in Vice Epistemology, Alessandra Tanesini offers an insightful analysis of the intellectual vices of self-evaluation and...

This paper analyzes a recent case in which a court, like the Daubert Court, was asked to demarcate legitimate from illegitimate science. The court was the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and it was asked by the state of Australia to find the state of Japan in violation of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling because of its licensing of a research program that engaged in killing whales ostensibly “for purposes of scientific research.” Australia premised a good portion (...) of its argument on a four-part definition of “scientific research,” reminiscent of the four notorious “Daubert criteria,” and the claim that the Japanese research program, “JARPA II,” failed to comply with this definition. The paper suggests that the Court’s judgment, which forced Japan to temporarily cease whaling, illustrates the merits for courts of avoiding the temptation to engage in demarcation exercises. (shrink)

Ethics and epistemology are close philosophical disciplines which frequently overlap. One intersection between the two domains is the study of blameworthiness and the nature of epistemic and moral blame. In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame in its entirety. This view, which I refer to as 'epistemic blame scepticism', seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose (...) of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against two epistemic blame sceptics, Dougherty and Boult, defusing their criticisms and restoring belief in the distinct form of epistemic blame. I discuss a favourable argument for epistemic blame before providing original defences against Dougherty and Boult's attempt to refute his claims. I then present and offer my own response to what I perceive to be the biggest challenge to epistemic blame, drawing from areas of epistemic deontology that have yet to be discussed in this literature. Finally, I present a new objection against epistemic scepticism which highlights how, if granted, their influence on the study of epistemic blame would be minor. (shrink)

Environmental and sustainability initiatives seek to respond to the challenges of ecological crises and ongoing environmental degradation by supporting students to develop knowledge and dispositions to respond to the challenges of and live in a climate changed world. However, these initiatives are often marginalised in curriculum and hamstrung by inherent tensions such as which worldviews should be prioritised, the incommensurability of some global and local values, and the pursuit of environmental needs in the age of neoliberalism. These challenges become more (...) complex when considering contextual stakeholders. In this paper we focus on the ethical dilemmas associated with environmental and sustainability education in a coal town where mining company sponsorship heralds mixed community response. In doing so, we unpack the contextual and philosophical complexities which create the crucial conditions for a viable normative case study—genuine uncertainty about issues not yet at tipping point, differences of reasonable perspectives and recognisable local concerns. We argue that teacher educators, particularly those with interdisciplinary philosophical insight should look to their local contexts for pressing ethical issues and engage in the development and field testing of their own normative case studies. We make the case that the process behind developing a normative case study involves insight into the relationships between educational ethics, policy, context, and divergent community perspectives. We argue that pedagogy using normative case study to navigate these elements has the potential to develop world-reading teacher deliberation which surpasses proceduralist approaches in teacher education. (shrink)

As part of the preparations to establish a population-based biobank in a large Israeli health organization, we aimed to investigate through focus groups the knowledge, perceptions and attitudes of insured Israelis, toward biobanking, and then, after input from focus groups’ participants, to empirically assess the impact of a revised recruitment process on recruitment rates. 1) Six Focus group discussions were conducted with individuals who had routine blood laboratory tests taken in the last 2 years. 2) After addressing the issues raised (...) in the focus groups and revising the recruitment process, individuals undergoing routine blood tests in phlebotomy clinics were invited to participate in the future biobank. Six Focus group discussions were conducted with individuals who had routine blood laboratory tests taken in the last 2 years. After addressing the issues raised in the focus groups and revising the recruitment process, individuals undergoing routine blood tests in phlebotomy clinics were invited to participate in the future biobank. At the outset of the focus groups there was an overall positive response to the prospect of a population-based biobank. Concerns revolved around infringement on privacy, fears of the “big brother”, and anxiety about inequality. Reaction to the language of the informed consent document revolved around concerns over ability to maintain anonymity, to withdraw consent, involvement of commercial entities, and the general tenor of the informed consent, which was perceived as legalistic and unilateral. In general, the longer participants were exposed to discussion about the biobank, the less likely they were to consent to sign in. Overall, only 20% of the 60 participants stated they would agree to sign in by the end of the 2 hour group session. The feedback obtained from the focus groups was used in the second stage of the study. A team of recruiters received extensive training to enable fruitful discussion and a detailed explanation to questions and concerns raised during the recruitment process. During the second stage of the study, after revising the consent form and training recruiters, a 53% consent rate was observed among 10,262 participants, more than 4 fold higher than estimated at the focus group stage. The qualitative focus group research helped identify important perceptions and concerns, which were subsequently addressed in the revised consent form and in the discussion the recruiters had with potential biobank donors. (shrink)

: A rich array of twelfth to fifteenth century Arabic texts captures the advent of a supererogatory prayer known as ṣalāt al-raghā’ib, on the eve of the first Friday of the month of Rajab in late eleventh-century Jerusalem, and its wide dissemination. This corpus offers an unusually vivid picture of the formation and the transformation of a medieval bid’a, or, of an ‘invention of tradition’. Combining our expertise in Islamic law and in Ayyūbid and Mamluk era history, we use this (...) corpus for an in-depth study of popular piety, power politics, scholarly polemics and legal discourse. Twenty eight translated excerpts of various texts are presented in this paper, preceded by a detailed introduction. Exploring legal reasoning in its concrete political and social context provides a nuanced understanding of the development, mass proliferation and ensuing debate over a highly controversial and extraordinary potent religious practice. (shrink)

This article is concerned with developing a philosophical approach to a number of significant changes to academic publishing, and specifically the global journal knowledge system wrought by a range of new digital technologies that herald the third age of the journal as an electronic, interactive and mixed-media form of scientific communication. The paper emerges from an Editors' Collective, a small New Zealand-based organisation comprised of editors and reviewers of academic journals mostly in the fields of education and philosophy. The paper (...) is the result of a collective writing process. (shrink)

In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the (...) cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate. (shrink)

One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in a Social and Digital World” is the epidemic of ‘fake news’ and a cluster of trust- relevant vices we commonly associate with those who share it, click on it, and believe it. Fake news consumers are, among other things, gullible and naïve. Many are also dogmatic: intellectually and/or emotionally tied to a view point, and as a result, too quick to uncritically (...) trust whatever aligns with it. Gullibility, naivety, and dogmatism are all examples of vices that lead to us trust when we shouldn’t. The effects of these kinds of vices can be dangerous. Our aim here, however, is to explore the other side of the coin: those character vices that lead us to refrain from trusting when we should trust. For ease of reference, call these vices of distrust. Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The three vices of distrust we want explore—with a particular focus on their manifestations online—are: closemindedness, emulousness, and arrogance. Each contributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 1 Seiten: 182-215.

Do we have a strong reason to offset even if offsetting is morally inefficient? Some philosophers – such as John Broome – argue that justice-based climate duties require us to contribute money to o...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument has (...) been basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.

Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...) we shall call “the quarantine problem”. The quarantine problem expresses a deep skepticism about achieving any exalted epistemic state. Further, the perspective gained by the quarantine problem allows us to easily categorize existing responses to Williamson’s anti luminosity argument and to observe the deficiencies of those responses. In sum, the quarantine problem reveals the deeply fallibilistic nature of whatever knowledge we may possess. (shrink)

This is a terrific tome. Packed with interesting insights and supported with extensive research, this book has tremendous potential to shape certain aspects of Hume studies. In light of such potential, it is not surprising that the earlier hardback edition earned the 2008 Journal of the History of Philosophy History of Philosophy Book Prize. Why is this book so important? Quite simply, this is one of the best contextualist studies of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature ever written. To elaborate (...) a bit, this book provides a unique and fascinating interpretation of the Treatise by relating its structure and content to many of the most influential debates about re- ligion raging at Hume’s time. Even the best of books is not without its flaws, though. After summarizing a representative sample of Russell’s main claims, I will isolate a key weakness of his overall interpretive argument..... Although I am not convinced by the strong version of Russell’s thesis, I want to reiterate that this is one of the best books on Hume I have ever read. Russell’s points about Hume’s religious context are surely important for a complete understanding of the Treatise, even if they do not help to solve the sceptic/naturalist riddle. It is a book that all Hume scholars should read. (shrink)

Stephen Gardiner and Augustin Fragnière offer a thorough critique of the Oxford Principles meant to govern geoenegineering in their paper ‘The tollgate principles for the governance...

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.